

外研社学术文库·当代国外语言学与应用语言学

Dictionary of Language Testing 语言测试词典

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韩宝成 导读

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Preface by Halliday

Foreign Language Teaching & Research Press is to be congratulated on its initiative in making these publications in linguistics available to foreign language teachers and postgraduate students of linguistics in China.

The books are a representative selection of up-to-date writings on the most important branches of linguistic studies, by scholars who are recognized as leading authorities in their fields.

The availability of such a broad range of materials in linguistics will greatly help individual teachers and students to build up their own knowledge and understanding of the subject. At the same time, it will also contribute to the development of linguistics as a discipline in Chinese universities and colleges, helping to overcome the divisions into “English linguistics”, “Chinese linguistics” and so on which hinder the progress of linguistics as a unified science.

The series is to be highly commended for what it offers to all those wanting to gain insight into the nature of language, whether from a theoretical point of view or in application to their professional activities as language teachers. It is being launched at a time when there are increasing opportunities in China for pursuing linguistic studies, and I am confident that it will succeed in meeting these new requirements.

M. A. K. Halliday
Emeritus Professor
University of Sydney

著包罗宏富，初学者读起来可能觉得茫无头绪。为了助他们一臂之力，本文库中每一种书我们都请专家写了一万字左右的导读材料。哪怕书中内容比较陌生，谁只要在读书前看一下导读材料，读书后把材料再看一遍，一定能弄清脉络，掌握要点。

在结束本文时，我们想向爱好泛读的人们提个建议。语言和社会生活息息相关；我们靠语言与他人协作；通过语言继承传统文化，接受外国先进思想和科学知识；利用语言来教育下一代，帮助他们创造美好的未来；语言又反过来表达着我们的个性和我们充当的各种角色。学一点语言学和应用语言学，有助于增强我们的语言意识，对我们的工作和生活都是有利的。我们不妨把此事作为一个项目，列入自己的日程。持之以恒，必有所获。

王宗炎

中山大学教授
博士生导师

Preface by Chomsky

It is about half a century since the study of language undertook a rather new course, while renewing some traditional concerns that had long been neglected. The central change was a shift of attention from behavior and the products of behavior (texts, corpora, etc.) to the internal mechanisms that enter into behavior. This was part of a general shift of perspective in psychology towards what became known as “cognitive science,” and was in fact a significant factor in contributing to this development.

With this departure from prevailing structuralist and behaviorist approaches, the object of inquiry becomes a property of individual persons, my granddaughters for example. We ask what special properties they have that underlie an obvious but nonetheless remarkable fact. Exposed to a world of “buzzing, booming confusion” (in William James’s classic phrase), each instantly identified some intricate subpart of it as linguistic, and reflexively, without awareness or instruction (which would be useless in any event), performed analytic operations that led to knowledge of some specific linguistic system, in one case, a variety of what is called informally “English,” in another a variety of “Spanish.” It could just as easily been one of the Chinese languages, or an aboriginal language of Australia, or some other human language. Exposed to the same environment, their pet cats (or chimpanzees, etc.) would not even take the first step of identifying the relevant category of phenomena, just as humans do not identify what a bee perceives as the waggle dance that communicates the distance and orientation of a source of honey.

All organisms have special subsystems that lead them to deal with their environment in specific ways. Some of these subsystems are called “mental” or “cognitive,” informal designations that need not be made precise, just as there is no need to determine exactly where chemistry ends and biology begins. The development of cognitive systems, like others, is influenced by the environment, but the general course is genetically determined. Changes of nutrition, for example, can have a dramatic effect on development, but will not change a human embryo to a bee or a mouse, and the same holds for cognitive development. The evidence is strong that among the human cognitive systems is a “faculty of language” (FL), to borrow a traditional term: some subsystem of (mostly) the brain. The evidence is also overwhelming that apart from severe pathology, FL is close to uniform for humans: it is a genuine species property. The “initial state” of FL is determined by the common human genetic endowment. Exposed to experience, FL passes through a series of states, normally reaching a relatively stable state at about puberty, after which changes are peripheral: growth of vocabulary, primarily.

As far as we know, every aspect of language — sound, structure, meanings of words and more complex expressions — is narrowly restricted by the properties of the initial state; these same restrictions underlie and account for the extraordinary richness and flexibility of the systems that emerge. It is a virtual truism that scope and limits are intimately related. The biological endowment that allows an embryo to become a mouse, with only the most meager environmental “information,” prevents it from becoming a fly or a monkey. The same must be true of human higher mental faculties, assuming that humans are part of the biological world, not angels.

We can think of the states attained by FL, including the stable states, as “languages”: in more technical terminology, we may call them “internalized languages” (I-languages). Having an I-language, a person is equipped to engage in the “creative use of language” that has traditionally been considered a primary indication of possession of mind; by Descartes and his followers, to cite the most famous case. The person can produce new expressions over an unbounded range, expressions that are appropriate to circumstances and situations but not caused by them, and that evoke thoughts in others that they might have expressed in similar ways. The nature of these abilities remains as obscure and puzzling to us as it was to the Cartesians, but with the shift of perspective to “internalist linguistics,” a great deal has been learned about the cognitive structures and operations that enter into these remarkable capacities.

Though the observation does not bear directly on the study of human language, it is nevertheless of interest that FL appears to be biologically isolated in critical respects, hence a species property in a stronger sense than just being a common human possession. To mention only the most obvious respect, an I-language is a system of discrete infinity, a generative process that yields an unbounded range of expressions, each with a definite sound and meaning. Systems of discrete infinity are rare in the biological world and unknown in non-human communication systems. When we look beyond the most elementary properties of human language, its apparently unique features become even more pronounced. In fundamental respects human language does not fall within the standard typologies of animal communication systems, and there is little reason to speculate that it evolved from them, or even that it should be regarded as having the “primary function” of communication (a rather obscure notion at best). Language can surely be used for communication, as can anything people do, but it is not unreasonable to adopt the traditional view that language is primarily an instrument for expression of thought, to others or to oneself; statistically speaking, use of language is overwhelmingly internal, as can easily be determined by introspection.

Viewed in the internalist perspective, the study of language is part of biology, taking its place alongside the study of the visual system, the “dance faculty” and navigational capacities of bees, the circulatory and digestive

systems, and other properties of organisms. Such systems can be studied at various levels. In the case of cognitive systems, these are sometimes called the “psychological” and “physiological” levels — again, terms of convenience only. A bee scientist may try to determine and characterize the computations carried out by the bee’s nervous system when it transmits or receives information about a distant flower, or when it finds its way back to the nest: that is the level of “psychological” analysis, in conventional terminology. Or one may try to find the neural basis for these computational capacities, a topic about which very little is known even for the simplest organisms: the level of “physiological” analysis. These are mutually supportive enterprises. What is learned at the “psychological level” commonly provides guidelines for the inquiry into neural mechanisms; and reciprocally, insights into neural mechanisms can inform the psychological inquiries that seek to reveal the properties of the organism in different terms.

In a similar way, the study of chemical reactions and properties, and of the structured entities postulated to account for them, provided guidelines for fundamental physics, and helped prepare the way for the eventual unification of the disciplines. 75 years ago, Bertrand Russell, who knew the sciences well, observed that “chemical laws cannot at present be reduced to physical laws.” His statement was correct, but as it turned out, misleading; they could not be reduced to physical laws in principle, as physics was then understood. Unification did come about a few years later, but only after the quantum theoretic revolution had provided a radically changed physics that could be unified with a virtually unchanged chemistry. That is by no means an unusual episode in the history of science. We have no idea what the outcome may be of today’s efforts to unify the psychological and physiological levels of scientific inquiry into cognitive capacities of organisms, human language included.

It is useful to bear in mind some important lessons of the recent unification of chemistry and physics, remembering that this is core hard science, dealing with the simplest and most elementary structures of the world, not studies at the outer reaches of understanding that deal with entities of extraordinary complexity. Prior to unification, it was common for leading scientists to regard the principles and postulated entities of chemistry as mere calculating devices, useful for predicting phenomena but lacking some mysterious property called “physical reality.” A century ago, atoms and molecules were regarded the same way by distinguished scientists. People believe in the molecular theory of gases only because they are familiar with the game of billiards, Poincare observed mockingly. Ludwig Boltzmann died in despair a century ago, feeling unable to convince his fellow-physicists of the physical reality of the atomic theory of which he was one of the founders. It is now understood that all of this was gross error. Boltzmann’s atoms, Kekule’s structured organic molecules, and other postulated entities were real in the only sense of the term we know: they had a crucial place in the best

explanations of phenomena that the human mind could contrive.

The lessons carry over to the study of cognitive capacities and structures: theories of insect navigation, or perception of rigid objects in motion, or I-language, and so on. One seeks the best explanations, looking forward to eventual unification with accounts that are formulated in different terms, but without foreknowledge of the form such unification might take, or even if it is a goal that can be achieved by human intelligence — after all, a specific biological system, not a universal instrument.

Within this “biolinguistic” perspective, the core problem is the study of particular I-languages, including the initial state from which they derive. A thesis that might be entertained is that this inquiry is privileged in that it is presupposed, if only tacitly, in every other approach to language: sociolinguistic, comparative, literary, etc. That seems reasonable, in fact almost inescapable; and a close examination of actual work will show, I think, that the thesis is adopted even when that is vociferously denied. At the very least it seems hard to deny a weaker thesis: that the study of linguistic capacities of persons should find a fundamental place in any serious investigation of other aspects of language and its use and functions. Just as human biology is a core part of anthropology, history, the arts, and in fact any aspect of human life, so the biolinguistic approach belongs to the social sciences and humanities as well as human biology.

Again adapting traditional terms to a new context, the theory of an I-language *L* is sometimes called its “grammar,” and the theory of the initial state *S-0* of *FL* is called “universal grammar” (*UG*). The general study is often called “generative grammar” because a grammar is concerned with the ways in which *L* generates an infinite array of expressions. The experience relevant to the transition from *S-0* to *L* is called “primary linguistic data” (*PLD*). A grammar *G* of the I-language *L* is said to satisfy the condition of “descriptive adequacy” to the extent that it is a true theory of *L*. *UG* is said to satisfy the condition of “explanatory adequacy” to the extent that it is a true theory of the initial state. The terminology was chosen to bring out the fact that *UG* can provide a deeper explanation of linguistic phenomena than *G*. *G* offers an account of the phenomena by describing the generative procedure that yields them; *UG* seeks to show how this generative procedure, hence the phenomena it yields, derive from *PLD*. We may think of *S-0* as a mapping of *PLD* to *L*, and of *UG* as a theory of this operation; this idealized picture is sometimes said to constitute “the logical problem of language acquisition.” The study of language use investigates how the resources of I-language are employed to express thought, to talk about the world, to communicate information, to establish social relations, and so on. In principle, this study might seek to investigate the “creative aspect of language use,” but as noted, that topic seems shrouded in mystery, like much of the rest of the nature of action.

The biolinguistic turn of the 1950s resurrected many traditional

framework for theory, which can be developed in various ways. It has proven to be a highly productive program, leading to an explosion of research into languages of a very broad typological range, and in far greater depth than before. A rich variety of previously-unknown phenomena have been unearthed, along with many new insights and provocative new problems. The program has also led to new and far-reaching studies of language acquisition and other areas of research. It is doubtful that there has ever been a period when so much has been learned about human language. Certainly the relevant fields look quite different than they did not very long ago.

The P&P approach, as noted, suggested a promising way to resolve the tension between the search for descriptive and explanatory adequacy; at least in principle, to some extent in practice. It became possible, really for the first time, to see at least the contours of what might be a genuine theory of language that might jointly satisfy the conditions of descriptive and explanatory adequacy. That makes it possible to entertain seriously further questions that arise within the biolinguistic approach, questions that had been raised much earlier in reflections on generative grammar, but left to the side: questions about how to proceed beyond explanatory adequacy.

It has long been understood that natural selection operates within a "channel" of possibilities established by natural law, and that the nature of an organism cannot truly be understood without an account of how the laws of nature enter into determining its structures, form, and properties. Classic studies of these questions were undertaken by D'Arcy Thompson and Alan Turing, who believed that these should ultimately become the central topics of the theory of evolution and of the development of organisms (morphogenesis). Similar questions arise in the study of cognitive systems, in particular FL. To the extent that they can be answered, we will have advanced beyond explanatory adequacy.

Inquiry into these topics has come to be called "the minimalist program." The study of UG seeks to determine what are the properties of language; its principles and parameters, if the P&P approach is on the right track. The minimalist program asks why language is based on these properties, not others. Specifically, we may seek to determine to what extent the properties of language can be derived from general properties of complex organisms and from the conditions that FL must satisfy to be usable at all: the "interface conditions" imposed by the systems with which FL interacts. Reformulating the traditional observation that language is a system of form and meaning, we observe that FL must at least satisfy interface conditions imposed by the sensorimotor systems (SM) and systems of thought and action, sometimes called "conceptual-intentional" (CI) systems. We can think of an I-language, to first approximation, as a system that links SM and CI by generating expressions that are "legible" by these systems, which exist independently of language. Since the states of FL are computational systems, the general properties that particularly concern us are

沈家煊序

刚刚过去的一个世纪是现代语言学在我国诞生、成长和发展的世纪。发生这样的情形是跟我们学习和借鉴国外语言学的理论和方法紧密相关的。我国传统的语言文字学科是小学，进入二十世纪以后，这门学科吸收了西方语言学的理论，引进和发展了新的方法，在继承传统的基础上进行了一番更新改造，从而获得了新的旺盛的生命力，走上了现代语言学的大道。拿我国传统的音韵学来说，由于欧洲历史比较法和内部拟测法等方法的引进，加上采用效果良好的标音工具——国际音标，这门传统的学科有了重大的转变和进展，我们得以构拟出古音的音值，同时也更好地区别古音的音类。汉语语法的研究，众所周知，我国学者自己撰写的第一部语法著作《马氏文通》正是直接学习和模仿西方语法的结果。上世纪中叶结构主义语法理论和分析方法的引进，使汉语语法研究提高到一个更加精深的层次。至于实验语音学、计算语言学、心理语言学这些跟自然科学联系密切的语言学分支，它们在我国的诞生和发展跟学习和借鉴西方更是分不开。尤其是改革开放以来，我国语言学界解除了长期的思想禁锢，学术空气空前活跃，国外语言学理论和方法的引进也随之出现了繁荣的局面。在新的世纪里要发展我国的语言学，我们在继承传统遗产的同时还需要继续学习和借鉴国外好的理论和方法，这一点是无庸讳言的。

外语教学与研究出版社引进并出版《当代国外语言学与应用语言学文库》，首批 54 本自 2000 年 9 月问世以来，取得很大成功。许多单位和个人争相订阅，研究生和大学生把《文库》视为良师益友，教师无论老中青都把《文库》视为知识更新的源泉。这次引进和出版的第二批 58 部，覆盖的领域比第一批又有所扩大，新增加了语言学史、语言哲学、人类语言学、认知语言学、语言的起源、语法化学说、音系学的优选论等内容。

精，去伪存真。国外的东西要虚心学习，但是也不要迷信。一部书读下来，要静心想一想，哪些是真有道理，哪些是貌似有理，哪些是精华，哪些是糟粕。（现在还有另一种倾向，为了表明自己有独立的思考和创见，曲解别人的观点。）三是联系实际，融会贯通。只攻一点不及其余的做法当然不可取，但有的人面对国外林林总总五花八门的理论和学派，书是读了不少，却始终理不出个头绪来。其实就《文库》而言，其中许多内容都是互相贯通的。比如，“语法化”的问题是近来语言学研究的一个热点，它牵涉到许多方面。要真正对这个问题有透彻的了解，既要有历史语言学的一般知识，还要了解功能语言学、认知语言学、语用学、语言类型学的相关研究成果，最好还要知道生成语言学的理论背景。融会贯通不够的一个主要原因是联系语言的实际不够，因此阅读时最好能联系你最熟悉、语感最好的语言（首先是你的母语）进行比较和思考。后面两点说起来容易做起来难：我自己也不能真正做到，提出来希望和广大读者共勉。

我们正处在一个信息时代，语言是人类最重要的信息载体。新兴的认知科学又把语言作为主要的研究对象，因为语言是人类最高级最重要的认知能力。新的世纪我国的语言学正面临新的挑战，《文库》的出版可以说是迎接这个挑战的第一个回应。

沈家煊

中国社会科学院语言所所长、教授

博士生导师

导 读

韩宝成

《语言测试词典》(*Dictionary of Language Testing*, 以下简称 DLT)是剑桥大学出版社出版的语言测试研究丛书(*Studies in Language Testing*)中的一本, 1999 年出版。作为一个常与语言测试打交道的工作者, 我第一次看到这本词典时很兴奋, 就笔者阅读范围而言, 我认为它是世界上第一本关于语言测试的词典。同二语习得一样, 语言测试也是应用语言学研究领域发展最快的一个学科。语言测试的发展, 充分汲取了应用语言学、心理语言学、教育测量学、统计学等领域的研究成果。阅读语言测试的有关文献, 读者碰到的第一个问题就是术语问题。对于一些语言教师或研究生来说, 这些术语可能是他们的拦路虎。这本词典的出版, 满足了读者的需要。

DLT 的编写始于 1991 年, 历时 6 年才完成, 主持这项工作的是世界著名的应用语言学家和语言测试专家 Alan Davies 教授。Alan Davies 早年在英国爱丁堡大学教授应用语言学, 之后曾在肯尼亚、加拿大、奥地利等国任教。他担任过英国应用语言学会主席, 国际应用语言学会秘书长, 国际语言测试协会主席等职, 主编过《应用语言学》和《语言测试》这两本国际知名的杂志。Alan Davies 教授在应用语言学和语言测试领域著述甚丰, 自上世纪六十年代起出版的主要著作有:《语言测试论文集》(1968),《测试及实验方法》(爱丁堡应用语言学教程, 第四卷, 1977),《中介语》(1984),《语言测试原理》(1990)等。

DLT 是 Alan Davies 教授在担任澳大利亚墨尔本大学语言测试研究中心第一任主任期间主持编写的。用他的话来说, 中心刚成立时, 大家都是这个领域的新手(这当然是谦虚了), 为方便交流, 取得共识, 大家需要有一个共同的术语表(common terminology)。Davis 认为, 既然他们都觉得有这个必要, 对其他从事语言测试工作的人来说, 就更需要这么一个东西了。他进一步指出, 编写一本专门的语言测试词典, 是建立语言测试标准和规范必须做的一件事情, 于是便有了词典这个研究项目。作为一个开创性的项目, 大家一干就是 6 年, 终于在 1997 年交剑桥大学出版社出版。

编词典难, 编写一本人们从来没有编写过的词典更难。Davies 专门

写了一篇文章，作为词典的附录，详细阐述了词典编写的甘苦。

首先是词典定位问题。这本词典应该是一个简单的术语表，词汇表，还是一部百科性词典？编写人员首先要解决这个问题。Davies 在这篇文章里仔细考究了各种词典的性质，尤其提到了学术界有名的两部词典：一部是 Richards 等人编写的 *Longman Dictionary of Applied Linguistics*，另一部是 Crystal 编写的 *First Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics*。可以说这两部词典对语言测试词典的编写产生了较大的影响。Davies 总结说，语言测试词典应该是一部百科性质的词典，要有解释、有示例、有引证，参见项目要全。这样做的好处是，能够为读者提供较为详尽的信息。但是，每个条目应该详尽到什么程度，他们没有太大的把握。他们以一些词条为例，分别给出几种不同的写法（详见本词典附录 2、3），在一些教师和研究生中进行了试验，让他们做出评判，然后写作组再根据反馈意见确定写作标准，分头工作。

这是一种扎实的工作态度，他们的前期研究有数据，有分析，写出来的东西自然有特色。我们以 construct validity（构念效度）为例（详见本词典 33 页）。

这个术语不仅是语言测试，而且也是应用语言学研究中的一个重要概念，我们再来看 Richards et al. (2000)^① 给出的解释：

(in testing) a form of validity which is based on the degree to which the items in a test reflect the essential aspects of the theory on which the test is based (the construct). For example, the greater the relationship which can be demonstrated between a test of communicative competence in a language and the theory of communicative competence, the greater the construct validity of the test.

Further reading: Brown 1998; Oller 1979

毫无疑问，本书定义要比 Richards et al. 给出的定义清楚得多，让读者更解渴，不管是从事语言测试还是应用语言学研究的人会更欣赏前者。当然，这两本词典的编写宗旨不同，拿一两个条目去比较可能有失客观，但这种对比却反映了这部词典的特色。

确定了词条的编写方案，接下来的问题就是收词。本词典该收多少条目，哪些收，哪些不收。因为没有同类词典可做参考，编写组征求了

^① Richards, J. C., J. Platt and H. Weber, 2000. *Longman Dictionary of Language Teaching & Applied Linguistics*. Beijing: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press.

许多语言测试专家的意见。最初他们设想选 500—1000 条左右，考虑到词条的长度和词典的篇幅，最后确定 600 条。当然，这种选择有很强的主观性。但 Davies 指出，这本词典的编写初衷是为那些已经或者还没有踏入语言测试领域的人解疑指路，提供信息，书后所附参考书目也是为了达到这个目的。我认为，作为一本启门开道的词典，这 600 个词条足够了。把这些概念都搞清楚，也可以称得上是语言测试“专家”了。

以上我们简要介绍了本词典的编写过程及其主要特点。借助本词典的一些条目，我们再来重新审视一下语言测试领域的一个老话题：语言测试测什么？对于这个问题的回答直接决定了我们如何设计和使用一项考试。

有人讲，语言测试应该着重测量学生的语言基本知识 (knowledge) 和基本技能 (skill)；有人讲，语言测试应该测量受试的语言水平 (proficiency) 或语言能力 (competence)；还有人讲，语言测试应该能够衡量出受试实际运用语言 (language use) 的能力。尽管大家说法不一，但有一点是肯定的，无论国内还是国外的语言测试机构都声称自己的语言测试是最好的测试，而且能够测量出受试的语言能力或水平。美国 ETS 的 TOEFL (托福考试) 和英国的 IELTS (雅思考试) 都被认为是权威的语言水平测试，而这两种考试在形式上则完全不同。我国规模最大的英语教学考试——大学英语四、六级考试被认为是国内最具权威的英语考试，考试形式与国外的这两种考试亦不相同。众所周知，考试形式是为考试目的服务的，考试形式的不同实际上反映了考试设计者的理念和思想不同，或者说，考试的设计者在对待什么是语言能力或水平的看法上存在不同。我们认为，弄清涉及语言测试的这些基本问题，包括语言知识、语言技能、语言能力和语言水平，以及语言运用和语言能力的关系，对于我们正确地理解、设计、使用一项考试大有好处。

首先，我们来看什么是语言知识。依照 DLT 的定义，在语言测试领域，语言知识指有关形式语言系统 (formal linguistic system) 的知识。通常，人们将语言系统分为语音、词汇、语法等几个不同的层面。测量一个人语言能力的高低，就看他对语言系统几个层面的知识掌握得如何。测试方式以分离式测试项目 (discrete-point test) 为主，多项选择题是分离式测试的主要形式。这是传统语言测试的做法，其特点是把语言知识等同于语言能力，认为考生语言知识掌握得好，其语言能力就强。长期以来，把语言分成不同部分来教和测的方式在我们的外语教学和测试中一直占很重要的地位。仔细研究一下国内的一些大规模考试我们不难看出

出，其设计思路和形式在很大程度上走的还是这条老路子。

语言水平这个术语不仅搞语言测试的人常用，普通人也常说。但它到底指的是什么？DLT 给出了三种解释，第一种指人们掌握语言知识的程度。第二种指用语言去做某种特定事情的能力，如英国的 IELTS 是一种为想到英国大学读书的学生设计的考试，测量他们的英语是否达到听课的水平。第三种解释指通过某种特定测试过程反映出考生的语言运用情况（performance）。对“水平”一词的不同理解会直接影响到语言测试的设计和使用。我认为，这句话说得最有份量。还是看看当今的一些语言测试，都声称用来考核受试的语言水平，但有的考试主要是在测量受试的语言知识，把知识测试等同于水平测试。

在强调素质教育的今天，多数人反对把语言测试搞成知识测试，认为语言是一种技能，语言测试的目的就是要看考生对听、说、读、写四种技能掌握得怎么样。人们通常把听和读视为接受性语言技能（receptive skills），说和写视为产出性语言技能（productive skills），每种技能可分为多种微观技能，各种微观技能又分为低层次技能（lower order skills）和高层次技能（higher order skills）。从语言测试发展史的角度看，把语言分解为几种不同的技能并加以测试是语言测试的一大进步。但遗憾的是，这一从上个世纪 60 年代就开始流行的观点，至今在我国没有得到很好的贯彻，因为国内很多英语考试根本就不考口头表达技能。

这里有两点需要指出：第一，一些人仍过分强调语言的可分性，尤其是将语言技能和语言知识割裂开来，认为知识是技能的基础，在测试中把知识测试和技能测试分开进行；而另一些人则更强调知识和技能的互动性（dynamic interaction），即把知识测试融入技能测试之中，其典型代表是 IELTS。这两种不同的做法给外语教学带来的反拨作用完全不同。前者仍会使学生把语言的学习视为知识的学习，而后者更能促使学生把精力放到技能操练上。第二，一项考试含有听、说、读、写四个部分是否就是一个严格意义上的技能考试？这里关键要看如何理解“技能”一词。按照 DLT 的定义，技能是能力的一个方面，是通过语言运用体现出来的。在我们熟悉的一些考试中，一种语言技能往往被分解成各种更小的技能，然后通过多项选择题的形式来测，测试结果到底从多大程度上能够反映考生的实际语言运用情况？DLT 的编者在“skill”这个词条的最后指出，能否用测试各种微技能的办法去体现考生的语言运用（language performance）情况是学者们争论不休的话题。

语言教学的最终目的是教会学生使用一门语言，学生学习语言的目

Series Editor's Note

The Language Testing Dictionary represents a substantial contribution to the field of language testing and credit needs to be given to the Melbourne team for undertaking the work. The dictionary has taken six years to write and has been rigorously reviewed on an on-going basis throughout this period. Its 600 or so entries are clearly written and aim to communicate to a wide range of readers with varied background experience. The team, led by Alan Davies, approached the project in a systematic and organised manner and their approach is documented in both the preface and appendix to this volume.

Many of those involved in Applied Linguistics and EFL/ESL have found language testing a daunting area. This is partly because of the emphasis on numbers and 'difficult' statistical techniques and partly because there is a large amount of terminology and jargon to contend with. I hope that the dictionary will contribute to making language testing more transparent, and help to demystify some aspects of it. In this way, it will strengthen the field and help it to mature. It should be useful to students at all levels as a source of reference and guidance. The entries are not unduly long, but are often accompanied by references to further reading thus making it valuable to most professionals in the field of applied linguistics as a reference document.

The dictionary will complement the multilingual glossary, published as volume 6 in this series. Both volumes will help to make language testing more accessible, which is consistent with the overall aims of this series.