


胡塞爾現象學的知識論析論

吳汝鈞著



A Study of the Epistemology of Husserl's Phenomenology

內容簡介

本書為研究現象學宗匠胡塞爾的知識論的專著，就比較哲學的方法，以佛教的護法唯識學和康德的超越哲學作為參照來析論胡塞爾的知識理論的內容與特性。胡塞爾的現象學本來便艱澀難明，他的知識論更是深奧費解，少人問津，但處處都是洞見。本書實為這方面的開荒之作。

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前 言

此文是我在撰寫的《量論：知識現象學》一大書的重要篇章，專門處理現象學特別是胡塞爾（E. Husserl）的知識論問題。由於所論問題繁複，篇幅浩大，這本書甚麼時候能寫好，難以預測。由於胡塞爾現象學特別是知識論艱澀難明，在這方面的著作《邏輯研究》（*Logische Untersuchungen*）與《經驗與判斷》（*Erfahrung und Urteil*）解讀不易，在這方面的研究絕少；西方哲學界是如此，日本哲學界也是如此，我國的哲學界更不用說了。這章的內容，可以獨立成篇，我因此把它抽出來，先行發表，希望能就正於學界的高明人士。

熊十力先生當年造論，撰寫《新唯識論》，莫立了當代新儒學發展的基礎。他又屢次表示寫量論或知識論，在理論上把他的體用論的形而上學體系撐持起來。但他未有真正寫出來，這成了他的形而上學體系的一個漏洞。我受到熊十力先生的《新唯識論》的啓發，近年構思純粹力動現象

學的理论體系，而寫成《純粹力動現象學》一書（台北：台灣商務印書館，2005），跟著要寫的，自然是量論或知識論。在構思這量論的過程中，我受到胡塞爾現象學的知識論很大的啓發，也多方面吸收胡氏的觀點，加以消化、會通、批評，這些觀點也己成為自己的思想了。

胡塞爾現象學的知識論析論

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摘 要

本書研究胡塞爾（E. Husserl）的現象學（Phänomenologie）中的知識理論。此種研究在哲學界中甚為罕見。研究的方法是以一種比較哲學的方法來進行；以康德（I. Kant）、懷德海（A. N. Whitehead）與佛教唯識學在相關問題上的觀點為參照，以突顯胡塞爾的知識論的特性。

胡氏的知識論（Erkenntnistheorie）有一個基調：由作為經驗科學的心理學作觀念科學的現象學的轉向，最後還是保留經驗科學的心理學，與觀念科學的現象學並存，而依次成立如佛教所說的世俗諦與第一義諦。即是，知識要以我們對世界的經驗為基礎，同時也強調知識的先驗根源，從現象層面的認識以進於本質層面的認識，最後達致自我轉化的目標。在他來說，知識的中核是對象與判斷。在對象方面，有具明證性（Evidenz）的對象與不具的對象。前者為知覺或直覺所接觸，是物體的表象（Dingerscheinung），相應於唯識學的親所緣；後者是表象的物體（erscheinendes Ding），相應於唯識學的疏所緣。在判斷方面，不管是邏輯的或經驗的，都預認範疇所表示的先驗連結。這是胡塞爾承受康德觀點最重要的一點。

在認識機能方面，胡塞爾基本上確認直覺（Anschauung）與思維（Denken）；前者認識對象的個別性（Einzelheit），後者則認識普遍事物（Allgemeine）。這與康德的感性（Sinnlichkeit）與知性（Verstand）與唯識學陳那（Dignāga）、法稱（Dharmakīrti）所提的現量（pratyakṣa）與比量（anumāna）也相通。直覺吸收

外界的資料，思維則以範疇整理這些資料，而成就對象以至對象性。胡氏的範疇理論可化約為以下三點。一、範疇的知識先在於經驗科學，它表示思維的先驗連結形式，知識基於這種連結形式而成立。二、範疇只涉及知識的構造因素或律則，具有客觀有效性。三、範疇不指涉實際存在，但指涉它們的普遍性格，是最本源的知識形式。

進一步看胡氏的知識論，在直覺與範疇問題上都有進於前人之處。胡氏細分直覺為四種。一、感性直覺；依賴感官，以經驗對象為所覺。二、範疇直覺；所覺的對象是範疇。三、觀念直覺；一種建構觀念的意識作用，其所覺對象包含範疇和其他思想性的東西。四、本質直覺；以本質（Wesen）為所覺的對象。特別關連到本質直覺來說，胡氏把認知的焦點從現象轉移到本質，是知識論的一個突破。在這裏我們特別重視範疇直覺（kategoriale Anschauung）。按範疇與直覺是矛盾的，分別展示普遍性與特殊性。康德只提兩種直覺：感性直覺與睿智的直覺；人只有前者，上帝則只有後者。胡氏則以為人可同時具有這兩者，又更有範疇直覺或範疇知覺（kategoriale Wahrnehmung），來說直覺、知覺與範疇、思維的結合。他提出知覺有兩方面的意識涵義：本原意識與存在意識。「本原」與感覺與料有直接關連；「存在」則指存在物在知覺中的呈現。在胡氏看來，知覺是對於存在著的東西的意識，故知覺可與意識相連。他又作出範疇直覺的行為轉向，而成範疇行為（kategoriale Akte）。他的目的顯然是要把思維（包含範疇、意識）、行為與直覺（也有知覺意味）三者結合在一起。這種結合，在概念與實踐上能否站得住，顯然需要作進一步的推證。就胡塞爾自身而言，他

大概要建立一種認識能力，它是直覺的，可以把握對象的個別相狀；又是思考性的，是能以範疇來思考的知性，以把握對象的普遍相狀。這種雙重作用，只有康德義的睿智的直覺（intellektuelle Anschauung）才具有。因此胡塞爾認為人可有這種直覺，不必只限於上帝。

至於對象（Gegenstand），胡氏認為，感性直覺只能接收對象的資料，不能構造對象。對象要由意識來構架。另外，感性直覺接觸對象而進行認識，便成知覺行為。此中沒有連結、綜合作用，意識則可作概念的連結與綜合。對象為感性直覺所認識，是當下的、即時的性格。這認識是直覺的，不是辯解的。胡氏的這種感性直覺的非辯解性，讓人想到佛教陳那的現量遠離分別（vikalpa, kalpanā）的說法，分別即是辯解性格的認知活動。

進一步，胡塞爾說及對象問題，喜歡區分對象（Gegenstand）和對象性（Gegenständlichkeit），而尤重後者。他以對象性指一件完整的行為所指向的東西，對象則是部分行為所指向的東西。故他的對象性有範疇的意味，指可以使某些東西成為對象的那些性格、條件。胡氏把注意的焦點從對象轉移到對象性，有轉化的意味在裏頭。對象是質體性的（entitative），含有質實性（rigidity），不利於轉化。對象性則是鬆動的，沒有很強的質體性、質實性，因而容易被改變、被轉化。這便類似懷德海不講實體性而講事件（event）、實際的境遇（actual occasion），後者對於轉化有較強的適切性。

Abstract

As indicated in the title, this work is a study of E. Husserl's epistemology in the light of his phenomenology. The method undertaken is a comparative study, namely, to make reference to the philosophy of I. Kant, A. N. Whitehead and the Buddhist Vijñānavāda, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's theories in particular in related issues, so as to reveal the features of Husserl's phenomenological epistemology.

There is a basic point in Husserl's epistemology, viz., we should start from psychology as an empirical science to initiate a phenomenological turn, the phenomenology being a science of ideas. But the empirical psychology has to be maintained and upheld side by side with the idealistic phenomenology on the final stage. Husserl's point is that our knowledge should be established on the basis of the empirical world, at the same time the transcendental origin of knowledge should be emphasized. We work on our cognition from the phenomenal level and proceed to the cognition of essence of entities, thus finally attaining the goal of self-transformation. In Husserl's view, the most important issues of knowledge are on objects and judgments. Some objects possess evidence, whereas others do not. The former are approached in perception or intuition, and are taken as real. The latter are inferred by understanding and are thought to be devoid of reality. The judgments, whether they be logical or

empirical in nature, are regarded as presupposing a transcendental connection in various senses as expressed in the categories, the connection of substance and attribute for instance. This is the most important element that Husserl inherited from Kant.

Dealing with the faculties of cognition, Husserl fundamentally confines them to intuition and understanding. The former cognizes the particular aspects of the object in absorbing its external data, whereas the latter cognizes the universal aspects in categorizing these data. His theory of category are as follows: first, the knowledge based on the category is prior to all empirical sciences, because it expresses the transcendental connection of the object's data. Secondly, the category determines the structural form of the knowledge, and thus possesses objective validity. Thirdly, the category has nothing to do with individual actual entities, but it represents their universal characters, and is therefore the most original form of knowledge.

To look into Husserl's epistemology more closely, he has, indeed, made significant developments on the issues of both intuition and category from his predecessors. He divides intuition into four types: sensible intuition, intuition of category, idealistic intuition and intuition of essence. The sensible intuition by and large resembles Kant's sensibility. The intuition of category takes categories as its objects of cognition. The idealistic intuition is a kind of function of consciousness which takes mental things as its objects. Finally, the intuition of essence understands the very essence of entities. This

intuition of essence should attract our attention particularly in the sense that the focus of cognition shifts from phenomenon to essence, a breakthrough initiated at the first time in the history of Western epistemology.

Husserl's conception of the intuition of category is also inspiring. Generally speaking, this concept is contradictory because the category is related to universality, whereas the intuition to particularity. Husserl brings them to stand together, overcoming the contradiction therein. Kant holds that there are merely two kinds of intuition: the sensible and the intellectual, and that humankind possess the former and God the latter. They can only have one form of intuition. Husserl proposes that humankind can have these two intuitions simultaneously. He also adds the intuition or perception of category attainable to humankind. He apparently tries to establish a unification of perception, category and intellectuality. In his view, the perception can be related to consciousness which is two-folded: original consciousness and existential consciousness. The so-called "origin" refers to the sensible data, and the "existence" denotes entities appearing in front of the perception. In consequence, the perception is the consciousness of existing entities, and thus can be connected with the consciousness. Moreover, Husserl suggests the actionist turn of the intuition of category to form the action of category. He intends to develop a cognitive faculty in synthetic character, which is on the one hand, intuitive and capable of grasping the individual aspects of the object, and on the other hand mental,

and can understand the universal aspects of the object. This faculty is, indeed, what Kant entitles as “intellectual intuition”, corresponding to the “great and round mirror wisdom (ādarśa-jñāna)” delineated in Yogācāra Buddhism.

With regard to the issue of object, Husserl holds that our sensible intuition can only absorb the material data of the object, but is not capable of constructing it. Its construction relies on the consciousness with the latter’s function of intentionality. The sensible intuition touches the object, cognizes it and initiates a perceptive action which is, however, devoid of connection and synthesis toward the material data expressed by the category. The object is cognized by the sensible intuition, and the cognition as such is immediate, without discursiveness whatsoever.

To go further, when Husserl discusses the object, he often distinguishes the object itself and the object in general or the nature of object. The latter refers to what is pointed to or intended by a complete action, whereas the former refers to what is intended by a portion of the action. Thereby the object in general is closely related to the category, indicating the characteristics or conditions that render something to an object. That he shifts the focus of concern from the *object itself to the object in general* carries some sense of transformation. The object itself is entitative, and in possession of rigidity which may hinder our attainment of transformation, whether it be moral or religious. The object in general is less substantive and rigid, and is less difficult to change and transform.

關鍵字：胡塞爾、知識論、判斷、明證性、直覺、思維、範疇、本質、範疇直覺、範疇知覺、對象、對象性

Keywords: E. Husserl, Erkenntnistheorie, Urteil, Evidenz, Anschauung, Denken, Kategorie, Wesen, kategoriale Anschauung, kategoriale Wahrnehmung, Gegenstand, Gegenständlichkeit

略語表 (Abbreviations)

- EU E. Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik*. Redigiert und herausgegeben von Ludwig Landgrebe, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985.
- KrV₁ I. Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft I*, Herausgegeben von Wilhelm Weischedel, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977.
- LU_{II}₁ E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, Zweiter Band, Erster Teil: *Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*. Herausgegeben von Ursula Panzer, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984.
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