




英文版
剑桥哲学研究指针

The Cambridge Companion to Philosophy

女性主义哲学

米兰达·弗里克 珍妮弗·霍恩斯比 编



Feminism in Philosophy

剑桥哲学研究指针

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The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy

米兰达·弗里克 珍妮弗·霍恩斯比 编

Edited by Miranda Fricker and Jennifer Hornsby

生活·讀書·新知 三联书店

图书在版编目(CIP)数据

女性主义哲学 = The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy / 弗里克, 霍恩斯比编. —北京:

生活·读书·新知三联书店, 2006.6

(剑桥哲学研究指针)

ISBN 7-108-02496-9

I. 女... II. ①弗...②霍... III. 女权运动-哲学-研究-英文 IV. D440-05

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字 (2006) 第 037489 号

责任编辑 舒 炜

封扉设计 罗 洪 崔建华

出版发行 生活·读书·新知 三联书店

(北京市东城区美术馆东街 22 号)

图 字 01-2006-1987

邮 编 100010

经 销 新华书店

印 刷 北京隆昌伟业印刷有限公司

版 次 2006 年 6 月北京第 1 版

2006 年 6 月北京第 1 次印刷

开 本 635 毫米×965 毫米 1/16 印张 18.5

印 数 0,001-4,000 册

定 价 28.00 元

剑桥哲学研究指针

出版说明

生活·读书·新知三联书店自20世纪80年代中期以来一向重视引进西方现当代学术著作，在著译界朋友大力支持下，我店陆续刊行综合性文库和专题性译丛若干套，对近二十余年中国学术思想的建设发展起到了积极的作用。

三联书店现在以英文原版形式引进出版“剑桥哲学研究指针”，其主旨则在于便利国内读者和研究者翻阅查考，掌握西方学术研究的最新动态。“剑桥哲学研究指针”是英国剑桥大学出版社20世纪90年代刊行的大型学术参考书，面世之后，好评如潮，影响巨大，自1992年至今已出版六十余种。这套书以大哲学家为中心线索，辅以若干时期的哲学主题及哲学流派，由出色当行的学者出任主编，邀集各领域专家组成国际化的学者队伍，专门撰写文章，综述研究状况，缕列文献目录；各书的编辑方针清晰，体例完备周密，内容丰富，资料充足，是很好的西方哲学研究指南读物。如原出版者所说：“这套书的目的之一，乃是针对艰深而富有挑战性的哲学家著作，帮助读者打消畏难心理”，对哲学有兴趣的非专业读者和学生，由此可获得权威有效的方便指引；专家和深入研究者由此则可概览各种解释与分析的新进展。

在21世纪中国社会和思想文化创造性发展的大背景下，这套书或将有助于中国读者深入勘察有关西方思想传统的各种不断演变的诠释，形成权衡取舍的批判性视野，并逐步确立中文学术界自身的看法。这是我们引进出版这套书的深层期望所在。

三联书店编辑部

2006年3月

The thirteen chapters in this volume are written by philosophers at the forefront of feminist scholarship, and are designed to provide an accessible and stimulating guide through a philosophical literature that has seen massive expansion in recent years. Ranging from history of philosophy through metaphysics to philosophy of science, they encompass all the core subject areas commonly taught in anglophone undergraduate and graduate philosophy courses, offering both an overview of and a contribution to the relevant debates. Together they testify to the intellectual value of feminism as a radicalizing energy internal to philosophical inquiry. This volume will be essential reading for any student or teacher of philosophy who is curious about the place of feminism in their subject.

EDITED BY

MIRANDA FRICKER

Highgate College, University of London

AND

JENNIFER HORNBY

Highgate College, University of London

THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO
FEMINISM
IN
PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY
MIRANDA FRICKER
Heythrop College, University of London

AND
JENNIFER HORNSBY
Birkbeck College, University of London

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剑桥大学出版社, 2000

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仅供在中华人民共和国境内销售, 不包括台湾、香港和澳门, 及其他境外地区。

CONTRIBUTORS

DIEMUT BUBECK is Lecturer in Political Theory at the London School of Economics. She has worked on feminist political theory and ethics, particularly on the ethic of care debate, and is the author of *Care, Gender, and Justice* (1995). She also has research interests in Nietzsche and in virtue ethics, and is currently working on a project entitled 'Women: Victims or Agents?'

MIRANDA FRICKER is Lecturer in Philosophy and British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow at Heythrop College, University of London. She contributed to *Knowing the Difference*, ed. Lennon and Whitford (1994), and has published articles in epistemology and social philosophy. Her current work focuses on the idea of an ethics of epistemic practice, and her book *Epistemic Injustice* is forthcoming with Oxford University Press.

MARILYN FRIEDMAN teaches philosophy at Washington University in St Louis. She has published articles in ethics, social philosophy and feminist theory. She is the author of *What Are Friends For? Feminist Perspectives on Personal Relationships and Moral Theory* (1993) and co-author with Jan Narveson of *Political Correctness: For and Against* (1995). She co-edited *Feminism and Community* (with Penny Weiss, 1995) and *Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science* (with Larry May and Andy Clark, 1995).

SALLY HASLANGER is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She has published on topics in metaphysics, epistemology, ancient philosophy (on Aristotle's metaphysics) and feminist theory, with a recent emphasis on feminist epistemology, critiques of objectivity and theories of social construction (especially the social construction of race and gender). She was guest editor for a

Philosophical Topics issue on 'Feminist Perspectives on Language, Knowledge, and Reality' (Fall 1995).

JENNIFER HORNSBY is Professor of Philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London. She is author of *Actions* (1980) and of *Simple-Mindedness: A Defence of Naïve Naturalism in Philosophy of Mind* (1996) and editor, with Elizabeth Frazer and Sabina Lovibond, of *Ethics: A Feminist Reader* (1992). Her published articles and current work are in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, metaphysics and in those areas of political and social philosophy that have been informed by feminist thinking.

ALISON JAGGAR is Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Her books include *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* (1983), *Morality and Social Justice*, co-authored with James P. Sterba et al. (1994) and *Living with Contradictions: Controversies in Feminist Social Ethics* (1994). She is currently working on a project entitled 'Sex, Truth and Power: A Feminist Theory of Moral Reason'.

SUSAN JAMES is Reader in Philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London. She is the author of *The Content of Social Explanation* (1984) and *Passion and Action: The Emotions in Early Modern Philosophy* (1998) and editor, with Gisela Bock, of *Beyond Equality and Difference* (1992). She is also a General Editor of Oxford Readings in Feminism.

RAE LANGTON is Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. She has published articles in the history of philosophy, and in moral and political philosophy, where she has drawn attention to feminist arguments about pornography and objectification. She has also published in metaphysics and epistemology, and is author of *Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves* (1998).

GENEVIEVE LLOYD is Professor of Philosophy at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, and a fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities. She is the author of *The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy* (1984, 1993), *Being in Time: Selves and Narrators in Philosophy and Literature* (1993), *Part of Nature: Self-Knowledge in Spinoza's Ethics* (1994) and *Spinoza and the Ethics* (1996). She has published articles on seventeenth- and eighteenth-

century philosophy, on philosophy and literature, and on feminist philosophy.

SABINA LOVIBOND is Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Worcester College, Oxford. Her published work includes *Realism and Imagination in Ethics* (1983), *Ethics: A Feminist Reader* (1992), edited with Elizabeth Frazer and Jennifer Hornsby, and *Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value* (1996), edited with S. G. Williams. Her main philosophical interests are in ethics, feminist theory, practical rationality and the idea of a postmodern 'critique of reason'.

SARAH RICHMOND is Lecturer in Philosophy at University College London. Her published work has been in the area of continental philosophy, focusing in particular on the relationship between recent continental and analytical philosophy. Her current research is in the areas of ethics and psychoanalysis, with a special concern to explore the insights into moral psychology that psychoanalytical thought can provide.

NAOMI SCHEMAN is Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies at the University of Minnesota. She is the editor of *Feminist Interpretations of Wittgenstein* in the Re-reading the Canon series (2000) and the author of *Engenderings: Constructions of Knowledge, Authority, and Privilege* (1993). The essays in that book and her subsequent published work and current research focus on understanding the distinctive problems and methods of philosophy in relation to historically specific constructions of identity, with particular attention to especially unstable or 'impossible' identities, such as transsexual or secular Jew.

ALISON WYLIE is Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in St Louis. She writes on philosophical issues raised by archaeology and on the implications of feminist critiques of science. She is co-editor of *Critical Traditions in Contemporary Archaeology* (1989) and has contributed articles on feminist research in archaeology to special issues of *Osiris* (1997) and *Philosophical Topics* (1995), and to collections such as *Women in Human Evolution*, ed. Hager (1997), *The Disunity of Science*, ed. Galison and Stump (1996), and *Changing Methods*, ed. Burt and Code (1995).

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PREFACE

Our authors were presented with an especially demanding task, being asked to introduce the reader to feminist debate in a whole area of philosophy as well as to make a contribution of their own. We thank them all, for their essays, for their flexibility, and for their enthusiasm and encouragement along the way. We are grateful to our editor at Cambridge University Press, Hilary Gaskin, for her help with the project, and to our colleague Chris Janaway for suggesting the Gabriele Münter painting for our cover picture.

There are more influences on this book than are apparent from all its footnotes and the many works cited in the lists of Further Reading. When women first began to make distinctively feminist contributions to philosophy, their work was not supported by the usual institutional structures and it was often not recorded on the printed page. Feminist philosophy forced its way into the academy through the political and practical commitment of women whose intellectual courage and professional daring made books like this one possible. The international profile of the contributions here may hide a particular, more local influence on the two of us. We should like to record a debt to the UK Society for Women in Philosophy, and to its dedicated core members, past and present.

M.F. J.H.

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MIRANDA FRICKER AND JENNIFER HORNSBY

Introduction

This *Companion* represents a departure from the previously published volumes in its series. Each of those dealt with a single philosopher and with a male one in every case, whereas this one brings women in and treats a theme rather than an authority. So far as the departure allows, this book's principal aim is in line with that of other *Companions*: it consists of new papers by an international team of philosophers at the forefront of feminist scholarship; and these have been written with non-specialists in mind, so that the collection can serve as an introduction to the area. We have tried to design it to be helpful to any student or teacher of philosophy who is curious about feminism's place in their subject.

The present *Companion* has a further aim. It is intended to foster appreciation of the potentially far-reaching impact of feminist thinking in philosophy. As departments of women's studies and gender studies have grown up in the last twenty years, there has come to be more and more published work falling under the head of feminist philosophy. In our experience as members of philosophy departments, students and teachers of philosophy find it difficult to relate much of this work to their own projects. It needs to be made clearer that – and how – feminist concerns can be brought to bear on philosophy. Then 'pure' philosophers may feel less disconnected from work that they are now perhaps inclined to ignore, and genuine interdisciplinary links may be made between philosophy and other subjects on which feminism has had an impact.

In this Introduction, we address at a general level the question of how feminism can impinge upon philosophy, and we say some more about the book's organization and rationale. We hope to illuminate our view of the role of feminism *in* philosophy, by explaining why we wish neither to advocate an understanding of feminist philosophy as a separate and distinctive branch of philosophy, nor to argue for the ability of feminist philosophy to replace philosophy. We also attempt to situate the work it

presents in the context both of the political movement that has inspired it and of the discourse of philosophy that it seeks to engender.

One might ask whether it has made a difference to philosophy that it should have been the creation largely of men and not women. Feminists are bound to ask this question. So long as philosophy is an object of their critical reflection, they will insist on viewing its authors as socially situated beings with a specific location in history. But the question makes perfectly good sense even for someone who usually abstains from the historicizing perspective of a feminist.

The publication twenty years ago of Genevieve Lloyd's *The Man of Reason*¹ incubated an influential line of argument. Lloyd's central claim was that philosophers' conceptions of reason have tended to be aligned with cultural conceptions of masculinity, reason being conceived as contrasted with and superior to intuition and emotion which the cultural imagination has associated with femininity. When one sees the bearing of gender on the understanding of such faculties as reason – which is taken often enough to be the faculty distinctive of human kind – one comes to be concerned also with gender's bearing on the philosophical conception of individual human subjects, whether in the role of thinker, of agent, of speaker, or of inquirer. It may be agreed that the great subjects of philosophy ought to be concerned with us in the sense of 'us' in which we are all human. But when the association of 'man' and 'reason' is acknowledged, it is possible to think that the male philosophers who have addressed these questions have actually not always subsumed everyone with their 'we's and their 'our's. Although philosophers' accounts of what 'we' know, or of how 'we' relate to 'our' bodies, purport to have universal application, one can question whether their authors' generic conception really is the socially and historically neutral one that their universal claims would require. In doing so, one takes issue with traditional philosophy on its own, 'neutralist' terms. One arrives, from a starting point within philosophy, at a place at which questions about male bias arise.

Feminism's own starting point tends not to be this neutralist one. By starting from the idea that human subjects are socially concrete and socially diverse beings, feminists encourage suspicion of any given universal claim. Of course feminists are not alone in their commitment to the social specificity of the subject. Other politicizing theoretical perspectives can equally place emphasis on the socially concrete character of any human being. If a feminist perspective is unique, then it is probably unique only in its insistence on the importance of gender. But we can see how a feminist perspective tends to take one more quickly to a point at which philosophy

itself may arrive unaided so long as it allows that its texts are written by real people. Given philosophy's reflexive character – given that philosophy is concerned with 'ourselves and our place in the world', so that its authors belong among its objects of study – a questioning of philosophers' self-image cannot be simply external to philosophy.

When the gender-ideological aspects of a piece of philosophical theory are unveiled, the theory is exposed as masculinist. The theory might be less sophisticated or less complete than it had purported to be, or it might simply be in error – as when an account records only male experience while putting forward claims about the whole of humanity. But an account may also be charged with masculinism in a different sense, when its generalizations are taken to exclude the *symbolically* feminine. This sort of charge might be made as a psychoanalytic claim – in which, for instance, some tendency in philosophical thought is diagnosed in terms of male philosophers' unconsciously living out an exclusively masculine psychology (see Susan James's chapter here). Or, again, such a charge might be made as a historical claim – in which a tendency is diagnosed by reference to the operation of a 'philosophical imaginary'² that arises from distinctively masculine social experience. There are feminist writers who think that all of philosophy excludes or subordinates the symbolically feminine, so that they take the whole philosophical enterprise to be irredeemably masculinist. Theirs is a radical view, in which the task of feminism is to find a surrogate for philosophy – philosophy in the feminine.³

Evidently, the radical view is not our own view. (There is no space for the project of this book on the radical view.) But we share with the radical view a belief that a feminist perspective can bring enlightenment by introducing insights gained from lived experience. Philosophical reflection has always been conditioned by background intuitions and assumptions about how people generally behave or what they would think, say, want, intend, in particular circumstances. To the extent that it may have been conditioned by a consensus among its (*de facto*) white, male, middle-class practitioners, there are likely to be new debates as other sorts of people find their way in.⁴ Feminism will impinge upon philosophy wherever feminist insights challenge prevailing intuitions and assumptions. We agree with Sabina Lovibond, in the first chapter here, that 'the relation of feminist thought to its discursive environment' can be grasped in terms of Neurath's boat, 'which cannot find a haven safe from error but has to be repaired while out at sea'. Feminism is then one among the critical impetuses for the ongoing repair work that determines philosophy's historical development and its sense of its own history.