

“公司+农户”模式：

社会资本、关系治理与联盟绩效

万俊毅 等◎著



“公司+农户”经营组织成为农业产业化的主导模式，订单合同成为公司与农户间主要的利益联结机制。但由于生产风险、市场风险和履约风险的客观存在，“公司+农户”联盟还面临利益联结机制不完善、合作农户利益亟待得到更多保障、履约绩效亟待进一步改善等问题。探讨“公司+农户”联盟的治理机制对订单农业的发展至关重要。

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内 容 提 要

农业产业化经营制度是对统分结合的双层经营体制的创新、充实、完善和发展，自 20 世纪 80 年代末期诞生起，一直被社会各界寄托着改变农业弱质性、农民弱权性和农村弱位性的重任。30 多年来，得益于各级政府的大力扶持，中国各地的农业产业化经营发展迅速。如今，各类农业产业化经营组织已经成为农业和农村经济发展中极具活力和生命力的市场主体，极大地推动着农民增收、农业增效和农村增富进程。

农业产业化经营组织主要有龙头企业带动型、合作经济等中介组织带动型、专业市场带动型、经纪人带动型和大户带动型等多种类型。现实中，已经出现公司领办合作社、合作社创办公司等多种新的产业化组织形式。在适宜的制度环境下，“公司 + 农户”可以实现向更有效率的“公司 + 合作社 + 农户”的制度变迁。尽管如此，在现有的制度情境下，各方利益主体博弈的均衡结果是，“公司 + 农户”经营组织成为农业产业化的主导模式，订单合同成为公司与农户间主要的利益联结方式。

由于生产风险、市场风险和履约风险的客观存在，“公司 + 农户”联盟还面临着利益联结机制亟待完善、合作农户利益亟待更多保障、履约绩效亟待进一步改善等问题。现实中发生了不少难如人愿的“订单农业”现象，这不是“公司 + 农户”产业化经营方式的过错，而是农业企业与合作农户没有形成契合经济社会运行内在化要求的组织方式，没有运用与组织结构相

匹配的治理机制所致。许多运行良好的“公司 + 农户”联盟组织都是得益于因地制宜的组织构建及其匹配的治理机制运用，例如江苏如意集团模式、内蒙古塞飞亚模式、广东温氏模式和江西德宇模式等。因此，探讨“公司 + 农户”联盟的治理机制对订单农业的发展至关重要。

中国是一个关系本位的社会。经济活动的社会嵌入性表明，“公司 + 农户”联盟运作嵌入在特定的社会网络中。从地域嵌入看，绝大多数农业企业起源于创始人的家乡；从网络嵌入看，特定企业与不同农户的合作关系打上了系列错综复杂关系的烙印；从社会嵌入看，公司与农户的合作必定反映出宗族、家族等社会关系的运作。因此，社会资本毋庸置疑影响着公司与农户联盟的运作及其绩效。

农业企业可以利用不同层面的社会资本去获取所需资源，一是政策性资源，二是投入要素类资源，三是合作农户的互补性资源。多个实证研究的结果分述如下：

首先，基于省际数据的实证研究结果表明，区域社会资本对区域内农业龙头企业的发展有正向影响作用。在控制各省（区）的区位后，社会资本水平越高的省（区）拥有的农业产业化国家重点龙头企业的数量越多；在控制各省（区）的受高等教育人数比例、交通设施情况等因素后，社会资本水平越高的省（区）以农林牧渔总产值替代计量的地区农业龙头企业总销售收入越高。

其次，基于农业上市公司的实证研究显示，商业社会资本与企业绩效相关系数不显著；政治社会资本中政治网络强度对企业绩效起着正向影响的作用；技术社会资本与企业绩效正相关，但技术网络规模没有显著影响企业绩效，技术网络强度对企业社会绩效产生显著积极影响。这无疑揭示，农业企业在社会上“有

关系”不如“关系深”的作用大。

再次，基于对 83 家实行“公司 + 农户”模式的企业进行问卷的实证研究表明，社会资本的结构维度包括认知水平、关系网络和政治关系，关系治理的结构维度包括信任与沟通、灵活性和互惠适应，联盟绩效的结构维度包括获取知识和联盟持续。社会资本与关系治理正相关，关系治理与联盟绩效显著正相关，社会资本对联盟绩效也有着正向影响，关系治理在社会资本与联盟绩效的关系中起到部分中介作用。来自赣南脐橙业农户 4 350 份问卷的调查显示，大多数农户基本认可“公司 + 农户”模式，但是农户对与企业合作的总体满意度不高，主要是对合作获取的收益、生产过程、与企业员工打交道等情况不尽满意。

最后，东进农牧的案例研究显示，特定农业企业与不同农户可以签订差异化的合约，借助嵌入在差序格局中的关系治理机制，差异化合约能够得到持续履行；温氏模式的案例研究表明，其成功在很大程度上得益于企业与农户形成准纵向一体化的组织结构安排和既定制度安排下的关系治理机制。德宇集团的案例研究揭示，农业企业承担社会责任与追求自身利润的目标并不冲突，企业偏好合乎伦理的关系治理行为，可以为企业和合作农户带来双赢。比较案例研究得到的结论是，“公司 + 农户”联盟的社会资本越丰富，关系治理机制运用越自如，联盟绩效就越好，合作双方从联盟中获取的利益也越多。

中国目前仍需依靠多方力量，进一步推进农业产业化进程，完善公司与农户联盟的治理机制，提高农业企业带动农户的绩效，让农户从产业化经营中获得更多的利益。

(1) 对农业企业而言，由于在现阶段，中国的法律法规仍有待进一步完善，农业企业的经营生态仍有待进一步优化，企

业必须重视培育社会资本并对之加以充分利用，着力提高企业经营能力，不断强化运用关系治理机制的意愿，主动介入到合作中介主体的培育中，重视学习并把企业建成学习型组织。

（2）对合作农户而言，需要摒弃一些陈旧认识，培育与农业企业合作的意识；不要被短期利益所诱惑，应追求与企业合作的长期利益；需要有组织地联合起来，通过中介组织与企业进行交易。

（3）对政府部门而言，需要引导农业企业热衷于产业化经营，而不是去积累社会资本、搞“跑部钱进”活动；培训与农业产业化经营的相关主体，提高它们产业化经营的能力；加大对农业产业化宣传的力度，培育产业化组织主体的进取精神；加大对农业产业化经营的扶持力度，缓解农业产业经营主体的行业困境；优化“公司 + 农户”联盟的治理环境，促使“公司 + 农户”向更加有效率的组织形式变迁。

Abstract

Agricultural industrialization operation institution innovates, enriches, improves and develops double operation institution which is a combination of centralization and decentralization. Since it emerged in the late 1980s, it was given an important mission to change agriculture weak quality, farmers' weak rights and rural weak status by the whole country. Over the last two decades, agricultural industrialization in China developed rapidly with the great support from all levels of the government. Nowadays, diversity of agricultural industrialization operation organizations have become powerful and vigorous market subjects along with agricultural and rural economic development. They greatly promote the process to increase the peasant's income, improve the agricultural efficiency and thereby enrich the rural areas.

Agricultural industrialization operation organizations mainly include the following driving modes of leading enterprises, intermediary organizations, professional market, broker and the larger farmer households. In reality, many kinds of new industrialization organizations come into being, such as cooperatives led by enterprises and enterprises founded by cooperatives. In a suitable institutional environment, "company + farmers" can achieve institutional change into "company + cooperatives + farmers" which is more efficient. Even

so, under the existing institutional condition, the result of stakeholders' game is that “company + farmers” operation organization becomes a leading mode in agricultural industrialization and contract farming becomes a main interests binding mode between enterprises and farmers.

Because of production risk, market risk and contract enforcement risk, “company + farmers” alliance also faces some problems. For instance, interests binding mechanism is in urgent need of improvement, the benefit of cooperative farmers acquires more protection and contract enforcement performance should be promoted. As is well known, a large sum of undesirable phenomenon of contract farming happens in reality, but it is not the fault of “company + farmers” operation organization. Obviously, agriculture enterprises and cooperative farmers don't form the organizations that meet the internal requirements of economic society and don't use proper governance mechanisms to match with organization structure. Many “company + farmers” alliances benefit from the organization construction that rooted in local conditions and the perfect practices of governance mechanism, such as Jiangsu Ruyi Group mode, Inner Mongolia Saifeiya mode, Guangdong Wenshi mode, and Jiangxi Deyu mode. Therefore, it is of importance to explore the impact of governance mechanism of “company + farmers” alliance on the development of contract farming.

China is a relation-based society. The social embeddedness of economic activity indicates that “company + farmers” alliance is embedded in the specific social network. From the perspective of regional embeddedness, the majority of agriculture enterprises derive

from the hometown of the founder. As for network embeddedness, the cooperative relationship between specific enterprise and different farmers is branded with a series of complicated relationship. At last, the cooperation between enterprises and farmers is sure to reflect the operation of clan' and family's social relationship from the point of social embeddedness. Therefore, social capital will influence the operation and performance of "company + farmers" alliance undoubtedly.

Agriculture enterprises can capture resources through social capital at different levels, which consist of policy resources, input factors resources and complementarity resources of cooperative farmers. Results of several empirical studies have been given separately as follows:

(1) Based on the empirical analysis of the data at provincial level, the result demonstrates that the regional social capital has positive influence on the development of agriculture leading enterprises. After controlling the location of each province, the higher the level of social capital is, the more number of national key leading enterprises of agricultural industrialization the province will have. With the control of factors like the proportion of the number of higher education people as well as transport facilities, the higher the level of social capital is, the higher total sales revenue of regional agriculture leading enterprises which is replaced by total output value of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery the province will obtain.

(2) Based on the empirical study of Chinese listed companies in the agriculture industry, the result shows that the correlation coefficient

between commercial social capital and firm performance isn't significant, while the political network strength of political social capital has positive effect on firm performance. Similarly, technology social capital is also positively related to firm performance, but technology network scale has nothing to do with it. In addition, technology network strength has significant positive influence on social performance. It is clear that the agriculture enterprise with deep relationship can get more benefits than the one with relationship.

(3) Based on the empirical study of questionnaire survey on 82 enterprises which impose “company + farmers” mode, the result indicates that the structure dimension of social capital includes relation networks, cognitive level and political relation, while relational governance contains trusting communication, flexibility and reciprocal adaptation, and alliance performance consists of knowledge acquirement and alliance persistence. It also points out that social capital positively relates with relational governance, while relational governance has positive effect on alliance performance and social capital positively influences alliance performance. Furthermore, relational governance has part of mediating impact between social capital and alliance performance. A study of 4 350 questionnaire survey on farmers who grow Gannan Navel Orange suggests that most farmers recognize the mode of “company + farmers”. However, the farmers' overall satisfaction about the cooperation with enterprises is not high, which is mainly because farmers are not satisfied with the benefits gained from cooperation, production process and the contact with agriculture enterprises staffs.

(4) The case study of Dongjin mode shows that specific agriculture enterprises can sign differentiated contract with different farmers. Taking advantage of relational governance mechanism which is embedded in difference sequence, differentiated contract can be enforced persistently. The case study of Wenshi mode indicates that its success largely benefits from the organizational framework of quasi-vertical integration formed between farmers and enterprises and the relational governance mechanism under the specific institutional arrangement. The case of Deyu Group reveals that there is no conflict between assuming social responsibilities and pursuing profits. And it can bring a win-win situation for agriculture enterprise and cooperative farmers, if agriculture enterprise has preference for relational governance which is ethical. Compared with above case studies, it shows the “company + farmers” alliance with more social capital and relational governance operating more freely will get better performance, while cooperative partners can gain more profits.

At present, China still needs to rely on many-party forces to promote the process of agricultural industrialization, improve the governance mechanism of “company + farmers” alliance and performance between agriculture enterprises and farmers, and help farmers to gain more profits from industrialization operation.

First of all, China's laws and regulations need further improvement and operation ecology of agriculture enterprises should be optimized. Therefore, agriculture enterprises should pay more attention to cultivating social capital and taking full advantage of it, focus on improving enterprise's operating capacity, continue to strengthen the

willingness of using relational governance mechanism, participate in the cultivation of cooperative intermediary subject actively and lay stress on learning and changing the enterprises into learning organization.

Secondly, cooperative farmers should abandon some outdated understandings and cultivate consciousness to cooperate with agriculture enterprises. They also should resist the temptation of short-term interests and pursue the long-term interests of the cooperation with agriculture enterprises. What's more, it is necessary for cooperative farmers to join up systematically and make transaction with enterprises through intermediary organization.

Finally, government departments should lead agriculture enterprises to devoting to industrialization operation instead of accumulating social capital and making the practice of “running to ministries to get money”. They also need to train related subjects of agricultural industrialization operation to improve their operating capacity and increase the propaganda of agricultural industrialization to cultivate entrepreneurial spirit of industrialization organization subjects. In order to ease the industry difficulties of operating subjects, government should give more support to agricultural industrialization operation. Moreover, government is responsible to optimize the governance environment of “company + farmers” alliance to promote “company + farmers” to change into a more efficient organization.

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