

传媒与文化产业研究丛书

Media Economic Behavior:  
Strategies and Games

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韩晓宁◎著

 中国出版集团

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## 摘 要

本书试图借助经济学领域中的最新理论研究成果,主要是博弈论的理论,将其与传媒领域的理论和实践相结合,研究传媒领域中各种主体的经济行为,重新解读各种传媒经济现象,为传媒经济领域中的一些理论和实践问题找到答案,推进传媒经济领域中的理论和实践研究,填补该领域的空白。以传媒研究语言结合经济学研究语言解读传媒经济现象,会得到不同的结果。传媒经济现象是一系列传媒经济行为相互作用的外在表现。经济行为的分析工具——博弈论,可以为传媒经济现象提供一种更加清晰的解读方式。

博弈论主要研究决策主体的行为发生直接相互作用时候的决策以及这种决策的均衡问题。一个行为主体即一个人、一个企业或一个媒体的选择受到其他人、其他企业或其他媒体选择的影响,之后反过来又影响到其他人、其他企业或其他媒体选择时的决策问题和均衡问题。博弈可分为合作博弈和非合作博弈,主流经济学中研究的均为非合作博弈。非合作博弈是我们研究的主要对象,其强调的是个体理性和个体最优决策。

从经济学的观点看,人的行为其实就是经济行为。传媒经济行为,我们可以认为就是传媒运行过程中参与各方的行为。对传媒经

济行为的研究,包括了对传媒运行规律、传媒经营、传媒管理等领域的研究;与传媒相关的一切个体的行为都属于传媒经济行为。传媒经济行为中最微观的是个人的行为,个人以参与新闻传播活动为目的进行的行为。个人的行为又构成更高层次的集体行为、传媒组织行为、政府行为等。可以说传媒经济行为几乎构成了整个传媒世界。

本书第1章解释一些与传媒经济行为博弈相关的基本概念,包括本书所涉及的一些博弈论概念;介绍博弈论的研究方法以及在传媒领域的应用路径,同时做必要的文献研究。

博弈论的基本概念包括:参与人、行动、信息、战略、支付函数、结果、均衡。博弈论的研究范式是:建模者对参与人(player)规定支付函数(pay-off functions)和战略空间(strategy space),观察当参与人选择策略以最大化其收益时会产生什么结果。博弈论分析方法的核心在于发现对于产生一个结论所必不可少的最简单的假设,即构造一个具有预得结论的最明显、最直白的模型。新闻传播学领域内,博弈论的研究范式和分析方法将大有用武之地;本书的目的就是试图借助博弈论来研究传媒经济领域内的实际问题。

在传媒经济领域的研究中,博弈论的研究方法能够对传媒产业实际运营过程中的具体战略或策略问题提供很好的解读。本书在引入博弈论研究方法之后,会尝试对传媒经济行为进行一些策略方面的研究。近年,传媒运营战略研究成为国内传媒经济研究领域在产业经济学层面的热点话题。现有的很多研究成果对中国传媒运营实践中的策略选择指出了“现状是什么”和“应该怎样做”;而本书借助博弈论的研究范式和分析方法,则可以解释“为什么这样选择”,从博弈论的视角来解读某种策略方向选择背后的依据。

我们对传媒经济行为的其他领域进行分析时,将传媒现象化繁为简,根据实例化理论,建立合理的实例模型,然后通过对模型的分

析,找到传媒博弈中的各个关键环节,为我们希望达到的均衡结果找到解决方案,再将解决方案还原到传媒实际当中。我们可以借助博弈论,对传媒领域内各类问题进行探索性研究、描述性研究和解释性研究。

本书第2章介绍传媒领域内的完全信息博弈,利用完全信息博弈的概念和分析方法来解释传媒领域内的各种问题,比如传媒产品的价格竞争和内容竞争问题。

通过对“报业市场上的囚徒困境”的完全信息博弈分析,可以看到传媒产品价格保持稳定的原理以及价格战作为竞争手段的机制。在一般情况下,保持产品的价格稳定是符合传媒经营者利益的。而当出现市场份额的争夺时,传媒产品价格战又往往成为一个可行的选择。通过对媒体内容竞争的完全信息博弈分析,可以发现媒体在确定产品内容时的采取雷同策略、差异化策略以及进行内容创新的依据。当博弈参与者之间的市场份额差距较大时,处于竞争劣势的一方选择差异化策略,选择不同于处于竞争优势一方且具有一定受众吸引力的内容题材时,往往可以获得更好的收益。当博弈参与者之间的市场份额差距较小时,处于竞争劣势的一方选择雷同策略,选择与处于竞争优势一方相同的内容题材,则符合自身的利益。为获得竞争优势,媒体可以采取独占策略和创新策略。独占策略就是缩小竞争对手的战略空间,使竞争对手虽然有能力生产某种可获得最大受众偏好的产品但却受制于一些外在因素而不能生产。创新策略就是增加自身的战略空间,制造出具有更大受众偏好的内容产品,创造自身新的优势战略,以获得更大的收益。此外还需注意的是,传媒实际经营的博弈过程中,传媒经营者需要能够识别竞争对手的不可置信威胁以及如何利用承诺行动使自己的威胁变成可置信威胁,才能正确地做出自己的战略选择。

本书第3章介绍传媒领域内的不完全信息博弈。利用完全信

息博弈的概念和分析方法来解释传媒领域内的各种问题,比如传媒产品的竞标问题和公信力问题。

解决不完全信息博弈时要了解海萨尼转换和贝叶斯纳什均衡的概念。在不了解对方信息的情况下,博弈参与人要判断对方所属的类型的概率分布,并在多回合的博弈中逐步根据对方的战略选择来修正对对方类型的判断。本章以竞标设计为例,介绍了如何使用不完全信息博弈的方法来分析传媒领域内的实际问题。在传媒领域中,广告的竞标活动比较频繁。站在广告售卖者的角度,获得最大利益的关键是设计出符合自身利益的竞标规则,竞标规则应当包括广告产品的设计和竞标程序。产品数量少、有实力的买家数量少时,密封招标形式对卖家更有利;产品数量多、有实力的买家数量多时,公开拍卖形式对卖家更有利。无论何种竞标形式,对卖家来说,都要促使买家进入一种参与者之间的不完全信息博弈过程,而要避免阻止买家之间进行合作。多种差异化不明显的产品进行竞标时,买家一旦达成合作,在不同的产品中各取所需,卖家就无法获得最大收益了。媒体公信力的建立过程也就是媒体与受众之间进行不完全信息博弈的过程。媒体提高公信力的方法,首先是找到能够提高媒体公信力各相关因素的做法,涵盖媒体传播渠道、信息来源、组织结构、从业人员、社会形象、信誉程度等各个构成公信力的要素;找到这些要素并坚持下去,同时经常性地对受众进行调查,考察公信力的提高情况,根据外部环境发展变化的要求,继续改进整体表现并继续坚持。媒体在提高公信力的过程中与受众的动态博弈是一个永无止境的博弈过程。我们只要将这个�过程分解为一个又一个阶段性的动态博弈,就可以在媒体不同的发展阶段中为其找到合适的战略,找到分别应该采取的整体表现风格,进一步为其分别应该采取何种传播渠道、信息来源、组织结构、从业人员等提供具体的建议。

本书第4章介绍传媒领域内的各类博弈关系,并对其中有传媒

特色的部分进行博弈模型应用与建构的尝试。

本章首先对传媒实践的各个领域发生的博弈关系进行一个全景式的介绍,对传媒经济行为博弈发生的领域有一个比较直观的了解。传媒经济行为博弈发生在传媒实践中的各个领域,而所有博弈的大背景是特定的传媒环境。当我们尝试将各类传媒经济行为博弈划分到外层、内层、微层三个博弈圈时,我们发现在外层博弈圈中,主要的博弈关系围绕着政府,政府对传媒经济行为博弈的博弈规则有着很大的影响。内层博弈圈中,主要的博弈关系则围绕着传媒组织。在这个博弈圈内,发生着有传媒产业特殊性的博弈。通过模型的建构尝试,笔者提出传媒与受众之间的双向选择博弈模型,这个模型的均衡结果是,传媒在生产传媒产品时,要么无偏好,去获得最大规模的受众,要么在某个特定偏好方向上做到极致,获得受众偏好的最大集中度。这两种选择都可以使媒体的经济利益达到最大化,而任何中间道路都不是均衡结果。在微层博弈圈中的博弈,实际就是传媒组织内部的博弈,以传媒经营者与雇员之间为提高生产效率和获得更大个人收益而进行的博弈,这个领域的博弈可以直接借助信息经济学中的博弈模型进行分析。

本书第5章进行传媒经济行为博弈的个案研究。

本章将博弈分析方法应用到四个有代表性的传媒领域中,以博弈论的视角对这四个领域中的具体问题进行解读。这四个领域分别是新闻体制改革领域、传媒价格竞争领域、传媒内容竞争领域和旧传媒形态竞争领域。新闻体制改革领域,以行业报改革为例,介绍了博弈论视角下新闻体制改革的规律。一种制度安排,要能够行之有效,必须是一种均衡,否则这种制度安排便不能成立。改革的结果首先是要能使大部分人受益,才能得到社会各种力量的认可。改革令一部分人的得益大于另一部分人,那么前者更有积极性参与和推动改革。在不同领域的改革中,政府或者研究者要具体分



析其中参与各方的利益格局,分析各方的最优战略,找出有积极性推动改革的力量,或者调整参与各方的效用函数,这样才能推动改革或者发展改革过程中出现的问题。传媒价格竞争领域,以报业价格战为例,通过以博弈分析方法分析南京报业价格战过程,总结出价格战发生的原因和参与各方应该采取的正确应对措施。价格战对市场的整体发育和多数媒体经营者来说是弊大于利的,恶性竞争降低媒体竞争参与者的整体利润。传媒经营者应该了解价格竞争策略,一旦价格战真的不可避免,应该采取最优战略进行积极应对,让市场形成新的均衡。传媒内容竞争领域,以电视节目竞争为例,分析了湖南卫视“超级女声”节目的创新策略。传媒经营者要想在内容竞争中取胜,必须时刻了解受众对传媒内容的偏好变化。复制成功的节目模式,虽然能保证一定的收益,但是不能产生同样的创新效果。内容创新本身无法复制,但是内容创新的思路可以学习。新旧传媒形态竞争领域,分析了新兴媒体与传统媒体的竞争博弈,主要以网络媒体与报业联盟的竞争为例。报纸要想实现迫使网络媒体转载新闻产品时签订抬价协议,首先报纸要建立广泛的联盟,增加网络媒体退出合作的成本;其次,报纸联盟内部必须达成一致,防止被分化,拒绝分别谈判,单一报纸与网络媒体进行抬价谈判是难有胜算的。网络媒体在这场博弈中已经占领先机,报纸联盟想要夺回失地的设想还需要更多的博弈回合;报纸在移动互联网平台面前由于技术落后将面临更大困难。

本书第6章研究了不同传媒环境对传媒市场博弈的影响。

传媒经济行为都发生在特定的传媒环境中。一般情况下,传媒环境对传媒经济博弈分析的影响并不大,博弈规则中最重要的因素是经济学原理或商业规则。但不同国家的传媒环境会对传媒博弈产生不同的影响,在面对特定的问题时,传媒环境中的因素会对博弈规则产生较大的影响,比如有时可能影响参与人的战略空间,有

时影响到参与人的支付函数。不同传媒环境中的博弈参与人由于在价值取向上的不同也会产生不同的博弈目的。由于国家政治、经济制度和历史发展的不同,各国传媒环境存在不同之处,尤其在中国,国家政策等宏观层面的因素对传媒经营的影响较大。中国传媒产业中的大部分新闻媒体与政府有着极为密切的联系,在从业资格到内容导向等方面都受到严格的限定,绝大部分传统媒体的产权都属于国有。而且传媒产业在中国的发展,也一直在经历产业属性的确立等许多观念与政策的突破。中国传媒市场上的博弈,博弈参与人的目的比较多元化,有以经济效益最大化为目的的博弈,也有政治利益导向的博弈。而在其他国家,如欧美一些市场经济发达国家,其国家政府因素所占影响相对来说比重不大,除去传媒相关政策的制定之外,不存在宣传任务的规定和直接干涉传媒具体经营的情况,但不同国家也有自己特有的传媒政策限制。相对来说,报纸和网络媒体受到政府的政策限制较少;无线广播电视受到政策限制较多。市场经济发达国家出于保护言论多样化、防止垄断方面的考虑,对广播、电视、报纸之间的跨媒体经营一直有一定程度的限制。博弈目的方面,绝大多数媒体以经济利益为导向;政府、民间组织、行业协会和公共媒体则以公共利益为导向。不同的传媒环境下,媒体的最优战略是不同的,在做传媒决策时必须时刻注意不同传媒环境的特点和传媒环境的改变。中国传媒市场未来的博弈热点和重点会存在于三个方面:①伴随传媒体制改革,媒体与政府之间、媒体与媒体之间重新分配政治、经济资源的博弈;②伴随新的传播技术的发展和运用,新兴传媒形态媒体与传统媒体之间的竞争与合作博弈;③伴随经济全球化的发展,跨国传媒集团进入中国传媒市场过程中与中国政府和中國本土媒体之间的多方面博弈。

## Abstract

With the help of the latest theoretical research results in economic field, especially game theory, together with the theory and practice in the field of mass media, this book tries to study the economic behavior of various bodies in media field, re-understand various media economic phenomenon, thus to solve the problems in the theory and practice in media economic field, to promote further research and fill in the blanks. We could draw different conclusions when study media economic phenomenon from different perspectives, namely media and economy. Media economic phenomenon is the explicit expression. Game theory, as an analytical tool of economic behavior, could offer a clearer perspective of the study of media economic phenomenon.

Game theory mainly study the decision making process during the direct interaction between behaviors of decision making bodies and the equilibrium problem in this process. The choice of a certain body, a individual, an enterprise, a media would be influenced by other individual, enterprise and media's choice, and then it reacts on

the decision making process and equilibrium problem in the later one's choices. Game theory concludes cooperative game and non-cooperative game, while economy study mainly focus on the later one. Non-cooperative game is our main study objective, which emphasize individual rationality and individual optimal decision.

From the economic prospective, human behavior is actually economic behavior. Media economic behavior could be considered as the behavior of various participants in the media operative process. The study of media economic behavior concludes the study on the rule of media functioning, media operation, media management, etc, all the individual behaviors related to media is concluded in media economic behavior. The most microcosmic level of media economic behavior is individual behavior, the aim of which is to participate in the media activities. Individual behavior constitutes higher level media behaviors, such as group behaviors, media organization behaviors and government behavior. It could be concluded that the whole media world is consisted of media economic behaviors.

The first chapter of this book gives explanations to the basic concepts related to media economic behavior games, including concepts of game theories mentioned in the book, introduces the study method of game theory and its application path in media field, meanwhile necessary literature review is made.

The basic concepts of game theory include players, actions, information, strategies, payoffs, outcome and equilibria. The study paradigm of game theory is that pay-off functions and strategy space is set up to players by modeler, and then observe the results

when players make decisions to maximize the income. The core of game theory analytical method is to discover the simplest assumption which is absolutely necessary to draw conclusion, which is to build up the most obvious and direct model with presupposed conclusion. In the field of media, the study paradigm and analytical method of game theory would be quite helpful; the aim of this book is to study the practical problem in the field of media economy with the application of game theory.

In the research of media economy, game theory provides a good perspective to view specific strategic and tactical problems in the practical management process of media industry. Through the application of game theory, this book tries to do research on the tactical aspect of media economic behavior.

In recent years, the study on media management strategy appears to be a highlighted topic in domestic media economy study field on the level of industry economy. The existing research results mainly focus on the answers to problems such as what is current situation like, and what should be done to the tactical decision in Chinese media management practice, while with the help of the study paradigm and analytical method of game theory, this book explains why should decisions be made like this, to understand the basis behind certain tactical orientation in the perspective of game theory.

When analyzing other field of media economic behaviors, we simplify media phenomenon, build up reasonable instantiation model according to instantiation theory, then through analysis on the model, find every single key links in media games, thus to find

the solution to the expected equilibrium outcome, then revert the solution to media practice. Through game theory, we could do exploring research, descriptive research and explanatory research on all kinds of problems in media field.

The second chapter of this book introduces complete information games, explains various problems in media field, such as price and content competition with the concept and analytical method of complete information games, such as price and content competition between media products.

Through complete information games analysis on prisoner's dilemma in newspaper market, we can see the principle of media products' price keeping stable, and the mechanism in which price war becomes means of competition. Usually, keeping the price of products stable is in favor of media operator's interest. While contest appears in market share, price war of media products always turn out to be another feasible choice. Through complete information games analysis on media content competition, we could find the basis upon which media make choice among identical strategy, diversified strategy and content innovation while setting products content. When the gap between players' market share is large, the player in inferior position would choose diversified strategy, it would bring more profit if he choose contents which is different from the superior side and attractive. While the gap between players' market share is small, the inferior side would choose identical strategy, choose contents identical with the superior side, and it is in accordance to his own interest. To achieve competition superiority, media could take monopolistic strategy and innovation strate-

gy. Monopolistic strategy is to reduce the strategic room of the competitor, keep the competitor who has the ability to produce products in the favor of the mass from producing process, restricted by certain exterior factors. Innovation strategy is to increase own strategic room, produce products with more favored contents and develop own innovative superior strategy and gain more profit. What's more, it should be noticed that, in the game process of practical media operation, media operator needs to identify the unbelievable threat of the competitor, and how to turn its own threat into believable treat through promise, thus wise strategic decision could be made.

The third chapter of this book introduces the incomplete information game. Concepts and analytical method of incomplete information are applied to explain problems in media field, such as bidding and public trust of media products.

The concept of Harsanyi transformation and Bayesian Nash equilibrium is necessary when dealing with incomplete information game. With the absence of competitor's information, players need to estimate the probability distributing of competitor's type, and modify the judgment according to the competitor's tactical choice in the multi-round game. This chapter take bidding as example, introduces how to analyze practical problem in media field with incomplete information game. Advertisement bid is rather frequent in media field. From the perspective of an advertisement seller, the key to optimal profit is to design favorable bidding rules, including the design and bidding process of advertisement products. While the quantity of products and strong buyers are both small, sealed

bid is more favorable towards seller; while the quantity of products and strong buyers are both large, public bid is more favorable. Whatever bid format chosen, it's necessary for sellers to promote buyers into an incomplete information game process between participants and to avoid the cooperation between buyers. When several products which have little difference are bidding together, as soon as the buyers achieve in cooperation and gain each one's profit according to their needs, the seller would have no chance to gain maximized profit. The construction process of media's public trust is also an incomplete information game process between media and its audience. To raise public trust of media, first of all is to find the way to raise each factors relevant to the raising of media's public trust, including media communication channel, information resource, organization structure, working staff, social image, reputation degree etc. ; these factors should be discovered and persisted, with frequent investigation among audience, to see the latest development of common trust, and keep on with the improvement of overall performance according to the need of development and change of exterior environment. The dynamic game between media and its audience in the process of raising its public trust is endless. If only we divide this process into several phase dynamic game, could we find suitable strategy in different phase of media development, and find overall styles of expressions, thus to provide specific suggestion for corresponding media communication channel, information resource, organization structure, and working staff etc. .

The fourth chapter of this book introduces various game relations in media field, and tries to apply and construct game model in



particular parts.

This chapter firstly gives a whole picture of the game relations in each field of media practice, to offer direct understanding of the field where media economic game occurs. Media economic behavior game occurs in several field of media practice, while the overall background of all games is specific media environment. If we try to divide media economic behaviors into three games circle: outer circle, inner circle and micro circle, we could find that in the outer circle, the main game relations concentrate on government, which has great influence on game rules of media economic behavior game. In the inner game circle, the core is media organization. In this game circle, games with the particularity of media industry occur. Through the effort to build the model, this book concluded the game model of two-way choice between media and its audience, the equilibrium outcome of this model shows that, media products could either be of no preference to achieve maximum audience, or be extreme in specific orientation to achieve the maximum concentration of audience preference. Both choice could maximize the economic interest of media, there is no middle way to get equilibrium outcome. Game in micro game circle is actually game inside media organization, between media operator and employees, the aim of which is to achieve working efficiency and maximum personal income, game in this field could be analyzed directly with game model in information economics.

The fifth chapter of this book is case study on media economic behavior game.

In this chapter, game analytical method is applied into four