

● 本书受教育部“本科教学工程”——赣南师范大学历史学专业综合改革试点项目资助



# 国际关系史

GUOJIGUANXISHI JINGDIAN YINGWEN WENXIAN XUANDU

## 经典英文文献选读

朱大伟 魏 炜◎编著

黑龙江人民出版社



# 国际关系史

GUOJI GUANXISHI JINGDIANYINGWENWENXIANXUANDU

## 经典英文文献选读

朱大伟 魏 炜◎编著

黑龙江人民出版社

## 图书在版编目(CIP)数据

国际关系史经典英文文献选读 / 朱大伟, 魏炜编著.  
— 哈尔滨: 黑龙江人民出版社, 2016. 11  
ISBN 978 - 7 - 207 - 10876 - 0

I. ①国… II. ①朱… ②魏… III. ①英语—阅读教学—高等学校—教材②国际关系史—文献—汇编 IV. ①H319.4:D

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字(2016)第 284646 号

责任编辑:朱佳新

封面设计:鲲 鹏

## 国际关系史经典英文文献选读

朱大伟 魏 炜 编著

出版发行 黑龙江人民出版社

地 址 哈尔滨市南岗区宣庆小区 1 号楼

邮 编 150008

网 址 www.longpress.com

电子邮箱 hljrmcbs@yeah.net

印 刷 黑龙江艺德印刷有限责任公司

开 本 787 × 1092 1/16

印 张 20

字 数 380 千字

版 次 2016 年 11 月第 1 版 2016 年 11 月第 1 次印刷

书 号 ISBN 978 - 7 - 207 - 10876 - 0

定 价 60.00 元

版权所有 侵权必究

法律顾问:北京市大成律师事务所哈尔滨分所律师赵学利、赵景波

本书受教育部“本科教学工程”——赣南师范大学历史学专业综合改革试点项目资助



## 说 明

本书成稿的起源是作者在历史学专业英语、西方经典史学文献选读等相关课程的教学过程中苦于找不到一本现成的国际关系史英文原版教材供学生学习、参考之用,于是便起了编写校本教材的想法。作者把近年来在教学、科研中所使用的国际关系学、国际关系史方向的英文经典文献汇集成册,加以解析、导读,遂有此教材的成稿。

依据国际关系史学科的性质和内涵,本书所选文献的种类和来源构成有:国际关系史方向的经典著作的重要篇章、有学术影响的学术期刊论文以及具有重要历史意义的主要大国外交档案文献的摘录。同时,出于尊重知识产权和出版便利的考虑,本文所选作品均为1966年前公开发表或出版的作品或已经解密的外交档案资料。

本书选编的文献结构组成,可分为三部分。第一部分为一组近代以来有关国际关系史、外交史研究的思想、理论和方法的英文文献。此部分材料反映了早期国际关系思想界对该学科研究内容和方法的基本认知。第二部分是对英文经典国际关系史论文、论著的摘编和解读,所涉选题多是近代以来国际关系史的重大议题。第三编部分是近代以来,英国、德国、美国等国家已经解密的有关重大国际关系事件的外交档案的摘录和导读。以上文献的采编基本上沿着文献研究对象的历史演进时间序列脉络展开。

每篇选文设定的框架结构由五部分组成,一是引言部分,为作者简介、该篇文献的学术地位以及主要内容观点的介绍;二是主体部分,也即文献文本及其注释(主要历史学专业术语、人名、地名等);三是重点段落、长句的翻译训练;四是阅读思考题的设置;五是该问题领域延伸阅读文献的推荐。

此书可供国际关系史、历史学、国际关系学、外交学等专业的本科、研究生及教师作为相应课程教辅资料所用。

另外,本教材能如期顺利出版,还需要感谢赣南师范大学陈春生副校长、教务处刘福来处长、历史文化学院林晓平院长、魏炜副院长的关心和支持。文字的编辑和校对上,我校世界史专业唐梦琪、李林果两位硕士研究生以及陈心雨、朱青香、熊婷玉和孙丹莹等本科生也做了不少工作。同时,也感谢出版社朱佳新老师的热情、耐心,她在该书编辑校对过程中表现出了高度的专业与敬业,在此一并谢过。

朱大伟

# Contents

<b>Part one</b>	<b>The Thought and Methods of the Study of the History of International Relations</b> .....	( 1 )
Chapter 1	International Politics and History .....	( 1 )
Chapter 2	The Scope and Study of International History .....	(14)
Chapter 3	The Place of Diplomatic History in the Study of International Relations during the Twentieth Century .....	(33)
Chapter 4	The History And Nature Of International Relations .....	(44)
Chapter 5	Power In International Politics .....	(59)
Chapter 6	The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy ;The National Interest vs. Moral .....	(68)
<b>Part two</b>	<b>The Classics of the History of International Relations</b> .....	(87)
Chapter 1	The History of International Relations During Antiquity and the Middle Ages .....	(87)
Chapter 2	The Peace of Westphalia , 1648—1948 .....	(97)
Chapter 3	Perpetual peace ; a philosophical essay .....	(109)
Chapter 4	Discussion Of The Elements Of Sea Power .....	(123)
Chapter 5	The Geographical Pivot of History .....	(160)
Chapter 6	The Great Illusion .....	(171)
Chapter 7	The Origins of the Second World War .....	(185)
Chapter 8	Peace – Building Problems .....	(199)
Chapter 9	The Costs and Consequences of the Cold War .....	(213)

**Part three The Diplomatic Archives About the international Relations**

<b>History</b> .....	(229)
Chapter 1 Crowe Memorandum .....	(229)
Chapter 2 President Wilson's Fourteen Points. ....	(250)
Chapter 3 The Hossbach Memorandum, 1937 .....	(259)
Chapter 4 The Cairo conference and China .....	(272)
Chapter 5 NSC -68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security [excerpt] .....	(281)
Chapter 6 The Cuban Missile Crisis .....	(297)
参考文献 .....	(312)



# Part one The Thought and Methods of the Study of the History of International Relations

## Chapter 1 International Politics and History

Source: Henry R. Spencer. *International Politics and History*. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Aug., 1923), pp. 392 ~403.

### Introduction

第一世界大战的惨痛悲剧唤起了人们内心深处对建设永久和平的渴望,国际政治学这一以战争与和平问题为主要研究对象的学科于是应时而生,国际思想界对国际问题的理论探讨与思考开始成为一种显学。

亨利·R·斯宾塞是20世纪前半叶美国著名的政治学家。在1909—1947年间长期担任美国俄亥俄大学政治系主任,并主导开设了国际政治学专业课程。本章所选的文献材料是亨利·R·斯宾塞教授在1923年《美国政治学评论》杂志上发表的论文《国际政治学与历史学》。

该文开篇指出了论文的研究任务就在于界定国际政治学,如何看待它与历史学这个研究内容有交叉的学科之间的关系,以及如何有效地把历史和历史学作为一个工具来促进人们对国际政治的研究。斯宾塞认为,历史学之于国际政治学的价值是为后者提供了历史经验素材,该点至少体现在三个方面:(1)梅特涅和帕麦斯顿类型的政治家传记,他们的工作主要代表他们自己的国家,以及其他一定程度上代表国际利益工作的人,如科布登、威尔逊;(2)世界政府观念的演变,已经实现的或构想中,如独立主义、国际主义、世界主义、霸权、协调、联盟等;(3)制度历史,国际政府机构的发展,例如外交代表、临时会议、常设秘书处、仲裁和法院、调查委员会、保护机构、托管制度等。作者同时指出了历史学具有的特点,如客观性、公平性、特定的时空性以及倾向于传统等,这些使之区别于国际政治学。最后作者主张正视国际政治学、国际法和历史学三个学科之间的交叉和差异,以促进国际政治学实现更良性的发展。

## Text

Our present task is one of definition. We are students of political science in its international phase, and we use history as a means. We operate in a marginal area that overlaps two fields, government as that term is usually understood, and the history of international affairs. How shall we bound this marginal area, what are its relations to those other two, more familiar conceptions?

We are forced to this study by the World War. Modern history has had an immense expansion for the reason that a tremendous political event has taken place and the world must know why it happened, the causes as well as the occasions and events. A voluminous literature is appearing on the doings and motives of Great Powers, on the rise of nationalities and their crude strivings, on the remapping of state boundaries, and the development of spheres of economic influence. We welcome, for instance, Mr. Gibbons' recent book on World Politics, a clear and useful summary of the recent history of certain political entities called world powers and their policies. It is the story as he calls it of "the struggle of European nations for world power." The struggle is there. More power to him in his description of the contestants and the contest. But we view all this as only preparatory for our task. To put it in a word, the special object of our study is the problem of governmental organization on a world scale. In the relations of humankind we study the movements of ideas and the evolution of institutions that shall signify order in place of anarchy. This order may come in the shape of a unified, cosmopolitan<sup>①</sup>, H. G. Wellsian structure, after millenniums. There may continue the well-known multiplicity of isolated national states, which usually observe a sort of law in their relations, but now and then find their disputes too much for their diplomacy and lapse into the barbarism of war. Or it may be a federal combination of unity and multiplicity which we call internationalism. This last is a condition infinitely difficult and that calls for intricate contrivance, but it appeals to us as offering a combination of realism and idealism, an opportunity for feasible progress toward a constitution, while maintaining civilization in stable equilibrium.

The study of this problem is of extreme importance for democracy. Self-rule, as we Americans have good cause to know, is difficult enough to achieve even on the

---

① adj. 世界的, 世界性的; 全球的

petty local scale, where the citizens have a reasonable degree of familiarity with ends and means. How much more difficult must it not become with increasing remoteness of affairs from common knowledge and interest. Radicals in England used to talk of the impossibility of preserving and developing freedom at home when the state's energies are bestowed on foreign problems. Sembrat the Socialist rather enigmatically told the French that if they would live in a world of wars, then a king was indispensable to their safety. In our newspaper age the disease of demagoguery is endemic, especially deadly to democracy in the field of foreign affairs, where accurate knowledge is rare, and the mass are easily carried away by catch phrases, shibboleths<sup>①</sup>, slogans.

Yet national self – government in passable degree has arrived, and so also there will come the realization of international self – government, else democracy is only half real. The public consciousness, once confined to the vicinity of the town pump, has progressively advanced to the comprehension of larger affairs. Now the same irresistible forces of steam, electricity, world commerce in goods and in ideas, have broken down even the national barriers, and the life we lead has a still wider horizon. Hence the beginning of a world consciousness, rudimentary as yet, but demanding institutions for its safe realization. Bryce convinced us Americans that national public opinion tends actually to control our governmental operations. So the hopeful reconstruction literature of 1917—1918 suggested and stimulated a super – national public opinion, destined when fitly organized to the high function of mastery in world affairs. As in 1848, so in 1917 communism made an appeal to a world proletariat<sup>②</sup> to shake off its chains. Possibly these appeals and failures open the way to a world public opinion which is not merely proletarian but democratic, – to realize itself, with partial respect to national boundaries, but with partial respect as well to international and super – national interests.

This hoped for world democracy makes unwonted demands upon the “public spirit” of those who profess its service; their public is not near and familiar, but vague and remote. A Goethe or a Kant might be a real citizen of the world, ruling in the clouds; but let their Vaterland begin playing the role of an earthly state, and even ninety three intellectuals ignore the greater public and yield to the narrower, warmer, more intimate loyalty called patriotism. (And who of us shall cast the first

① n. 用语;教条;(党派、组织等的)准则

② n. 最下层的;工人阶级、无产阶级

stone?) Patriotism being a sentiment has the advantage, in controlling conduct, over an inter-nationality that is mere reason. With growing rational appreciation of economic and spiritual world interests, inter-nationality itself may become suffused with a mystic aura of world-brotherhood, as sung by a Schiller-Beethoven Ninth Symphony. That day is not yet. The higher loyalty is only now beginning to emerge, an international loyalty, wherein one judges Lord Robert Cecil, for example, as a "good world citizen," perhaps as good a European as he is Englishman. So perhaps in some of his moods was Gladstone. Not so the vast bulk of statesmen when they weigh advantages that are national and local against values that are international and European.

Confronting such a situation we, if we call ourselves scientists, soberly feel a high obligation. Ours is a task calling for infinite patience. It is a work of decades, even centuries. Yet we have inspiring examples. In international law the German-American Lieber performs for President Lincoln a work of codification destined in the course of thirty years to become international, and his constructive work is continued by the institutes and associations of international law, privately but cooperatively working as it were in the dark, advancing inch by inch. In the field of international administration likewise there is a noble army of little-known workers drafting statute and treaty clauses, devising and operating administrative agencies, learning "to labor and to wait."

Not only patience but objectivity is demanded by science. We must be "above the battle." How much of our international political literature consists of national, not to say partisan views. Witness the study of plebiscites. The scientific contributions of a Frenchman with Alsace in mind, of a German or a Pole with Silesia<sup>①</sup> or Vilna<sup>②</sup>, of a Chilean with Tacna-Arica, are enriched by intimate realization of the conditions under which the device may be worked, but are subject to heavy national discounts. Propaganda, effort for good causes, the taking of tactical positions for effectuating just results in men's minds, is not science, but it is politics, and we have only the beginnings of a criticism that shall enable us to judge credentials, to test evidence.

Science must work a posteriori. How pathetically much of the constructive work

---

① n. 西里西亚

② n. 维尔纳

of today is justly condemned as “mere ideals,” because it is dealing with an “international man” and an “international mind” that are a priori conceptions, abstractions as unreal as the “economic man” of a generation ago. The separate study of the statics and dynamics of the problem has hardly begun. Qualitative analysis there is in plenty, both of economic conditions and of human motive. The hard grind of quantitative analysis is still to do. Without it our judgment is color-blind, one-dimensional, without perspective.

Unscientific, furthermore, is the bitterness of scornful intolerance with which various groups view each other, the “hard-boiled<sup>①</sup>” and the “sap-heads<sup>②</sup>.” Generous open-mindedness is needed, an affirmative, constructive, heartening faith like the scientist’s faith in the uniformity of nature, and in the breadth as well as the goodness of truth. Examples of our shortcoming are the contempt, whether amused or outraged, of the man in the street for the “idealistic mouthings” he thinks he hears from Geneva, and on the other hand the pessimistic view of the so-called radical or liberal press, regarding France today as wickedly imperialistic. We in international political science have to resist the temptation to premature formation of categories. We must seek, by keeping the thing fluid in our minds, still in solution, to prepare for more useful and accurate groupings. Only an open-minded scientific attitude can keep on bathing these ideas with impartiality, keep them from becoming fixed around centers of crystallization, which will acquire emotional values of patriotic sympathy or antipathy, and thus become impervious to scientific analysis.

There is an inviting prospect of problems of governmental science to be solved, of which the raw materials have barely arrived in our laboratory to be worked up. Though this is not the occasion for even beginning the analysis, a few examples may be mentioned. Is the plebiscite workable as a means of ascertaining a national will in international disputes? Is the economic boycott or other penalty available against disorderly states? How can treaty making and diplomacy be kept under democratic control? What are the political relations between economically advanced peoples and those not so advanced, especially where the latter are in possession of material resources needed by the world and capable of being exploited only by the advanced? Is migration of labor or capital susceptible of control in behalf of super-national inter-

① adj. 冷峻的, 毫无感情的

② adj. 衰竭的

ests? By what devices shall we secure an Open Door in colonies, or even in mandates<sup>①</sup>? What are the uses and limits of Home Rule, as a device for reconciling national self-determination with the international self-determination of a larger, complex society like the British Commonwealth? What have been the favoring conditions and what the obstacles to growth of international administration, as in postal, railway, and monetary unions? Where has the unanimity rule been safely dispensed with? What are the possibilities of concerted international action on problems of joint interest, as in the so-called neutralization of straits, rivers and canals, in the Ottoman debt, in the Chinese consortium<sup>②</sup>? What can Egypt, Tangier, the Lebanon, the Philippines tell us as to the possibilities of world-trusteeship?

One delicate scientific problem of this sort may be given special mention because of the extraordinary effect it has had upon present day international life, namely, the doctrine of nationalities and their alleged right to be states and to determine the boundaries of states. Not to go into the familiar elements of nationality, such as race and language, it may be admitted that a factor growing in significance is the public consciousness of a community. A nationality<sup>③</sup> exists when the people described feel themselves to be a nationality, even without racial or lingual unity, as in Switzerland and Belgium. But what creates that self-consciousness? Often one of the weightiest of these psychic factors is the recollection of historic glories or disasters, of heroes authentic or legendary. Who shall measure the significance of Lincoln to Americans, of Huss to the Czechs, of Tell to the Swiss, of Kosovo to the Serbs, of Byzantium to the Greeks? But this is all in the realm of history, and the international political scientist must be qualified with historical-mindedness, to interpret this material, for setting forth present conditions and tendencies. He must have a realization of the flux of things, their becoming and their ceasing to be, their evolutionary relations. He requires the steadying force of history that he may keep his wagon hitched to the star of a world ideal, and yet progress steadily and safely on the ground of realities, national and international.

Even the recent admirable work of P. B. Potter on International Organization, devoted among other things to establishing, like Savigny of old, the *Ruf unserer Zeit*

① n. 授权;命令,指令;委托管理;受命进行的工作

② n. 财团;联合;合伙

③ n. 国籍,国家;民族;部落

for a study of this subject of international organization, properly gives some 25 per cent of its pages to what can only be called history. The times do summon us to an individualized view of international political science, but not to a view divorced from history. It is not a divorce that justice requires, but rather a clear recognition of separate individual personalities in partnership, each with its own rights and duties.

History can be specifically useful to international political science in several species; for example, (1) biography of statesmen, men of the type of Metternich and Palmerston, whose work was mainly in behalf of their own states, or others who were working in some considerable measure in behalf of international interests, like Cobden, Hay, Wilson; (2) the evolution of world – government ideas, achieved or only planned, such as isolationism, internationalism, cosmopolitanism, hegemony, concert, leagues; then there is (3) institutional history, the development of organs of international government, such as diplomatic representation, occasional conferences, a permanent secretariat, arbitration and courts, the commission of inquiry, the protectorate, the mandate, institutions which have their rise, development, and sometimes decay.

Evolution of world organization takes place partly by very gradual variation and adaptation, unconscious, blind “natural selection” of the fittest political form to survive. This is a process of eons or at least periods of time beyond the grasp of creatures of threescore years and ten. On the other hand we have biological precedent for hoping something enduring from “discontinuous mutation,” conscious effort under special stress to contrive particular results. The balance of power doctrine crude though it might be, came from a conscious effort of world society under the lead of an Orange or a Pitt to check the ambition of a Louis XIV or a Napoleon. So also with the ideal of concert. Metternich<sup>①</sup> set it up to maintain the status quo and repress subversive movements; Bismarck used it to secure peace in Europe by cancelling out the rival ambition of Great Powers; Sir Edward Grey strove by its means to limit the Balkan wars by the action of a supervising, presiding council of Europe. So in the

---

① n. 克莱门斯·梅特涅(Klemens Wenzel von Metternich, 1773年5月15日—1859年6月11日), 19世纪著名奥地利外交家。生于德国科布伦茨,从1809年开始任奥地利帝国的外交大臣,1821年起兼任奥地利帝国首相。任内成为“神圣同盟”和“四国同盟”的核心人物,反对一切民族主义、自由主义和革命运动,在欧洲形成以“正统主义”和“大国均势”为核心的梅特涅体系。1848年,奥地利爆发三月革命,梅特涅被迫辞职,逃往伦敦。1851年回国,1859年在维也纳病逝。

third place might be mentioned the effort toward federalism<sup>①</sup> during the present decade, the “war to end war,” the ideas and institutions that we associate with Moscow, with Paris, and with Geneva.

Pathetically crude may have been much of this activity associated with the names Balance of Power, Concert of Europe, and League of Nations. Nevertheless there was progress by discontinuous mutation; there was conscious effort toward improvement of international organization; there was some success in that effort; civilization advanced perceptibly. And it is history that enables us to perceive this advance, to note its direction and to study the causes and processes of its successes and of its failures. With good reason did President Wilson carry with him to Paris a shipload of historians to advise him, to the scandal doubtless of European foreign offices with their expert intelligence service, professional but not academic. Yet among these amateurs there was real expertness free from the handicap of bureaucratic discipline; there was unusually valuable service rendered by historical scholarship directly to statesmanship, indirectly to international political science.

(We perhaps do not need Mr. Toynbee’s warning against laying too great emphasis on the so-called “historical claims” of territory by certain nationalities, for example those of Serbia and Greece in the Balkans. The essentially unhistorical character of many such becomes clear on close historical study, another case of a little learning a dangerous thing, dangerous only because of its littleness.)

But when it comes to diplomacy democratically controlled, what a maze of difficulties we face, questions to be settled not on democracy’s good intentions but on intelligence, knowledge which will be difficult enough to diffuse when it is ascertained by the wise, and which the high and mighty shall ascertain only by expert historical service. Witness the effort of a Lloyd George to imagine who or what Teschen might be, or of a Wilson with the senators to pronounce Yap with a straight face. Imagine the American people dealing with East Europe without being quite sure of the identity of Stamboul<sup>②</sup> and Stambuloff and Stambulisky, or of the distinction between Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. No wonder our popular instinct recoils from the task of understanding such unpronounceable things, and curses them all as foreign.

But we are entering an epoch in which we must have dealings with them on

---

① n. 联邦制; 联邦主义

② n. 伊斯坦布尔



some basis whether we will or no, though it were only as receivers of interest on war loans, payable in a form we do not try to imagine, goods barred out meanwhile by a tariff wall whose relation to interest – payments and to world trade we do not even suspect. This is not the time for discussing such matters. Attention is merely called to the priceless value international political science will set upon the tale that history alone can tell of former international trade problems and their solution, or the results of leaving them unsolved, of tariff wars and customs unions, of indemnities French and Chinese and their payment, of the tribute relation and the resentment it engenders.

Take a concrete case of universal interest today. How can we even “observe” at Lausanne except as history shall disentangle and illuminate the tale of the gradual opening of the Bosphorus<sup>①</sup> and Dardanelles<sup>②</sup>, of the degradation giving place to civilization as populations Christian and Moslem have been set free from the Ottoman yoke, of all the other factors involved, suggested by the names Mehemet Ali, Stratford de Redcliffe, Midhat Pasha, Muravieff, the Lebanon, Crete.

Not to labor this point, which is obvious enough, let us pass to a consideration of the other side of the matter, the insufficiency of history. Much of the data and the process with which we must deal is in the present. It is no Utopian dream, it is a living reality, but it is not history. We are in the field of action, we are in the laboratory with apron on, with microscope at eye; not in the library digesting at leisure the experiment records and documents and publishing the results as definitive conclusions.

History, with the utmost objectivity and most scrupulous fairness imaginable, is mostly written from a point of view, of time and place. Take the Eastern question for example. What made it Eastern? The fact that it was studied from the western end of Europe, advanced states dealing with a series of problems involved in a decaying Ottoman empire. Now comes Mr. Toynbee, who as spokesman of the Levant calls it the Western Question, the interfering action of western powers with their conflicting aims. Political science considers it as a problem in which there is neither east nor west, but man and society, that society exceedingly ill organized, needing a spirit of cooperation and administrative machinery fitted to the case.

① n. 博斯普鲁斯海峡,又称伊斯坦布尔海峡

② n. 达达尼尔海峡,与伊斯坦布尔海峡和马尔马拉海一起组成土耳其海峡(即黑海海峡)