

21世纪国际政治系列教材

国际政治经济 专业英语

Subject-Based
English
on
International
Political
Economy

主 编 刘文秀
副主编 李庆四



中国人民大学出版社

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图书在版编目 (CIP) 数据

国际政治经济专业英语/刘文秀主编.

北京: 中国人民大学出版社, 2005

(21 世纪国际政治系列教材)

ISBN 7-300-06759-X

I. 国…

II. 刘…

III. 世界经济政治学—英语—高等学校—教材

IV. H31

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字 (2005) 第 093736 号

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出版发行 中国人民大学出版社

社 址 北京中关村大街 31 号 邮政编码 100080

电 话 010-62511242 (总编室) 010-62511239 (出版部)

010-82501766 (邮购部) 010-62514148 (门市部)

010-62515195 (发行公司) 010-62515275 (盗版举报)

网 址 <http://www.crup.com.cn>

<http://www.ttrnet.com> (人大教研网)

经 销 新华书店

印 刷 北京密兴印刷厂

开 本 787×965 毫米 1/16

版 次 2005 年 9 月第 1 版

印 张 23.75

印 次 2005 年 9 月第 1 次印刷

字 数 434 000

定 价 28.00 元

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印装差错 负责调换



前 言

《国际政治经济专业英语》是根据教育部颁布的《大学英语教学大纲》的基本精神，在大学公共英语教学的基础上，为适应国际政治经济类专业学生提高专业英语水平的需求而编写的教材。长期以来，我们在专业英语教学工作中，深切感到编写这样一部专业英语教材的必要性。根据中国人民大学国际关系学院院长李景治教授的提议，基于长期专业英语教学工作的经验，我们组织编写了这本教材。

本书由中国人民大学国际关系学院专业外语教研室主任刘文秀副教授任主编，负责提出教材编写框架，选材审核以及拟订具体编写要求和规范，对全书进行统一修改定稿并负责出版校对的全部工作。李庆四副教授任副主编，主要负责第六单元的统稿工作。根据教材试用过程中国际形势发生的重大变化，李庆四副教授对第六单元做了较大的修改和重新选材工作。

本书的具体分工为：刘文秀负责编写第二、三、五单元，第一、二、三、五单元的导读；李庆四负责编写第一、四单元，第四、六、七单元的导读；刘青建教授参与编写第七单元。参加教材编写的还有：刘卿（第六单元）、姜念涛、范勇（他们参与了第四、第五单元的协助编写工作）。

本教材基于长期专业英语教学工作经验编写而成，经过了较长时期的试用过程，并广泛听取了学生的意见。教材的主要特点为：

1. 以大学英语四级为起点，以国际政治经济领域为基础，主要取材于近年公开出版的英文原版著作和在国际上具有重要影响的专业期刊。文章的选取以兼顾国际政治经济的不同研究领域为原则。教材涉及的经济领域主要指与国际政治内容相关的经济领域。

2. 全书共分七个单元，每个单元都反映了国际政治的特定领域。每个单元包括三篇文章，一篇主课文，两篇辅课文。三篇文章均属同一领域，如“美国政治经济”、“欧洲一体化”等。辅课文主要供学生课外阅读，教师也可根据课堂教学具体情况进行取舍。一般而言，辅课文的难度较主课文要小一些。辅课文的作用在于从专业知识和语言表述两方面加强学生对特定单元主题的理解。

3. 课文生词的释义主要采用英汉双解的形式，以便学生能够结合课文对词汇内涵有较为清楚的理解。主课文导读在于阐述课文背景知识、文章中心思想及其评述。

4. 课文注释主要涉及特定背景知识、术语解释和部分语言难点，以英语注释为主。鉴于学术性文章具有专业性强、语言难度相对较大的特点，我们着重加强了对课文的注释工作，课文注释达十万三千余字。每篇课文除作者简介外，注释均为编者注。详尽的注释有助于读者从英语和专业两方面完整深入地理解课文内涵，故注释是编写本教材的本质需求，也是本书的特色和精髓。

5. 鉴于专业英语与公共英语的差异，教材的主要目的在于从专业的角度提高学生的英语水平，加之对学生既有英语水平的考虑和学生的反馈意见，故在课文后面练习的设计中主要侧重具有专业特点的语言练习，而不涉及语法项目。

主课文课后有三个练习。练习一根据课文内容提出四到五个问题，这些问题一般基本涵盖了课文的主要内容。练习二主要选取在一定程度上与课文和专业相关的单词，配以同等考虑的例句，以加强学生对特定单词和句子的理解和记忆。练习三是汉译英练习，15个句子都与课文密切相关，力求既反映课文的主要观点，又具有达意清楚、易于进行翻译练习的特点。

辅课文课后的三个练习设计的指导思想与主课文一样，形式有所不同。练习一为概括文章中心思想，目的在于加强学生对文章的综合分析能力；练习二为十个汉译英句子，设计思想与主课文练习三相同；练习三是翻译课文中的十个画线部分，画线部分主要为在句意和语法方面有一定难度的句子，以加强学

生对课文的深度理解。

6. 书后有三个附录。附录一提供了每个单元部分练习题的答案, 主要包括主课文的汉译英练习、辅课文的汉译英与英译汉练习; 问答题属于理解性练习, 可由学生独立完成或由任课教师酌情处理。附录二是主课文译文, 仅供参考。提供参考译文主要考虑为学生和其他人士自学提供便利。附录三是总词汇表, 主要为课文中出现的生词。

7. 短语、术语和缩写一般不包括在词汇表中, 主要以课文脚注方式来处理。对于在不同的文章中出现的相同术语或缩写, 考虑到教学和自学的便利, 一般在第一次出现时进行详注, 同一单元只注一次。如在其他单元出现相同术语或缩写, 则标注“见……页注释”。如某一术语属于特定课文的关键词, 则在该课文进行详注, 不受是否第一次出现的限定。

8. 本书所选用的文章只代表作者的观点。个别文章的价值取向在我们看来实际是有一定偏颇或应予以批驳的, 如第三单元阅读材料二选自欧盟官方文件《同中国建立全面的伙伴关系》, 文中对中国人权状况的评估与事实有较大差异。为保持选材的连续性和完整性, 我们未作删节, 希望读者注意正确审视其观点。

本教材可作为高校国际政治经济专业英语教材, 相关专业的教学参考书, 相关科研机构研究人员的参考书。亦可供具有相当的外语水平并对国际政治经济感兴趣的人士参阅。

出版这样一部教材是一种较新的尝试, 需要编写人员具备较高的英语水平和专业层次。我们在编写过程中从选材到具体的编写环节力求做到既反映国际政治经济的现实, 又体现专业性和一定的理论性。本书经过了较长时期的试用, 随着国际形势的变化我们对相关内容也做了部分更新。由于水平所限, 书中的不足之处敬请专家、学者批评指正。

本教材在中国人民大学国际关系学院本科生和研究生层次进行了较长时间的试用, 随着国际形势的变化我们对相关内容也做了部分更新。在教材试用过程中, 中国人民大学国际关系学院专业外语教研室老师刘青建教授、刘东国副教授、罗天虹副教授、房乐宪副教授等均提出了很多宝贵的修改意见, 使本书通过试用得以日臻完善。中国人民大学国际关系学院院长李景治教授对本书的编写给予了极为宝贵的支持。

本教材的出版得到了中国人民大学出版社郭晓明先生的大力支持和帮助; 中国人民大学出版社杨宗元女士、王磊先生对本书的精心编辑和修改为保证本

书的出版质量作出了重要贡献。

在此，谨向以上为本书编写和出版给予宝贵支持和帮助的学者和同仁致以最诚挚的谢意！

刘文秀
2005 年 5 月



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Unit One

Text

Guide Reading

The upheaval of Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall all represent the Cold War victory of the West towards East. However, the end of the Cold War doesn't mean the global triumph of American-style capitalist political system. Postindustrial America and other capitalist countries have all faced some intractable political and economic problems. In this article, the author pointed out that in the age of global triumph of democracy and markets, people can still see the evidence of a decline of public confidence in American political institutions. The current subjective distemper is a reflection of a very serious objective disequilibrium in the American political economy, as well as in the political economies of other advanced capitalist democracies. The author clarified the explanations of pluralist theory to democratic capitalism, argued that the pluralist model of democracy seemed not only to explain American politics, but also to function as a stable system of democratic governance. At last, the article gave an objective analysis for the post-war developments of American economy.

The Political Economy of Postindustrial America^①

Arthur C. Paulson^②

Introduction

In the American popular mind^③, and probably for elites as well, the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union all represent something of a “final” triumph of democracy. A “New World Order”^④, we have been told, is being achieved, slowly perhaps, but inexorably, which involves democratization, economic development, and the globalization of market economies and the American way of life.

Yet, if we are living through the global triumph of democracy and markets, why do we see evidence of a decline of public confidence in American political institutions^⑤ here at home? The 1992 campaign provided the stage for disquiet about serious economic problems: “it’s the economy, stupid”^⑥, the Clinton campaign reminded itself. But the political distemper extended to a perception, promoted by scandal and “gridlock”, that American government was not working

① The selection is taken from Kul B. Lal, David F. Walsh and Paul J. Best, *America in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities in Domestic Politics*, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1998, pp. 21-42.

② Arthur C. Paulson, Ph. D., University of Colorado, associate professor of political science at Southern Connecticut State University.

③ Popular mind; common viewpoint 大众的观点、看法

④ New World Order (世界新秩序): Initiated by President George Bush (old Bush) immediately after the US military victory in the Gulf War in 1991, which was an attempt to create an American dominated unipolar world system, to better serve the US interests.

⑤ political institutions; 政治制度

⑥ “it’s the economy, stupid”: “是经济问题, 傻瓜”。这是 1992 年美国大选时报纸普遍引用的克林顿的话, 意指选民关注的是经济问题而不是布什所关心的外交或所谓的“世界新秩序”问题。

the way it should. The public reluctance toward any new program involving new taxes, the landslide defeat of the Democrats as the incumbent party^① in the 1994 mid-term elections, and the partial shutdowns^② of the federal government over budget disputes, all seem to be an expression of this distemper.

This article presents the argument that the current subjective distemper is a reflection of a very serious objective disequilibrium in the American political economy, as well as in the political economies of other advanced capitalist democracies. The evidence of the last two decades suggests that low rates of economic growth in advanced capitalist economies stretch across waves of the business cycle^③, and have become a long-term structural reality.

Low growth presents a severe problem for political elites in pluralist or consociational democracies^④, as bargaining over a static pie becomes a zero-sum game^⑤. Simultaneously, low growth and rapid technological change increase rates of structural unemployment^⑥. A breakdown of political consensus among elites, along with growing social inequality, combines to promote a decline in elite-mass consensus^⑦. At the same time, to combat low growth, the need for the exertion of political authority to accumulate capital for private investment increases. But the difficulty of coalition building^⑧ in a zero-sum game increases the likelihood of policy stasis^⑨, just as concerted policy initiatives are most required.

The postindustrial capitalist state would seem to face the dilemma of becoming either more dysfunctional or more authoritarian. Our contemplation of global democratization in the twenty-first century must include serious consideration of the fate of democracy here at home. Now let's see the historical

① incumbent party: 执政党

② partial shutdowns: 局部关门; 部分关门。指 1995—1996 年白宫与国会因预算问题分歧而造成一些政府部门两度关门

③ stretch across waves of the business cycle: 跨越(超越)经济波动的周期

④ consociational democracies: 单一民族占优势的民主

⑤ zero-sum game: 零和游戏规则, 在零和博弈中, 一方收益是另一方的损失

⑥ structural unemployment: 结构性失业

⑦ elite-mass consensus: 精英—大众共识

⑧ coalition building: 建立联盟

⑨ policy stasis: 政策停滞

background of the political economy of the postindustrial America.

The current agnostic political temper^① is hardly typical of the American experience. Indeed, America has often been considered “exceptional” for a political culture marked by pride in its political structures, and its virtually universal support for classic liberal ideology and a capitalist economy^②. As recently as thirty years ago, the tenor of American politics was considered remarkable for its degree of consensus at both elite and mass levels of the mainstream culture^③, grounded in a public confidence in American political institutions and in a rapidly growing economy. “Postindustrial society” was presented as an age in which affluence would spread through an increasingly egalitarian division^④ of a growing economic pie. Within the academic discipline of political science, pluralist theories of democratic capitalism seemed to justify, as well as to explain, the operation of the American political economy.

Pluralist Democracy and Capitalism

Pluralist theory^⑤ acknowledges that democratic capitalist societies, including the United States, are not purely democratic; that is, they do not operate by pure majority rule. But, according to pluralism, democratic capitalist societies offer about as much political democracy as is practical in a modern, organizationally and technologically complex world.

The limits on majority rule are evident. First, while capitalism produces unprecedented wealth, it also produces disparities of wealth. Citizens are not equal in their economic resources, and economic resources are also political

① political temper; 政治气氛

② virtually universal support for classic liberal ideology and a capitalist economy: 对古典自由主义理念和资本主义经济事实上的普遍支持

③ mainstream culture; 主流文化

④ egalitarian division; 平均/平等分配

⑤ pluralist theory; 多元主义理论。Pluralist image of international relations is based on four key assumptions: (1) non-state actors are important entities in world politics; (2) the state is not a unitary actor, composing of competing interests; (3) pluralists challenge the realist assumption of the state as rational actor, clash of interests, bargaining do not always make for a rational decision-making process; (4) for pluralists the agenda of international politics is extensive, such as interdependence, trade and economy.

resources. Therefore, pluralist theory concedes that economic inequality at least limits political equality and majority rule.

Second, according to pluralist theory, modern capitalist societies are not organic communities^① that can be ruled by any single majority. Rather, they are technologically complex, specialized societies, organized around competing economic, social, and political interests. Desirable or not, rule by a majority in such societies is structurally unlikely, if not impossible.

Finally, constitutional structures^② of government in democratic capitalist societies facilitate or limit majority rule to varying degrees. In the United States, the Constitution was designed to prevent "majority tyranny"^③ for the purpose of protecting liberty and property rights. The result was a separation of power among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Political structures such as the Electoral College and staggered elections^④ limited popular influence even on the elected branches of government, while the judicial branch was insulated almost entirely.

Thus, pluralist theory views modern democracy as constitutionally limited government which arrives at policy through a process of conflict and compromise^⑤ among competing interests. Capitalism facilitates political democracy, according to the pluralist analysis, because it avoids the command economies^⑥ of fascist and socialist states, thus preserving a degree of liberty necessary to democratic citizenship. While capitalism does not provide social equality, it is capable of approximating political equality and equality of economic opportunity^⑦.

If pluralists acknowledge that modern democracy is not majority rule, they

① organic communities; 有组织的社区; 共同体

② constitutional structures; 宪法结构

③ majority tyranny; 多数人的暴政

④ Electoral College and staggered elections; 选举人团和交叉选举(交叉选举指参议院每两年改选其议员总数的 1/3, 也称差别选举)

⑤ through a process of conflict and compromise; 通过冲突和妥协的过程

⑥ command economy; directed economy 指令经济 (=controlled economy 统制经济, planed economy 计划经济)

⑦ approximating political equality and equality of economic opportunity; 趋于政治平等和经济机会平等

argue that it is, at least, government by consent of the governed^①. Certainly, elites hold the power to make policy decisions, but they gain and hold their position by “competitive struggle for the people’s vote”. And, in their exercise of power, political elites are representing the masses. While individuals, acting alone, have little power to shape the policy agenda^②, they gain power when they organize. For example, David B. Truman argued that power in democratic capitalist societies resides with an “intervening structure of elites”^③, and that masses of ordinary people “cannot act except through organization and in response to the initiative of small numbers of leaders”.

Thus, according to pluralist theory, despite the fact that, citizens are not all politically equal, popular movements^④ can — and do — make a difference. Although the Constitution of the United States limits majority rule by design, organized movements representing, for example, abolitionism, populism, labor, feminism, and civil rights,^⑤ have all contributed to the democratization of the American political system over two centuries. But placing issues on the public agenda requires elite initiative.

Pluralism and Consensus

Generally speaking, for a generation after World War II, the pluralist model of democracy seemed not only to explain American politics, but also to function as a stable system of democratic governance. While political scientists who subscribed to pluralism claimed to be free of bias, pluralist theory provided a justification for political consensus^⑥. Its power in the postwar period can be traced to two factors: the ideological hegemony of classic liberalism^⑦ in

① consent of the governed: 被统治者的同意

② to shape the policy agenda: 制定政策日程

③ intervening structure of elites: 精英干预结构

④ popular movements: 群众运动

⑤ abolitionism, populism, labor, feminism, and civil rights: 废奴主义, 平民主义, 劳工(权利), 女权主义和民权运动

⑥ political consensus: 政治共识

⑦ the ideological hegemony of classic liberalism: 古典自由主义的意识形态霸权(控制)

American political culture, and extended economic growth at unprecedented rates.

The ideological hegemony of classic liberalism in America has been widely noted. Despite the efforts of the framers of the Constitution, Alexis de Tocqueville warned of the “tyranny of the majority” in American society. As he put it:

I know of no country in which, speaking generally, there is less independence of mind and true freedom of discussion than in America. . .

In America, the majority has enclosed thought within a formidable fence^①. The writer is free inside that area, but woe to the man who goes beyond it. . .

Under the absolute government of a single man, despotism, to reach the soul, clumsily struck at the body, and the soul, escaping such blows, rose gloriously above it; but in democratic republics, that is not at all how despotism behaves; it leaves the body alone and goes straight for the soul^②.

In his classic work *The Liberal Tradition in America*, Louis Hartz agreed:

This then is the mood of America's absolutism: the somber faith that its norms are self-evident. It is one of the most powerful absolutisms in the world. . . American absolutism . . . lacked even the passion that doubt might give.

It was so sure of itself that it hardly needed to become articulate. American pragmatism has always been deceptive because, glacierlike, it has rested on miles of submerged conviction, and the confirmation ethos which that conviction generates has always been infuriating because it has refused to pay its critics the compliment, of an argument.

In the postwar period, the hegemony of liberalism in the context of the Cold War took the form of a virulent anti-communism, reaching the level of hysteria in

① enclose thought within a formidable fence: 把思想禁锢在难以对付的藩篱中

② it leaves the body alone and goes straight for the soul: it ignores the physical existence but takes strong hold of one's mind 给予人身行动自由, 却抓着人的思想不放

McCarthyism^①. But rather than being the isolated pathology of an individual, Joe McCarthy was more the product of an ideological hegemony which, at least, periodically “encloses thought within a formidable fence”, and “refuses to pay its critics the compliment of an argument”. It was in this ideological environment that pluralist democracy flowered. The leaders of a variety of interest groups, however they may have differed over policy issues, shared in the consensus that capitalism, political democracy and personal liberty all go hand in hand.

High rates of economic growth and the relatively strong political consensus of the mid-twentieth century are not coincidental. Dealing with a growing pie, political elites were able to negotiate economic issues on the basis of a distribution of benefits. On these issues, at least, coalition building could be treated as a win-win proposition^②.

At the mass level, affluence fed the belief that the American system provides equitably for freedom, economic opportunity, and upward social mobility^③. Ironically, ideological hegemony plus affluence led to observations of an “end of ideology”.^④ According to this vision, mature capitalist societies had become “postindustrial” societies, service economies in which industrial class conflict was being resolved by the spread of affluence^⑤. The apparent result was a growing “working class conservatism”, in which the working class had come to support capitalism as vigorously as the owners of capital.

① hysteria in McCarthyism: (50 年代初美国)麦卡锡主义泛滥时的歇斯底里。McCarthy was a American Senator, a typical representative of anti-Communism and anti-democracy from 1950 to 1954 in the United States. He maliciously denigrated and persecuted Communist Party members, democratically progressive people and even dissidents, which were the main features of McCarthyism. Because McCarthyism became too disrupting to the whole American society that president Eisenhower could no longer tolerate it, and the senate also passed resolution to condemn it, which brought to an end to McCarthyism, the American style Fascism.

② win-win proposition: opposite to zero-sum game 双赢命题, 与零和游戏规则对应

③ freedom, economic opportunity, and upward social mobility: 自由、经济机会及向上流社会升迁

④ ideological hegemony plus affluence led to observations of an “end of ideology”: 意识形态霸权加上富足导致了“意识形态的终结”

⑤ industrial class conflict was being resolved by the spread of affluence: 工业阶级冲突由于普遍富足而得以解决