

心理学新进展影印丛书

美国心理学会 (APS) 组编

Current Directions 变态心理学新进展 in Abnormal Psychology

英文主编 / 托马斯·奥特曼斯 (Thomas F. oltmanns)

罗伯特·艾默瑞 (Robert. E. Emery)

王大华 点评 申继亮 审校



北京师范大学出版社
BEIJING NORMAL UNIVERSITY PRESS


B846
26

心理学新进展影印丛书

美国心理学会 (APS) 组编

Current
Directions

变态心理学新进展 in
Abnormal
Psychology



英文主编 / 托马斯·奥特曼斯 (Thomas F. oltmanns)

罗伯特·艾默瑞 (Robert. E. Emery)

王大华 点评 申继亮 审校



GD 01387498



北京师范大学出版社
BEIJING NORMAL UNIVERSITY PRESS

版权声明

本书中文简体版由培生教育出版集团授权北京师范大学出版社在中国境内出版发行。版权所有，翻印必究！
本书英文版由培生教育出版集团出版。

Chinese simplified language edition published by Beijing Normal University Press, Copyright © 2007, Beijing Normal University Press.

Authorized translation from the English language edition, published by Pearson Education, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from Pearson Education, Inc.

图书在版编目(CIP)数据

变态心理学新进展：英文／(美)宾特曼斯，艾默瑞主编。
—影印本.北京：北京师范大学出版社，2007.11
(心理学新进展影印丛书／申继亮审校)
ISBN 978-7-303-08989-5

I.变… II.①宾… ②艾… III.变态心理学—研究—进展
—英文 IV.B84

中国版本图书馆CIP数据核字(2007)第042727号

北京市版权著作权合同登记图字：01-2007-1037

出版发行：北京师范大学出版社 www.bnup.com.cn
北京新街口外大街19号
邮政编码：100875

印 刷：北京新丰印刷厂
经 销：全国新华书店
开 本：185 mm × 236 mm
印 张：17.5
字 数：260千字
版 次：2007年12月第1版
印 次：2007年12月第1次印刷
定 价：30.00元

责任编辑：谢 影 装帧设计：高 霞
责任校对：李 菡 责任印制：董本刚

版权所有 侵权必究

反盗版、侵权举报电话：010-58800697

北京读者服务部电话：010-58808104

外埠邮购电话：010-58808083

本书如有印装质量问题，请与印制管理部联系调换。

印制管理部电话：010-58800825

出版说明

“心理学新进展影印丛书”由北京师范大学出版社从培生教育出版集团引进出版，包括《普通心理学新进展》《发展心理学新进展》《认知心理学新进展》《社会心理学新进展》《人格心理学新进展》《健康心理学新进展》《变态心理学新进展》共7册英文影印图书，全部由美国心理学会（APS）组编，撰写者均为心理科学各自研究领域的世界著名学者和专家。入选的文章代表了各心理学分支自2000年以来的最新研究成果，同时各册所涉及的主题也全面体现了该分支学科的研究动态。

作为北京师范大学出版社成立26年以来第一批英文原版影印图书，我们真诚希望“心理学新进展影印丛书”的出版，可以为中国广大心理学研究者、教师以及相关专业的研究生，带来国际心理学界近十年的综合发展趋势，从研究思路、概念界定、研究方法与设计、统计技术以及未来的研究方向等方面，国内的学者能够及时把握到国际同行的关注热点，并感受到他们对传统理论的挑战与创新。

在各册图书中，既包括文献综述、对已有研究的质疑，也结合了先进的实验手段、技术和其他学科的综合知识，研究更多地关注和探索心理现象机制层面的复杂原因。每册均有问题思考，以启发学者们深入思索今后的研究热点和可能产生实质性飞越的突破口。

为便于读者阅读，我们特别邀请了北京师范大学心理学院的申继亮教授作为丛书审校专家，各册分别由北京师范大学的青年学者加入了简要的中文进行导读，同时还评价了研究的优缺点。

此套丛书可以作为各高校教师开设心理学新进展课程或专题讲座的教学用书，同时可以作为相关领域的研究人员发表文献综述的内容依据，尤其还适合作为心理学专业英语课程的教材进行学习和讨论。

Contents

第一编 一般理论问题：病因、治疗与分类 1

General and Theoretical Issues: Etiology, Treatment, and Classification 3

心理与神经科学：和平共处 6

Miller and Keller

Psychology and Neuroscience: Making Peace 7

进化心理学：麦与糠 16

de Waal

Evolutionary Psychology: The Wheat and the Chaff 17

行为遗传学的三条法则及其含义 26

Turkheimer

Three Laws of Behavior Genetics and What They Mean 27

情境——行为框架与人格的稳定点 37

Mischel, Shoda, and Mendoza – Denton

Situation – Behavior Profiles as a Locus of Consistency in Personality 38

反馈式干预：一柄双刃剑的理解 47

Kluger and DeNisi

Feedback Interventions: Toward the Understanding of a Double – Edged Sword 48

基于计算机与网络的心理治疗干预 60

Taylor and Luce

Computer – and Internet – Based Psychotherapy Interventions 61

第二编 抑郁症、焦虑症、分离性障碍以及应激反应 73

Depression, Anxiety, Dissociative Disorders, and Responses to Stress 75

抑郁症的性别差异 78

Nolen – Hoeksema

Gender Differences in Depression 79

自杀的群集和自杀传染 88

Joiner

The Clustering and Contagion of Suicide 89

心因性健忘症研究启示录 98

Arrigo and Pezdek

Lessons from the Study of Psychogenic Amnesia 99

创伤的记忆恢复：实验室观点 108

McNally

Recovering Memories of Trauma: A View from the Laboratory 109

压力、积极情绪和应对 118

Folkman and Moskowitz

Stress, Positive Emotion, and Coping 119

第三编 人格障碍、性与饮食障碍、精神分裂症和痴呆 127

Personality Disorders, Sexual and Eating Disorders, Schizophrenia, and Dementia 129

苗条——理想的内化：身体映像障碍和饮食障碍的新危险因素 132

Thompson and Stice

Thin – Ideal Internalization: Mounting Evidence for a New Risk Factor for Body – Image Disturbance and Eating Pathology 133

行为遗传学：新成果与前景 140

Dick and Rose

Behavior Genetics: What's New? What's Next? 141

人类的性行为：男性与女性有何差别？ 151

Peplau

Human Sexuality: How Do Men and Women Differ? 152

他们会再次作案吗？对性犯罪再犯者的预测	161
Hanson	
Will They Do It Again? Predicting Sex – Offense Recidivism	162
从神经发展观看精神分裂症	170
Conklin and Lacono	
Schizophrenia: A Neurodevelopmental Perspective	171
精神分裂症的认知：工作记忆起作用吗？	181
Barch	
Cognition in Schizophrenia: Does Working Memory Work?	182
认知活动与患阿尔采默氏疾病的风险	192
Wilson and Bennett	
Cognitive Activity and Risk of Alzheimer's Disease	193

第四编 童年期障碍、生命周期的转折以及心理健康 203

Childhood Disorders, Life Cycle Transitions, and Mental Health and the Law 205

成人注意缺失多动症：诊断理论的含义	207
Faraone	
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in Adults: Implications for Theories of Diagnosis	208
婚姻冲突：相关因素、结构和背景	217
Fincham	
Marital Conflict: Correlates, Structure, and Context	218
后半生的情绪	228
Carstensen and Charles	
Emotion in the Second Half of Life	229
心理学与老龄化：改善老年人的生活	243
Fisk and Rogers	
Psychology and Aging: Enhancing the Lives of an Aging Population	244
对伴侣施暴的男性类型学：了解暴力丈夫的异质性	253

Holtzworth-Munroe

A Typology of Men Who Are Violent Toward Their Female Partners: Making Sense of the
Heterogeneity in Husband Violence **254**

对养子的暴力 **263**

Daly and Wilson

Violence Against Stepchildren **264**

[导读]

第一编 一般理论问题：病因、治疗与分类

在《心理与神经科学：和平共处》一文中，作者 Gregory A. Miller 和 Jennifer Keller 颇具思考性地指出心理学的一个基本误解：还原论和二元论。作者对一些常识性误解：抑郁不是别的就是大脑中化学物质的失衡提出了批评，并强调心理体验不能还原成生理学。这些研究者认为生物学和心理学不是竞争性地解释人的行为，而是相互补充地从不同角度提供解释。他们认为把神经科学看成是比心理学更基础的学科完全是一种误解，这将有助于读者把握在变态心理学领域存在的还原论所带来的问题。

第二篇作者是 Frans de Waal，一位灵长类动物研究者，曾出版过许多优秀的关于灵长类动物行为的书籍，受到读者们的欢迎。他在《进化心理学：麦与糠》中讨论了当前的热门话题：进化心理学。在文章中，作者并不是争论进化论本身的价值，更多地是在批评那种简单进化论的观点。读者可以从中受到启发，对那些进化论尚未能提供有力解释的问题进行思考，比如强奸是否真像传说的那样具有适应性价值。

Eric Turkheimer 是另一位友好的生物学理论批评者。与 Frans B. M. de Waal 相似，Turkheimer 在《行为遗传学的三条法则及其含义》一文中也承认遗传因素对正常行为或不正常行为的影响。他的第一个行为遗传学法则就是所有的人类行为特质都是可遗传的。在 Turkheimer 看来，遗传与环境的争论已不再是行为是否受遗传影响，而是如何影响的。他认为目前的行为遗传学对如何影响的问题尚不能提供回答。另外，此文还提出了一个非常重要的问题，就是共享环境与非共享环境对正常行为或不正常行为的影响，并指出要界定环境以不同方式对不同个体产生影响的原因是非常困难的。

行为是情境特定性的还是跨情境或时间稳定性的，这一争论由来已久。在第四篇《情境—行为框架与人格的稳定点》中，作者 Walter Mischel 和他的同事 Yuichi Shoda 与 Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton 带领读者简单回顾了这一争论的历史。作者认为，这一争论在多方面引起了误导。通过新的数据，他们指出行为的稳定性可以通过个体如何对相似情境做出反应找出来。

这一节的最后两篇与治疗有关，这个话题更接近读者，也会令读者更感兴趣。

Avraham Kluger 和 Angelo DeNisi 对反馈干预的积极和消极效应进行了总结。在文章《反馈式干预：一柄双刃剑的理解》中，他们指出，反馈干预既可能带来积极作用也可能产生消极作用。他们用注意的分配来解释其原因，同时提出设置清晰的目标有利于得到稳定的积极效应。第六篇作者 C. Barr Taylor 和 Kristine Luce 用易于理解的语言总结了运用计算机作为评估和治疗工具的各种尝试。读者一定会感慨于作者在《基于计算机与网络的心理治疗干预》一文中流露出的创造性，并思考科学家们的呼唤：基于技术治疗的有效性还需要更多的研究。

General and Theoretical Issues: Etiology, Treatment, and Classification

Articles from *Current Directions in Psychological Science* are perfect original source supplements for Abnormal Psychology—accessible, current, and theoretically rich overviews written by leading experts in the field. The supplementary readings are especially useful for the first section of the course, which deals with broad conceptual issues including etiology, treatment, and psychological assessment. These topics are basic to abnormal psychology—and are revisited within the context of specific disorders throughout the course, but at first encounter students can find the topics to be difficult, abstract, and perhaps even seemingly irrelevant to the topic at hand, abnormal behavior. The readings we have selected from *Current Directions* go a long way toward engaging students in the relevance of the course material by exploring “hot topics” in more depth while complementing the broader message of conceptual material covered in the text.

In *Psychology and Neuroscience: Making Peace*, Gregory A. Miller and Jennifer Keller thoughtfully address one of the basic misunderstandings in psychology: reductionism and the lingering dualism in thinking about mind (psychology) and body (biology). They strongly reinforce the message that psychological experiences cannot be reduced to biological, for example by critiquing the common misconception that depression is now known to be nothing more than a “chemical imbalance” in the brain (p. 214). These scholars argue for viewing biology and psychology not as competing explanations but in terms of systems theory, that is, as explanations offered at different levels of analysis. Their thoughtful consideration of various misunderstandings of neuroscience as somehow being more “basic” than psychology will help students to grasp the problems with a reductionist view of abnormal behavior, an inaccurate posi-

tion that unfortunately often is embraced by the popular media.

In the next article, Frans de Waal, a noted primate researcher who has published a number of superb, popular books on primate behavior, discusses one of the hottest of hot topics: evolutionary psychology. Skeptics should note that his article, *Evolutionary Psychology: The Wheat and the Chaff*, is more of a critique of simplistic evolutionary explanations than a polemic about the value of the evolutionary approach. The value of an evolutionary perspective is a given to Frans B. M. de Waal, as is a systems conceptualization, but his article challenges students with incisive questions about specific areas where weak evolutionary explanations have been offered, for example, the purported adaptive value of rape.

Eric Turkheimer is another friendly critic of biological theorizing. Like Frans B. M. de Waal, in *Three Laws of Behavior Genetics and What They Mean*, Turkheimer assumes that major genetic influences on normal and abnormal behavior are a given. In fact, his first law of behavior genetics is that all human behavioral traits are heritable. In Turkheimer's view, the question for the genetic side of the gene-environment debate is no longer whether genes affect behavior but how—and he suggests that current behavior genetic explanations offer little guidance about how genes affect complex social behavior. In addition, this article raises the very important issue of shared and nonshared environmental influences on normal and abnormal behavior, and the difficulty in specifying causes if the environment affects different people in unique ways.

The much-debated issue of whether behavior is situation specific or consistent across time and situations is discussed by one of the leading theorists in the field, Walter Mischel and his colleagues Yuichi Shoda and Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton. In their article, *Situation-Behavior Profiles as a Locus of Consistency in Personality*, these authors take students through a brief and very clear history of the debate. They argue that the debate has been misguided in various respects and present new data suggesting that consistency in behavior may be found in how some individuals respond to similar situations.

The final two articles in this first section deal with treatment, a topic that usually is more accessible to students and of considerable interest to them. Avraham Kluger and Angelo DeNisi review the positive—and negative—effects of feedback interventions, treatments where information is provided on performance in order to enhance it.

In their article, *Feedback Interventions: Toward the Understanding of a Double-Edged Sword*, these authors note that feedback is almost as likely to produce negative as positive results. They explain this pattern in terms of the (mis) allocation of attention, and suggest clear goal setting is the solution to producing consistently positive gains. Finally, C. Barr Taylor and Kristine Luce provide a highly accessible overview of various attempts to use the computer as an assessment and treatment tool. Students surely will be fascinated by the innovations these authors highlight in *Computer-and Internet-Based Psychotherapy Interventions*, and students hopefully both will be cautioned and challenged by the scientists' call for more research on the effectiveness of these technologically-based treatments.

[导读]

心理与神经科学：和平共处

近些年脑科学的兴起，推动了心理学研究的进展。比如，在方法上，使研究者得以将脑的生理活动与心理的功能联系起来。但与此同时，也出现了一些争论，如什么地方可以将生物现象纳入到心理学研究中，什么地方可以将心理现象纳入到生物学研究中？在心理病理学中，这种争论尤其突出。在表面的争论之下隐含的深意似乎是把心理学与生物学对立起来。对脑科学的热衷指向了一种简单的还原论思想，即强调生物学，轻视心理学，认为生物学是心理学的基础。然而，这种还原论思想是站不住脚的。拿“害怕”来说，神经科学研究发现，大脑杏仁核的活动与产生害怕情绪有关。但并不能就此把“害怕”这个心理学概念还原为“杏仁核活动”这个生物学概念。实际上，害怕常常包含了认知、判断等心理的功能。至于说，谁是誰的基础，也是片面的。生物学和心理学对心理现象的解释都有各自的优势和局限。双方是对等的关系而不是对手的关系。对于一个心理现象或行为来说，来自神经生理的数据和来自心理功能的数据对解释该现象是同样重要的。在心理学和生物学之间建立因果关系的想法会产生误导，这种关系不是实证的，只能是理论或逻辑上的。对于临床研究，这种对立思想导致了错误的观念：生物学概念上的失调要进行生物学干预；心理学概念上的失调要进行心理学干预。以抑郁为例，生物学的和心理学的干预其实可以取得同样效果。鉴于此，研究者不应当用“基础性”而是用“补偿性”来描述二者的关系。生物学现象与心理学现象间的关系不是必然的而是偶然的，研究者应注意避免二元论思想。在未来的几十年，研究不仅要发展生物学技术，也要不断提高心理学手段。

Psychology and Neuroscience: Making Peace

Gregory A. Miller¹ and Jennifer Keller

Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, Illinois

Abstract

There has been no historically stable consensus about the relationship between psychological and biological concepts and data. A naively reductionist view of this relationship is prevalent in psychology, medicine, and basic and clinical neuroscience. This view undermines the ability of psychology and related sciences to achieve their individual and combined potential. A nondualistic, nonreductionist, noninteractive perspective is recommended, with psychological and biological concepts both having central, distinct roles.

Keywords

psychology; biology; neuroscience; psychopathology

With the Decade of the Brain just ended, it is useful to consider the impact that it has had on psychological research and what should come next. Impressive progress occurred on many fronts, including methodologies used to understand the brain events associated with psychological functions. However, much controversy remains about where biological phenomena fit into psychological science and vice versa. This controversy is especially pronounced in research on psychopathology, a field in which ambitious claims on behalf of narrowly conceived psychological or biological factors often arise, but this fundamental issue applies to the full range of psychological research. Unfortunately, the Decade of the Brain has fostered a naively reductionist view that sets biology and psychology at odds and often casts psychological events as unimportant epiphenomena. We and other researchers have been developing a proposal that rejects this view and provides a different perspective on the relationship between biology and psychology.

A FAILURE OF REDUCTIONISM

A term defined in one domain is characterized as reduced to terms in another do-

main (called the reduction science) when all meaning in the former is captured in the latter. The reduced term thus becomes unnecessary. If, for example, the meaning of the (traditionally psychological) term “fear” is entirely representable in language about a brain region called the amygdala, one does not need the (psychological) term “fear,” or one can redefine “fear” to refer merely to a particular biological phenomenon.

Impressive progress in the characterization of neural circuits typically active in (psychologically defined) fear does not justify dismissing the concept or altering the meaning of the term. The phenomena that “fear” typically refers to include a functional state (a way of being or being prepared to act), a cognitive processing bias, and a variety of judgments and associations all of which are conceived psychologically (Miller & Kozak, 1993). Because “fear” means more than a given type of neural activity, the concept of fear is not reducible to neural activity. Researchers are learning a great deal about the biology of fear—and the psychology of fear—from studies of the amygdala (e.g., Lang, Davis, & Öhman, in press), but this does not mean that fear is activity in the amygdala. That is simply not the meaning of the term. “Fear” is not reducible to biology.

This logical fact is widely misunderstood as evidenced in phrases such as “underlying brain dysfunction” or “neurochemical basis of psychopathology”. Most remarkably, major portions of the federal research establishment have recently adopted a distinctly nonmental notion of mental health, referring to “the biobehavioral factors which may underly [sic] mood states” (National Institute of Mental Health, 1999). Similarly, a plan to reorganize grant review committees reflects “the context of the biological question that is being investigated” (National Institutes of Health, 1999, p. 2). Mental health researchers motivated by psychological or sociological questions apparently should take their applications elsewhere.

More subtly problematic than such naive reductionism are terms, such as “biobehavioral marker” or “neurocognitive measure,” that appear to cross the boundary between psychological and biological domains. It is not at all apparent what meaning the “bio” or “neuro” prefix adds in these terms, as typically the data referred to are behavioral. Under the political pressures of the Decade of the Brain, psychologists were tempted to repackage their phenomena to sound biological, but the relationship of psy-

chology and biology cannot be addressed by confusing them.

WHOSE WORK IS MORE FUNDAMENTAL?

Such phrases often appear in contexts that assume that biological phenomena are somehow more fundamental than psychological phenomena. Statements that psychological events are nothing more than brain events are clearly logical errors (see the extensive analysis by Marr, 1982). More cautious statements, such as that psychological events “reflect” or “arise from” brain events, are at best incomplete in what they convey about the relationship between psychology and biology. It is not a property of biological data that they “underlie” psychological data. A given theory may explicitly propose such a relationship, but it must be treated as a proposal, not as a fact about the data. Biological data provide valuable information that may not be obtainable with self-report or overt behavioral measures, but biological information is not inherently more fundamental, more accurate, more representative, or even more objective.

The converse problem also arises—psychology allegedly “underlying” or being more fundamental than biology. There is a long tradition of ignoring biological phenomena in clinical psychology. As Zuckerman (1999) noted, “One thing that both behavioral and post-Freudian psychoanalytic theories had in common was the conviction that learning and life experiences alone could account for all disorders” (p. 413). In those traditions, it is psychology that “underlies” biology, not the converse. Biology is seen as merely the implementation of psychology, and psychology is where the intellectually interesting action is. Cognitive theory can thus evolve without the discipline of biological plausibility. As suggested at the midpoint of the Decade of the Brain (Miller, 1995), such a view would justify a Decade of Cognition.

Such a one-sided emphasis would once again be misguided. Anderson and Scott (1999) expressed concern that “the majority of research in the health sciences occurs within a single level of analysis, closely tied to specific disciplines” (p. 5), with most psychologists studying phenomena only in terms of behavior. We advocate not that every study employ both psychological and biological methods, but that researchers not ignore or dismiss relevant literatures, particularly in the conceptualization of their research.

Psychological and biological approaches offer distinct types of data of potentially