

NEW CENTURY MILITARY ENGLISH

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English

新世纪军事英语

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高级阅读教程



外教社

上海外语教育出版社

SHANGHAI FOREIGN LANGUAGE EDUCATION PRESS

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图书在版编目(CIP)数据

新世纪军事英语高级阅读教程 / 姜镔等编.

—上海:上海外语教育出版社,2005

ISBN 7-81095-474-1

I. 新… II. 姜… III. 军事-英语-阅读教学-军事院校-教材 IV. H319.4

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字(2004)第 119962 号

出版发行: 上海外语教育出版社

(上海外国语大学内) 邮编: 200083

电 话: 021-65425300 (总机)

电子邮箱: bookinfo@sflep.com.cn

网 址: <http://www.sflep.com.cn> <http://www.sflep.com>

责任编辑: 李振荣

印 刷: 商务印书馆上海印刷股份有限公司

经 销: 新华书店上海发行所

开 本: 890×1240 1/32 印张 12 字数 363 千字

版 次: 2005 年 6 月第 1 版 2005 年 6 月第 1 次印刷

印 数: 5 000 册

书 号: ISBN 7-81095-474-1 / G · 279

定 价: 16.00 元

本版图书如有印装质量问题,可向本社调换

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总 序

以信息化为主要特征的现代高技术战争,对我军广大官兵的全面素质提出了更高的要求,其中外语素质已经成为现代军事人才诸多素质中不可缺少的重要组成部分。全面提高我军官兵的外语素质,已经提到做好新时期军事斗争准备、打赢高技术条件下局部战争的战略高度。为此,江泽民主席和其他军委首长曾多次强调学习外语的重要性。四总部也对军官的外语素质作出明确规定,要求军官必须“熟悉军事外语词汇,掌握军事资料阅读与翻译的基本常识”并“具有阅读、翻译外文军事资料的初步能力”。

多年来全军指挥院校和部队缺乏一套符合军队实际的、具有鲜明军事特色的统编军事英语教材,在外语教学中往往采用地方院校编写的教材,难以满足军队外语教学的实际需要。20世纪80年代初几所陆军学院相继编写过若干军事英语教材,但由于编写者各自为战,力量单薄,加之军事知识、资料收集有限,对军事院校的外语教学实际、国内外大学外语教学的发展动向不够了解,因此所编教材往往难以适应时代发展的需求,教学效果不甚理想,也无法在全军指挥院校及部队进行推广。

为更好地贯彻执行江主席、军委首长和四总部的指示精神,提高我军指战员的外语素质,解放军外国语学院在军队院校协作中心外语协作组组长联席会的指导与协调下,联合全军相关指挥院校的专家教授共同编写了《新世纪军事英语》系列教材,力求把军事知识与外语教学有机地结合起来,使学员在掌握英语的同时掌握相关的军事知识与术语,提高英语的实际应用能力。这是解放军外国语学院和指挥学院在统编军事英语教材方面强强联合、协同作战的初步尝试,必将对全面提

高我军广大指战员的外语素质起到积极的作用。

《新世纪军事英语》系列教材由《精读》(三册)、《泛读》(二册)、《听力》(三册)、《口语》(一册)和《高级阅读》(一册)等5种共10册书组成。其中《精读》、《听力》为零起点,《泛读》(上、下册)及《口语》与《精读》第二、三册同步,《高级阅读》则为已具有一定英语阅读水平的学员进一步提高英语水平用,也可作为军校“4+1学员岗前培训”的英语教材。在内容安排上,《新世纪军事英语》系列教材遵循“通用+军事”的原则。第一册以通用为主,第二册课文有一半为军事内容,第三册以军事为主,《高级阅读》和《口语》则全部为军事题材。学完该系列教材,参训学员的英语词汇量应达到2 500~3 000左右,并掌握基本英语语法,能够达到借助工具书阅读、翻译一般英语文章以及运用英语进行简单对话的程度。

《新世纪军事英语》系列教材不仅军事特色鲜明,且编排合理,时代感强,语言地道,难度适宜。《听力》教材与《精读》教材配套呼应,相得益彰,大大提高了词语的覆盖率与复现率,成为本系列教材的特色之一。

为更好地达到教学与自学效果,《新世纪军事英语》系列教材的《精读》、《泛读》、《听力》和《口语》教材均配有磁带与VCD教学光盘。

《新世纪军事英语》系列教材在编写的过程中得到了军队院校协作中心外语协作组组长联席会、解放军外国语学院和全军相关指挥院校的鼓励与指导,得到了上海外语教育出版社领导与编辑的大力支持与帮助,在此一并致谢。

由于编者水平、经验有限,教材中难免有不足之处,恳请广大读者批评指正。

李公昭
2003年4月

编写与使用说明

一、编写指导思想和原则

在听、说、读、写四项英语技能中,英语阅读不仅是最重要的语言技能,也是必须掌握的学习技能。英语阅读不仅是英语学习的目的,而且是英语学习的主要手段和途径。英语阅读能力是发展其他语言技能的基础和前提,培养阅读技巧和提高理解准确率及阅读速度当然也只有通过阅读才能实现。《高级阅读教程》是《新世纪军事英语》系列教材之一,是为各类军事院校及部队指战员中具有公共大学英语四、六级水平以上者编写的教程。该教程旨在帮助学习者尽快扩大英语军事词汇、丰富军事语言知识、提高英语原文阅读能力、培养精确理解军事材料信息的技能。

编写过程中,我们参考了大量的英语军事文献,从浩若烟海的材料中提取出最具代表性、最符合我军指战员学习需要的题材,包括了古今中外的军事内容。

编写过程中力求体现以下特色:

1. 题材以反映高新军事科技为主;
2. 注重体现一定的军事科技前瞻性;
3. 题材选择比较全面,适合各军兵种人员的学习。

二、编写框架结构

本教程由 30 个单元组成,每个单元均由正文、词汇、讨论题和参考译文四个部分组成。

正文的长度在 1 500 词左右,均选自原文未做任何改动,力图保持原文特色。为了达到形象生动的效果、使学习者能够更直观地了解正

文内容,文中配有一定量的图片。

正文后所注的词汇以大学英语四、六级范围之外的生词为主,目的在于使学习者能够节省字典查阅时间、提高阅读效率。

讨论题供学习者在读完材料后进行自测、思考和讨论,部分问题不设标准答案,以起到各抒己见、畅所欲言、启迪思维的作用。

参考译文仅供学习者对照参考,通过对比以了解自己对原文的理解和掌握程度。

三、教学建议

本教程共 30 单元,供军事院校两个学期的正规教学使用。在学员充分预习的基础上,每单元可用 2 个课时来讲解和讨论。亦可根据教学对象和课时的实际情况灵活处理,从本教程中选取适合各自情况的部分单元进行教学或自学。

四、自学建议

本教程非常适合具有一定英语基础的官兵、出国研修人员自学使用。学习者可以先熟悉单词、问题后再开始正文的阅读;阅读过程中遇到难点时不要急于翻参考译文,深入思考后做出自己的判断,最后再对照译文进行参考,方能不断提高理解和翻译的能力。

因编写时间有限,选材难度极大,加之水平有限,不妥或错误之处恳望各位同仁、专家及读者批评指正。

编 者
2004 年 3 月

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UNIT ONE

Text

The Art of War

Sun Tzu

The Art of War The book is traditionally attributed to Sun Tzu (personal name Sun Wu), a military strategist and general who served the state of Wu near the end of the Spring and Autumn Period (770–476 BC). It is more likely, however, that it was written early in the Warring States period (475–221 BC), at a time when China was divided into six or seven states that often resorted to war with each other in their struggles for supremacy.

The Art of War is a systematic guide to strategy and tactics for rulers and commanders. The book discusses various maneuvers and the effect of terrain on the outcome of battles. It stresses the importance of accurate information about the enemy's forces, dispositions and deployments, and movements. This is summarized in the axiom "Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat." It also emphasizes the unpredictability of battle and the use of flexible strategies and tactics. The book's insistence on the close relationship between political considerations and military policy greatly influenced some modern strategists. Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communists took from *The*



Art of War many of the tactics they utilized in fighting the Japanese invaders and, later, the Chinese Nationalists.

CHAPTER ONE: ESTIMATES

War is a matter of vital importance to the state; a matter of life or death, the road either to survival or to ruin. Hence, it is imperative that it be studied thoroughly.

Therefore, appraise it in terms of the five fundamental factors and make comparisons of the various conditions of the antagonistic sides in order to ascertain the results of a war. The first of these factors is politics; the second, weather; the third, terrain; the fourth, the commander; and the fifth, doctrine. Politics means the thing which causes the people to be in harmony with their ruler so that they will follow him in disregard of their lives and without fear of any danger. Weather signifies night and day, cold and heat, fine days and rain, and change of seasons. Terrain means distances, and refers to whether the ground is traversed with ease or difficulty and to whether it is open or constricted, and influences your chances of life or death. The commander stands for the general's qualities of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage, and strictness. Doctrine is to be understood as the organization of the army, the gradations of rank among the officers, the regulations of supply routes, and the provision of military materials to the army.

These five fundamental factors are familiar to every general. Those who master them win; those who do not are defeated. Therefore, in laying plans, compare the following seven elements, appraising them with the utmost care.

- Which ruler is wise and more able?
- Which commander is more talented?
- Which army obtains the advantages of nature and the terrain?
- In which army are regulations and instructions better carried

out?

- Which troops are stronger?
- Which army has the better-trained officers and men?
- Which army administers rewards and punishments in a more enlightened and correct way?

By means of these seven elements, I shall be able to forecast which side will be victorious and which will be defeated.

The general who heeds my counsel is sure to win. Such a general should be retained in command. One who ignores my counsel is certain to be defeated. Such a one should be dismissed.

Having paid attention to my counsel and plans, the general must create a situation which will contribute to their accomplishment. By "situation" I mean he should take the field situation into consideration and act in accordance with what is advantageous.

All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable of attacking, feign incapacity; when active in moving troops, feign inactivity. When near the enemy, make it seem that you are far away; when far away, make it seem that you are near. Hold out baits to lure the enemy. Strike the enemy when he is in disorder. Prepare against the enemy when he is secure at all points. Avoid the enemy for the time being when he is stronger. If your opponent is of choleric temper, try to irritate him. If he is arrogant, try to encourage his egotism. If the enemy troops are well prepared after reorganization, try to wear them down. If they are united, try to sow dissension among them. Attack the enemy where he is unprepared, and appear where you are not expected. These are the keys to victory for a strategist. It is not possible to formulate them in detail beforehand.

Now, if the estimates made before a battle indicate victory, it is because careful calculations show that your conditions are more favorable than those of your enemy; if they indicate defeat, it is because careful calculations show that favorable conditions for a battle

are fewer. With more careful calculations, one can win; with less, one cannot. How much less chance of victory has one who makes no calculations at all! By this means, one can foresee the outcome of a battle.

CHAPTER TWO: WAGING WAR

In operations of war — when one thousand fast four-horse chariots one thousand heavy chariots, and one thousand mail-clad soldiers are required; when provisions are transported for a thousand li; when there are expenditures at home and at the front, and stipends for entertainment of envoys and advisers — the cost of materials such as glue and lacquer, and of chariots and armor, will amount to one thousand pieces of gold a day. One hundred thousand troops may be dispatched only when this money is in hand.

A speedy victory is the main object in war. If this is long in coming, weapons are blunted and morale depressed. If troops are attacking cities, their strength will be exhausted. When the army engages in protracted campaigns, the resources of the state will fall short. When your weapons are dulled and ardor dampened, your strength exhausted and treasure spent, the chieftains of the neighboring states will take advantage of your crisis to act. In that case, no man, however wise, will be able to avert the disastrous consequences that ensue. Thus, while we have heard of stupid haste in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged for there has never been a protracted war which benefited a country. Therefore, those unable to understand the evils inherent in employing troops are equally unable to understand the advantageous ways of doing so.

Those adept in waging war do not require a second levy of conscripts or more than two provisionings. They carry military equipment from the homeland, but rely on the enemy for provisions. Thus, the army is plentifully provided with food.

When a country is impoverished by military operations, it is due to distant transportation; carrying supplies for great distances renders the people destitute. Where troops are gathered, prices go up. When prices rise, the wealth of the people is drained away. When wealth is drained away, the people will be afflicted with urgent and heavy exactions. With this loss of wealth and exhaustion of strength, the households in the country will be extremely poor and seven-tenths of their wealth dissipated. As to government expenditures, those due to broken-down chariots, worn-out horses, armor and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantlets, draft oxen, and wagons will amount to 60 percent of the total.

Hence, a wise general sees to it that his troops feed on the enemy, for one zhong of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own and one shi of the enemy's fodder to twenty shi of one's own.

In order to make the soldiers courageous in overcoming the enemy, they must be roused to anger. In order to capture more booty from the enemy, soldiers must have their rewards.

Therefore, in chariot fighting when more than ten chariots are captured, reward those who take the first. Replace the enemy's flags and banners with your own, mix the captured chariots with yours, and mount them. Treat the prisoners of war well, and care for them. This is called "winning a battle and becoming stronger."

Hence, what is valued in war is victory, not prolonged operations. And the general who understands how to employ troops is the minister of the people's fate and arbiter of the nation's destiny.

CHAPTER THREE: OFFENSIVE STRATEGY

Generally, in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the enemy's entire army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a regiment, a company, or a squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one hundred victo-

ries in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence.

Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances by diplomacy. The next best is to attack his army. And the worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative because to prepare big shields and wagons and make ready the necessary arms and equipment require at least three months, and to pile up earthen ramps against the walls requires an additional three months. The general, unable to control his impatience, will order his troops to swarm up the wall like ants, with the result that one-third of them will be killed without taking the city. Such is the calamity of attacking cities.

Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle. They capture the enemy's cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations. Their aim is to take all under heaven intact by strategic considerations. Thus, their troops are not worn out and their gains will be complete. This is the art of offensive strategy.

Consequently, the art of using troops is this: When ten to the enemy's one, surround him. When five times his strength, attack him. If double his strength, divide him. If equally matched, you may engage him with some good plan. If weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing. And if in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him, for a small force is but booty for one more powerful if it fights recklessly.

Now, the general is the assistant to the sovereign of the state. If this assistance is all-embracing, the state will surely be strong; if defective, the state will certainly be weak.

Now, there are three ways in which a sovereign can bring misfortune upon his army:

When ignorant that the army should not advance, to order an

advance; or when ignorant that it should not retire, to order a retirement. This is described as “hobbling the army.”

When ignorant of military affairs, to interfere in their administration. This causes the officers to be perplexed.

When ignorant of command problems, to interfere with the direction of the fighting. This engenders doubts in the minds of the officers.

If the army is confused and suspicious, neighboring rulers will take advantage of this and cause trouble. This is what is meant by: “A confused army leads to another’s victory.”

Thus, there are five points in which victory may be predicted:

He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious.

He who understands how to fight in accordance with the strength of antagonistic forces will be victorious.

He whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious.

He who is well prepared and lies in wait for an enemy who is not well prepared will be victorious.

He whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious.

It is in these five matters that the way to victory is known.

Therefore, I say: Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle.

CHAPTER FOUR: DISPOSITIONS

The skillful warriors in ancient times first made themselves invincible and then awaited the enemy’s moment of vulnerability. Invincibility depends on oneself, but the enemy’s vulnerability on himself. It follows that those skilled in war can make themselves invin-