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在西方学术思想的发展流变中,出现过很多影响深远的经典著作,这些著作穿越时空,为人们长久研读,有的甚至影响了整个人类文明的发展进程。这套《西方学术经典文库》(英汉对照本),精选了其中最具有代表性的一些名著,计划达到一百部,将陆续分批出版直至全部完成。

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九州出版社

The Principles Of Psychology  
By *William James*

本书根据 Macmillan And Co. ,Ltd. 1907 年版本译出

## PREFACE

The treatise which follows has in the main grown up in connection with the author's class-room instruction in Psychology, although it is true that some of the chapters are more ' metaphysical,' and others fuller of detail, than is suitable for students who are going over the subject for the first time. The consequence of this is that, in spite of the exclusion of the important subjects of pleasure and pain, and moral and æsthetic feelings and judgments, the work has grown to a length which no one can regret more, than the writer himself. The man must indeed be sanguine who, in this crowded age, can hope to have many readers for fourteen hundred continuous pages from his pen. But *wer Vieles bringt wird Manchem etwas bringen*; and, by judiciously skipping according to their several needs, I am sure that many sorts of readers, even those who are just beginning the study of the subject, will find my book of use. Since the beginners are most in need of guidance, I suggest for their behoof that they omit altogether on a first reading chapters 6, 7, 8, 10 (from page 330 to page 371), 12, 13, 15, 17, 20, 21, and 28. The better to awaken the neophyte's interest, it is possible that the wise order would be to pass directly from chapter 4 to chapters 23, 24, 25, and 26, and thence to return to the first volume again. Chapter 20, on Space – perception, is a terrible thing, which, unless written with all that detail, could not be fairly treated at all. An abridgment of it, called ' The Spatial Quale,' which appeared in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. XIII. p. 64, may be found by some persons a useful substitute for the entire chapter.

I have kept close to the point of view of natural science throughout the book. Every natural science assumes certain data uncritically,

## 序 言

虽然由于本书的一些章节太“形而上”，而其他一些章节又太细致，因而对于首次接触这一学科的学生来说，不太适合，但以下论述的形成却主要和作者的心理学课堂教学有关。其结果是，尽管除去了愉快与痛苦、道德的和审美的情感与判断这些重要的题目，但这本书篇幅的冗长之憾还是令作者本人比任何人都感觉更甚。在这急速前进的时代，期望笔下那连续 1400 页的书拥有很多读者的人必定是乐观派。但是，谁做的事情多，谁就会对某些事情有帮助；而且我确信，通过按照各自的一些需要进行明智的跳读，多种类型的读者，甚至那些刚刚开始学习这一学科的人，都将会发现我这本书的用处。由于初学者最需要指导，为他们着想，我建议他们在首次阅读时完全省略掉第六、七、八、十（从 330 至 371 页）、十二、十三、十五、十七、二十、二十一和二十八章。为了更好地唤起初学者的兴趣，可能明智的顺序是读完第四章就直接进入第二十三、二十四、二十五和二十六章，并从那儿再返回第一卷。关于空间知觉的第二十章棘手一些，如果不那样细致地叙述，则根本不能清楚地对它加以处理。它的一个删节本，题为《空间感觉质》，刊登在《思辨哲学杂志》第十三卷 64 页上，一些人可能会发现它是整个二十章的一个有用的替代本。

我整本书者紧跟自然科学的观点。每门自然科学都不加批

and declines to challenge the elements between which its own 'laws' obtain, and from which its own deductions are carried on. Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, assumes as its data (1) *thoughts and feelings*, and (2) *a physical world* in time and space with which they coexist and which (3) *they know*. Of course these data themselves are discussable; but the discussion of them (as of other elements) is called metaphysics and falls outside the province of this book. This book, assuming that thoughts and feelings exist and are vehicles of knowledge, thereupon contends that psychology when she has ascertained the empirical correlation of the various sorts of thought or feeling with definite conditions of the brain, can go no farther—can go no farther, that is, as a natural science. If she goes farther she becomes metaphysical. All attempts to *explain* our phenomenally given thoughts as products of deeper – lying entities (whether the latter be named 'Soul,' 'Transcendental Ego,' 'Ideas,' or 'Elementary Units of Consciousness') are metaphysical. This book consequently rejects both the associationist and the spiritualist theories; and in this strictly positivistic point of view consists the only feature of it for which I feel tempted to claim originality. Of course this point of view is anything but ultimate. Men must keep thinking; and the data assumed by psychology, just like those assumed by physics and the other natural sciences, must some time be overhauled. The effort to overhaul them clearly and thoroughly is metaphysics; but metaphysics can only perform her task well when distinctly conscious of its great extent. Metaphysics fragmentary, irresponsible, and half-awake, and unconscious that she is metaphysical, spoils two good things when she injects herself into a natural science. And it seems to me that the theories both of a spiritual agent and of associated 'ideas' are, as they figure in the psychology – books, just such metaphysics as this. Even if their results be true, it would be as well "to keep them, *as thus presented*, out of psychology as it is to keep the results of idealism out of physics.

判地假定某种论据,然后再挑战它自己的“规律”所由以获得的、它自己的推论所由以展开的要素。心理学这门有限个体心灵的科学,假设它的论据如下,(1)思想和感受,(2)与它们共同存在的时空中的物质世界,(3)它们所知的物质世界。当然,这些论据本身尚可探讨,但是对这些论据(以及其他要素)的探讨被称作形而上学,而且也超出了本书的范围。由于假设思维和感受是存在的,而且是知识的媒介物,因此本书主张,一旦心理学确定了各种思想和感受同大脑的明确条件的经验关系,她就不能走得更远了——就是说,作为一门自然科学不能走得更远了。如果她再走得远些的话就变成形而上学的了。所有将现象界赋予的思想解说成深层本体(不管后者被称作“灵魂”、“先验自我”、“理念”或是“意识的基本单元”)的产物的尝试,均是形而上学的。因而本书拒绝联想主义者和唯灵论者的理论,并且本书的唯一特征就在于其严格的实证观点,而这也是我乐于称道的原创性之所在。当然,这绝不是终极的观点。人必须不断地思索,而且心理学所假设的论据,如同物理学和其他自然科学所假设的论据一样,必须在某个时期予以检验。对它们进行明晰的和彻底的检验之努力是形而上学,但是只有当形而上学清楚地意识到它极大的范围时,才能够完成好她的任务。当不完整的、不可靠的、半清醒的和没有意识到自己是形而上学的形而上学将自己注入一门自然科学中时,她就会把两种好的事物都破坏掉。并且,精神执行者的理论和联想“观念”的理论,就其在心理学书籍中出现的情况而言,在我看来它们就是这样的形而上学。即使它们的结果是真实的,也还是让它们和如此呈现的一样,同心理学分离为好,如同让唯心主义的结果和物理学分离一样。

I have therefore treated our passing thoughts as integers, and regarded the mere laws of their coexistence with brain – states as the ultimate laws for our science. The reader will in vain seek for any closed system in the book. It is mainly a mass of descriptive details, running out into queries which only a metaphysics alive to the weight of her task can hope successfully to deal with. That will perhaps be centuries hence; and meanwhile the best mark of health that a science can show is this unfinished – seeming front.

The completion of the book has been so slow that several chapters have been published successively in *Mind*, the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, the *Popular Science Monthly*, and *Scribner's Magazine*. Acknowledgment is made in the proper places.

The bibliography, I regret to say, is quite unsystematic. I have habitually given my authority for special experimental facts; but beyond that I have aimed mainly to cite books that would probably be actually used by the ordinary American college – student in his collateral reading. The bibliography in W. Volkmann von Volkmar's *Lehrbuch der Psychologie* (1875) is so complete, up to its date, that there is no need of an inferior duplicate. And for more recent references, Sully's *Outlines*, Dewey's *Psychology*, and Baldwin's *Handbook of Psychology* may be advantageously used.

Finally, where one owes to so many, it seems absurd to single out particular creditors; yet I cannot resist the temptation at the end of my first literary venture to record my gratitude for the inspiration I have got from the writings of J. S. Mill, Lotze, Renouvier, Hodgson, and Wundt, and from the intellectual companionship (to name only five names) of Chauncey Wright and Charles Peirce in old times, and more recently of Stanley Hall, James Putnam, and Josiah Royce.

HABVARD UNIVERSITY,

AUGUST 1890.



因此,我将我们逝去的思想当作整体来加以对待,并且把关于它们和大脑状态共同存在的纯粹规律当作我们科学的最终规律。读者在本书中寻求任何封闭的体系都将是徒然的。本书有大量描述性的细节,而它们所引起的质疑,只有可以承担她重任的形而上学才能有希望成功地解决。那可能是此后几百年的事情了,同时,一门科学能展示出的最好的健康标志就是这种表面上未完成的样子。

由于本书的完成过于缓慢,一些章节已经相继在《心灵》、《思辨哲学杂志》、《大众科学月刊》和《斯克里布纳杂志》上发表过了。我在适当的地方承认了这一事实。

我很遗憾地指出,参考文献很不系统。我习惯性地授权自己采纳了一些特殊的实验事实,但除此之外,我的目标主要是引用一些普通的美国大学生在他们进行辅助阅读时可能会实际用到的书籍。W. 沃尔克曼·冯沃尔克玛的《心理学教科书》里的参考文献迄今为止都是相当全面的,我们不需要对其加以劣等的复制。而就较为近期的参考书目来看,我们可以方便地使用萨利的《提纲》、杜威的《心理学》和鲍德温的《心理学手册》。

最后,如果一个人对太多的人有所亏欠,那么从中挑选出几个特殊的债权人似乎是荒唐的,然而,在结束我第一次写作冒险之际,我还是忍不住要说,感谢 J. S. 密尔、洛采、雷诺维尔、霍奇森和冯特,我从他们的著作中获得了启发;感谢(仅列出五个人的名字)昌西·赖特、查尔斯·皮尔士、斯坦利·霍尔、詹姆斯·普特南和赛亚·罗伊斯,我在同前两位旧时进行的以及和后三位近期进行的智慧的交往中获得了启发。

哈佛大学

1890 年 8 月

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心 理 学 原 理

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THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY

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[美] 威廉·詹姆斯 著

郭 宾 译

(一)

 九 州 出 版 社  
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## CHAPTER I.

### The Scope Of Psychology.

Psychology is the Science of Mental Life, both of its phenomena and of their conditions. The phenomena are such things as we call feelings, desires, cognitions, reasonings, decisions, and the like; and, superficially considered, their variety and complexity is such as to leave a chaotic impression on the observer. The most natural and consequently the earliest way of unifying the material was, first, to classify it as well as might be, and, secondly, to affiliate the diverse mental modes thus found, upon a simple entity, the personal Soul, of which they are taken to be so many facultative manifestations. Now, for instance, the Soul manifests its faculty of Memory, now of Reasoning, now of Volition, or again its Imagination or its Appetite. This is the orthodox 'spiritualistic' theory of scholasticism and of common-sense. Another and a less obvious way of unifying the chaos is to seek common elements *in* the divers mental facts rather than a common agent behind them, and to explain them constructively by the various forms of arrangement of these elements, as one explains houses by stones and bricks. The 'associationist' schools of Herbart in Germany, and of Hume the Mills and Bain in Britain have thus constructed a *psychology without a soul* by taking discrete 'ideas,' faint or vivid, and showing how, by their cohesions, repulsions, and forms of succession, such things as reminiscences, perceptions, emotions, volitions, passions, theories, and all the other furnishings of an individual's mind may be engendered.

## 第一章 心理学的范围

心理学是关于心理生活的现象及其条件的科学。这些现象指的是诸如所谓的情感、欲望、认知、推理、决定等等的东西；若是肤浅地考虑它们，这些现象的多样性和复杂性便会使观察者留下一种混乱的印象。最寻常、因而也是最早被用来统一这些材料的方法是，首先，尽量将其分类；其次，将由此找到的不同种类的心理模型从属于一个单纯本体——个人灵魂，这些心理模型被看作是个人灵魂的大量随机显现。例如，灵魂时而展露出记忆的能力，时而展现出推理的能力，时而又表现出意志力，又或者是想像力与自然欲望。这便是经院哲学与常识理论所说的“唯灵论”。此外，还有一种不太显著的用来统一这些混乱材料的方法，那便是在诸种心理事实中寻求共同的元素，而不是寻求这些事实背后共同的执行者，如同用石头和砖块来解释房屋一样，通过对构成心理事实的不同元素之间排列的不同形式的研究，对这些心理事实做出建设性的阐释。包括德国的赫尔巴特和英国的休谟、密尔父子以及贝恩在内的“联想主义”学派，已经以此种方式创建了一门无灵魂的心理科学，他们采用分离的“构想”（是模糊的或者清晰的），通过展示心理事实之间的联结、排斥及序列形式，来说明诸如记忆、知觉、情绪、意志、激情、理论以及所有其他的



The very Self or *ego* of the individual comes in this way to be viewed no longer as the pre-existing source of the representations, but rather as their last and most complicated fruit.

Now, if we strive rigorously to simplify the phenomena in either of these ways, we soon become aware of inadequacies in our method. Any particular cognition, for example, or recollection, is accounted for on the soul-theory by being referred to the spiritual faculties of Cognition or of Memory. These faculties themselves are thought of as absolute properties of the soul; that is, to take the case of memory, no reason is given why we should remember a fact as it happened, except that so to remember it constitutes the essence of our Recollective Power. We may, as spiritualists, try to explain our memory's failures and blunders by secondary causes. But its *successes* can invoke no factors save the existence of certain objective things to be remembered on the one hand, and of our faculty of memory on the other. When, for instance, I recall my graduation-day, and drag all its incidents and emotions up from death's dateless night, no mechanical cause can explain this process, nor can any analysis reduce it to lower terms or make its nature seem other than an ultimate *datum*, which, whether we rebel or not at its mysteriousness, must simply be taken for granted if we are to psychologize at all. However the associationist may represent the present ideas as thronging and arranging themselves, still, the spiritualist insists, he has in the end to admit that *something*, be it brain, be it 'ideas,' be it 'association,' *knows* past time as past, and fills it out with this or that event. And when the spiritualist calls memory an 'irreducible faculty,' he says no more than this admission of the associationist already grants.

And yet the admission is far from being a satisfactory simplification of the concrete facts. For why should this absolute god-given Faculty retain so much better the events of yesterday than those of last year, and, best of all, those of an hour ago? Why,