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2005 年：应对挑战

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导摇论
裂变在延伸摇斗争在延续

○ 许志新

一

2006 年新年钟声刚刚响过，俄罗斯便切断了对乌克兰和摩尔多瓦两国的天然气供应，一场令世界瞩目的国际性危机终于爆发。其后，尽管双方很快达成了新协议，但乌克兰购买俄罗斯天然气的价格已从每千立方米 50 美元陡然升至 95 美元，摩尔多瓦购买的价格也从 80 美元升至 110 美元。

祸不单行，这一地区的新年已连续三年都是在危机中度过的——2004 年新年临近时，格鲁吉亚的 “天鹅绒革命” 使俄罗斯人经历了一场梦魇；2004 年底 2005 年初的乌克兰 “橙色革命”，更是给了俄罗斯当头一棒；2006 年伊始则是 “天然气危机” ……危机频仍一词，是对这一多事地区的恰当写照。

本发展报告所涵盖的这个多事地区，是地理上彼此接壤的俄罗斯、独联体其他国家和中东部欧洲，共有 27 个研究对象国，包括从苏联分裂出来的 15 国，以及中东欧地区的 12 国，其中的多数国家获得独立的时间不到 15 年。这些国家所以被纳入一个大的研究范畴，是因为它们有两大共同点：①它们都曾是社会主义国家，至今与西方和东方国家仍有很大的不同，并仍是国际舞台上重要的群体；②它们都走上了社会转轨道路，构成了当代转轨学研究的主要客体，其经验和教训对中国具有借鉴或警示意义。

严重分化，是过去十几年间这些国家发展的突出特点。例如，截至目前，已有十个中东欧国家加入了北约，其中有八个国家还加入了欧盟，而俄罗斯等一大批独联体国家尚游离在世界贸易组织之外、处于全球化进程的边

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缘。又如，在这些国家中个别的已达到欧洲中等发达水平，但多数发展水平仍处在欧洲最底层，有的国家甚至跌入了世界最穷国的行列。

正因为严重分化，这些国家所面临的发展问题已出现很大差异。这种差异甚至导致了利益冲突和敌对。例如：俄罗斯推行的是一种石油战略，并试图通过“能源武器”来保障其大国地位和地区控制；而乌克兰、格鲁吉亚和摩尔多瓦等国则力图摆脱这种控制，并不惜恶化同俄罗斯的关系以争取西方的援助，加速“脱俄入欧”。又如：一些国家正采取措施防止“颜色革命”向本国蔓延，而完成“颜色革命”的国家却组织了“民主选择共同体”，中欧国家则普遍出现政治向右转；所秉持的价值观不同和发展方向不同推动了这些国家对立一面的发展。在政治、经济、外交、军事、边界、民族、人口、宗教和文化等各类矛盾的作用下，这一地区尚处于裂变大于聚合的发展时期。

“应对挑战”，被本发展报告概括为这一地区 2005 年发展的主题词。在这一年里，这一地区的多数国家忙于应对各类挑战，例如：大多数独联体国家忙于应对“颜色革命”的挑战；作为这一地区的主要国家，俄罗斯的任务不仅是防止“颜色革命”，而且还需要对“颜色革命”所带来的地缘政治挑战做出反击；而那些排队等候加入欧盟的中东欧国家，则正按照入盟要求推进颇为艰巨的政治和经济改革。

二

危机主要集中在独联体地区。不论是格鲁吉亚和乌克兰的“颜色革命”，或是 2005 年 3 月的吉尔吉斯斯坦政权更迭、5 月的乌兹别克斯坦安集延事件，以及 2005 年底 2006 年初的“天然气危机”，都发生在这一地区。这些危机，特别是“颜色革命”和“天然气危机”，体现了独联体分裂趋势。

独联体分裂的趋势与俄罗斯民族历史性地缘政治大退却的趋势是一致的。这一历史性退却发端于 20 世纪 80 年代苏联从阿富汗撤军，紧接着是华沙条约组织、经互会的解散和苏联的解体。1997 年北约第一轮东扩、1999 年科索沃战争和 2000 年南斯拉夫大选，几乎使俄罗斯在中东欧地区的影响力荡然无存。2003 年的伊拉克战争又打掉了俄罗斯在中东地区的特殊权益。2004 年波罗的海三国的入约入盟，是西方在原苏联地区打开的第一个缺口。当所有这些肃清外围的行动完成后，西方开始深入独联体，向俄罗斯的切身

利益区发起了攻势。

独联体的分裂目前还处于开始阶段，因此俄罗斯民族的地缘政治大退却尚未完结。2005 年 6 月俄罗斯国防部长谢·伊万诺夫在一次讲话中估计，大约 7 ~ 10 年后在独联体境内将会出现北约成员国。俄罗斯民族退却的终点何在？答案将由独联体的命运来决定。

导致独联体分裂的第一个原因，正如我们在报告中所指出的，是与俄罗斯相敌对的势力过于强大——“在独联体问题上，与俄罗斯的利益相敌对的，是欧洲的地缘政治安全、独联体国家的主权发展、美国的全球战略这三种利益结合而成的力量”。

导致独联体分裂的第二个原因更为重要，亦如我们在报告中所指出的，“独联体危机的实质是现代化危机”，一个经济上落后的联盟很难维持自身的存在。面对经济的全球化进程、世界科学技术的迅猛发展、周边强势经济特别是欧洲经济的扩张，独联体显得弱不禁风。

俄罗斯没有束手待毙，如果说 2004 年是西方在独联体因发动“颜色革命”而凯歌高奏的一年的话，那么 2005 年则是俄罗斯采取反击措施应对地缘政治挑战的一年。这些反击措施包括：改变对独联体政策，即改行“能源换安全”——用提供廉价能源的办法换取独联体国家不退出独联体、不危害俄罗斯安全的保证。对坚持“去俄罗斯化”的乌克兰等国进行经济制裁，并使出了大幅度抬高能源价格这一严厉的杀手锏；用《上海合作组织成员国元首宣言》方式，要求美国从中亚撤军；加强同独联体国家的战略合作，特别是与乌兹别克斯坦签署联盟关系条约，使两国实际结成了军事战略和防御联盟。

但是，这些反击措施远未达到目的。“天然气危机”的最终结果表明，乌克兰宁可遭受损失，也不愿意回头。乌克兰、格鲁吉亚等国虽未脱离独联体，都已渐行渐远。

独联体仍将是个多事的地区。独联体分裂将是一持续的过程，在此过程中将会事件频发并导致危机不断。俄罗斯将会因此而饱受煎熬，与美国和欧洲的关系也会因此而时时变得紧张。

三

如果说在过去十几年里这一地区曾给世界的发展留下过什么印记的话，那么最清晰的印记莫过于所谓的“民主化浪潮”了。东欧剧变和苏联

解体被认为是第一、二波浪潮，现在的“颜色革命”又被说成是第三波浪潮。

在从 2003 年底到 2005 年 3 月一年半的时间里，“颜色革命”似已产生多米诺骨牌效应，无往而不胜，大有席卷独联体之势。一时间似乎“民主化浪潮”滚滚、“西风”劲吹。

但是，正是从 2005 年下半年起，这股“民主化浪潮”被初步遏制。11 月的阿塞拜疆议会选举和 12 月的哈萨克斯坦总统选举都平稳度过，仅仅激起一丝“颜色革命”的涟漪而已。

2005 年是独联体国家采取措施应对“颜色革命”挑战的一年。阿塞拜疆采取的措施有：向国际社会展示执政党的民主形象；瓦解执政党内与反对派联合策动的政变；以涉嫌贪污、侵吞国家财产及策划暴力政变为名，逮捕了一批政府高官和商界人士，向民众显示打击腐败的决心。哈萨克斯坦采取的措施有：提出一系列跨年度和连续性的社会保障措施和福利政策，如提高工资待遇、加强社会保障、改革住房政策等；大幅度提高大学生的奖学金和助学补贴；查封反对派报纸，取缔反对派政党；修改《选举法》，禁止选举期间进行群众集会；颁布《非政府组织法》，限制国内外非政府组织在哈萨克斯坦的活动。这些措施行之有效，保证了选举的平稳进行。

俄罗斯未雨绸缪。尽管它尚未进入选举年，但也采取了一系列措施严防“颜色革命”。例如：议会通过《非政府组织法》，对非政府组织接受国外资助以及国外非政府组织和社会团体在俄罗斯开办代表处做出严格限制；成立亲政权的青年组织，既争取青年，又是为“街头政治”斗争做准备；从名誉上打击反对派领袖；提高社会福利开支，缓和因福利货币化改革而产生的与民众的矛盾。

值得一提的是，为了应对“颜色革命”的思想挑战，俄罗斯在 2005 年提出了“主权民主”概念。“主权民主”的实质是普京上台以来长期推行的“可控的民主”。所谓“可控的民主”就是树立国家权威以建立对社会的控制，避免重蹈“民主至上”导致社会混乱的覆辙，为经济发展创造条件。“主权民主”不仅是对“可控的民主”的正式命名，而且是对民主学说的一种俄罗斯式的发展。对普京的有关讲话进行归纳，可以得出“主权民主”有两个基本点：一是民主的建立与发展要符合国情；二是民主需要建立在一定的经济基础之上。这两点都有说服力。正因为如此，“主权民主”的提出成为俄罗斯防止“颜色革命”、在意识形态上变被动为主动的重要举措。

尽管有上述种种，但是“颜色革命”的危机并没有过去。实际上，鉴于在吉尔吉斯斯坦政权更迭中所得几近于零，以及在乌兹别克斯坦安集延事件中利益严重受损——被迫撤除军事基地，美国人似已放弃了在中亚等国发动“颜色革命”的努力（如2005年10月份美国国务卿赖斯访问哈萨克斯坦时曾示意将不干涉其大选），而把矛头集中指向了白俄罗斯。2006年是白俄罗斯的选举年。“颜色革命”是势头延续，或是戛然而止，成为吹过去的飓风，这也许将由白俄罗斯的事态发展来决定。

四

不论白俄罗斯的命运如何，2005年的发展已显示出，俄罗斯和中亚国家有可能成功地防止“颜色革命”，阻挡住“民主化浪潮”。

分析表明，“颜色革命”所以能在一些国家获得成功，需要一些基本条件：①经济发展落后、贫富悬殊、社会矛盾尖锐；②与欧盟国家接壤或仅咫尺之遥，可以直接从欧洲寻求发展的源泉。格鲁吉亚同时具备这两个条件。乌克兰具备后一个条件。乌克兰近些年经济形势较好，但仍面临许多问题，它与俄罗斯在经济结构上的冲突以及对现代化的需求，最终使它选择了欧洲。吉尔吉斯斯坦虽然具备第一个条件，但除了俄罗斯和独联体外，它很难找到其他的国际归属。

在“革命”后的国家，人们几乎看不到民主体制有丝毫的进步。所不同的或许仅仅是腐败的程度，但那不过是新一轮的腐败尚处于取代旧腐败的过程之中。

因此，所谓“颜色革命”，归根到底是个发展问题，而不是民主政治问题，民主在很大程度上成了打人的工具。由于经济长期落后，由于与俄罗斯结盟不可能解决发展和现代化问题，一些独联体国家中的某些政治势力转而向欧洲寻求发展和现代化的源泉。这种要求与美欧挤压俄罗斯地缘政治空间的目标一拍即合，“颜色革命”应运而生。

“民主化浪潮”的始作俑者是西欧，其实质是西欧国家以“民主化”为旗帜而进行的同质化扩张。早在东欧国家发生剧变的1989年，西欧就规定了援助东欧国家的标准，受援国必须：①建立法治；②尊重人权；③建立多党制；④在1990年底前组织自由选举；⑤执行建立市场经济的政策。东欧国家作为资源稀缺的小国，在经互会范围内的国际分工崩溃后，只有从西欧

经济中寻求资源，参与新的国际分工，并重新确立自己在世界经济中的定位。这是经济发展本身的规定性要求，而经济的规定性又产生了政治发展的规定性。

“颜色革命”成功的独联体国家无一例外地将加入欧盟和北约作为自己的终极目标。因此，“颜色革命”实际是欧盟和北约向独联体东扩的前奏，其实质是西欧同质化扩张的延续。

这种同质化扩张及其掀起的“民主化浪潮”正在俄罗斯和中亚国家碰壁。对于中亚国家，西欧鞭长莫及。而俄罗斯则太大，不仅为西欧的扩张所难以消化，还会引发不同质物体的碰撞。实际上，俄罗斯坚持走自己的强国之路，其“主权民主”与欧洲民主的差异所反映的就是这种不同的质。

俄罗斯并不是没想过与西欧同质化。20 世纪 90 年代它曾照搬西方模式，大力推行民主化，但结果付出了综合国力急剧下降、人民生活普遍贫困的惨重代价。普京上台后开始探索俄罗斯自己的发展道路，与其强国战略相伴而来的是“可控的民主”（“主权民主”），从而与西方模式拉开了距离。

俄罗斯等国的经历已经不止一次地证明，西方模式不是什么“万应灵药”。只要这些国家坚持走符合国情的发展道路，就不会盲目照搬西方模式，就会抵制西方的同质化扩张及为此掀起的“民主化浪潮”。

五

这一地区的危机几乎都与俄罗斯有关，过去的东欧国家剧变源起于苏联危机，现在的独联体裂变也缘于俄罗斯危机。正是俄罗斯的衰败，正是俄罗斯民族的历史性地缘政治大退却，使这一地区成了纷争不已和大国角逐的场所。

俄罗斯要想稳定地区形势，必须以强大的综合国力做后盾，这首先需要建立强大的经济。截至 2005 年，俄罗斯经济已连续七年增长，但这还仅仅是接近苏联解体前俄罗斯经济的最高水平——1989 年的水平。

正如我们在报告中所指出的，独联体内部的危机可以从两个方面来理解：

其一，作为同样是现代化程度低、科技应用水平相对落后的经济体，俄罗斯不可能带领独联体国家跟上经济全球化和科技进步迅猛发展的步伐，不可能解决独联体的现代化问题。也就是说，危机产生于俄罗斯自身经济的落后。

其二，独联体国家既然不能从俄罗斯获得现代化源泉，那就只有从外部去寻找这种源泉。欧洲经济对独联体影响最大，独联体中的欧洲国家的分离倾向也就最强。而经济上的分离要求必然会带动政治上的分离要求。

俄罗斯经济的复兴得益于石油，但其孱弱恰恰也在于对石油的依赖，在于经济结构的日趋低度化。俄罗斯经济的原料化性质决定了它很难成为凝聚独联体的“经济磁石”。因此，对俄罗斯来讲，经济发展问题仍是个根本问题，是一连串危机之症结所在。

不仅如此，俄罗斯的发展问题还在于其资源型经济增长模式已难以长期持续。2005 年原油产量仅增长 2.4%，俄罗斯政府估计 2006 年的增幅也不会超过 3%，而 2003 年和 2004 年的增幅则分别为 11% 和 9%。由于勘探长期落后于开采，已探明石油储量日益枯竭，开采和出口基础设施的约束加重，增产的潜力缩小。

2005 年底，俄罗斯政府通过了《2006 ~ 2008 年经济社会发展中期纲要》，提出利用石油价格高涨和石油收入大增的有利时机，通过积极财政政策增加对高新技术经济和加工工业的投入，促使资源型经济向创新发展型经济转变。但是，这种转变受到种种因素的制约，前景并不明朗。

对俄罗斯最直接的挑战是来自独联体地区的地缘政治挑战，最根本的挑战则来自经济领域，即能否成功地实现经济增长模式的转型，实现创新发展型经济。从这两个方面看，俄罗斯发展面临的挑战大于机遇。

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Foreword

Widespread Disintegration, Ceaseless Conflicts

○ Xu Zhixin

I

The beginning of 2006 witnessed Russia's shut-off natural gas delivery to Ukraine and Moldova: a shocking crisis worldwide, which soon came to an end by an agreement on both sides. As a result, Ukraine and Moldova paid a price for natural gas at US$ 95/1000m^3 and US$ 110/1000m^3 respectively, i. e. Russia charged US$ 45/1000m^3 and US$ 15/1000m^3 more than the prices prior to the crisis.

Unfortunately, this region has been rather eventful throughout these three years: the nightmarish "Velvet Revolution" in the late 2004, Ukraine "Orange Revolution" in early 2005: a hard blow on Russia, and "Natural Gas Crisis" at the beginning of 2006.

This Annual Review will cover the study of 27 countries, including Russia, other CIS states, as well as Central and East Europe countries, among which 15 are from the former Soviet Union and 12 from the Central and East Europe. We've singled them out for attention in view of the facts that: a, they were socialist members, who are different in many ways from others and still remain important roles on global stage; b, they have undergone social reforms and transitions, whose experiences may serve for case-study and teach us lessons.

The typical feature for these countries in the past decades has been

disintegration: 10 Central and East European countries entered NATO, 8 out of which turned to be the EU members, while Russia and the CIS states have been stayed outside WTO, wandering at the edge of globalization. Economically, a majority of these countries have stayed at poor level in Europe, some even have come down in the world and been listed among the poorest, with only a few developed.

These unbalanced development plus different interests led to confrontation and enmity. For example, while Russia favored and wielded its "energy weapon" to keep its power in regional control, Ukraine, Georgia and Molvador broke away from Russia's control and ran for the West help, thus speeding their step getting away from Russia and get close to the Europe. Still while some states struggled hard to keep Color Revolution from themselves, colorized states started Community of Democratic Choice, turning right politically. Owing to discord and variance in politics, economy, diplomacy, military affairs, border issues, nationalities, population, religions, values, national goals and cultures, disintegration has been overweighed convergence in this region.

So "challenge" becomes the key word for this report about 2005 situation in this region: the CIS states protested against Color Revolution; Russia, on one hand, tried to stop Color Revolution, on the other hand, had to make prompt response to geopolitical challenges; Some other states while waiting for entry into the EU, have been working at reform in politics and economy to be qualified for the EU.

II

Crises have haunted the CIS: Color Revolution in Georgia and Ukraine in 2004, Power Change in Kirgizstan Mar. 2005, Andjian Event in May 2005, Natural Gas Problem at the turn of 2005 －2006, all of which indicated their further disintegration.

The CIS disintegration went together with Russia historical geopolitical retreat in 1980s, when Russia called back its troop in Afghanistan, followed by dismissal of Warsaw Treaty Organization and CEMA as well as disintegration of the Soviet

Union. 1997 NATO Enlargement, 1999 Kosovo War and 2000 Yugoslavia election reduced Russia influence on Central and East Europe states. And 2003 Iraqi War was another bang on Russia in his privileged region, where the first split by the West came with the three Baltic-states entry into NATO in 2004. After clarifying Russia neighboring areas, the West launch aimed at the CIS-the Russia rooted self-interest proper.

Both the CIS disintegration and Russia geopolitical retreat are at their beginning. In 7 – 10 years, there will be NATO members in the CIS, Russia Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov once predicted in June 2005 in his speech. How far will Russia retreat? The CIS fate will be the answer.

The CIS disintegration lies firstly in, as mentioned in the report, the strong enmity against Russia-geopolitical security for Europe, the CIS sovereignties, and U. S. global strategies.

What really accounts for the CIS disintegration, also as stated in the report, is Modernization Crisis-economical backwardness can hardly hold together a coalition. It is economic globalization, rapid scientific progress as well as neighboring strong economy (esp. Europe economy expansion) that throws the CIS into a disadvantageous and feeble position.

However, Russia didn't stop taking its actions. If 2004 witnessed Color Revolution victory against the CIS by the West, 2005 recorded Russia's counter-attacks against geopolitical challenges. Russia adjusted its policies to the CIS. A case in point is the policy of Energy in Exchange for Security, which, at the cost of Russia distress selling in energy, made sure that the CIS states remain in the coalition and keep Russia away from danger. By contrast, Russia's soaring energy price worked at cracking down on Ukraine's economy for its "peeling off" Russia. What's more, in form of Declaration of Heads of Member States of SCO, Russia demanded that U. S. withdraw its troop from Central Asia. Finally, Russia worked hard at strengthening its strategic negotiation with the CIS states, esp. the treaty with Uzbekistan, aiming at military and defensive cooperation.

But, these counter-attacks have not been powerful enough. Natural Gas Crisis has made it clear that Ukraine wouldn't turn back even at the risk of damages. Though Ukraine and Georgia still the CIS members, they have gone farther away.

To sum up, the CIS will remain eventful in the course of its disintegration, which means more crises, which means Russia's further suffer and tense-relations with U. S. and Europe between whiles.

Ⅲ

What impressed the world most in this region in the past 10 more years has been the "Wave of Democratization"——Political Change in East Europe and Disintegration of the Soviet Union——the first and second waves, and now the third, Color Revolution.

From the end of 2003 to Mar. of 2005, Color Revolution, as domino effect, swept and prevailed all over the CIS. It seems that the Wave of Democratization - the West wind was blowing hard.

But back to 2005 summer, this Wave of Democratization seemed to be held back. Nov. Azerbaijan Parliamentary Election and Dec. Kazakstan Presidential Election went smoothly: a less exciting Color Revolution.

2005 also noted down what the CIS states did when challenged by Color Revolution. Take Azerbaijan for example: it has improved democratic image of Party in power, stopped the coup conspired jointly by insiders and rivals, showed determination in fighting against corruption by arresting some officials and businessmen for their corruption, embezzlement, and violent coup. Another example is Kazakstan: it took measures in social assurance and welfare, such as pay rise, insurance, housing, scholarship and grant-in-aid, etc., closed down opposition press and clamped down rival party, amended election act, banned mass gatherings during election, made regulations to restrict NGO improper activities. All these guaranteed the smooth elections.

Also, Russia have taken precautions against Color Revolution, in advance of its election year: is passed the act of NGO activities, imposed strict restrictions upon agencies of NGOs and societies in Russia, set up pro-authority youth organization, won over young people to serve for "street politics", lashed rival leaders, added expenditure on welfare, alleviated tension resulted from welfare-monetization.

What is worth noticed is the concept of Sovereignty Democracy, put forward in 2005 when Russia coped with Color Revolution ideologically. In fact, Sovereignty Democracy, in other words, Controllable Democracy, has been pursued for a long time after President Putin came into power. Controllable Democracy is to establish authority's control over society rather than prioritized democracy, which may bring about social disorder. Sovereignty Democracy, formal expression for Controllable Democracy is a Russia-characterized theory for developing democracy. The basic convincing points of President Putin's Sovereignty Democracy are: a, democracy should serve for state situation b, democracy should be built on certain economy. This concept holds back Color Revolution in Russia and put Russia in less passivism ideologically.

However, Color Revolution hasn't been at a standstill. In fact, U. S. has benefited little in Kirgizstan Change of Power and Uzbekistan Andjian Event. U. S. dismantlement of its military base: a signal of U. S. quitting its Color Revolution in Central Asia (U. S Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice indicated there's no intervention in Kazakstan election in her speech during her Oct. visit there), but U. S. turns to Belarus: the weakest CIS non-colorized state. So what will happen in Belarus election in 2006 will be a touchstone to see wheather Color Revolution come to a standstill like a hurricane or still continue.

Ⅳ

Whatever 2006 Belarus situation will be, 2005 has thrown hint on us that Russia and Central Asia states are somewhat immune to Color Revolution, and lowered the so-called Wave of Democratization.

As analysis shows, we think there are two premises for a successful Color Revolution: a, Lagging economy, Wide Gap between the rich and the poor, Serious social conflicts; b, Being Neighboring the EU and within the reach of the resources from Europe. Georgia has been qualified for both; but as far as Ukraine is concerned, it enjoyed the latter-improved economy and strong need for modernization pushed Ukraine to the Europe, in spite of its conflicts in economic structure with Russia and exciting problems. Kirgizstan satisfied the first, whose

unsuccessful Revolution was due to its lack of support from any others but Russia and the CIS.

"Revolutionized" states found there's hardly any democratic progress, but the corruptions: a new corruption in the course of replacing the old one.

Therefore, the so-called Color Revolution is a problem of development rather than a democratic and political problem. In a sense, democracy converted into a lash. Since Russia coalition was not helpful in economic development and modernization, some political groups turned to seek help from Europe. Dwindling Russia geopolitical space has been what U. S. and Europe has been working at and then came the Color Revolution.

The Wave of Democratization started by the West Europe is actually a means of assimilation in name of democratization. Back to Political Change in East Europe in 1989, the West Europe required aid-receivers to do the following: a, establish lawful society; b, show respect to human rights; c, allow the existence of multi-party system; d, organize free election by the end of 1990; e, enforce market economy policies. Due to the lack of resources, the East Europe countries headed for the West in search of more resources, participation in a newly international reorganization and resetting their economical position in the world. This is the set rules in developing economy, which brings set rules for political development.

Without exception, colorized states ended by the CIS' entry into the EU and NATO. So Color Revolution is a beginning of the EU and NATO enlargement, further assimilation by the West Europe.

Nevertheless, assimilation and Wave of democratization did not go very smoothly in Russia and Central Asia states. It seemed out of the reach of the West. Russia is so large to be assimilated by the West and conflicts are unavoidable. In fact, Russia follows its own path to develop itself. Russia's "Sovereignty Democracy" and Europe democracy are different in nature.

Russia was willing to follow the West mode in 1990s, advocating democracy but failed at the sacrifice of its comprehensive national strength and mass wealth. After Putin's came into office, Russia has explored its own way for self-development. Together with its powerful state's policy comes the "Controllable Democracy" (Sovereignty Democracy), thus Russia's mode and the West 's has

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