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道德情操论

THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS

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(二)

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CHAP. III

Of The Influence And Authority Of Conscience

But though the approbation of his own conscience can scarce, upon some extraordinary occasions, content the weakness of man; though the testimony of the supposed impartial spectator, of the great inmate of the breast, cannot always alone support him; yet the influence and authority of this principle is, upon all occasions, very great; and it is only by consulting this judge within, that we can ever see what relates to ourselves in its proper shape and dimensions; or that we can ever make any proper comparison between our own interests and those of other people.

As to the eye of the body, objects appear great or small, not so much according to their real dimensions, as according to the nearness or distance of their situation; so do they likewise to what may be called the natural eye of the mind; and we remedy the defects of both these organs pretty much in the same manner. In my present situation an immense landscape of lawns, and woods, and distant mountains, seems to do no more than cover the little window which I write by, *and to be out of all proportion less than the chamber in which I am sitting.* I can form a just comparison between those great objects and the little objects around me, in no other way, than by transporting myself, at least in fancy, to a different station, from whence I can survey both at nearly equal distances, and thereby form some judgment of their real proportions. Habit and experience have taught me to do this so easily and so readily, that I am scarce sensible that I do it; and a man must be, in some measure, acquainted with the philosophy of vision, before he can be thoroughly convinced, how little those distant objects would appear to the eye, if the imagination, from

第三章 论良心的影响和权威

虽然在一些特殊场合,自己良心上的认同几乎不能使意志薄弱的人感到满足;虽然在内心中设想的那个公正的旁观者所提供的证据并不能单独支撑其信心;但是,在所有的场合,良心的影响和权威都是非常大的;只有在询问内心的审判者后,我们才能真正看清与自己相关的物品它所固有的形状和尺寸;或者我们才能对自己的利益和他人的利益作合宜的比较。

正如对人的肉眼而言,物品的大或小,并非依据它们的真正体积,而是依据它们位置的远近;对于所谓的自然的心灵之眼来说,情形亦是如此;并且,我们纠正这两个器官的缺陷的方法几乎也是相同的。从我现在的位置来看,无边的草地、森林以及远处的群山,这些风景看上去都大不过我书桌旁的那扇小窗,与我身处其中的这间房子相比则更是小得多。我能对我周围大的物体与小的物体作一个合宜的比较,所用的方法无非就是,至少在想象中让自己换个位置,在那个位置,我能从大致相等的距离去观察这两处物体,从而对它们实际的大小作出判断。习惯和经验已经教会我轻而易举地这样去做,以致几乎是下意识地去做;并且一个人必须或多或少懂得一些视觉哲学,他才能充分相信,如果不是想象力依据物体真实大小的知识,根据物体的远近对它进

a knowledge of their real magnitudes, did not swell and dilate them.

In the same manner, to the selfish and original passions of human nature, the loss or gain of a very small interest of our own, appears to be of vastly more importance, excites a much more passionate joy or sorrow, a much more ardent desire or aversion, than the greatest concern of another with whom we have no particular connexion. His interests, as long as they are surveyed from this station, can never be put into the balance with our own, can never restrain us from doing whatever may tend to promote our own, how ruinous soever to him. Before we can make any proper comparison of those opposite interests, we must change our position. We must view them, neither from our own place nor yet from his, neither with our own eyes nor yet with his, but from the place and with the eyes of a third person, who has no particular connexion with either, and who judges with impartiality between us. Here, too, habit and experience have taught us to do this so easily and so readily, that we are scarce sensible that we do it; and it requires, in this case too, some degree of reflection, and even of philosophy, to convince us, how little interest we should take in the greatest concerns of our neighbour, how little we should be affected by whatever relates to him, if the sense of propriety and justice did not correct the otherwise natural inequality of our sentiments.

Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us consider how a man of humanity in Europe, who had no sort of connexion with that part of the world, would be affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity. He would, I imagine, first of all, express very strongly his sorrow for the misfortune of that unhappy people, he would make many melancholy reflections upon the precariousness of human life, and the vanity of all the labours of man, which could thus be annihilated in a moment. He would too, perhaps, if he was a man of speculation, enter into many reasonings concerning the effects which this disaster might produce upon the commerce of Europe, and the trade and business of the world in general. And when all this fine philosophy was over, when all these humane sentiments had been once fairly expressed, he would pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the

行放大或缩小,远处的物体在他看来会是何等渺小。

同样,对于人性中的自私而又原始的情感来说,我们自己的蝇头小利的得失,会显得比与我们没有特殊关系的人的最高利益重要得多,它会激起比后者更强烈的高兴或悲伤,引发比后者更强烈的爱慕和反感。只要从这一立场出发,他的那些利益就无法跟我们自己的利益相提并论,就无法阻止我们做对他有百害而对我们仅有一利的事情。我们要对这两种相对立的利益作一合宜的比较,必须首先改变自己的立场。我们必须既不从自己的立场和眼光,也不从他的立场和眼光,而是从第三者的立场和眼光来看待它们,这个第三者同我们没有什么特殊的关系,他在我们之间能不偏不倚地作出判断。在这里,习惯和经验也使我们轻而易举地这样做,以致几乎是无意识地这样去做;并且,在这种情况下,如果合宜感和公正感没有纠正我们情感中的天生的不公正之处,那么要使我们确信自己对有重大利害关系的邻居不动恻隐之心,不以他的情况而影响我们的立场,就需要某种程度的反思,甚至是某种哲学的反思。

让我们假设,伟大的中国帝国连同她的亿万居民突然被一场地震吞没,让我们想一想,一个仁慈的欧洲人,他与中国没有任何关系,在获悉中国发生这个可怕的灾难时会有什么反应。我想,他首先会对这些不幸的人遇难深表悲痛,他将悲伤地感慨人生的无常,人类全部劳动成果竟然在顷刻之间化为乌有,令他深感虚无。如果他是一个投机商人,他或许还会推测这次灾难对欧洲贸易乃至广泛的世界贸易可能造成的影响。而一旦这些冷静的思考一结束,一旦充分表达完所有这些仁慈的情感,他就会继续他的生意或者娱乐,跟以前一样悠闲和平静地休息或者消遣,

same ease and tranquillity, as if no such accident had happened. The most frivolous disaster which could befall himself would occasion a more real disturbance. If he was to lose his little finger tomorrow, he would not sleep to-night; but, provided he never saw them, he will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a hundred millions of his brethren, and the destruction of that immense multitude seems plainly an object less interesting to him, than this paltry misfortune of his own. To prevent, therefore, this paltry misfortune to himself, would a man of humanity be willing to sacrifice the lives of a hundred millions of his brethren, provided he had never seen them? Human nature startles with horror at the thought, and the world, in its greatest depravity and corruption, never produced such a villain as could be capable of entertaining it. But what makes this difference? When our passive feelings are almost always so sordid and so selfish, how comes it that our active principles should often be so generous and so noble? When we are always so much more deeply affected by whatever concerns ourselves, than by whatever concerns other men; what is it which prompts the generous, upon all occasions, and the mean upon many, to sacrifice their own interests to the greater interests of others? It is not the soft power of humanity, it is not that feeble spark of benevolence which Nature has lighted up in the human heart, that is thus capable of counteracting the strongest impulses of self-love. It is a stronger power, a more forcible motive, which exerts itself upon such occasions. It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct. It is he who, whenever we are about to act so as to affect the happiness of others, calls to us, with a voice capable of astonishing the most presumptuous of our passions, that we are but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in it; and that when we prefer ourselves so shamefully and so blindly to others, we become the proper objects of resentment, abhorrence, and execration. It is from him only that we learn the real littleness of ourselves, and of whatever relates to ourselves, and the natural misrepresentations of selflove can be corrected only by the eye of this impartial spectator. It is he who shows us the propriety of generosity and the

似乎不曾发生过这灾难一般。相反,发生在他身上即使是微不足道的灾难,也会引起他更为真切的不安。如果他明天要失去一个小指,他今晚就会无法入睡;但是,假如他素昧平生的亿万同胞们面临灭顶之灾,他在知道他们的消息后依然会高枕无忧,呼呼大睡,亿万同胞的毁灭同他自己微不足道的不幸相比,显然前者是无足轻重的事情。如此说来,为了阻止在自己身上发生微不足道的不幸,一个仁慈的人难道就愿意牺牲他素昧平生的亿万同胞的生命吗?一想到这一点就会使我们的天性感到恐惧,世界腐败堕落到极点,也不至于产生有如此想法的恶棍。但是,是什么造成这种差异呢?既然我们消极的情感总是如此卑鄙和自私,积极的本能为什么又会如此慷慨和高尚呢?既然我们总是计较自己的利害得失,而对别人的利害得失无动于衷,那么是什么东西促使高尚的人在所有情况下、平常的人也在许多情况下,为了他人更大的利益而牺牲自己的利益呢?人性中宽厚的力量,大自然在人类心中点燃的微弱仁慈火光,是无法抗衡最强烈的自爱冲动的。这是一种更为强大的力量、更为有力的动机在这类场合发挥的作用。它就是理性、道义、良心,内心的一个居住者、内心的审判者、我们行为的伟大审判者和仲裁人。每当我们将要做出的行为影响到他人的幸福时,正是他,用一种足以震慑内心自以为是的情感的声音告诫我们:我们不过是芸芸众生之一,丝毫不比其他人更为重要;如果我们无耻地和盲目地将自己凌驾于别人之上,就会成为愤恨、憎恨和咒骂的合宜对象。只有从他那里,我们才知道自己以及与自己有关的事真正是微不足道的,只有借助于公正的旁观者眼光,我们才能纠正自爱所造成的天然误解。正是他向我们指出慷慨行为的合宜性和不义行为的丑恶;向我们指出为了他

deformity of injustice; the propriety of resigning the greatest interests of our own, for the yet greater interests of others, and the deformity of doing the smallest injury to another, in order to obtain the greatest benefit to ourselves. It is not the love of our neighbour, it is not the love of mankind, which upon many occasions prompts us to the practice of those divine virtues. It is a stronger love, a more powerful affection, which generally takes place upon such occasions; the love of what is honourable and noble, of the grandeur, and dignity, and superiority of our own characters.

When the happiness or misery of others depends in any respect upon our conduct, we dare not, as self-love might suggest to us, prefer the interest of one to that of many. The man within immediately calls to us, that we value ourselves too much and other people too little, and that, by doing so, we render ourselves the proper object of the contempt and indignation of our brethren. Neither is this sentiment confined to men of extraordinary magnanimity and virtue. It is deeply impressed upon every tolerably good soldier, who feels that he would become the scorn of his companions, if he could be supposed capable of shrinking from danger, or of hesitating, either to expose or to throw away his life, when the good of the service required it.

One individual must never prefer himself so much even to any other individual, as to hurt or injure that other, in order to benefit himself, though the benefit to the one should be much greater than the hurt or injury to the other. The poor man must neither defraud nor steal from the rich, though the acquisition might be much more beneficial to the one than the loss could be hurtful to the other. The man within immediately calls to him, in this case too, that he is no better than his neighbour, and that by this unjust preference he renders himself the proper object of the contempt and indignation of mankind; as well as of the punishment which that contempt and indignation must naturally dispose them to inflict, for having thus violated one of those sacred rules, upon the tolerable observation of which depend the whole security and peace of human society. There is no commonly honest man who does not more dread the inward disgrace of such an action, the indelible stain which it would for ever stamp upon his own mind, than the greatest external calamity which, without any fault of

人更大的利益而放弃自己最大的利益是合宜的,为了获得自己最大的利益而对他人哪怕有丝毫的伤害都是丑恶的。在许多场合促使我们去实践神圣美德的,不是对邻人的爱,也不是对人类的愛。它通常是在这种场合产生的一种更强烈的爱,一种更有力的感情;一种对光荣而又高尚的东西的爱,一种对自身品质的伟大、尊严和卓越的爱。

当别人的幸福或痛苦在各方面都取决于我们的行为时,我们恐怕不敢按自爱之心可能提示的那样,把自己的利益看得比其他众人的利益更为重要。内心的审判者立刻提醒我们:太看重自己的利益而过于轻视别人的利益,这样做会把自己变成同胞们蔑视和愤慨的合宜对象。这种情感不只是限于品德特别高尚的人。这种想法还深深地影响着每一个比较优秀的士兵,他感到,如果他在危险面前退缩,或当军人的职责需要他挺身而出或献出生命时他踌躇不前,就会成为战友们轻视的对象。

一个人绝不当把自己看得比其他人更重要,以致为了自己获利而伤害或者损害他人,即使他所得的利益远远大于别人的损失或伤害。穷人绝不当骗取或者偷窃富人的东西,即使所得之物给前者带来的利益远远大于后者因失去该物而造成的损失。同样,在这种情况下,内心的审判者会马上提醒他:他并不比他的邻人优越多少,他那不正当的偏爱会使自己既成为人们轻视和愤慨的合宜对象;同样也会成为惩罚的合宜对象,人类出于蔑视和愤慨必然会主张惩罚他,因为他已经违背了一条神圣的规则,就是在大致遵守这一规则的基础上,人类才建立了社会的全部安全与和平。任何一个还算诚实的人,都害怕这种行为带来的内心的耻辱,它是永远铭刻在自己心灵上的不可磨灭的污点,它比起在自己没有任何过错的

his own, could possibly befall him; and who does not inwardly feel the truth of that great stoical maxim, that for one man to deprive another unjustly of any thing, or unjustly to promote his own advantage by the loss or disadvantage of another, is more contrary to nature, than death, than poverty, than pain, than all the misfortunes which can affect him, either in his body, or in his external circumstances.

When the happiness or misery of others, indeed, in no respect depends upon our conduct, when our interests are altogether separated and detached from theirs, so that there is neither connexion nor competition between them, we do not always think it so necessary to restrain, either our natural and, perhaps, improper anxiety about our own affairs, or our natural and, perhaps, equally improper indifference about those of other men. The most vulgar education teaches us to act, upon all important occasions, with some sort of impartiality between ourselves and others, and even the ordinary commerce of the world is capable of adjusting our active principles to some degree of propriety. But it is the most artificial and refined education only, it has been said, which can correct the inequalities of our passive feelings; and we must for this purpose, it has been pretended, have recourse to the severest, as well as to the profoundest philosophy.

Two different sets of philosophers have attempted to teach us this hardest of all the lessons of morality. One set have laboured to increase our sensibility to the interests of others; another, to diminish that to our own. The first would have us feel for others as we naturally feel for ourselves. The second would have us feel for ourselves as we naturally feel for others. Both, perhaps, have carried their doctrines a good deal beyond the just standard of nature and propriety.

情况下降临在自己头上的巨大的外部灾难来,要恐怖得多;他在内心深处会感受到斯多葛学派那伟大的格言所表达的真理:对于一个人来说,不正当地夺取他人的任何东西,或不正当地损失或损害他人的利益来增进自己的利益,是比死亡、贫穷、疼痛,比无论从他自己肉体或从外部环境影响他的所有不幸,更与他的天性相背离。

当别人的幸福和痛苦确实丝毫不取决于我们的行为时,当我们的利益完全同别人的利益毫不相关时,因而两者之间既无联系又无竞争时,我们总是认为,没有必要抑制我们对自己的事情那种天生的也许并不合宜的热心,或者抑制我们对别人的事情那种天生的也许并不合宜的冷漠。最通俗的教育也会教导我们,在所有重大场合,甚至是平常的世界贸易的情况下,都要依据某种高于自己和他人的公正的原则,来调节我们的积极天性,使之达到某种程度的合宜性。但是,据说只有最刻意、最精致的教育方式,才能纠正我们消极情感的不当;并且据称,为了这个目的,我们必须求助于最严谨和最深奥的哲学。

有两类不同的哲学家,他们都试图向我们讲授所有道德课程中这一最难学的部分。一类哲学家试图增强我们对他人利益的感受;另一类哲学家试图减少我们对自己利益的感受。前者使我们如同天生同情自己的利益那样,去同情别人的利益,后者使我们如同天生同情别人的利益那样,去同情自己的利益。或许,这两类哲学家都使自己的学说远远超过了自然和合宜性的正确标准。