






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
Social and Political Theory

社会与政治原理

【美】 迈克尔·基梅尔(Michael S. Kimmel) 著
查尔斯·斯蒂芬(Charles Stephen)



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学系列



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PREFACE

This book has its origins in a classroom. I had been teaching Classical Sociological Theory for over twenty years—first as a teaching assistant at U.C. Berkeley, then at Rutgers and SUNY Stony Brook, where I've been a professor. In 1991 I returned to Berkeley as a visiting professor for a couple of years, teaching in both the sociology department and the program in the Political Economy of Industrial Societies (PEIS), an interdisciplinary program in international studies. Early in the semester of one particular class session of Classical Theories of Political Economy, we were discussing Locke's second *Treatise on Government*, as I had in every theory class I had taught. Here Locke makes his case to expand the franchise by arguing that each man has property in his own person, a radical idea for the time, because property ownership was the basis for civic participation. I knew enough to modify Locke's seeming radicalism with an acknowledgment that women were still excluded from the franchise. One student, an African American man, posed a different question. "Locke theorizes about men owning property, or at his most radical, in possessing property in their own person," he said. "But how about his position on men who were themselves property? What does Locke say about slavery? How can he justify that?"

This was one of those moments of decision for me as a professor. Do I take the easy route, mumble some equivocating answer, and move on to the next topic? Do I toss it back his way by suggesting he do some research on the topic, and thus avoid being exposed for not knowing the answer? "I don't know," I said. "I'll get back to you on it next class."

I spent the next day in the library, riffling through several biographies of Locke and reading through other works I had not read since college. It turned out that Locke had financial interests

in the Royal African Company, a slave trading company, and helped to draft the *Fundamental Constitution of the Carolinas*, which explicitly granted citizens the right to own "negro slaves." His tepid equivocations about slavery struck me as so much academic weaseling, hardly a well-thought-out and coherent response.

I dutifully reported my findings to the class. I had discovered one of my own blind spots—or, rather, been pushed into discovering it. I was surprised, and somewhat thrilled, to be pressed to return to the library, to have to do some homework myself. (I often think that much of the resistance to multiculturalism that is evident among the fiercest defenders of the traditional canon is just academic laziness masquerading as deference. Professors often feel too busy, too harried, and too preoccupied with their research to do something as mundane as re-read texts they have been teaching for what seems like an eternity.)

Here was the virtue of the multicultural classroom in sociological miniature—students of equal ability bringing their different life experiences into the classroom and using those experiences as resources, as the basis for interrogation of the canon. I was also curious: What else had I missed? What other perspectives had been missing from the way I had been taught the canonical texts?

I was already primed for such an inquiry. I had just completed a documentary history of men throughout American history who had supported feminism, and I knew from that research that many of the biographies of the more prominent of these "profeminist" men had scarcely mentioned their support of women's equality. Thus was the historical record shaped by biographers who wanted it clear that men such as Thomas Paine, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, or even Frederick Douglass were "really" involved in far more

pressing matters than the trivial pursuit of women's rights.

Now I knew better. I knew that the historical record is sanitized through revision, as each generation of historians creates the history they feel is important for readers to have. And I came to know how some of the more prominent voices of the nineteenth century had been eliminated from the historical record that shaped the traditional canon as it was created in the first few decades of this century. That canon is itself an historical creation, a series of decisions about which works get in and which works are left out.

So I began to set the record straight—or, at least, straighter. This anthology is the first result of that effort. We have not tried to elevate second-rate thinkers into that hallowed pantheon of classical theorists, but rather tried to restore for contemporary readers the number of lively voices—voices of women, voices of people of color—who were actively engaged with the questions that define the terrain of classical social and political theory. Many of these theorists' contributions were effaced in the construction of the canon, their work omitted, their voices silenced. But at the time, their work was part of a theoretical conversation that was more heterogeneous than has been acknowledged.

This anthology, then, has been motivated more by a need for historical restoration than by ideological purity. It is part of a project that questions the sacredness of the sacred texts, not because they are not in themselves meritorious, but because in the process of handing them down to us, history has forgotten other voices. This anthology, then, presents a more historically accurate classical canon—a canon that is informed by both the historical record and the needs of contemporary students.

I am grateful to the institutions at which I have taught for the past two decades. In particular, I wish to thank various colleagues and friends at those institutions for their discussions about theory, and about so much else. They include Jorge Ardití, Harry Bredemeier, Bob Connell, Troy Duster, Neil Fligstein, John Gagnon, Mark Granovetter, Jerry Himmelstein, Iona Mara Drita, Mike Messner, Vida Prater, Michael Rogin, Ian Roxborough, Lillian Rubin, Jeff Weintraub, and Robert Zussman. My thanks also to reviewers Patricia Atchison, Colorado State University; Craig Calhoun, New York University; and Henry Walker, Cornell University, for their feedback and guidance.

My family and friends have, as always, been supportive. And Amy Aronson, in the final throes of her dissertation writing, was constantly generous with her ideas as well as her heart, which makes all the work worthwhile.

This preface is the only part of this book that I have written alone. When I first began work on this project, I hired Charles Stephen as a research assistant. He has since become an equal collaborator on this project, and the coeditorship of this volume reflects his enormous contribution to the book and to my own intellectual development.

This book was born in that classroom at Berkeley, but it has been developing in all of the classical social and political theory courses I have ever taught. I was deeply honored when those students nominated me as Best Professor at U.C. Berkeley in 1992–1993 (and thrilled when the article about me in *The Daily Californian* was placed next to the article about Jason Kidd, who had been voted Best Athlete). But I have learned far more from those students than they can ever know. This book is for them.

M. S. K.

INTRODUCTION

Classical social and political philosophy forms the theoretical backbone of most disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. An introductory course in social and political theory presents the traditional canon of the development of western social theory from the Enlightenment to the end of the nineteenth century. A second course usually picks up the story from the turn of the century to the present day. This traditional canon of social and political theory seems to have solidified at the turn of the century, when academic social science sought its historical origins in the first centuries of Enlightenment thought. As academic social and political sciences distinguished themselves from philosophy, they appropriated Continental political and social philosophy as the foundation texts of their disciplines.

The classical sociological canon—consisting invariably of Durkheim, Weber, and Marx, and usually of Comte, Freud, Veblen, Mead, Tocqueville, and Simmel—built on the chief insights of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Smith. Occasionally, works by Jefferson, Michels, Mill, Mosca, and Pareto might also have been added; these were far more routinely included in courses on classical political theory offered in political science departments.

The traditional classical canon in social and political theory, therefore, did not fall out of the western European sky as a complete package ready for course adoption. It was an attempt by turn-of-the-century social scientists to claim a legacy within the canonical theories of Enlightenment philosophy in western Europe. Classics became classics because they were *declared* “classics” by intellectual specialists seeking to legitimate their own status. The canon has a history.

And it has politics. The creation of the canon was a political project from the start, seeking to locate these new discourses within the frame-

works occupied by older, more respected and established academic fields such as philosophy. In the process, certain themes were accentuated, such as the relationship of the individual to society, the development of the marketplace, and the relationship of that marketplace to the state. And certain themes were downplayed, such as the competing claims for inclusion by women or by African Americans; certain discourses were moved to the margins, such as the debates about woman suffrage or slavery. As we came to know them, the “Founding Fathers” of sociology, political science, anthropology, psychology, and economics were almost all white European men.

Of all the courses in the social science curriculum, those on classical social and political theory have been perhaps the most resistant to transformation in light of the current movements toward multiculturalism and diversity. In part, this is a generational issue as much as a political issue. In sociology, the classical canon was predominantly the work of Talcott Parsons in the 1930s and 1940s, and a subsequent generation of his students built the great sociology departments during the boom period of academic growth of the social sciences in the 1950s and 1960s. It was thus not until recently that sociology had such a classical canon.*

Increasingly, however, a new generation of scholars and students is seeking to disestablish that traditional canon, reevaluate the criteria for inclusion and exclusion, and redefine what constitutes the “classical” in classical social and political theory. We are interested in developing curricula that reflect the diversity and multicultural backgrounds of our students, our colleagues,

*R. W. Connell, “Why Is Classical Theory Classical?” *American Journal of Sociology* 102, no. 6 (May 1997).

and ourselves and, in so doing, in developing courses that more accurately reflect the subject matters we teach.

This movement is not simply a matter of historical resuscitation, by which formerly obscure theorists are elevated to the ranks of the great simply because they fill specific niches that had previously gone unfilled. It is more a project of setting the historical record straight, striving for a more inclusive and historically accurate presentation of the evolution of sociology's core ideas. Several of the theorists included here were far more influential in their time than they were subsequently declared to be as the canon was created. When Mary Wollstonecraft, Frederick Douglass, and W. E. B. Du Bois wrote, for example, their work was widely read and discussed as major contributions to the development of social and political theory. It was only later that they were pushed to the margins of the canon, declared to be derivative or second rate. This book restores them not only to a position that they *should* hold, but also to a position that they *did* hold.

This raises another issue in the study of classical social and political theory. Currently, most departments require their majors to take a course in classical theory—a course that the students invariably dread, put off for as long as possible, and finally, grudgingly take. They are convinced that such courses will be among the most esoteric in their collegiate curriculum and will speak less to their intellectual needs than to some perverse, possibly sadistic need of professors to make students take unpleasant, boring, and irrelevant courses.

Social and political theory was not always considered an esoteric subject. Like any other cultural form, social and political theory was removed from everyday discussion to the rarified atmosphere of the university lecture hall. As intellectual elites at the turn of the century strove to legitimize their privileged access to knowledge, they removed from the emerging canon writers whose works were popular and widely read and debated by large numbers of nonintellectuals. In their stead, the canon became increasingly composed

of university professors who wrote, to be sure, about foundation issues in the social sciences, but in a language that was increasingly dense and impenetrable to ordinary people.

Such a process occurred in other cultural arenas as well. In the middle of the nineteenth century, ordinary people loved Shakespeare and the opera. Presentations of Shakespeare's plays and classical opera were raucous affairs, with full-fledged audience participation as viewers would shout their approval of particular scenes or especially delightful arias. They would often even shout requests for their favorite scenes from *other* plays, and often be obliged by a dedicated cast. As the eminent cultural historian Lawrence Levine shows in his brilliant book *Highbrow/Lowbrow*, it wasn't until the turn of the century that cultural and intellectual elites insisted on the reverential respect and utterly silent viewing that we now accord opera and Shakespearean drama.

So too with classical social and political theory. In the middle of the nineteenth century, local town meetings were held to discuss the writings of Frederick Douglass, arguably the premier public intellectual of the century. When Douglass publicly advocated woman suffrage in 1848, for example, it was seen as so newsworthy that the day after, the newspapers in Syracuse, New York, wrote vicious editorials denouncing his momentous position, calling him an "Aunt Nancy Man," the mid-nineteenth-century version of a wimp. Mary Wollstonecraft's writings were widely published in eighteenth-century newspapers and magazines, and her radical notions about women's rights were debated in coffeehouses, not seminar classrooms.

The selections in this book, then, paint a different picture of the historical development of classical social and political theory—a picture at once more historically accurate and more inclusive of the voices of those who have historically been marginalized. In so doing, they also suggest new questions to be posed to the Founding Fathers of the field. If, as Locke and Jefferson assert, human beings have an inalienable right to property, including property in their own person, then

what are we to make of those people who are, themselves, property? Including the works of Frederick Douglass, Margaret Fuller, and Mary Wollstonecraft forces us to reexamine that question from a new angle. If human beings' experiences in the process of economic production hold the keys, as Marx argued, to both our enslavement and to our liberation, then, asked Charlotte Perkins Gilman, what of the realm of *reproduction*, the home and family? What does that separation of spheres look like from *women's* point of view? W. E. B. Du Bois and Gilman ask if the traditional community, however fundamentally moral (as Durkheim suggested that it was), also includes "natural" hierarchies of race and gender.

These are not idle questions, offered to placate the marginalized. They were, and remain, among the most vital theoretical and political questions of our era, evidence that classical social and political theory continues to speak to new generations of students and scholars about the issues that most affect our lives. This it has always done, despite the efforts of effete scholasticists to remove theory from the realm of the practical, to which it has always been linked. And as long as we continue to read these works in context, questioning always which voices are privileged and which are marginalized, classical social and political theory will continue to inform the everyday life of an enlightened citizenry.

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PART ONE

THE RISE OF SOCIETY, THE MARKET, AND THE STATE

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THOMAS HOBBES

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), English philosopher and scientist, is almost universally regarded as the founder of modern social thought. Hobbes attempted to use the new science of his day to explain the nature of man and society, without recourse to the religious and moral assumptions of the Greco-Christian tradition.

Hobbes was born in 1588 in Malmesbury, England, the son of a poor clergyman who deserted his family when Thomas was sixteen years old. He was recognized early as a brilliant boy and mastered the curriculum of the Renaissance grammar school, with its emphasis on Latin, Greek, and poetry. A fine linguist and translator, he was fluent in Latin, Greek, French, and Italian, and all his life wrote Latin and English verse. With these skills, a bright, lower-class boy could expect opportunities in the church, law, or medicine, or perhaps a place in an aristocratic household. Many seventeenth-century writers lived as bachelor secretaries, conducting correspondence, drafting speeches, giving advice, and tutoring the children. It was into the household of Sir William Cavendish that Hobbes was recruited in 1608, and he remained in such employment for the rest of his life, sitting in anterooms while his master and other great men discussed affairs of state, managing the lord's financial affairs, providing advice, and touring Europe with noblemen's sons.

Hobbes's first trip to Europe (1610–1615), particularly his stay in Venice, stimulated his interest in science and philosophy by bringing him into contact with the leaders of Renaissance thought in Europe. These men were skeptics grappling with the rise of the modern state and with deep divisions in the church. Modern political reality, based on deceit and intimidation, was a far cry from the recently rediscovered writings of Ci-

cero and Aristotle, and also seemed to render traditional ethics irrelevant. Shaken by the Wars of Religion that followed the Reformation, these men condemned honor, patriotism, and religious principle as dangerous illusions, declaring that the only certain principle of human conduct was *self-preservation*. In one sense Hobbes's lifework was to transform this culture from within: What the skeptics regarded as a fact of human nature, Hobbes makes the fundamental *right* on which a new kind of ethics can be constructed.

Another visit to Europe from 1634 to 1636 gave Hobbes the tools he needed to answer skepticism without a retreat to Greco-Christian ethics, which he believed to be discredited. Whereas sixteenth-century skepticism had questioned the possibility of ever having true knowledge of anything, the new philosophers of Paris, led by René Descartes, insisted that human beings could still know reality even if there is no resemblance at all between our sense experience and the external world. Descartes's own solution rested on a complex argument about God that few found convincing. But the search for a firm basis of knowledge, not fallible like our senses, led others, including Hobbes, to the new physics of Galileo and to geometry. Hobbes visited Galileo at Florence in 1636, and during the next three years worked on a philosophy that would incorporate but go beyond Descartes. Entitled *The Elements of Philosophy* and written in Latin, it comprised three parts: a section on physics, showing that the causes of all things lay in diversity of motion; a section on psychology, showing that bodily motions were involved in human thinking and volition; and a section that developed the political implications of these arguments. The book was never published as a whole but was the basis of most of Hobbes's later work.

Increasing strife in England forced Hobbes to flee England for Paris, where he joined other Royalist exiles and found himself cut off from his English income. In 1640, hoping to avert civil war, he published the third part of his Latin treatise as *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*. Basing human rights on the principles of natural science, Hobbes argued that in a “state of nature,” man’s restless appetites drive him to seek his own preservation, and that whatever is necessary for this (provided it does not endanger other people’s preservation) is therefore legitimate. Yet this is the *only* right man possesses, which means that in times of strife, an entire population might agree to renounce its freedoms in order to achieve social peace or harmony. Indeed, Hobbes intended his theory of rights as a defense of absolute monarchy—a view that was to irk John Locke and arouse the fury of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Hobbes’s views antagonized almost everyone in the England of his day: The believers in divine right of kings condemned his atheism and his effort to base sovereignty on a social contract, and parliamentarians were outraged by his advocacy of absolute monarchy.

Believing himself a marked man, Hobbes stayed in exile until 1651. He made his living as a mathematics tutor to the Prince of Wales, the future Charles II, but worked chiefly on his philosophy. *De cive* (1642) expanded *The Elements of Law*, focusing on the relation between church and state, and argued that because church and state were one body, with the ruler at the head, he thus had the right to interpret Scripture, to decide religious disputes, and to determine the form of public worship. In 1651 there appeared an English edition of *De cive* and, in the same year, Hobbes’s masterpiece, *Leviathan*. Illness and poverty, together with difficulties stemming from his move back to England, delayed the completion of *The Elements of Philosophy*; as a result, Section One did not appear until 1655, under the title *Matter (De Corpore)*, and Section Two in 1658, as *Man (De Homine)*, published as Hobbes turned seventy. Both works show a decline in his powers and

have never excited the enthusiasm that still greets his earlier works.

It can hardly be said that in the years after age seventy Hobbes retired from public life. He acquired a new prominence when the Prince of Wales, his former pupil, was restored to the throne as Charles II. He resumed his controversy with the church and entered into new ones over mathematics, physics, and constitutional law. He published an account of the English Civil War, *Behemoth* (1679), and in his eighties produced complete translations of the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad*. Hobbes died in Derbyshire on December 4, 1679.

Hobbes’s reputation as a thinker rests on his social philosophy, in particular *Leviathan*. In accordance with his view that everything is matter in motion, Hobbes argues that all human desires are connected with the need to keep the body in motion and so avoid death. The most important passions are hope, or “appetite,” and fear; the former impels people toward society, the latter drives them from it. All seemingly unselfish motives are seen as indirect ways of furthering our own interests, and human life is a constant struggle to satisfy desire.

To help them in this process, human beings are endowed with reason, which shows them the most effective ways to gain satisfaction and avoid disappointment. These strategies Hobbes calls “power,” and power cannot be acquired without conflict. First people must struggle for scarce resources, then they must prevent others from taking the power they have obtained, and finally, even when they are secure in their possessions, they seek the feeling of superiority that springs from having power over others. As a result, in the absence of external controls they are in a chronic “state of war” with one another, and face a life that is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”

Human beings need society and covet its benefits, yet by their nature they seem unable to cooperate. No one can be trusted to refrain from harming others when it benefits him to do so. Hobbes’s solution to this paradox is that people in the “state of nature,” before they make any