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心 理 学 原 理

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THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY

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(二)

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意识趋向个人的形式；它在不断的变化之中；它可以被感觉到是连续的；意识的“实体”和“过渡”部分；对关系的感受；对倾向的感受；对象的“边缘”；对理性序列的感受；思维在任何一种心理质料中都是可能存在的；思想和语言；意识是认知的；对象这个词；每一次认知都是由于一个完整的思维脉冲所致；思想之流的图解；思维始终是选择性的

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## CHAPTER VI.

### The Mind-Stuff Theory.

The reader who found himself swamped with too much metaphysics in the last chapter will have a still worse time of it in this one, which is exclusively metaphysical. Metaphysics means nothing but an unusually obstinate effort to think clearly. The fundamental conceptions of psychology are practically very clear to us, but theoretically they are very confused, and one easily makes the obscurest assumptions in this science without realizing, until challenged, what internal difficulties they involve. When these assumptions have once established themselves (as they have a way of doing in our very descriptions of the phenomenal facts) it is almost impossible to get rid of them afterwards or to make any one see that they are not essential features of the subject. The only way to prevent this disaster is to scrutinize them beforehand and make them give an articulate account of themselves before letting them pass. One of the obscurest of the assumptions of which I speak is *the assumption, that our mental states are composite in structure, made up of smaller states conjoined*. This hypothesis has outward advantages which make it almost irresistibly attractive to the intellect, and yet it is inwardly quite unintelligible. Of its unintelligibility, however, half the writers on psychology seem unaware. As our own aim is *to understand* if possible,

## 第六章 精神素材理论

那些发现自己在上一章为太多的形而上学所淹没的读者,在这一章将会度过一段更加艰难的时光,这一章的内容完全是形而上学的。形而上学不是指别的什么,它就是意味着以一种异乎寻常地倔强的努力去清晰地思考。心理学的基本概念在实践上对我们来说是非常清楚的,但是在理论上它们是非常混乱的,并且人们很容易在这门科学中做出最模糊的假设,而且,除非这些假设受到了挑战,否则他们不会意识到它们涉及到了什么样的内在困难。当这些假设一旦自身确立了(由于它在我们对现象事实的特别描述中发挥了某种作用),此后要想摆脱它们,或者想要让任何人都了解它们不是问题的本质特征,都几乎是不可能的。防止这种灾难发生的唯一办法就是预先对它们进行详细的考察,并且在让它们通过之前,让它们就自身给出一个清晰明白的说明。我所谈到的假设中最模糊的一个假设是这样的:我们的心理状态在结构上是复合的,由结合在一起的更小的状态所组成。这一假说具有外在的优势,这使得它对我们的智性来说有着几乎不可抗拒的诱惑力,但是它在内涵上却很难被理解。然而,就其不可理解性而言,有一半的心理学作者都似乎没有觉察出来。由于我们自己的目的是在可能的情况下去理解,因此在开始从事我们工作

I make no apology for singling out this particular notion for very explicit treatment before taking up the descriptive part of our work. *The theory of 'mind-stuff' is the theory that our mental states are compounds*, expressed in its most radical form.

### Evolutionary Psychology Demands A Mind-Dust.

In a general theory of evolution the inorganic comes first, then the lowest forms of animal and vegetable life, then forms of life that possess mentality, and finally those like ourselves that possess it in a high degree. As long as we keep to the consideration of purely outward facts, even the most complicated facts of biology, our task as evolutionists is comparatively easy. We are dealing all the time with matter and its aggregations and separations; and although our treatment must perforce be hypothetical, this does not prevent it from being *continuous*. The point which as evolutionists we are bound to hold fast to is that all the new forms of being that make their appearance are really nothing more than results of the redistribution of the original and unchanging materials. The self-same atoms which, chaotically dispersed, made the nebula, now, jammed and temporarily caught in peculiar positions, form our brains; and the 'evolution' of the brains, if understood, would be simply the account of how the atoms came to be so caught and jammed. In this story no new *natures*, no factors not present at the beginning, are introduced at any later stage.

But with the dawn of consciousness an entirely new nature seems to slip in, something whereof the potency was not given in the mere outward atoms of the original chaos.

The enemies of evolution have been quick to pounce upon this undeniable discontinuity in the data of the world, and many of them, from the failure of evolutionary explanations at this point,

的描述性部分之前,选出这一观点并加以非常明晰的处理,我认为合理的。“精神素材”理论是指,我们的心理状态是复合物,这种理论以其最激进的形式被表达了出来。

### 进化心理学需要精神微粒

在一般的进化论中,无机物首先出现,然后是最低级的动植物生命形式,而后是拥有精神的生命形式,最后是像我们自己在更高程度上拥有精神的生命形式。只要我们一直考虑纯粹的外部事实,甚至包括生物学中最复杂的事实,作为进化论者我们的任务相对而言就容易一些。我们所始终涉及的是物质及其聚合与分离;尽管我们的处理必须一定是假说性的,但这并不妨碍它是连续性的。作为进化论者我们一定要牢牢掌握的要点是,所有使其显现的新的存在形式,实际上仅仅是原初的和不变的质料重新分布的结果。混乱散布着的、组成星云的自我同一的原子,现在被挤压在一起并且暂时被置于特殊的位置之中,形成了我们的大脑;大脑的“进化”如果可以理解的话,它将仅仅是对原子如何逐渐地被置于这样的位置并且这样挤在一处的说明。在这种论述中,没有新的性质,没有开始不存在的要素在任何后来的阶段被引进来。

但是随着意识的首次出现,一种全新的本性似乎溜了进来,它是某种在最初混乱的单纯的外部原子那里没有获得其力量的东西。

进化论的敌人很快就对在世界的资料中这种不可否认的非连续性发起了突然的袭击,而且他们之中的很多人,由进化论在

have inferred their general incapacity all along the line. Every one admits the entire incommensurability of feeling as such with material motion as such. "A motion became a feeling!"—no phrase that our lips can frame is so devoid of apprehensible meaning. Accordingly, even the vaguest of evolutionary enthusiasts, when deliberately comparing material with mental facts, have been as forward as any one else to emphasize the 'chasm' between the inner and the outer worlds.

"Can the oscillations of a molecule," says Mr. Spencer, "be represented side by side with a nervous shock [he means a mental shock], and the two be recognized as one? No effort enables us to assimilate them. That a unit of feeling has nothing in common with a unit of motion becomes more than ever manifest when we bring the two into juxtaposition."①

And again:

"Suppose it to have become quite clear that a shock in consciousness and a molecular motion are the subjective and objective faces of the same thing; we continue utterly incapable of uniting the two, so as to conceive that reality of which they are the opposite faces."②

In other words, incapable of perceiving in them any common character. So Tyndall, in that lucky paragraph which has been quoted so often that every one knows it by heart:

"The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that a definite thought and definite molecular action in the brain occur simultaneously; we do

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① Psychol. § 62.

② Ibid. § 272.

这一点上解释的失败,已经推导出了它们对沿着这条线索而来的所有问题的解释的普遍无能。每个人都承认同量的感受和同量的物质运动是完全不能比较的,“运动变成了感受!”——我们的嘴再不能构造出比这更缺乏可理解的含义的短句了。相应地,甚至最暧昧的进化论狂热者,当有意地将物质事实和精神事实相比较时,也和所有其他人一样激进地强调内部和外部世界之间的“裂口”。

斯宾塞先生说:“分子的振动和神经的震动(他是指心理的震颤)能够相互表象吗,并且它们能够被认作是一个东西吗?所有的努力都不能让我们将它们同化。当我们将感受单元和运动单元并置在一起时,它们之间没有任何共同之处这一事实就比以前变得更加明显了。”<sup>①</sup>

还有:

“假设意识中的震颤和分子的运动是同一事物的主观方面和客观方面这一事实已经变得非常清楚了;我们依然完全不能将二者统一起来,以便思考关于它们是相反的两个方面的那种事实。”<sup>②</sup>

换言之,我们无法在它们中间感知到任何共同的特征。廷德尔在那个经常被人引用、以至于每个人都将它铭记于心的幸运的段落中也如此说道:

“从脑物理学到相应的意识事实之间的通道是不可思议的。即使承认一种确定的思想和一种确定的分子运动在大脑中同时发生;我们还是没有拥有这种智性器官,或者显然是这器官的雏

<sup>①</sup> 《心理学》,第62节。

<sup>②</sup> 同前,第272节。

not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to pass, by a process of reasoning, from one to the other.”<sup>①</sup>

Or in this other passage:

“We can trace the development of a nervous system and correlate with it the parallel phenomena of sensation and thought. We see with undoubting certainty that they go hand in hand. But we try to soar in a vacuum the moment we seek to comprehend the connection between them. . . . There is no fusion possible between the two classes of facts—no motor energy in the intellect of man to carry it without logical rupture from the one to the other.”<sup>②</sup>

None the less easily, however, when the evolutionary afflatus is upon them, do the very same writers leap over the breach whose flagrancy they are the foremost to announce, and talk as if mind grew out of body in a continuous way. Mr. Spencer, looking back on his review of mental evolution, tells us how “in tracing up the increase we found ourselves passing *without break* from the phenomena of bodily life to the phenomena of mental life.”<sup>③</sup> And Mr. Tyndall, in the same Belfast Address from which we just quoted, delivers his other famous passage:

“Abandoning all disguise, the confession that I feel bound to

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① Fragments of Science, 5th ed., p. 420.

② Belfast Address, ‘Nature,’ August 20, 1874. p. 318. I cannot help remarking that the disparity between motions and feelings on which these authors lay so much stress, is somewhat less absolute than at first sight it seems. There are categories common to the two worlds, Not only temporal succession (as Helmholtz admits, *Physiol. Optik*, p. 445), but such attributes as intensity, volume, simplicity or complication, smooth or impeded change, rest or agitation, are habitually predicated of both physical facts and mental facts. Where such analogies obtain, the things do have something in common.

③ Psychology, § 131.

形,它可以通过推理的过程从一方到达另一方。”<sup>①</sup>

在别的段落中他又说:

“我们可以追踪神经系统的发展,并且使它与平行的感觉和思维现象相关联。我们毫不怀疑地确知它们是携手共进的。但是,一旦我们试图理解它们之间的联系,我们就如同想要在真空中飞翔……这里不存在将这两种类别的事实融合在一起的可能性——在人的智性中没有这样一种动力可以在从一方到另一方时不出现逻辑的破裂情况下将它完成。”<sup>②</sup>

然而,当进化论的灵感降临到这些作者身上之时,尽管这裂痕的恶名是他们最先宣布的,但是这些相同的作者依旧很容易地越过了那条裂痕,而且说起话来就好像心灵是以一种连续的方式从身体中生长出来的。斯宾塞先生回顾了他对精神进化的评论,告诉我们如何“在追踪这种增长时,我们发现自己不断地从身体生活的现象到达了精神生活的现象。”<sup>③</sup>而且,廷德尔先生在我们刚刚引用过的同一个《贝尔法斯特演讲》中,写下了另外一个著名的段落:

“遗弃所有的掩饰,在你们面前我感到一定要承认的是,我将

① 《科学片断》,第5版,第420页。

② 《贝尔法斯特演讲》,《自然》,1874年8月20日,第318页。我不禁要指出的是,这些作者所如此强调的运动与感受之间的不一致,有点不如它似乎初看起来那么绝对。有一些范畴是两个世界所共有的,不仅时间的连续性(如赫姆霍尔茨所承认的那样,《视觉生理学》,第445页),还有诸如强度、体积、简单性或复杂性、平稳的变化或受到阻碍的变化、平静或兴奋这些属性,都被习惯性地断言为物理事实和精神事实的属性。在这种类比成立的地方,事物确实具有一些相同的地方。

③ 《心理学》,第131节。

make before you is that I prolong the vision backward across the boundary of the experimental evidence, and discern in that matter which we, in our ignorance and notwithstanding our professed reverence for its Creator, have hitherto covered with opprobrium the promise and potency of every form and quality of life. ”<sup>①</sup>

—mental life included, as a matter of course.

So strong a postulate is continuity! Now this book will tend to show that mental postulates are on the whole to be respected. The demand for continuity has, over large tracts of science, proved itself to possess true prophetic power. We ought therefore ourselves sincerely to try every possible mode of conceiving the dawn of consciousness so that it may *not* appear equivalent to the irruption into the universe of a new nature, non-existent until then.

Merely to call the consciousness ‘nascent’ will not serve our turn.<sup>②</sup>

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① ‘Nature,’ as above, 317-8.

② ‘Nascent’ is Mr. Spencer’s great word. In showing how at a certain point consciousness must appear upon the evolving scene this author fairly outdoes himself in vagueness.

“ In its higher forms, *Instinct* is probably accompanied by a rudimentary consciousness. There cannot be co-ordination of many stimuli without some ganglion through which they are all brought into relation. In the process of bringing them into relation, this ganglion must be subject to the influence of each—must undergo many changes. And the quick succession of changes in a ganglion, implying as it does perpetual experiences of differences and likenesses, constitutes the *raw material* of consciousness. The implication is that as fast as *Instinct* is developed, some kind of consciousness becomes nascent. ” (Psychology, § 195. )

The words ‘*raw material*’ and ‘*implication*’ which I have italicized are the words which do the *evolving*. They are supposed to have all the rigor which the ‘synthetic philosophy’ requires. In the following passage, when ‘impressions’ pass through a common ‘centre of communication’ in succession (much as people might pass into a theatre through a turnstile) consciousness, non-existent until then, is supposed to result:

“Separate impressions are received by the senses—by different parts of the body. If they go no further than the places at which they are received, they are useless. Or if only some of them are brought into relation with one another, they are useless. That an effectual adjustment may be made, they must be

视野向后延伸从而越过了实验证据的边界,在由于我们的无知和我们所公开宣称的对其创造者的敬重而使得我们迄今对其加倍非难的那种物质中,我看到了每种生命形式及其性质的希望与力量。”<sup>①</sup>

——不用说,精神生活也包括在内。

对连续性的假定是如此的强烈!现在,本书将试图表明,对精神的假定在总体上来说应该是受到尊重的。在广泛的科学领域之内,对连续性的要求已经证明自身具有真正的预言能力。因此,我们自己应该真诚地尝试每一种构想意识开始出现的方式,以便使它的显现看上去不等同于直到那时都不存在的一种新的本性侵入了宇宙之中。

将意识仅仅称作是“初生的”并不符合我们的目的。<sup>②</sup>确实,

① 《自然》,同上,第317~318页。

② “初生的”是斯宾塞先生的重要措词。在表明意识如何在某一点必须出现在进化现场时,这位作者在模糊性方面完全超越了他自己。

“在其高级形式中,本能可能由一种初步的意识相伴随。如果没有某些使许多刺激全部联系起来的神经节,就不能够存在这些刺激间的协调。在将它们联系起来的过程中,这种神经节必须受每一个刺激的影响的支配——必须经历许多变化。而在神经节中的变化的快速演替,如它所暗示出了对差异性和相似性的永久持续的经验那样,构成了意识的原材料。这里的含义是,随着本能的快速发展,某种意识就成为了初生的。”(《心理学》,第195节。)

我将之变成斜体的“原材料”和“含义”这两个词就是解答进化的词。它们被期望具有“综合哲学”所要求的全部精确性。在下面的段落中,当“印象”相继穿过一个共同的“交流中心”时(很像人们穿过十字转门进入一个剧场),直到那时还不存在的意识就应该产生了。

“单独的印象接收通过的是感观——身体的不同部分。如果它们到达其接收所在地就不再前进了,它们就是无用的。或者,如果它们中间只有一些互相联系了起来,它们也是无用的。那么可以做一种有效的调整,它们必须

It is true that the word signifies not yet *quite* born, and so seems to form a sort of bridge between existence and nonentity. But that is a verbal quibble. The fact is that discontinuity comes in if a new nature comes in at all. The *quantity* of the latter is quite immaterial. The girl in 'Midshipman Easy' could not excuse the illegitimacy of her child by saying, 'it was a little small one.' And Consciousness, however little, is an illegitimate birth in any philosophy that starts without it, and yet professes to explain all facts by continuous evolution.

*If evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape must have been present at the very origin, of things.* Accordingly we find that the more clear-sighted evolutionary philosophers are beginning to posit it there. Each atom of the nebula, they suppose, must have had an aboriginal atom of consciousness linked with it; and, just as the material atoms have formed bodies and brains by massing them-selves together, so the mental atoms,

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all brought into relation with one another. But this implies some centre of communication common to them all, through which they severally pass; and as they cannot pass through it simultaneously, they must pass through it in succession. So that as the external phenomena responded to become greater in number and more complicated in kind, the variety and rapidity of the changes to which this common centre of communication is subject must increase—there must result on unbroken series of these changes—*there must arise a consciousness.*

"Hence the progress of the correspondence between the organism and its environment necessitates a gradual reduction of the sensorial changes to a succession; and by so doing *evolves a distinct consciousness*—a consciousness that becomes higher as the succession becomes more rapid and the correspondence more complete." (*Ibid.* § 179.)

It is true that in the Fortnightly Review (vol. xiv. p. 716) Mr. Spencer denies that he means by this passage to tell us anything about the origin of consciousness at all. It resembles, however, too many other places in his Psychology (e.g. §§ 43, 110, 244) not to be taken as a serious attempt to explain how consciousness must at a certain point be 'evolved.' That, when a critic calls his attention to the inanity of his words, Mr. Spencer should say he never meant anything particular by them, is simply an example of the scandalous vagueness with which this sort of 'chromo-philosophy' is carried on.