

中央党校学位研究生教材

The Graduate School Textbook of Central Party School

博士生学术英语综合阅读

Comprehensive Academic English Reading for Doctoral Students

郭莲 主编 焦玉莉 副主编

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前 言

随着我国研究生教育的不断发展,研究生英语教学已经成为高层次人才培养的一个重要组成部分,尤其是博士研究生的英语教学更是承担了国家教育部《非英语专业研究生英语教学大纲》所规定的目标要求,即培养学生能够以英语为工具,熟练地进行本专业的研究并能进行本专业的学术交流。

正是根据大纲的要求,博士生阶段英语教学需要注重专业性和学术性的特点,我们编写了这部《博士生学术英语综合阅读》教材。这部教材在课文选材上兼顾了中央党校及其他高校人文社会科学方向的主要学科专业:哲学、政治学、经济学、法学、历史学、社会学、文化学,其中一些材料还具有跨学科性。同时为了突出教材的学术性特点,我们将课文选材范围设定在西方经典原著、西方经典教材、现当代学术专著及学术期刊文章等方面。我们编写这部教材的目的是为了通过教授涵盖了人文社科各专业的古代经典和现当代学术文章,使学生熟悉学术文章的词汇语法、语篇结构和文体体裁等特点,培养和提高学生阅读英文学术文章所需要的理解、思考和分析批判的能力,同时通过课文前后的各种练习题的训练,提高学生的读、说、写、译的英语综合能力。

本教材由7个单元,18篇课文构成。其中哲学单元3篇:柏拉图《理想国》“洞喻”篇、《新约》“山顶讲道”篇、加尔文《基督教原理》“被造时的人性及其灵魂的特征”章节;政治学单元3篇:亚里士多德《政治学》第四章、卡尔·马克思《共产党宣言》第一章:资产阶级与无产阶级、安德鲁·海伍德《政治学》第十三章:政党与政党制度;经济学单元2篇:亚当·斯密《国富论》序论、尼可拉斯·曼昆《经济学原理》第一章:经济学中的十大原理;法学单元2篇:孟德斯鸠《论法的精神》第十章:论汇率、哈特《法律的概念》第一章:经久不绝的问题;社会学单元3篇:马克斯·韦伯《新教伦理与资本主义精神》第一章:宗教归属与社会分层、赖特·米尔斯《社会学的想像力》附录:论治学之道、维克多·

尼“市场转型理论：国家社会主义从再分配向市场的过渡”；历史学单元2篇：托克维尔《旧制度与大革命》序言、约翰·托什《史学导论》第七章：历史知识的局限；文化学单元3篇：拉里·萨默瓦等人《跨文化交流》第一部分第二章：了解文化、吉尔特·霍夫斯塔德“与孔子的联系：从文化根源到经济增长”、罗纳德·因格莱哈特“文化与民主”。

每单元结构及教学目的如下：(1) Pre-Reading Questions (旨在让学生在阅读课文前对文章涉及的主题内容有所了解与思考)；(2) Text (旨在让学生在阅读了解著作或文章原文)；(3) About the Author (旨在让学生对作者生平简历和学术背景有更多的了解)；(4) Notes to the Text (注释范围主要包括概念、术语、人物、事件等相关文化知识，旨在帮助学生了解课文背景知识有更加详细的了解)；(5) Comprehension Questions (旨在帮助学生加强对文章内容的理解)；(6) Questions for Discussion and Writing (旨在引导学生对课文主题所涉及的相关问题进行更深入的思考；通过学生口、笔头作业练习，提高学生的语言输出能力，体现“综合”之意义)；(7) Vocabulary and Structure (旨在加强巩固学生对词汇、语法等语言基本知识的掌握。此题型及题型8与我校博士入学考题词汇语法题型一样，因此，本教材可用于报考我校博士生入学考试的参考书)；(8) Reading (旨在提高学生对文章整体篇章结构的理解)；(9) Translation (旨在加深学生对文中重点难点句子的理解与提高学生的翻译能力)；(10) Suggested Reading (旨在帮助学生对文章所涉及主题进行更全面深入的了解、思考和研究)。教材最后附有练习7和练习8的答案，以备学生查阅对照。

本教材的编写工作是由中央党校文史部外国语言与文化教研室的7位英语教师共同完成的，其中主编：郭莲；副主编：焦玉莉；编者：肖宏宇、刘丽丽、张慧娟、沈凌、李楠。具体分工如下：郭莲编写16—18课并负责统稿审稿工作；焦玉莉编写11—13课；肖宏宇编写1—3课；刘丽丽编写7、9课；张慧娟编写14—15课；沈凌编写4—6课；李楠编写8、10课。

本教材可作为非英语专业博士研究生英语阅读课教材使用，也适用于高等院校人文社会科学专业研究生及科研人员提高学术英语阅读能力的参考用书。

本教材是中央党校研究生院创新工程项目。我们在编写教材过程中，

得到了研究生院、出版社和文史部各单位领导及同仁的大力支持，特别是研究生院的杨洪江、解国臣和出版社的王君、蔡锐华等人，我们谨在此对他们的支持表示最诚挚的感谢。

由于编写人员教学任务重、时间紧、水平有限，本教材中的错误和不妥之处在所难免，敬请读者批评指正。

教材编写组

2016年9月

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Lesson 1

The Republic

VII The Allegory of the Cave (excerpt)¹

Plato

PRE-READING QUESTIONS

1. *What do you know about the Allegory of the Cave?*
2. *What kind of things might you be reminded of when people mention the word “cave”?*
3. *What is the nature of our soul? Will our nature be enlightened or unenlightened?*

Socrates (S)²: Now compare our condition with this: Picture men having in a cave which has a wide mouth open towards the light. They are kept in the same places, looking forward only away from the mouth and unable to turn their heads, for their legs and necks have been fixed in chains from brain. A fire is burning higher up at their backs, and between it and the prisoners there is a road with a low wall built at its side, like the screen over which puppet players put up their puppet.

Glaucon (G)³: All that I see.

S: See, again, then, men walking under cover of this low wall carrying past all sorts of things, copies of men and animals, in stone or wood and other materials; some of them may be talking and others not.

G: This is a strange sort of comparison and these are strange prisoners.

S: They are like ourselves. They see nothing but their own shadows, or one another's, which the fire throws on the wall of the cave. And so too with the things carried past. If they were able to talk to one another, wouldn't they think that in naming the shadows they were naming the things that went by? And if their prison sent back an echo whenever one of those who went by said a word, what could they do but take it for the voice of the shadow?

G: By Zeus⁴, they would.

S: The only real things for them would be the shadows of the puppets.

G: Certainly.

S: Now see how it will be if something frees them from their chains: When one is freed and forced to get on his feet and turn his head and walk and look towards the light—and all this hurts, and because the light is too bright, he isn't able to see the things whose shadows he saw before—what will he answer, if someone says that all he has seen till now, was false and a trick, but that now he sees more truly? And if someone points out to him the things going by and asks him to name them, won't he be at a loss? And won't he take the shadows he saw before as more real than these things?

G: Much more real.

S: And if he were forced to look straight at the light itself, wouldn't he start back with pained eyes? And if someone pulled him up the rough and hard ascent and forced him out into the light of the sun, wouldn't he be angry? And wouldn't his eyes be too full of light to make out even one of the things we say are real.

G: Yes, that would be so at first.

S: He would need to get used to the light before he could see things up there. At first he would see shadows best, and after that reflections in still water of men and other things, and only later these things themselves. Then he would be ready to look at the moon and stars, and would see the sky by night better than the sun and the sun's light by day. So, at last, I take it, he'd be able to look upon the sun itself, and see it not through seemings and images of itself in water and away from its true place, but in its own field and as it truly is.

G: So.

S: And with that he will discover that it is the sun which gives the seasons and the years, and is the chief in the field of the things which are seen, and in some way the cause even of all the things he had been seeing before. If he now went back in his mind to where he was living before, and what his brother slaves took to be wisdom there, wouldn't he be happy at the change and pity them?

G: Certainly, he would.

S: And if their way was to reward those who were quickest to make out the shadows as they went by and to note in memory which came before which as a rule, and which together, would he care very much about such rewards? And, if he were to go down again out of the sunlight into his old places, would not his eyes get suddenly full of the dark? And if there were to be a competition then with the prisoners who had never moved out and he had to do his best in judging the shadows before his eyes got used to the dark—which needs more than a minute—wouldn't he be laughed at? Wouldn't they say he had come back from his time on high with his eyes in very bad condition so that there was no point in going up there? And if they were able to get their hands on the man who attempted to take their chains off and guide them up, wouldn't they put him to death?

G: They certainly would.

S: Take this comparison, dear Glaucon, with all we have said before. The world seen through the eyes, that is the prison house; the light of the fire is like the power of the sun; and if you see the way out and that looking upon things of the upper world as the going up of the soul to the field of true thought, you will have my hopes or beliefs about it and they are what you desired—though only God knows if they are right. Be that as it may, what seems clear to me is that in the field of deep knowledge the last thing to be seen, and hardly seen, is the idea of the good. When that is seen, our decision has to be that it is truly the cause, for all things, of all that is beautiful and right. In the world that is to be seen, it gives birth to light and to the lord of light, but in the field of thought it is itself the master cause of reason and all that is true; and anyone who is to act wisely in private or public must have seen this.

G: I am with you—as far as I am able.

S: It is not strange that those who have been so high are not willing to take up again the everyday business of men. Their souls are ever for turning again to that higher world. Nor again, is it surprising if a man, coming back from such godlike visions to the evil condition of men, seems a poor and foolish thing in his behavior; if before his eyes have got used to the dark again he is forced to go to law, for example, and fight about the shadows of justice or the images which make them, or argue about those images in the minds of men who have never seen justice itself.

G: That isn't strange at all.

S: Anyone with sense would keep in mind that there are two ways in which the eyes may be troubled: when they change over from the light to the dark, and from the dark to the light. He'd believe that the same thing takes place with the soul, and he wouldn't be overquick to laugh at a soul unable to see something, but would be careful to note if it were coming from a brighter light into the dark or were going from the deeper dark of little knowledge into daylight and if its eyes were unclear because the light was overstrong.

G: A very just observation.

S: If so, education is not truly what some of its professors say it is. They say they are able to put knowledge into a soul which hasn't got it—as if they were putting sight into blind eyes.

G: They do say so.

S: But our argument points to this: the natural power to learn lives in the soul and is like an eye which might not be turned from the dark to the light without a turning round of the whole body. The instrument of knowledge has to be turned round and with the whole soul, from the things of becoming to the things of being, till the soul is able, by degrees, to support the light of true being and can look at the brightest. And this, we say, is the good?

G: We do.

S: Of this very process, then, there might be an art, the art of turning the soul round most quickly, and with the most effect. It would not be an art of producing a power of seeing in the soul, for it has that already—though it has been

looking in the wrong direction. It would be an art of turning the soul in the right direction.

G: That seems probable.

S: The other qualities of the soul do seem like those of the body, for even when they are not present from birth, they may be formed in it by training and use. But the quality of reason and thought, it seems, is a much more godlike thing whose power never goes away, but as it is turned in one direction or another, becomes useful and able to do good, or useless and able only to damage. Haven't you noted, in those who are commonly said to be bad but sharp men, how quick their little souls are to see what is to their interest? It is clear they can see well enough. Only, the sharper their sight is, the worse are the things they do.

G: Quite true.

S: If from the earliest days this part of such a soul had been freed from the leadlike weights fixed to it at birth by the pleasures of taste and such, that now turn the soul's vision downwards; if, I say, the soul had been turned instead towards the things that are true and good, the same power in these same men would have been as quick to see the higher things as it is in seeing the low things it looks for now.

G: Probably.

S: And here is another thing which is probable, or, more truly, a necessary outcome of what we have said; those who are without education and true knowledge will never be able rulers of the state. And the same is true of those who never make an end of their education; the first because they have no one fixed purpose to give direction to all their acts, public and private; the others because they will not act at all, if they are not forced to, but believe they have been already transported to the Happy Isle⁵. So we who are designing this state will have to face these naturally best minds to get what we have said is the greatest knowledge of all, to go on up till they see the good and when they have seen enough, we will not let them do as they do now.

G: What is that?

S: They may not keep to themselves up there, but have to go down again

among those prisoners and take part in their work and rewards, whatever these may be.

G: Then are we to wrong them by forcing them into a worse way of living when a better one is within their power?

S: Are you keeping in mind, my friend, that this law of ours is not to make any one group in the state specially happy, but the state itself? Everyone is to give to all the others whatever he is able to produce for the society. For it made these men so, not to please themselves but, to unite the commonwealth.

G: I see. I was overlooking that.

S: But note, Glaucon, there will be no wrong done to the philosophers in this. We have just arguments to give them when we force them to become guardians. We will say to them, "It is natural that in other states men of your quality do not take part in the common work. For in these states such men come into being of their own sweet will and without the will of the government. Teachers of themselves, they have no cause to feel in debt to the state for an education they were never given. But you we begot to be rulers of yourselves and of the state. You have had a better and more complete education than any of the others; so down you go into the cave with the rest to get used to seeing in the dark. For then you will see far better than they do what these images are, and what they are of, for you have seen what the beautiful, the just and the good truly are." So our state will be ruled by minds which are awake, and not as now by men in a dream fighting with one another over shadows and for the power and office which in their eyes are the great good. Truly that state is best and most quietly ruled where the rulers have least desire to be such, and the state with the opposite sort of rulers is the worst. And will you name any other sort of man than a philosopher who looks down on political office?

G: By Zeus, no.

S: And now let us see how this sort of ruler is to be produced, and what sort of work will turn the mind from that which changes to that which is, turn it round from a day little better than night to the true daylight in the ascent we say is true philosophy.

G: Certainly.

S: Keep in mind that our guardians have to be ready to take command in war. There were two parts in our education. Gymnastic had to do with the growth and decay of the body and so with coming to be and passing away. And that is not the sort of knowledge we are after. But what do you say of music which was, in a way, the other part?

G: Music was a parallel to gymnastic and trained the guardians through forming their ways of living, giving them harmony and rhythm, but no science. There was nothing leading to the sort of good you are looking for now.

S: Your memory is right. There was nothing in music of that sort. But what branch of knowledge is there, dear Glaucon, of the sort we desire? For all the useful arts in our opinion are low.

G: Undoubtedly. But if music and gymnastic are out, and the arts are as well, what have we?

S: We will have to take something which is not special but has to do with everything. Something which all arts and sciences and all forms of thought use. Something which everyone has to have among the first steps of his education.

G: And what may that be?

S: The simple business of knowing about one and two and three; in a word, number and arithmetic. Don't all the arts and sciences make use of them? Is not this the sort of science we are looking for, which naturally takes us on into thought? But it has never been rightly used. Its true value is its attraction of thought towards being.

G: Please make that clearer.

S: Some accounts of things which the senses give us do not make us think, for the senses seem good enough judges of them; but others do, because sense experience gives us nothing we may put any faith in.

G: Clearly, what you have in mind is things seen at a distance or in paintings which trick the eye.

S: No, that is not my point at all.

G: Then what is it?

S: The experiences which don't make us think are those in which the senses don't give opposite views. In those that do, I say, the sense, whatever the distance, no more gives us one thing than its opposite. An example will make this clearer: here are three fingers—the little finger, the second finger, and the middle finger.

G: That is so.

S: Every one of these seems equally to be a finger. Being seen as in the middle or that at one side does not change that at all. Black or white, thick or thin, a finger is a finger all the same. For all these changes, the soul, in most men, is not forced to put any question like, "What, then, is a finger?" For in seeing it, we are not at any point suddenly made to see that the finger is not a finger.

G: Certainly not.

S: Such an experience does not naturally awake thought. But is this equally true of this point: are the fingers great or small? Will seeing answer that? And is that in no way changed by the fact that one of the fingers is in the middle and the others at the sides? And does touch, by itself, give us a good enough account of the qualities: thickness and thinness, softness and hardness? And so with the other senses. Do they give us good enough accounts of such things? No, the soul needs something with which to judge them. And this is the knowledge of numbers. It is needed in the army, and a philosopher has to have it because he has to go up from out of the sea of becoming and take a grip on being or he will never use his reason rightly in arithmetic.

G: It is so.

S: So it is right. Glaucon, for this branch of learning to be ordered by law for those who are to take part in the highest work of the state. And they are to go into it till by the help of thought itself they come to see what numbers are. They are not to use it as the traders and the men in the market do, but for war and for the purpose of turning the soul itself away from becoming to being and the true.

G: Well said. They are working with units which are only to be taken up by thought and in no other way.

S: Have you not noted how those who are naturally able at this science are generally quick in all others, and how men of slow minds, if they get nothing more from it, become sharper than they were before.

G: That is so.

S: And you will not readily name sciences which are more trouble to learn or to go on with than this. So for all these reasons let us keep this science in view and use it in the education of the naturally best minds.

G: I am with you.

S: With that point fixed, let us go on to the science which comes after this.

G: What is that? Is it geometry?

S: Yes.

G: So much of it as is useful in war is certainly in place here. For an officer who was good at geometry would be very different from one who was not.

S: But still, a very little geometry would be enough for that. What we have to see is if the greater and harder part of it farther on has a tendency to help us to keep in view the idea of the good. But geometry itself is flatly against the language the experts in it use.

G: In what way?

S: They have no other way of talking than as if they were doing something with their hands and as if all their words had acts in view. For all their talk is of squaring or of putting one thing on another or addition and the like. But in fact this science has nothing but knowledge itself in view—knowledge of that which always is and not of something which at one time comes into existence and then passes away.

G: That we may agree about, for the knowledge of geometry is of what is always so.

S: Then, my good friend, it will attract the soul towards the true, and will produce the philosophic way of thought, giving the powers which are now wrongly turned downward a direction upward.

G: Nothing is more certain.

S: Let us put this down as a second branch of knowledge for the men of your beautiful republic. And will astronomy be a third, or do you say “No”?

G: I am certainly with you, for quickness in noting the times of the year and the round of the months and years is very useful, not only in farming and at sea but still more in the military art.

S: I am amused by the reason you give. You seem to fear that the mass of men may take you to be putting useless sciences forward. It is in fact very hard to see how in every soul there is an instrument of knowledge which may be cleared and put in order by such sciences when everyday business has broken and blinded it. And this instrument is of more value than ten thousand eyes, for by it only do we see what is true. Those who believe this with you will be very pleased with what we say. But those who have never had any experience of the sort will take us to be talking complete nonsense. For they don't see any profit to be got from such sciences. Make up your mind then, right away, which of them you are talking to.

G: I see now I am wrong; and in place of that common sort of praise for astronomy, Socrates, let me say this about it from your point of view. It will be clear to everyone that astronomy makes the soul look upward and takes it up from things here to higher things.

S: It may be clear to everyone but me, for that's not my opinion.

G: Well, what is your opinion then?

S: I would say that the astronomy men offer us as a sort of philosophy today turns the mind's eye very much downward.

G: How so?

S: You seem to me to have a very wide view of this knowledge of higher things. For to you, it seems, a man with his head back looking up at ornaments on the ceiling would be using his higher reason and not his eyes. Maybe you are right and I am oversimple. But to me no true science which doesn't turn us toward being and the unseen makes the soul look upward. If anyone attempts to learn through the senses—whether by gaping at the sky or blinking at the ground—I would never say he was truly learning, for nothing of that sort is what science has to do with. His soul is looking down, not up—however much you stretch him on his back on the earth or in the sea!

G: It was coming to me! But what is the right way of teaching astronomy?