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第五卷 同盟国联合作战外交（一）

【本书编委会 编】

—— 人民 出版社 ——

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
韩海彬

韩中华

顾 问

杨雨青

同盟国联合作战外交概述



蒋委员长自重庆致驻美代表宋子文嘱转达美当局说明中、英、美、荷四国应速制定联合作战整个计划及成立联合指挥部与军事同盟协定电

民国三十年十二月十日

行新三四國應速成三年事
 同盟協定不許單將煤和
 并於美聯備以入以上各處
 各期內定章不成立為作
 此行新必被軸心國終一致
 各個管破又或抗預向今未
 表示難利時宣戰不過大時向子
 各演問題再舉中美英蘇
 確切整個作以計畫不修

等以此爲常事。日方表示
不日對美英懷疑態度是合
不同。是美英政府與中國
此表示此意或另有作用。皆
不能斷然。然我中英美討日
今當重其條件計畫。中國統一
之行動。是使稍有軍事。其
者。美英不寒心。其後軸心
陣線之內。若此。散漫。不
僅爲其害。笑而也。以此意而
美方局勢。達并。達。成。中
國。也。

【760】

致宋部長電稿

中英美代表按照羅斯福總統最近來電建議於十二月二十三日在重慶開
聯席軍事會議討論在東亞擊敗日本及其聯盟國之有效陸海空
軍行動計劃衛佛爾將軍代表英國勃蘭德將軍代表美國羅斯
福總統建議本會包括蘇荷惟蘇聯未派代表荷蘭尚無軍事代表在
渝會議決議如下：(一)在重慶成立一永久分區軍事委員會(二)代表
中國之蔣委員長代表印度緬甸之衛佛爾將軍代表美國遠東軍
之麥克阿瑟將軍及蘇聯加入後蘇聯亞洲總司令諸統帥所管
轄之區域(三)由蔣委員長派何應欽長應欽衛佛爾將軍派戴尼新
將軍勃蘭德將軍派馬格魯德將軍為其代表為該會會員(四)
成立一秘書處由參加各國政府代表派員組織之以美國代表為秘書
長(五)通過遠東聯合軍事行動初步計劃六條如下：甲使仰光及緬
甸全境免受敵方攻擊而當前要著者為中國繼續抗戰與從中國境
內擴展聯合軍事行動仰光與緬甸之關係皆甚重大目前應儘現
有實力對日本根據地及建築物發動空軍攻勢乙繼續以武器供

蒋委员长自重庆驻美代表宋子文告知在重庆召开之联席军事会议之各项决
议电

民国三十年十二月二十五日

給中國以支持中國之抗戰，俾中國軍隊得作對日最後反攻之準備及訓練。丙中國軍隊應繼續以攻擊或攻擊之威脅，以及對日軍交通綫弱點發動軍事行動，牽制日軍於其戰綫。丁俟實力充實之後，即發動中英美可以抽調之軍力對日攻取攻勢。戊在重慶之聯席分區軍事委員會應隨時開會，並將資料及建議彙送交聯軍軍事委員會，俾該會得擬定東亞戰略。己希望在美國組織之永久機構能早日實現。衛佛爾在上午預備會議中提出中國協助緬甸國防辦法三點：（一）撥借希諾德部下美國志願空軍三隊中之二隊，以數借令在緬境之租借法案器材一部份。（二）派遣部隊助戰，此三項問題，又小組會議討論擬具方案備核。余所提中英美蘇荷合作計劃大綱，因時間匆促，未及討論。茲將余建議原文抄附，以供羅斯福總統參攷。

宋子文

華盛頓宋部長轉大翼電云：下次太平洋作戰會議開會時，
 希將前次遠東會議意見，再說明。最近時局，在會議上提
 出下列意見：總的軍事會議，對盟國整個戰事，作一確切估計，接納我
 方建議，迅速改變，先解決德國，後解決日本之戰事。明確決定太平洋
 上今後之最高政策，以利整個之戰局。提案大要如下：德國為陸軍
 國家，此時英美欲以優勢之海空軍力，先擊敗大陸上之德國，勢必費
 力多而收效少。反之，若先將歐洲之德軍，而英美海空軍之力量
 達於日本，則日本之軍事將趨於下劣之原則。現時就德在此
 陸相持，英美在大西洋戰局亦已穩定。且在歐西河網第二戰場之時
 機尚早。此時大西洋方面，戰局已經鞏固。既無多顧慮，則英美尤
 其美國，正宜乘此時機，運用優勢之海空軍，先擊破日本，而消滅
 其向東北太平洋之野心，以鞏固美國西岸之防務。觀於日

蒋委员长自重庆致外交部长宋子文并转驻美军事代表团团长熊式辉电示对
 下次太平洋作战会议开会时之提案要旨电
 民国三十一年六月十二日

最近如遠島、荷屬港及阿留申群島之舉動，可見美國如不先解決日本，則日本對美始終可取攻勢，而且美不取主動，日本即可坐大。如此則在整個作戰期中，美國始終限於兩洋作戰被動之境，不能不作兩洋同時應付之準備，即今日德不能制勝，而贖日持久則同盟國戰性更大。若日本竟逐漸擴張其在東北太平洋上境之範圍，則美國西岸國防更蒙不利之影響，吾人必須注意者，現時美國實為防止其侵略陣營之起點，美國之安危利害，即繫於全條盟邦之安危利害所託。余為此言，實就全島觀察，毫不為中國利害而作此主張。余意無論從盟國整個之利害與改善上言，對日本日益擴張之海上行動，均非其全才，出以主動攻勢，先予以制命之打擊，不可。否則如照已往所施，先解決德國，則日本即不咸問題。我日本雖欲而德國仍能挽回形勢之觀念，計以最近戰事經過之事實，實非修正不可。蓋必先擊破軸心弱點之日本，以絕後患，而後可專心對德，易於為力，則其勢順而共效速。反之若予日本以震擾坐大之機會，

且使之以弱小兵力而牽制我盟邦中心勢力之美國。不僅能解決德國
之日期。而且能陷於逐漸免普不能獲得一免之大害。如此則其勢逆而
用力必多。且無勝之期。最後仍必循先擊破弱點而後再圖強者之
途徑。何不早日改修修正之海計。余切望盟邦不以余之迫切呼籲為河
漢。且能同意余之建議。速將太平洋上主動之戰畧。包括印度澳洲
中太平洋北太平洋以至蘇聯在東方對日之戰畧。在各國陸海空軍方
面即有一最高戰畧明確之決定。速採主動之攻勢。則太平洋形勢即
可大定。不待歐陸北非戰局揭曉。而日本必由主動而降為被動。由被動
而趨於消滅。日本無能為患之時。即美洲與南太平洋之日本即解
除得以專心對德之時。而後英美以其所保持之優勢軍力與大量生
產傾全力以對德。即可獲得決定之勝利。上述意見。純以盟國目前之
地位。再責戰畧上之所見。甚極速檢討。迅作決定。等語。務希以此
提議。或照當地情勢。加修正提出。亦可。中。日。事。故。似。此。

忠

附呈

Dear Generalissimo,

I can never forget the first hours close contact I had with you and your noble wife in Calcutta. I had already felt drawn towards you in your fight for freedom, and that contact and our conversation brought China and her problems still nearer to me. Later, again, between 1945 and 1948, when I was in South Africa, I was in constant touch with the small Chinese colony in Johannesburg. I knew then that as clients and later as comrades in the Indian passive resistance struggle in South Africa. I was in touch with them in Mauritius also. I learnt then to admire their faith, industry, self-reliance and internal unity. Later in India I had a very fine Chinese friend living with me for a few years and we all learnt to like him.

I have thus from greatly attracted towards your great country and, in common with my countrymen, our sympathy has gone out to you in your terrible struggle. Our mutual friend, Jawaharlal Nehru, whose love of China is only equalled, if at all, by his love of his own country, has kept me in intimate touch with the developments of the Chinese struggle.

Because of this feeling I have towards China and my earnest desire that our two great countries should come closer to one another and cooperate to their mutual advantage, I am anxious to explain to you that my appeal to the British power to withdraw from India is not meant in any shape or form to weaken India's defence against the Japanese or embarrass you in your struggle. India must not submit to any aggressor or invader and must resist him. I would not be guilty of purchasing the freedom of my country at the cost of your country's freedom. That problem does not arise before me as I am clear that India cannot gain anything in this way, and a Japanese domination of either India or China would be equally injurious to the other country and to world peace. That domination must therefore be prevented and I should like India to play an active and useful part in this.

I feel India cannot do so while she is in bondage. India has been a helpless witness of the withdrawal from Malaya, Singapore and Burma. We must learn the lesson from these tragic events and prevent by all means at our disposal a repetition of such befall these unfortunate countries. But unless we are free, we can do nothing to prevent it, and the same process might well occur again, crippling India and China disastrously. I do not want a repetition of this awful tale of woe.

Our proffered help has repeatedly been rejected by the British Government and the recent failure of the Cripps mission has left a deep wound which is still raw. But of that anguish has come the cry for immediate withdrawal of British power so that India can look after herself and help China to the best of her ability.

I have told you of my faith in non-violence and of my belief in the effectiveness of this method if the whole nation could turn to it. That faith in it is as firm as ever. But I realize that India today as a whole has lost that faith and belief, and the Government in Free India could be formed from the various elements comprising the nation.

Today the whole of India is impatient and feels frustrated. The

印度国民大会领袖甘地自华达致蒋委员长申述印度人民获得自由之重要及保证自由印度之政府必同意同盟国家军队可留驻印度并以印度为抵抗日人进袭之基地函

民国三十一年六月十四日

Indian Army consists largely of people who have joined us because of economic pressure. They have no feeling of a cause to fight for, and in no sense are they a national army. Those of us who would fight for a cause, for India and China, with armed forces or with non-violence, cannot, under the foreign heel, function as they want to. And yet our people know for certain that India free can play even a decisive part not only in her own behalf, but also on behalf of China and world peace. Many, like me, feel that it is not proper or manly to remain in this helpless state and allow events to overwhelm us when a way to effective action can be opened to us. They feel, therefore, that every possible effort should be made to ensure independence and that freedom of action which is so urgently needed. This is the origin of my appeal to the British Power to end immediately the unnatural connection between Britain and India.

Unless we make that effort there is grave danger of public feeling in India going into wrong and harmful channels. There is every likelihood of unbridled sympathy for Japan growing simply in order to weaken and cast British authority in India. This feeling may take the place of robust confidence in our ability never to look to outsiders for help in winning our freedom. We have to learn self-reliance and develop the strength to work out our own salvation. This is only possible if we make a determined effort to free ourselves from bondage. That freedom has become a present necessity to enable us to take our due place among the free nations of the world.

To make it perfectly clear that we want to prevent in every way Japanese aggression, I would personally agree, and I am sure the Government of free India would agree, that the Allied Powers might, under treaty with us, keep their armed forces in India and use the country as a base for operations against the threatened Japanese attack.

I need hardly give you my assurance that, as the author of the new move in India, I shall take no hasty action. And whatever action I may recommend will be governed by the consideration that it should not injure China or encourage Japanese aggression in India or China. I am trying to enlist world opinion in favour of a proposition which to me appears self-proved and which must lead to the strengthening of India's and China's defence. I am also educating public opinion in India and conferring with my colleagues. Needless to say my movement against the British Government with which I may be connected will be essentially non-violent. I am straining every nerve to avoid a conflict with British authority. But if in the vindication of the freedom which has become an immediate desideratum, this becomes inevitable, I shall not hesitate to run any risk however great.

Very soon you will have completed five years of war against Japanese aggression and invasion and all the sorrow and misery that these have brought to China. My heart goes out to the people of China in deep sympathy and in admiration for their heroic struggle and untiring sacrifices in the name of their country's freedom and integrity against tremendous odds. I am convinced that this heroic and warlike cannot be in vain; they must bear fruit. To you, to Madame Chiang and to the

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
great people of China, I send my warmest and sincerest wishes for your success. I look forward to the day when a free India and a free China will cooperate together in friendship and brotherhood for their own good and for the good of Asia and the world.

In anticipation of your publication, I am taking the liberty of publishing this letter in "Herald".

Yours sincerely,
Nikolai S. Gerasimov

Mia Repetition Test. Division
Chiang Kai-shek
Chongqing
China

手令380



蒋委员长自成都致外交部长宋子文告以甘地来函之内容摘要请转告罗斯福
总统电

民国三十一年六月二十二日