



心理档案

MENTAL FILES

[法] 弗朗西斯·雷卡纳蒂 著
刘龙根 伍思静 译

 復旦大學出版社
Fudan University Press



心理档案

MENTAL FILES

[法] 弗朗西斯·雷卡纳蒂 著
刘龙根 伍思静 译

 復旦大學出版社
Fudan University Press

图书在版编目(CIP)数据

心理档案/[法]雷卡纳蒂(Recanati, F.)著;刘龙根,伍思静译. —上海:复旦大学出版社, 2014. 5

书名原文: Mental files

ISBN 978-7-309-10486-8

I. 心… II. ①雷…②刘…③伍… III. 心理语言学-研究 IV. H0

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字(2014)第 059394 号

OXFORD

UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom

© François Recanati 2012

The moral rights of the author have been asserted

First Edition published in 2012

Impression: 1

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data. Data available.

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data. Data available.

ISBN 978-0-19-965598-2 (hbk)

978-0-19-965599-9 (pbk)

心理档案

[法]雷卡纳蒂(Recanati, F.)著 刘龙根 伍思静 译

责任编辑/唐 敏 宋启立

复旦大学出版社有限公司出版发行

上海市国权路 579 号 邮编: 200433

网址: fupnet@fudanpress.com http://www.fudanpress.com

门市零售: 86-21-65642857

团体订购: 86-21-65118853

外埠邮购: 86-21-65109143

常熟市华顺印刷有限公司

开本 890 × 1240 1/32 印张 8.375 字数 229 千

2014 年 5 月第 1 版第 1 次印刷

ISBN 978-7-309-10486-8/H · 2304

定价: 28.00 元

如有印装质量问题, 请向复旦大学出版社有限公司发行部调换。
版权所有 侵权必究

Preface to the Chinese Edition

One of my central concerns over the past fifteen years has been to extend to representation in general, and to mental representation in particular, some of the lessons we learn from the study of linguistic representations. This corresponds to a general move in the field: the emergence of a “theory of content” which uses tools from the analysis of language but extends to mental representations.

A particular reason to move to the analysis of thought is related to the pragmatic approach to semantics advocated in *Literal Meaning* and *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics*. According to one version of the approach, pragmatic processes of interpretation operate on the mental representations associated with utterances (see the discussion of Sperber and Wilson in *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics*, Chapter 4). Beyond pragmatics, the move toward mental representations has played a large role in recent theorizing about language. Semantic theories focussing on discourse, like DRT (Discourse Representation Theory), explicitly appeal to an intermediate level of mental representation between language and the world, and formulate the semantics in terms of it. This idea can also be found in the writings of cognitive linguists such as Fauconnier, Langacker, Talmy, Lakoff, or Jackendoff, who attempt to provide cognitive foundations for semantics. The “logical forms” of formal semantics are themselves sometimes interpreted as mental representations sitting at the interface with the conceptual system. ^①

① See the quotation from Chierchia in *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics*, p. 132.

In the theory of reference, the act of *mental* reference is taken as primary by authors such as Donnellan, who analyse linguistic reference in terms of the speaker's "having in mind" a certain object. The following quotation from the philosopher Charles Chastain is representative of this tradition, to which this book also belongs:

A theory of singular reference will have to be combined with a systematic account of certain internal states of the speaker — his thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, memories, and so on — which are, so to speak, the intermediate links connecting the singular terms he utters with their referents out in the world. These intermediaries can themselves be understood only if we treat them as being quasi-linguistic in structure and content (...) and as containing elements analogous to singular terms which can be referentially connected with things in the world...^②

When we move from language to thought, the role of context seems to be more widely accepted, as if "literalism" was out of place in this area. The majority view has it that no content is wholly independent of context: the content of mental representations essentially depends upon the environment. Relational factors, not things "in the head", are what determine reference.^③ Thus "externalism" is the dominant position in the philosophy of mind, while contextualism remains a minority position in the philosophy of language.

Yet the contrast should not be overestimated. It is the content of mental representation-*types* that is said to depend upon the environment — e. g. the environment in which the species has evolved, or the

② C. Chastain, Reference in Context, in K. Gunderson (ed.) *Language, Mind, and Knowledge*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975, p. 197.

③ See H. Putnam, The Meaning of Meaning, in his *Philosophical Papers 2: Mind, Language and Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 215-271.

environment in which the concepts whose content is at issue have been acquired. As I wrote in *Direct Reference*,

Mental contents are (...) environment-dependent in the sense that the existence of a certain type of content depends on there being systematic causal relations between states of the mind/brain and types of objects in the external world. Thus a (type of) configuration in the brain is a concept of water only if it is normally tokened in the presence of water. It follows that there would be no water-concept if there were no water. This sort of environment-dependence is what Externalism is concerned with. It affects mental states considered as types: the content of a mental state *type* depends on the environment — namely, on what normally causes a tokening of the type. ④

The form of context-dependence that externalism generalizes is comparable to a trivial form of context-dependence which can be found on the language side and which Bar-Hillel talks about in the following passage:

Let me (...) mention a brand of dependency which embraces even the non-indexical sentences. I mean the fact that any token has to be understood to belong to a certain language. When somebody hears somebody else utter a sound which sounds to him like the English “nine”, he might sometimes have good reasons to believe that this sound does not refer to the number nine, and this in the case that he will have good reasons to assume that this sound belongs to the German language, in which case it refers to the same as the English “no”. In this sense, *no* linguistic expression is completely

④ F. Recanati, *Direct Reference: From Language to Thought*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993, pp. 214-215.

independent of the pragmatic context. But just because this kind of dependence is universal, it is trivial, and we shall forget it for our purposes. ⑤

Being comparable to the trivial generalization of context-dependence Bar-hillel talks about, the generalization of context-dependence advocated by externalism is quite different from that advocated by contextualism in the language case. This raises the following question: Are there, in the mental realm, forms of context-dependence that are similar to the forms of context-dependence at issue in the literalism/contextualism debate?

In the same passage from *Direct Reference* which I quoted above, I mention:

another form of environment dependence which affects *tokens* rather than types. The “wide” content of a particular token of the thought “This man looks happy” is environment-dependent in the (stronger) sense that it depends on the context of occurrence of this token: it depends on the particular man who happens to cause *this tokening* of the thought.

Insofar as it affects the content carried by a particular token, rather than the constant meaning of the type, this form of context-dependence is similar to the dependence of the content of an indexical sentence upon the context of utterance. Indeed the dependence of the “wide” content of a thought upon the context of thinking is sometimes referred to as “mental indexicality”; a label that is motivated, in part, by the fact that the thoughts whose content is dependent upon the context in this way are typically expressed by indexical sentences such as “This man looks happy” or “I am hot”.

⑤ Y. Bar-Hillel, *Aspects of Language*, Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1970, p. 80.

There was a time when people took indexicality to be a property of language, and of language exclusively. Thought itself, they believed, *could not* be indexical (any more than it could be ambiguous). Then came the discovery of “the essential indexical”. Castañeda, Prior, Geach, Perry, Lewis and others put forward examples in which removing the indexicals from a sentence changes the nature of the thought that is expressed. This seems to establish that the thought expressed by uttering an indexical sentence is itself indexical, in some cases at least. Since then, the study of indexical thought has flourished. The nature of indexical thought has become a major topic in the philosophy of language and mind.

In the book I offer a theory of indexical concepts, following on the footsteps of Perry. But I generalize the idea and put forward an indexical model for (mental) reference in general. That theory emphasizes the importance of relational factors, by using an analogy between mental reference and linguistic indexicality. Indexicals in language encode the contextual relation which must hold between the indexical (token) and the reference. Thus the meaning of “I” is the rule that it refers to the speaker. Similarly, according to my theory, we think about objects through “mental files” which track the objects we bear certain contextual relations to. These files are used to store the information we get about the objects we encounter — the objects we are “acquainted with”. Different types of file correspond to different types of acquaintance relations with the objects. (The “self” file is a special case — it’s the file in which we store information about ourselves.) Files are subject to an acquaintance norm, but acquaintance is understood liberally, so that testimony counts as (mediated) acquaintance with the object we hear about. In any case, the reference of the file is the object one bears the relevant relation to, not the object which satisfies the information in the file. The information in the file

may be misinformation.

In theorizing about thought, I do not lose sight of language. First I use tools from the study of language (and the study of indexicals in particular) in approaching the topic of reference in thought. Second, I use the framework to provide an analysis of the referential uses of linguistic expressions, and to solve the paradox which the existence of indexical thoughts raises for the theory of communication. (If indexical thoughts depend upon the context and are available only to those in the right context, how do we manage to communicate these thoughts to others who are not in the same context?)

I wish to take advantage of this preface to express, once again, my indebtedness to Liu Longgen, Professor in the School of Foreign Languages at Shanghai Jiaotong University, who has taken upon himself to translate this book and make it available to a Chinese audience, as he had done already for my two previous books, *Literal Meaning* and *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics*. I am most grateful to him for his work on my three books.

François Recanati
Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris

中文版前言

过去 15 年里,我的重点关注之一是将我们从语言表征研究中获得某些经验扩展到一般表征,尤其是扩展到心理表征。这与本领域中总的动向是相一致的:“内容理论”的出现,运用源于语言分析的工具,但又扩展到心理表征。

开展思维分析的一个具体理由同《字面意义论》与《真值条件语用学》中所提倡的以语用学方法研究语义学的路径相关联。按照这种路径的一种形式,理解的语用过程运作于同话语相联系的心理表征(参见《真值条件语用学》第 4 章中斯珀伯与威尔逊的讨论)。除了语用学路径之外,展开心理表征探索在最近的语言理论研究中发挥了很大的作用。聚焦于话语的语义学理论,诸如 DRT(话语表征理论),明确地诉诸语言与世界之间心理表征这个中间层面,并且以此建构语义学理论。这种思想同样存在于诸如福科尼耶、兰加克、塔尔米、拉科夫或杰肯道夫等认知语言学家的著述之中。这些认知语言学家试图为语义学提供认知基础。形式语义学的“逻辑式”本身有时理解为处于概念系统接口的心理表征。^①

在指称理论中,心理指称行为被唐纳伦等作者看作是基本的行为,这些作者以讲话者“心里怀有”某个客体来分析语言指称。下面引自哲学家查尔斯·查斯顿的这段话就代表了这一传统,而本书也属于这一传统:

单称指称理论必须同关于讲话者某些内在状态——他的思

^① 参见《真值条件语用学》第 132 页上引自基耶尔基亚的话。

想、信念、感知、记忆等——的系统阐释结合起来,这些内在状态可以说是连接他所说出的单称词项与其在外部世界中的指称对象之间的中间环节。唯有当我们将这些中间环节看作在结构与内容上(……)具有类语言特征,并且包含类似于单称词项的成分,能够指称性地同世界上的事物相联系,这些中间环节本身才能够得到理解……^②

当我们从语言进入到思维时,语境的作用看来得到更加广泛的接受,似乎在这个领域中“字面论”是不适用的。大多数人的观点是,没有任何内容是完全独立于语境的:心理表征的内容本质上取决于环境。决定指称的是关系因素,而不是“头脑里的”东西。^③ 因此,“外在论”在心智哲学中占据主导地位,而语境论在语言哲学中仍然只是少数人坚持的立场。

然而,这种对照不应估计过度。取决于环境的——如,人类进化的环境,或者掌握那些其内容正受关注的概念的环境——被认为是心理表征类型的内容。正如我在《直接指称》中写道:

心理内容(……)在下述意义上依赖于环境,即某种内容的存在依赖于心理/大脑的状态与外部世界中的客体类型之间的因果关系。因此,大脑中的一(种)构型是水的概念,唯有当存在水时通常就会出现这个构型的例型。这就必然意味着倘若没有水就不会有水的概念。这种环境依赖性是在外在论所关心的。它影响视为类型的心理状态:一个心理状态类型的内容依赖于环境——即,依赖于通常导致这个类型例型地出现的东西。^④

外在论概括的那种形式的语境依赖性可与语境依赖性的一种平凡形

② 查斯顿《语境中的指称》,载于冈德森(编)《语言、心灵与知识》,明尼阿波利斯:明尼苏达大学出版社,1975,第197页。

③ 参见普特南《意义的意义》,载于他的《哲学论文集2:心灵、语言与实在》,剑桥:剑桥大学出版社,1975年,第215-271页。

④ 雷卡纳蒂《直接指称:从语言到思想》,牛津:巴兹尔·布莱克威尔出版社,1993年,第214-215页。

式做一比较,这种形式存在于语言这一边,巴尔·希勒尔在下面这段话中做了讨论:

我要(……)提及一种依赖性甚至包括非指示性语句。我意指任何例型都必须理解为属于某种语言。假如某人听到另外某个人发出一个声音,听起来像英语中的“nine”(九),他有时也许有充分的理由认为这个声音不指数字“九”,这是当他有充分的理由假定,这个语音属于德语,这时它所指的与英语中的“no”(不)相同。^⑤在这个意义上,没有任何语言表达式是完全独立于语用语境的。但是,正是因为这种依赖性很普遍,并无任何特殊之处,所以针对我们的目的将不再提起。

尽管可与巴尔·希勒尔讨论的语境依赖性的平凡概括相比较,外在论提倡的对语境依赖性的概括同语境论所主张的语言中的语境依赖性迥然而异。这就引起了以下问题:在心理领域,是否存在类似于字面论/语境论争鸣中涉及的语境依赖形式的那些语境依赖形式?

在上面引自《直接指称》的同一段话里,我提到:

环境依赖性的另一种形式,影响例型而非类型。“这个人看上去是幸福的”这一思想的特定例型之“宽式”内容在(强式)意义上,即依赖于该例型出现的语境,是环境依赖性的:这个内容依赖于恰巧引起这个思想例型地出现的那个具体的人。

鉴于这种语境依赖性影响特定例型带有的内容,而非类型的恒定意义,所以它类似于指示性语句的内容对话语语境的依赖性。事实上,思想的“宽式”内容对思维语境的依赖性有时称为“心理指示性”——这个名称的理据部分地源于这个事实,即其内容以这种方式依赖于语境的思想典型地由诸如“这个人看上去是幸福的”或者“我热”这种指示性语句表达。

人们曾一度将指示性看作语言的一种性质,而且仅仅是语言的

⑤ 巴尔·希勒尔《语言的若干方面》,耶路撒冷:马哥内斯出版社,1970年,第80页。

性质。他们认为,(就像思想不能是歧义的一样)思想本身不能是指示性的。后来发现了“基本指示语”。卡斯塔涅达、普赖尔、计奇、佩里、刘易斯等人列举了这样的例子,从句子中除去指示语就会改变所表达思想的性质。这就表明,由说出指示句所表达的思想本身是指示性的,至少在某些情形下如此。自那以后,指示性思想研究方兴未艾。指示性思想的性质业已成为语言哲学与心智哲学的一个主要课题。

我在本书中沿着佩里开辟的道路前行,提供了一种指示概念理论。但是,我将这一思想扩展,为普遍性(心理)指称模式提出了一个指示性模式。这一理论通过心理指称与语言指示性的类比,强调关系因素的重要性。语言中的指示语编码语境关系,这种语境关系在指示语(例型)与指称对象之间必须成立。因此,“我”的意义是它指称讲话者这条规则。同样,根据我的理论,我们藉由“心理档案”思考客体,心理档案追踪我们与之具有某些语境关系的客体。这些档案用于存储我们所获得的关于所遇到之客体——我们“亲知的”客体——的信息。不同类型的档案对应于与客体的不同类型的亲知关系。(“自我”档案是一个特例——这是一个我们存储关于我们自己信息的档案。)档案受制于亲知规范,但是亲知的理解并不严格,从而证词算作(中介地)亲知我们所听说的客体。无论怎样,档案的指称是人们与之具有相关关系的客体,而非符合档案信息的客体。档案中的信息可能是错误信息。

在关于思想的理论阐述中,我并没有忽视语言。首先,我运用源于语言研究(特别是指示语研究)的工具探究思想中的指称这一课题。其次,我使用这一框架以分析语言表达式的指称性用法,并且消解指示性思想的存在对交际理论提出的悖论。(假如指示性思想依赖于语境,而且只能为那些处于恰当语境中的人获得,我们如何将这些思想传达给不处于同一语境中的其他人呢?)

我愿借此前言再次表达我对上海交通大学刘龙根教授的感激之情,他承担起翻译本书的重任,使之能供中文读者阅读,此前,他业已

将我的前两本书《字面意义论》与《真值条件语用学》翻译成中文。我非常感谢他为翻译这三本书所做的工作。

弗朗西斯·雷卡纳蒂
巴黎让·尼可德研究所

前 言

心理档案的概念是在 20 世纪 60 年代晚期或 70 年代初期由几位哲学家提出的,涉及限定摹状词的指称性用法(Grice 1969:140-144)或同一性陈述(Lockwood 1971:208-211, Strawson 1974:54-56)。之后,几位作者使用了这个概念,包括埃文斯(Evans 1973:199ff, 1982:276)、巴赫(Bach 1987:34-37)、德维特(Devitt 1989:227-231)、福布斯(Forbes 1989, 1990:538-545)、克里明斯(Crimmins 1992:87-92)以及我本人(Recanati 1993, 第 7、10、15 章)。而最具影响的阐释则归于约翰·佩里(John Perry),他令我受益匪浅。(佩里在 1980 年的论文《关于持续信念的一个问题》中首次不断地诉诸心理档案这一概念。自那以后,他就这一论题撰文广泛进行探讨。)几乎与此同时,语言学中引入了类似的概念,以论述有定性、回指及信息结构(Karttunen 1976; Du Bois 1980; Reinhart 1981; Heim 1983, 1988; Vallduvì 1992, 1994; Erteschik-Shir 1997);在论及记忆、感知与注意等问题时,认知科学中也引入类似的概念(Anderson & Hastie 1974, Anderson 1977, Treisman & Schmidt 1982, Kahneman & Treisman 1984, Treisman 1988, 1992, Kahneman, Treisman & Gibbs 1992)。^{①-②}本书中阐述的心理档案理论同档案概念的许多用法相联系。这些联系十分值得探讨,因为正是这些联系赋予

① 鉴于这一按发表年份顺序排列的文献,说“[心理]档案概念并非源于哲学”(Fodor 2008:注 124)并不完全正确。

② 我提到一些著述,心理档案的概念显明地出现在这些著述中。但这一概念也隐含地出现在斯特劳森早期的著作,如:《单称词项与述谓》(1961)或《辨识指称与真值》(1964)中,当时他论述了“一系列辨识性知识”(Strawson 1971:63,79)。沙费(Chafe)以与斯特劳森相同的口吻,说人类知识是由“许多作为我们关于具体个人与事件之知识的认知单位”组成的(Chafe 1976:43)。

这一理论以实践价值。然而,在本书中,我只关注其概念基础。同其他讨论本课题的哲学家一样,我将聚焦于心理档案是如何为语言与思维中的单一指称提供启迪的。

根据我在此阐述的理论(这一理论是《直接指称》中理论的发展),我们通过心理档案指称。心理档案起着所谓“呈现方式”的作用。^③ 语言表达式的指称是从我们与这些表达式相联系的心理档案之指称承继而来的。心理档案的指称按照关系确定,而非依据满足条件确定。因此,心理档案不能等同于它所包含的(错误)信息体。心理档案类似于思维语言中的单称词项,带有非摹状论语义结构。与其他作者相对,我提供一种指示性模式,依照这个模式心理档案根据其功能分类。心理档案的类型对应于其所利用的语境关系类型。按照我的理论模式,就连分离的心理档案,即(我在《直接指称》中所称的)“百科词条”,也是基于与其指称对象所结成的对认知有贡献的关系之上。

近来,档案隐喻十分流行。我受惠于许多与我从事类似研究的人。我尤其要感谢两次研讨会的参与者。这两次研讨会围绕本书主题在巴黎召开:一次是2010年11月的“心理档案”研讨会,由我(同Imogen Dickie, Graeme Forbes, Robin Jeshion, Krista Lawlor, Christopher Peacocke, John Perry, Jim Pryor, Laura Schroeter)组织;另一次是2011年2月我(与Joseph Levine, Christopher Mole, 和David Papineau一起)组织的“感性概念与指示性思维”研讨会。

我在多个场合讲述过本书中的内容。在这些场合,尤其是2009年1月的巴塞罗纳单一思维研讨会,2010年与2011年在圣·安德鲁斯大学和让·尼可德研究所举办的数场(专题)研讨会,2011年1月我在牛津大学所作的加勒斯·埃文斯纪念演讲,2011年4月我在伦敦主讲的BPPA哲学高级讲习班,(2011年6月在瑟里西拉福雷、2011年9月在布达佩斯举办的)第二、三期PETAF研讨会,2011年9月杜布罗夫尼克语言学哲学/心理现象研讨会,以及同样于该年9月在斯德哥尔摩举

^③ 那实际上是三重作用:呈现方式应当对“认知意谓”、信息汇聚/协调、指称确定做出解释。

行的首次 PLM 网络会议,我从听众的问题与回应中学到了许多东西。在写完本书的初稿之后,受纽恩(Albert Newen)之邀,我于 2011 年 11 月至 2012 年 1 月在波鸿鲁尔大学,基于书稿作了六场关于语言与思维的讲座。我获益于每次讲座之后的讨论(以及继这些讲座之后不久我在科隆与杜塞尔多夫所作的讲座)。我也从在我 2011—2012 年的 EHES 思维档案讲习班上进行的那些讨论中获益良多。

我非常感谢我的研究生(特别是 Gregory Bochner, Marie Guillot, Michael Murez, Andrea Onofri, 和 Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho)就本书论述的课题所做的富有洞见的讨论。尤其要向米雷(Michael Murez)致谢!在这本著作成书的每个阶段,他都提出了大量的意见与质疑,我对他十分感激。我也非常感谢摩根(Daniel Morgan)和古德塞尔(Thea Goodsell)以及莫马奇洛夫(Peter Momtchiloff)等匿名顾问提出的书面意见,帮助我改进本书的终稿。

我在书中再次使用了几篇业已发表或即将刊出的论文中的材料,即:《第一人称思想的交流》(1995)、《单一思维:捍卫亲知》(2010a)、《心理档案与同一性》(2011)、《心理档案框架中的空洞单称词项》(2012b)、《指称思维心理档案》(即将刊出 a)以及《感性概念:捍卫指示模式》(即将刊出 b)。感谢有关期刊或刊物的编辑与出版者应允再次使用相关材料。

最后,感谢欧洲共同体第七次框架项目 FP7/2007-2013 基金 n°FP7-238128 的资助,尤其感谢 ERC 基金项目 n°229441-CCC 的资助。