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第三卷

Volume III



香港中文大學歷史學系主編

Edited by The Department of History CUHK

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
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香港中文大學歷史學系主編

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The Chinese University of Hong Kong





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序言

香港中文大學歷史系為慶祝建校三十周年，曾於1993年出版本系同仁中英文研究論著論文集《史藪》致意，刊後忝獲同行良好反應，認為事情對於促進國際學術交流以及提高本系研究風氣，均有意義。同仁獲此鼓勵，乃謀本系以後仍以《史藪》名稱刊行不定期有審學報，以反映研究興趣與成果之一斑。嗣後於1996年刊行第二卷。本卷之出版，則並藉以表達同仁對本校三十五周年校慶之賀忱。

本卷所收論文，一如前卷，均經校外相關專家評審。本卷評審人為北京中國社會科學院陳祖武教授，台北中央研究院歷史語言研究所黃清連教授、何漢威教授、柳立言教授，新竹清華大學蕭啟慶教授，臺北輔仁大學王芝芝教授，香港大學趙令揚教授、譚棣華教授，香港樹仁學院余炎光教授，香港珠海書院李谷城教授，香港科技大學Wang Xinyang教授，美國哈佛大學Sven Beckert教授。本刊謹此崇致敬謝。

編輯委員會謹識

1998年12月

Preface

Shihsou (Historia) was first published in 1993 by the Department of History to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Chinese University. The success of this collection of academic papers written by members of the faculty prompted the decision to continue its publication as an internationally refereed journal on an irregular basis. A second volume was published as a result in 1996. Presented in both Chinese and English, the essays in these volumes reflect the diverse academic interests and professional disciplines of our colleagues. Since their publication we have received positive responses indicating their significance in the promotion of international academic exchanges and of research activities at the Department. The current issue is largely the result of this encouragement as well as the Department's pleasure to commemorate the 35th anniversary of the University.

We acknowledge with gratitude those colleagues around the world who reviewed for us the articles in this issue. They are, in alphabetical order, Professor Chen Zuwu of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, Professor Chiu Ling-yeong of the University of Hong Kong, Professor Ho Hon-wai of the Academia Sinica in Taipei, Professor Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing of Tsing-hua University in Hsinchu City, Professors Huang Ching-lien and Lau Nap-yin of the Academia Sinica, Professor Li Guocheng of Chu Hai College in Hong Kong, Professor Sven Beckett of Harvard University, Professor Tan Dihua of the University of Hong Kong, Professor Wang Chih-chih of Fu-jen Catholic University in Hsinchuang City, Professor Wang Xinyang of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Professor Yu Yanguang of Shu Yan College in Hong Kong..

The Editorial Board
December 1998

War and Peace in Ancient China: International/Interstate Relationships in Chinese History *

Hsu Cho-yun

The title of this paper reflects a particular characteristic of the Chinese concept of international relationships. For a long time, China constituted virtually a world order within its own cultural sphere. Until the middle age, mainly the T'ang-Sung period, when a multi-state community emerged in East Asia, we can hardly observe political behavior resembling what we regard as common for a nation-state in the recent world. It needs to be noticed, however, that at least once during the later half of the first millennium B. C. a kind of multi-state system did appear within the Chinese world order. Therefore, the behavior of such political entities did exhibit certain patterns of interaction between and among such units. Again, it needs to be noticed that these political entities recognized themselves as member-states of a universal Chinese world order. In the following paragraphs, the history of such a development will be discussed.

It took two "dynasties" in Chinese History to bring a Chinese world order into shape. The first step occurred in the Shang period (C.A. 18-12 century B. C.) as a state building process took place in the bronze age. Archaeological data, especially inscription on several hundred thousand pieces of oracle-bones, provided us with some information

* A talk delivered at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. on October 3, 1997.

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War and Peace in Ancient China: International/Interstate Relationships in Chinese History *

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The title of this paper reflects a particular characteristic of the Chinese concept of international relationships. For a long time, China constituted virtually a world order within its own cultural sphere. Until the middle age, mainly the T'ang-Sung period, when a multi-state community emerged in East Asia, we can hardly observe political behavior resembling what we regard as common for a nation-state in the recent world. It needs to be noticed, however, that at least once during the later half of the first millennium B. C. a kind of multi-state system did appear within the Chinese world order. Therefore, the behavior of such political entities did exhibit certain patterns of interaction between and among such units. Again, it needs to be noticed that these political entities recognized themselves as member-states of a universal Chinese world order. In the following paragraphs, the history of such a development will be discussed.

It took two "dynasties" in Chinese History to bring a Chinese world order into shape. The first step occurred in the Shang period (C.A. 18-12 century B. C.) as a state building process took place in the bronze age. Archaeological data, especially inscription on several hundred thousand pieces of oracle-bones, provided us with some information

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on the basis of which to reconstruct the growth of the Shang from a proto-state toward a monarchy that governed a sizable territory in the lower reaches of the Yellow River drainage.

The Shang king ruled at a center which was called the Great City of Shang. The Great City seems to have moved five times until it finally settled at one definite place during the last two or three centuries of the dynasty. This capital city was the pivot of the Shang. Numerous sub-lineages of the royal household of the Tsu were assigned to reside in the vicinity of the Great City. Even a queen might have her assigned domain here, wherein she also would have maintained her retainers and subjects. Outside of the Royal Domain, there were subordinated states called *hou-kuo* (marquisates, etymologically, the garrisons at watching.) The Shang king might periodically take tours around these marquisates. Beyond this zone were states allied with the Shang or even Shang's tributaries. In the last period of the Shang dynasty, there were oracle-bone inscriptions telling of the installation of inspectors in such states. This seems to indicate that the Shang might have increased control over these tributaries. Beyond this zone of allies there were states of while some were friendly, while others were hostile. Often the oracle-bone inscriptions revealed details on warfare against an enemy. Now, what appears here is a pattern of five zones: The Capital, the Royal Domain, the marquisates, the satellites, and the foreigners. This pattern later survived in an idealized Chinese world order of concentric zones. A nine-zone model suggested in the Book of Documents is probably an extension of this pattern.

The Shang pattern probably is a proto-type of the concept of the celestial Empire in which the human world supposedly is perceived as sino-centrally arranged into zones determined by their respective distances from the center. It ought to be noticed that the Shang state did not represent a universal order because the royal divine authority allegedly received the blessing and protection of the royal ancestors - an exclusive privilege. Only in the last phase of the Shang religions development, a kind of Supreme Deity (Ti) appeared to be associated with the collective power of the Shang ancestors. An authority based

upon kinship should preclude the universality of its kingship. Was there any particular pattern of interstate relations between the Shang and others, especially the foreigners? We do not know; there is little information to elaborate.

The Shang was replaced by the Chou at the juncture of the 13th and 12th centuries B. C. The Chou was one of the satellite states at the west border of the Shang, sometimes in peace, and at other times in conflict, with the Shang. Chou's triumph over the mighty Shang prompted the Chou leaders to ponder their seemingly easy victory. They finally settled upon a justification theory by proclaiming that Heaven, a supreme god of the Chou faith, bestowed upon the Chou the mandate to rule because the Chou were morally worthy. Propaganda or not, the Chou formulated a claim of legitimate kingship such that the mandate of Heaven should not be taken for granted and that the future Chou kings should always be on guard lest the mandate be taken away. Since it was believed that the "Heaven" should judge impartially, then the mandate ought to be universal. Thus the world-order built around such a kingship of moralistic claims ought to be universal, transcending the limits of race or ancestry. This new claim is therefore a breakthrough that would have an enormous impact upon the development of Chinese political philosophy for many centuries to come.

The Chou established a feudal network in which the Chou princes and relatives were dispatched to found vassal states at various places of strategic importance. The ruling houses of these states were linked to the Chou royal house by kinship or matrimonial ties. They served the Chou as integrated parts of the governing apparatus, mandated by Heaven via the Chou royal authority. After the Chou order had prevailed for several centuries, the feudal ruling class of the Chou was brought together to share a common membership in the Chou world. This endeavor signaled the formation of a Hua-hsia culture as its main body in the Chou feudal network.

The general rule of inter-state relationships was that of cousins within a big extended family. Protocol and rituals, including court visits, exchanges of gifts, conferences, and gatherings at special occasions,

etc., brought state heads together to confirm and to renew familiar relations. Any quarrels normally would be settled in meetings at the royal court. The royal authority occasionally would call for collective action by vassal states to sanction a disobedient vassal. More often than not, however, vassal states were left alone to handle their own neighbors, who were also members of the Chou feudal network. Generally, this condition bore a great similarity to that of medieval feudalism in Europe.

Within the Chou system, familial relationships prevailed. Still, there were outsiders who were labeled as barbarians. In fact, many of these "barbarians" were by no means less-civilized than the Hua-hsia states of the Chou world. These non-Chou peoples, who were juxtaposed between and among the Chou states, were regarded as the "others" in contrast with the Chou states. This "We vs. They" division was not simply determined culturally because some of them shared the same cultural background as the Chou states, although some indeed differed distinctively from the Chou world as long as they were willing to convert. The Chou, however, always could include some "others" in the Chou world as long as they were willing to convert. Therefore, the universality of the Chou world was potentially open and inclusive. The "We vs. They" bifurcation was not rigid.

By the eighth century B. C., the Chou order virtually collapsed due to the complexity of numerous problems. At any rate, the Chou feudal network could not effectively hold together as the royal court lost its status. The Chou world was then politically disintegrated into a multi-state system which took some five centuries of ceaseless contentions, until unification was achieved by the Ch'in empire in the third century B. C.

These five centuries are known in history as the Spring and Autumn period (722-464B.C.), and the Warring States period (463-222B.C.). During the former period, some one hundred fifty Chou vassal states were gradually reduced to a total of thirteen major states and a score of lesser ones. Throughout these 259 years there were only thirty eight years without recorded wars. Most of these wars involved more than

two powers. Major battles could be participated in by virtually all states of what was then the China world. The Chou king, with only a pale shadow of his past glory, had no real authority to settle any disputes between these states. This was indeed a period of struggles for a new order.

At first, a few states in the heartland strove to seize leadership in the shattered Chou world order. Some of them would use the name of the royal authority to legitimize their claims. Each of these powers normally had a few lesser neighboring states or friendly states with whom to form an alliance against competing blocs.

The non-Chou peoples in the northern mountainous areas organized tribal states to attack the walled cities of the Chou states. Meanwhile, in the vast Yangtze valley of lakes and riverine, a new state of Ch'u arose to develop into a formidable challenger of the Chou states.

Ch'i, a Chou vassal state on the Shantung Peninsula, took opportunity of such a condition to rally the Chou states with the slogan of defending the Chou world in the name of upholding the Chou king against the "barbarians". (The same slogan was adopted by the Japanese in the nineteenth century to launch the Meiji Reformation.) In 663-661 B. C., Duke Huan of Ch'i helped troops drive away the mountaineer Jung who invaded the northern states of Yen, Wei, and Hsing. In 656 B. C. he organized an allied force of Chou states to launch a "punitive" campaign against the southern power of Chu. A conference was held between the Ch'i allies and the Ch'u in which subsequently the Ch'u pledged to offer some token tributes to the Chou royal court. In 651 B. C. Duke Huan convened a full-scale conference of all the Chou states as well as some non-Chou political entities. The Chou king officially bestowed upon the Duke the new title of Pa or "Prime-lord". This amounted to the recognition of a new interstate order, which in turn served as a substitute for the Chou royal authority. Ch'i leadership as a Pa did not survive the life of duke Huan, who had convened interstate conferences nine times and had led no less than six armed campaigns, either to rescue an invaded Chou state or to punish a betrayed member of the alliance.

After the death of Duke Huan in 643 B. C., for a brief period there was no effective leadership in the Chou world to halt the rapid expansion of the giant southern state of Ch'u, until Duke Wen of Chin successfully defeated Ch'u on the battleground at Ch'eng-p'u in 633 B. C. The Chin prime-lordship lasted for generations. The "Pa" system under the Ch'in leadership was institutionalized. Each of the participating states was assigned certain responsibilities, including the number of war chariots and financial contributions to be collected in order to assume a reliable pool of resources with which to fight Chu. These states also had to take part in periodically held conferences convened by the Chin. The leaders of such states were expected visit the Chin court frequently. Disputes among the members of the Chin-led bloc were settled in the inter-state meetings or in the Chin court. Sometimes, internal issues, such as the succession of the duke throne, were brought up for discussion. The Pa system under the leadership of the Ch'i and the Chin dukes lasted 163 years (681-529 B. C.). In the period of the Chin's Prime lordship, which was held by nine dukes for 104 years (632-529 B. C.), fifty-six inter-state conferences were convened for various reasons. The inter-state organization seemed to function rather well.

On the other hand, the Ch'u steadily expanded beyond the Han River by means of forcing some of the Chou states in the transitional zone to surrender to the Ch'u leadership. Later, a few such states were actually captured by Ch'u and became her satellites. Ch'u thus copied the institutionalized Pa leadership in the Central Plain to form a southern bloc which consisted of not only the southern non-Chou entities but also a few Chou states.

Contentions between these two blocs were a see-saw game along the Han-Huai valleys. Major battles fought by these two leagues of states involved several thousand war-chariots and several tens of thousands of soldiers. In a frequently occurring pattern, one state of either bloc decided to change sides and join the other bloc, and then accidental conflicts soon escalated to involve the major powers who mobilized its allies in order to cast full strength into the battleground

for a few months along an extended battle-line. The winning side, however, could not destroy its enemies totally. Usually a temporary truce prevailed until another show-down took place. The Chin leadership gradually diminished in the sixth century B. C. due to power struggles among the households of her powerful ministers, while Ch'u still maintained her states as a challenger of the Chou world.

Throughout the span of almost a full century since Duke Huan's Pa leadership, confrontation between the two blocs of states which formed leagues under a strong power bore a great resemblance to struggles among the ancient Greek city-states. It also reminds us of the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the cold-war era of our own time.

These two blocs led by Chin and Ch'u, respectively, could not include all states as partners. The state of Ch'i had been a major power ever since the beginning of the Spring-and-Autumn period. Wealthy and strong, Ch'i only half-heartedly took part in the Chin-led league after being defeated in battle in 589 B. C. However, Ch'i still was a power that neither the Chin nor Ch'u could afford to count out. Another strong state was the Ch'in, which arose in the former royal domain of the Western Chou. Being located at the west of Chin, she could afford to stay away from inter-state struggles among the states in the central plain. Chin and Ch'in had fought each other a few times and neither one could claim lasting victory. Ch'in also had the opportunity to expand her territory in the west and the north in order to secure the supply of valuable resources such as horses and salt. Therefore, both Chin and Ch'u could not claim either of these other powers, i.e. Ch'i and Ch'in, as subordinates. After the prolonged bilateral competition exhausted both leading powers, Ch'i and Ch'in gained influence in their respective regions. Thus a two-way division gradually evolved into a quadrangular balance.

The states located in the transition zone between the Chin and the Ch'u bloc hardly could be stable members of either league. The smaller states of Ch'en and Tsai formerly of the northern bloc were finally subjugated by Ch'u to become her satellites. The larger ones, such as

Cheng and Sung, retained limited independence. Nevertheless, sandwiched between giants, they often had to engage in a two-hands strategy in order to survive. More often than not, the two blocs were forced to fight big battles in their own territory. Therefore, Sung volunteered to arrange truces between Chin and Ch'u in 546 B. C. It was agreed in conference that the member states of Chin and Ch'u should recognize the superior status of the leader of the other leagues. Ch'i and Ch'in were not only exempted from subordinating themselves to either Chin or Ch'u, but they also had the privilege of claiming a few minor states in their region as their own satellites. However, the truce did not last long and the limitation of arms soon was broken. Recognition of the quadrangular balance seemed to reflect a new reality in the multi-state system. Such a scenario looks familiar in the world of our time, too.

The Chin-Ch'u deadlock was finally broken due to the rise of new powers further south. Wu, a state in the delta of the Yangtze River, was purposefully nurtured by Chin to check the mighty Ch'u in her hind-land. From 584 B. C. Chin advisors were sent to Wu to train troops and to develop an anti-Ch'u strategy which eventually defeated Ch'u completely in 509-505 B. C. In 482 B. C. Wu also forced Chin to yield its Pa status to the king of Wu in an interstate conference. Meanwhile, Chin had disintegrated into three states in 453 B. C., which then became the domains of her formerly powerful ministers. The Chou royal court, which survived only in name, bestowed the full status of states upon these three sub-states in 403 B. C. Thus bifurcated competition, which dominated much of the spring-and-autumn period, was to be replaced by multi-lateral struggles in the subsequent period of Warring-states.

During the following centuries, seven major powers and a handful of minor ones fought for the unification of China until the state of Ch'in finally made it in 221 B. C. when the first imperial dynasty was founded. The pattern of inter-state relations in the Warring states period was a sheer zero-sum struggle in which the previous inter-state order of the Pa system had no chance to prevail any more. No alliance was real. Sometimes, right in the middle of battles, an ally could secretly

shift sides and join hands with the enemy and then launch a sudden attack at the rear of allied forces. There was no lasting friend, nor permanent enemy!

By the time the state of Ch'in in the west became the most formidable one, six eastern states would sometimes organize allied forces with the intention to reduce the Ch'in's threat. Each such effort was thwarted. By shrewd manipulation aimed at breaking the alliance, Ch'in managed to take advantage of conflicts of interest and mutual suspicion among these six eastern powers. The state of Ch'in, served by strategists and advisors who were recruited from various states, never was reluctant to lie in diplomatic meetings, to acquire information on other states by espionage, or to buy the collaboration of key personalities in the courts of other states. Thus what appeared in the late Warring-states period was a pendulum swinging between an eastern (or "vertical") interstate pact against the Ch'in state and a West-bound (or "horizontal") relationship in which the eastern states individually established temporary "friendship" with the most powerful Ch'in. One after another, finally, all the major and minor states fell into the hands of Ch'in.

Once in a while, some of the major powers, such as the wealthy Ch'i on the Shantung peninsula and the populous Ch'u in the Yangtze valley, expanded at the expense of lesser powers in the east. The patterns were rather similar to struggles for regional domination in our recent history.

Rulers of each of these seven states proclaimed the royal title no sooner than the early fourth century B. C. Such proclamation meant that the order under the Chou royal authority had indeed ended. It also implied that each of these kings intended an exclusive claim of the entire world of what was then China because, in theory, royal authority was the sole sovereign of all China. Therefore, the multi-state order of the Spring-and-Autumn period was over. Seven kings aimed at unification under one ruler, while they were to fight for the final victory which would allow only one winner! A universal order of the Chinese world was anticipated.

In 222 B. C. the first emperor of Ch'in started the Chinese imperial tradition. However, outside of the Chinese world there were other

nations with whom China had to deal. In the north, a nomadic empire, Hsiung-nu, already controlled the vast steppe land. Chinese had to guard their border from invasions. To defend China, war seemed to be the only means of dealing with the northern neighbors. In both the Ch'in and the Han dynasty, long fortified walls, constructed by large numbers of troops, managed to secure the border. During the reign of Emperor Wu of Han (143-87 B. C.), Chinese began to reach Central Asia in order to organize a western front which could be a threat to the Hsiung-nu in their area. Such Chinese maneuvers involved active engagements with numerous statelets in Central Asia, which was known as the Western Region then. The Chinese court dispatched scouts to explore the possibility of forming alliances with Wu-sun and other states in Central Asia. With Wu-sun, a larger state near I-li valley, Han made an overture by marrying a Han princess to the Wu-sun Kings. Han showered other statelets with lavish gifts. For these states, their trade-interest with China was extremely profitable. Thus, the silk route was opened.

China also established colonies where small garrison units were stationed, and which sustained the members by farming the fertile oasis. A garrison commander in the Western Region could mobilize the troops of local statelets to form a task force in time of emergency. Princes and the children of native dignitaries were invited to Ch'ang-an, the Han capital, where these virtual hostages received Chinese education and even served in the Han court. Once they returned to their homeland, they formed pro-Han power blocs in their respective states. For some three centuries, the Western Region garrison command played a crucial role in support of Chinese interests in Central Asia.

In a similar manner, rather than launching military campaigns against the Hsiung-nu, the Han court also frequently established bonds with some of the Hsiung-nu leaders who married Han princesses and received Chinese gifts. These pro-Han elements of the Hsiung-nu often settled near the Chinese border to serve as a buffer between China and the main body of the Hsiung-nu.

The Han practice of building up pro-Han elements to form protective satellites involved substantial trade-interests in the disguise of an