

纪念万隆会议召开

程希 著

及《中华人民共和国与印度尼西亚共和国关于双重国籍问题的条约》
签订 50 周年

侨务与外交关系研究

——中国放弃“双重国籍”的回顾与反思



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内 容 摘 要

本书选择“双重国籍”问题作为切入点,在综合考察既有现象和相关研究成果的基础上,指出侨务工作在中国占有特殊地位,华侨华人对于中国的意义令人关注,认为放弃“双重国籍”政策是新中国在周边安全环境、国家利益得失喜忧参半的形势下进行外交战略和策略调整的重大举措,也是将侨务与外交密切联系在一起的最为重大的历史事件。本书由此将侨务与外交结合起来考察,认为国内侨务是以国外侨务为出发点和立足点的,国外侨务既服从和服务于外交,又是在特定历史条件下对外交积极而有效的补充;放弃“双重国籍”对于新中国外交和华侨华人社会的发展是必要的,但既有积极意义,又有历史局限性。

同时,本书还将“双重国籍”问题与中国的地缘政治和大国地位联系在一起进行探讨,并以此作为贯穿全书的思路和组织材料的线索,提出了“双重国籍于1954年至1955年通过谈判放弃是中国外交战略和策略调整的重要佐证”这一观点;而且认为,如果说1980—1990年代加入“世界贸易组织”(WTO)的努力意味着中国在国际经济方面积极融入“条约体系”的开始,那么,早于此数十年前,也即1950年代中期放弃“双重国籍”的决断已经是中国在国际政治关系方面独立自主地加入“条约体系”的重要标志之一。

作者简介

程希，女，中国华侨华人历史研究所副研究员，曾任《华侨华人历史研究》杂志编辑13年。1990年代中后期的研究兴趣主要集中于中国留学生问题，近年来正着力以“移民与国际关系”、“中国的侨务与外交”为关注方向拓展和深化既有研究。

曾主持中国华侨华人历史研究所“改革开放以来中国大陆留学人员的地位和作用”课题研究，并连续两个年度先后参加国务院侨办重点课题“建国以来侨务工作的回顾与反思”（2000—2001年度）以及“国际移民趋势与中国的对策”（2002—2003年度）的研究。目前是中国教育部人文社科基地重大项目“华侨华人学科建设”，以及2004—2007年度国家社会科学基金项目“国家战略、人权信条与实利驱动：发达国家国际移民政策文本与实务的比较研究”课题的主要承担人之一。

已出版著作有《当代中国留学生研究》，香港社会科学出版社有限公司，2003年；另有30余篇论（译）文在《中共党史研究》、《欧洲研究》、《东南亚研究》、《华侨华人历史研究》、《东南亚纵横》、《中国发展》等国内外刊物上发表。
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**本书由谢家茂先生赞助出版，
作者在此表示诚挚的感谢！**

序

程希写出了一本及时之作。她已经在中国华侨华人历史研究所任职多年。对于华侨华人事务的多方面了解,使她得以对华人双重国籍问题提出新的见解。随着这一问题重又出现于“新移民”和中国国内一定层面的官方探讨中,她的这本书使我们想起了1955年,也即在万隆会议上,中国对这一问题所采取的第一个解决办法。在这次会议上,中国声明不希望采取双重国籍的政策。本书可谓是“一石二鸟”:一方面,它突出了万隆会议对于中国外交政策的历史意义;另一方面,它又回顾了中国解决其海外公民双重国籍问题的历史背景,那就是在当时历史条件下并非是基于中国和生活在海外的华侨华人的立场来解决这一问题的。

50年前,中国在历经朝鲜半岛战火的创伤之后尚处于恢复期。东南亚地区则正在脱殖民化的进程中,英国和法国这样的国家都在竭力维护它们在这一地区的殖民统治和影响。尤为重要的是,它们要遏制苏联和中华人民共和国联手推进国际共产主义力量。中国面临着被孤立包围的危险,因而力图获得正在建立新兴民族主义国家的前殖民地人民的支持。在这些国家中,印度是最大的。因而,中国在亚洲,后来发展为在所有

新兴独立国家中,特别是在非洲和拉丁美洲,寻求友谊的外交政策是围绕着尼赫鲁总理展开的。在中国重要的邻国印度尼西亚,苏加诺成为了把帝国主义势力赶出东南亚的关键人物。

在这一地区错综复杂的地缘政治对抗中,新中国领导人意识到他们所遇到的难题是中国近代历史发展的独特产物。那就是同台湾“国民党政府”对于华侨向心力的争夺。由于半个世纪以来华侨对中国政治和经济的发展都发挥了特殊作用,因而中国大陆和台湾都认为华侨的支持是难能可贵的。

自孙中山先生领导发动辛亥革命以后,华侨被视为是中国未来现代化进程中不可或缺的一支力量,甚至是缔造共和的一个象征。因而,从1949年开始,新中国政府和台湾地区的领导人都一如既往地呼吁华侨“爱国”。事实上,台北当局为了维系华侨对于孙中山先生建立的党的忠诚付出了更多的努力。而新中国政府也认为,要赢得华侨对新中国的认同,必须有所回应。

这一对华侨向心力的争夺还与当时由冷战所导致的意识形态斗争密切相关。当反殖民情绪被视为是各地新兴民族主义国家领导人向苏联和中华人民共和国学习的迹象时,以美国为首的反共阵营惟恐华侨成为新中国的“代理人”而为敌人所用。基于这一背景下的认识,一些珍惜来之不易的独立,又不想在两个冷战阵营中作非此即彼选择的国家,开始使它们自己形成“第三种力量”,万隆会议就是这一对抗两极格局运动的产物。中国视此为赢得朋友的机遇。但将是会议东道国的印尼却提出了华侨问题。所有华侨都是属于中国的吗?他们中的许多人都参与了印度尼西亚的独立革命,都想认同于这个新的国家。他们是因为为中国和印尼所共有而做这一切的吗?中国与印尼的谈判表明,所有经历诞生和脱胎换骨之痛的新兴

国家都希望它们的国民只拥有惟一的认同。双重国籍在这种情形下是不可能的。

对于研究万隆会议的学者来说,关键的问题是当时的国际政治形势与中国成为冷战“中立国”的可能性。斯蒂芬·菲茨杰拉德的《中国与海外华侨:北京变化中的政策之研究,1949-1970》(1972年版)一书是在中国之外审视华侨双重国籍问题的第一部著作。但他较少援引中国国内的档案资料和官方的倾向性观点,在他之后这一课题也并未引起太多学术关注。我们的确想了解这一问题在东南亚华侨中所引起的巨大反响。他们以复杂的心情接受了新中国政府的声明。有迷茫的,也有遗憾的。甚至有感到“被遗弃”的,特别是那些公开表示拥护新中国的人。也有人认为这是一项合理的决定,因为它在有利于中国的同时,也使他们对于国家的忠诚不再深受疑虑而得以安居。还有人意识到这是不得不“认命”的时候了:或者回到中国,或者放弃中国籍选择当地国籍。

在过去50年中,这一决定命运的声明已成为了现实,许多人的生活也因此而全然改变。无论是变好还是变坏,都主要取决于有关国家政府所采取的政策措施。这些政策措施在同属东南亚的国家也是各不相同的,尽管多数华侨都试图使自己成为当地公民,从而不再处于寄人篱下的地位。这些新兴国家要求新归化入籍者绝对忠诚,但又无法把握他们对中国的忠诚,因而疑虑仍不同程度存在,许多华人也就往往受到这样或那样的歧视。相形之下,在已有一定建国历史的民族国家,或者像美国那样由移民建立的国家,华人则有不必明确认同取向的回旋余地。也正是在这些国家中的一部分国家,双重国籍的观念成为一种自信和便利的象征而得以确立。在采取双重国籍政策的国家,华人既能归化入籍,又能公开地表露他们对于自己

身为华人的自豪。

在过去 20 多年中,大量前往历史较为悠久的国家和移民国家——特别是前往北美地区国家的“新移民”,认为双重国籍是有利于中国以及他们现在所在国家的。他们不清楚 50 年前中国放弃双重国籍政策的复杂背景,对这一决定在当时使占华侨总数 90% 的人受到了怎样的影响,也知之甚少。即使到现在,东南亚华人也大约仍占世界华侨华人总数的 80%。因而,考虑任何恢复双重国籍的举措都将如何再一次影响到这些人的生活是必要的。如下列问题:恢复双重国籍这样一个决定将如何影响东南亚国家与其他“新移民”所前往国家的关系?东南亚华人与中国的关系仍像那些在历史较为悠久的国家或移民国家的华人与中国的关系一样密切吗?中国真的有必要非采取双重国籍的政策不可吗?

程希的新作迈出了探讨 1950 年代有关问题的第一步。本书对周恩来在万隆会议宣布的这一决定所进行的学术阐述,有助于我们更清晰地认识更多的问题。同时,程希也使我们注意到目前关于双重国籍问题的争论中,与当时这一决定的相关之处。她的这本书是一个很好的开端,但仍有许多问题并不为人所知。有一些问题是历史学家非常希望能了解的。例如,当时放弃双重国籍的决定是如何做出的?谁建议中国应该鼓励华侨定居于当地,取得当地国籍,并忠诚地遵守所在国的法律?单一国籍的新政策又有什么局限?提出新政策的人有没有预见到后来会出现分歧?只有对这一时期的档案进行解读,才可能找到这些问题的答案。此外,还应该有着眼于更广层次的人类利益的考察。在万隆会议期间中国和印尼发表关于双重国籍问题的声明后选择留在东南亚的华侨什么时候才会讲述他们自己的故事?他们所遭遇的经历如何导致了对他们生活的

决定性改变？尚未有太多有关于此的记载留存。如果程希的这本书能引发对有关事态发展的关注，那么这本书的出版将会是一件有意义的事。

东亚研究所所长 王赓武

2004年12月25日 写于新加坡

Preface

Cheng Xi has written a timely book. She has been working with the Institute for Overseas Chinese History Research for many years. Her familiarity with the work of the various areas of Overseas Chinese Affairs has made it possible for her to provide a fresh perspective on the question of dual nationality for Chinese citizens. Now that the issue has surfaced again among new migrants overseas and some officials within China, her book reminds us that it was in 1955, at the Bandung Conference, that China first worked out what to do about that question. And it was at that meeting that China announced that it did not wish to adopt a dual nationality policy. This book kills two birds with one stone. On the one hand, it highlights the historic significance of the Bandung Conference for China's foreign policy. On the other hand, it reviews the conditions under which China decided that dual nationality for its citizens abroad was not in the interests of both China and the Chinese who were living abroad at the time.

Fifty years ago, China was still recovering from the fierce war it had fought on the Korean peninsula. The region of South-

east Asia was in the midst of a process of decolonisation, but colonial powers like Britain and France were trying their utmost to preserve their power and influence in the region. Most of all, they wanted to check the advance of the combined internationalist forces of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). China was in danger of being isolated and sought to woo the people of the former colonial territories who were now building their own new nation – states. Of these, by far the largest was India. Thus the friendship of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was central to this policy of seeking friends in Asia and ultimately among all the new independent states of other continents, notably Africa and Latin America. Of special importance in China's neighbourhood was Indonesia where President Sukarno was determined to play a key role to ease the former imperial powers out of Southeast Asia.

In an extremely complex contest for geopolitical space in the region, the PRC's leaders were conscious that they had a problem that was a unique product of modern Chinese history. This was the contest for the hearts and minds of the huaqiao between the PRC and the Guomindang government on the island of Taiwan. After half a century giving a special place for the huaqiao in Chinese political and economic development, both governments considered that huaqiao support was valuable. In the context of Sun Yat-sen's revolution of 1911, huaqiao were seen as integral to China's modern future and even a symbol of the republic's legitimacy. Thus the leaders in Beijing and Taipei continued to appeal to huaqiao patriotism after 1949. In fact, the administration in Taipei worked harder than ever among the huaqiao in order to retain their loyalty to the party

founded by Sun Yat - sen. And the PRC felt that it had to respond if it wanted to win the huaqiao to identify with the government of New China.

This competition for Chinese hearts and minds could not be separated from the ideological war between the protagonists of the Cold War. When anti - colonial sentiments were seen as signs that the new nationalist leaders everywhere were leaning towards the Soviet Union and the PRC, the anti - communist powers led by the United States were afraid that the huaqiao would become China's agents and support their enemies. With this background in mind, a group of states that valued their independence and did not want to take sides in the Cold War began to organise themselves as a third force, and the Bandung Conference was the product of that countervailing movement. China saw this as an opportunity to win friends. But the fact that Indonesia was to host the conference highlighted the huaqiao question there. Were the huaqiao all Chinese nationals? Many of them had sided with the Indonesian revolution and wanted to identify with the new nation. Could they do this as nationals of both China and Indonesia? Negotiations with Indonesia made clear that new nations in the throes of nation - building all wanted their nationals to have a single loyalty. Dual nationality under such conditions was not possible.

For the scholars who have dealt with the Bandung Conference, the key issue was international politics and the possibility of China being neutral in the Cold War. Stephen FitzGerald's *China and the Overseas Chinese: A study of Peking's changing policy, 1949 - 1970* (1972) was the first work done outside China that carefully examines the dual nationality question for

the huaqiao. But he had little access to internal Chinese documents and the views of the officials concerned, and the subject has not received much academic attention since. We do know that the issue caused immense concern among the Chinese in Southeast Asia. They received the news of China's announcement with mixed feelings. There was confusion and there was regret. There was even the sense of having been "abandoned", especially among those who have been openly patriotic. Others accepted this as a rational decision that benefited China while also enabling them to settle down among peoples who might otherwise view their loyalties with grave suspicion. Yet others realised that this was the moment when they had to choose their own fates, to return to China or to give up their Chinese nationality and seek a local one.

During the past fifty years, the fateful announcement has become reality and many lives have been totally changed as a result. Whether for better or for worse has depended largely on the policies of the national governments concerned. And the policies have varied considerably even within Southeast Asia where most huaqiao tried to turn themselves into local citizens and discard their sojourner status. In the new states that insisted on absolute loyalty from newly naturalised citizens and were not certain of China's sincerity, degrees of distrust remained and many Chinese have suffered from discrimination in one way or another. By contrast, the Chinese in older nation - states, or states established by immigrants like the United States, there was some room for ambiguity. It was also in some of these countries that the idea of dual nationality took root as a symbol of confidence and convenience. As a result, the Chinese there

could become nationals and still hope to display pride in their Chinese ethnicity openly.

New migrants of the past two decades who have largely gone to the older and migrant states, notably to North America, see dual nationality as something that would benefit China as well as the host country. They are not aware of the complex background that had led to its rejection some fifty years ago and even less of how that decision affected ninety per cent of all huaqiao at the time. Even now, ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia constitute about eighty per cent of those of Chinese descent around the world. It is necessary to consider how any move towards dual nationality would once more affect the lives of these people. Among the questions would be the following: How would such a decision affect relations with Southeast Asian and other newer nations? Do the ethnic Chinese there still matter to China as much as those in the older and migrant states? Is it really necessary for China to adopt a dual nationality policy?

Cheng Xi's new book has taken the first step to explore the issues of the 1950s. By providing a scholarly explanation of Zhou Enlai's decision at Bandung Conference, this book helps us see the larger question in a clearer light. She also draws attention to where that decision is relevant to the current debate about dual nationality. Her work is a very good beginning, but there is much that is still unknown. For example, there are questions that historians would very much want to know. How was it decided to reject dual nationality at the time? Who advised that China should encourage the huaqiao to settle down, seek local nationality and loyally observe the laws of their adopted country? What were the limits of that new policy and did