


Friedrich Nietzsche

The Birth of Tragedy Twilight of the Idols



Essential Classics of Liberal Studies



全国百佳出版社
中央编译出版社
Central Compilation & Translation Press

Translated by E. V. Rieu

The Birth of Tragedy Twilight of the Idols



THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

Chicago, London, and New Delhi, India

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
50 EAST LEXINGTON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10017

Essential Classics of Liberal Studies

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY
TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS



Friedrich Nietzsche
Translated by Ian Johnston
The Birth of Tragedy

Richer Resources Publications, 1938

Friedrich Nietzsche
Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale
Twilight of the Idols

Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968

图书在版编目(CIP)数据

悲剧的诞生·偶像的黄昏: 英文/(德)尼采(Nietzsche, F.)

著. —北京: 中央编译出版社, 2012. 1

ISBN 978-7-5117-1089-5

I. ①悲… II. ①尼… III. ①美学理论-德国-近代-
英文 ②尼采, F. W. (1844~1900)-哲学思想-英文
IV. ①B83-095.16 ②B516.47

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字(2011)第 218240 号

悲剧的诞生·偶像的黄昏(英文版)

出版人: 和 龔

责任编辑: 韩慧强

责任印制: 尹 珺

出版发行: 中央编译出版社

地 址: 北京西城区车公庄乙 5 号鸿儒大厦 B 座(100044)

电 话: (010)52612345 (总编室) (010)52612363 (编辑室)
(010)66130345 (发行部) (010)66509618 (读者服务部)
(010)66161011 (团购部) (010)52612332 (网络销售部)

网 址: www.cctpbook.com

经 销: 全国新华书店

印 刷: 北京瑞哲印刷厂

开 本: 880 × 1230 毫米 1/32

字 数: 280 千字

印 张: 9.75 插页: 4

版 次: 2012 年 1 月第 1 版第 1 次印刷

定 价: 24.00 元

本社常年法律顾问: 北京大成律师事务所首席顾问律师 鲁哈达

凡有印装质量问题, 本社负责调换, 电话: 010-66509618



TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY 35

 THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY 50

TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS 185

 PREFACE 186

 MAXIMS AND ARROWS 188

 THE PROBLEM OF SOCRATES 195

 “REASON” IN PHILOSOPHY 202

 HOW THE “TRUE WORLD” FINALLY
 BECAME A FABLE 208

 MORALITY AS ANTI-NATURE 210

 THE FOUR GREAT ERRORS 216

 THE “IMPROVERS” OF MANKIND 225

 WHAT THE GERMANS LACK 230

 SKIRMISHES OF AN UNTIMELY MAN 238

 WHAT I OWE TO THE ANCIENTS 280


 THE HAMMER SPEAKS 288

I



TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION



I. Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE developed his philosophy during the late 19th century amid growing criticism of G. W. F. Hegel's philosophic system.

Nietzsche owed the awakening of his philosophical interest to reading Arthur Schopenhauer's *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (*The World as Will and Representation*, 1818, revised 1844) and admitted that Schopenhauer was one of the few thinkers that he respected, dedicating to him his essay *Schopenhauer als Erzieher* (*Schopenhauer as Educator*), published in 1874 as one of his *Untimely Meditations*.

Since the dawn of the 20th century, the philosophy of Nietzsche has had great intellectual and political influence around the world. Nietzsche applied himself to such topics as morality, religion, epistemology, psychology, ontology, and social criticism. Because of Nietzsche's evocative style and his often outrageous claims, his philosophy generates passionate reactions running from love to disgust, and it has drawn amateurs of all kinds to be heavily involved in the project of interpretation as well. Nietzsche noted in his autobiographical *Ecce Homo* that his philosophy developed over time, so



interpreters have found it difficult to relate concepts central to one work to those central to another, for example, the thought of the eternal recurrence features heavily in *Also sprach Zarathustra* (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*), but is almost entirely absent from his next book, *Beyond Good and Evil*. Added to this challenge is the fact that Nietzsche did not seem concerned to develop his thought into a system, even going so far as to disparage the attempt in *Beyond Good and Evil*.

Common themes in his thought can, however, be identified and discussed. His earliest work emphasized the opposition of Apollonian and Dionysian impulses in art, and the figure of Dionysus continued to play a role in his subsequent thought. Other major currents include the will to power, the claim that God is dead, the distinction between master and slave moralities, and radical perspectivism. Other concepts appear rarely, or are confined to one or two major works, yet are considered centerpieces of Nietzschean philosophy, such as the Übermensch and the thought of eternal recurrence. His later works involved a sustained attack on Christianity and Christian morality, and he seemed to be working toward what he called the transvaluation of all values (*Umwertung aller Werte*). While Nietzsche is often associated in the public mind with fatalism and nihilism, Nietzsche himself viewed his project as the attempt to overcome the pessimism of Arthur Schopenhauer.

Nihilism and God Is Dead

Nietzsche saw nihilism as the outcome of repeated frustrations in the search for meaning. He diagnosed nihilism as a latent presence within the very foundations of European culture, and saw it as a necessary and approaching destiny. The religious worldview had already suffered a number of challenges from contrary perspectives grounded in



philosophical skepticism, and in modern science's evolutionary and heliocentric theory. Nietzsche saw this intellectual condition as a new challenge to European culture, which had extended itself beyond a sort of point-of-no-return. Nietzsche conceptualizes this with the famous statement "God is dead", which first appeared in his work in section 108 of *The Gay Science*, again in section 125 with the parable of "The Madman", and even more famously in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The statement, typically placed in quotation marks, accentuated the crisis that Nietzsche argued that Western culture must face and transcend in the wake of the irreparable dissolution of its traditional foundations, moored largely in classical Greek philosophy and Christianity.

Christianity and Morality

In *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche fights against the way in which Christianity has become an ideology set forth by institutions like churches, and how churches have failed to represent the life of Jesus. Nietzsche finds it important to distinguish between the religion of Christianity and the person of Jesus. Nietzsche attacked the Christian religion, as represented by churches and institutions, for what he called its "transvaluation" of healthy instinctive values. Transvaluation consists of the process by which one can view the meaning of a concept or ideology from a "higher" context. Nietzsche went beyond agnostic and atheistic thinkers of the Enlightenment, who simply regarded Christianity as untrue. He claimed that the Apostle Paul may have deliberately propagated Christianity as a subversive religion (a "psychological warfare weapon") within the Roman Empire as a form of covert revenge for the Roman destruction of Jerusalem and of the Second Temple in 70 AD during the Jewish War of 66-73 AD. Nietzsche contrasts the Christians with Jesus, whom he regarded as a





unique individual, and argues he established his own moral evaluations. As such, Jesus represents a kind of step towards his ideation of the *Übermensch*. Ultimately, however, Nietzsche claims that, unlike the *Übermensch*, who embraces life, Jesus denied reality in favor of his “kingdom of God”. Jesus’s refusal to defend himself, and subsequent death, logically followed from this total disengagement. Nietzsche goes further to analyze the history of Christianity, finding it has progressively distorted the teachings of Jesus more and more. He criticizes the early Christians for turning Jesus into a martyr and Jesus’s life into the story of the redemption of mankind in order to dominate the masses, and finds the Apostles cowardly, vulgar, and resentful. He argues that successive generations further misunderstood the life of Jesus as the influence of Christianity grew. By the 19th century, Nietzsche concludes, Christianity had become so worldly as to parody itself—a total inversion of a world view which was, in the beginning, nihilistic, thus implying the “death of God”.

Master Morality and Slave Morality

Nietzsche argued that two types of morality existed: a master morality that springs actively from the “noble man”, and a slave morality that develops reactively within the weak man. These two moralities do not present simple inversions of one another. They form two different value systems: master morality fits actions into a scale of “good” or “bad” whereas slave morality fits actions into a scale of “good” or “evil”. Notably he disdained both, though the first clearly less than the second.

The *Wille zur Macht* and the Thought of Eternal Recurrence

Since Martin Heidegger at least, the concepts of the will to power (*Wille zur macht*), of *Übermensch* and of the thought of

Eternal Recurrence have been inextricably linked. According to Heidegger's interpretation, one cannot be thought without the others. During Nazi Germany, Alfred Baeumler attempted to separate the concepts, claiming that the Eternal Recurrence was only an "existential experience" that, if taken seriously, would endanger the possibility of a "will to power"—deliberately misinterpreted, by the Nazis, as a "will for domination". Baeumler attempted to interpret the "will to power" along Social Darwinist lines, an interpretation refuted by Heidegger in his 1930s courses on Nietzsche.

The term *Wille zur Macht* first appeared in the posthumous fragment 23 [63] of 1876-1877. Heidegger's reading has become predominant among commentators, although some have criticized it: Mazzino Montinari by declaring that it was forging the figure of a "macroscopical Nietzsche", alien to all of his nuances.

The Will to Power

Nietzsche's "will to power" (*Wille zur Macht*) is the name of a concept created by Nietzsche; the title of a projected book which he finally decided not to write; and the title of a book compiled from his notebooks and published posthumously and under suspicious circumstances by his sister and Peter Gast.

The work consists of four separate books, entitled "European Nihilism", "Critique of the Highest Values Hitherto", "Principles of a New Evaluation", and "Discipline and Breeding". Within these books there are some 1067 small sections, usually less than a page, and sometimes just a key phrase—such as his opening comments in the 1st section of the preface: "Of what is great one must either be silent or speak with greatness. With greatness—that means cynically and with innocence."

Despite Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche's falsifications (highlighted in 1937 by Georges Bataille and proved in the



1960s by the complete edition of Nietzsche's posthumous fragments byazzino Montinari and Giorgio Colli), his notes, even in the form given by his sister, remain a key insight into the philosophy of Nietzsche, and his unfinished transvaluation of all values. An English edition of Montinari & Colli's work is forthcoming (it has existed for decades in Italian, German and French).

Übermensch

In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche posits the Übermensch (often translated as "overman" or "superman") as a goal that humanity can set for itself. While interpretations of Nietzsche's overman vary wildly, here are a few of his quotes from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*:

I teach you the Übermensch. Man is something that shall be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? [...] All beings so far have created something beyond themselves; and do you want to be the ebb of this great flood, and even go back to the beasts rather than overcome man? What is ape to man? A laughingstock or painful embarrassment. And man shall be that to Übermensch: a laughingstock or painful embarrassment. You have made your way from worm to man, and much in you is still worm. Once you were apes, and even now, too, man is more ape than any ape...The Übermensch is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the Übermensch shall be the meaning of the earth... Man is a rope, tied between beast and Übermensch—a rope over an abyss...what is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end...

Amor fati and the Eternal Recurrence

Nietzsche encountered the idea of the Eternal Recurrence in the works of Heinrich Heine, who speculated that one day a person would be born with the same thought-processes as himself, and that the same applied to every other individual. Nietzsche expanded on this thought to form his theory, which he put forth in *The Gay Science* and developed in *Thus Spoke*



Zarathustra. Schopenhauer directly influenced this theory. Schopenhauer postulated that a person who unconditionally affirms life would do so even if everything that has happened were to happen again repeatedly.

Nietzsche's view on eternal return is similar to that of Hume: "the idea that an eternal recurrence of blind, meaningless variation—chaotic, pointless shuffling of matter and law—would inevitably spew up worlds whose evolution through time would yield the apparently meaningful stories of our lives. This idea of eternal recurrence became a cornerstone of his nihilism, and thus part of the foundation of what became existentialism." Nietzsche was so impressed by this idea, that he at first thought he had discovered a new scientific proof of the greatest importance, referring to it as the "most scientific of hypotheses". He gradually backed-off of this view, and in later works referred to it as a thought-experiment. "Nietzsche viewed his argument for eternal recurrence as a proof of the absurdity or meaninglessness of life, a proof that no meaning was given to the universe from on high."

What if a demon were to creep after you one day or night, in your loneliest loneliness, and say: "This life which you live and have lived, must be lived again by you, and innumerable times more. And there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh—everything unspeakably small and great in your life—must come again to you, and in the same sequence and series—" Would you not throw your self down and curse the demon who spoke to you thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment, in which you would answer him: "Thou art a god, and never have I heard anything more divine!" [*The Gay Science* (1882)]

Alexander Nehamas wrote in *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* of three ways of seeing the eternal recurrence: "(A) My life will recur in exactly identical fashion." This expresses a



totally fatalistic approach to the idea. “(B) My life may recur in exactly identical fashion.” This second view conditionally asserts cosmology, but fails to capture what Nietzsche refers to in *The Gay Science*, 341. Finally, “(C) If my life were to recur, then it could recur only in identical fashion.” Nehamas shows that this interpretation exists totally independently of physics and does not presuppose the truth of cosmology. Nehamas draws the conclusion that if individuals constitute themselves through their actions, then they can only maintain themselves in their current state by living in a recurrence of past actions (Nehamas 153).

Nietzsche’s Place in Contemporary Ethical Theory

Nietzsche’s work addresses ethics from several perspectives: meta-ethics, normative ethics, and descriptive ethics.

In the field of meta-ethics, one can perhaps most accurately classify Nietzsche as a moral skeptic; meaning that he claims that all ethical statements are false, because any kind of correspondence between ethical statements and “moral facts” remains illusory. (This forms part of a more general claim that no universally true fact exists, roughly because none of them more than “appear” to correspond to reality). Instead, ethical statements (like all statements) remain mere “interpretations.” However, Nietzsche does not claim that all interpretations are equivalent, since some testify for “noble” character while others are the symptom of a “decadent” life form.

Sometimes Nietzsche may seem to have very definite opinions on what he regards as moral or as immoral. Note, however, that one can explain Nietzsche’s moral opinions without attributing to him the claim of their truth. For Nietzsche, after all, we needn’t disregard a statement merely because it expresses something false. On the contrary, he depicts falsehood as essential for “life”. Interestingly enough, he mentions a “dishonest lie”, (discussing Wagner in *The Case of*



Wagner) as opposed to an “honest” one, recommending further to consult Plato with regard to the latter, which should give some idea of the layers of paradox in his work.

In the juncture between normative ethics and descriptive ethics, Nietzsche distinguishes between “master morality” and “slave morality”. Although he recognizes that not everyone holds either scheme in a clearly delineated fashion without some syncretism, he presents them in contrast to one another.

Nietzsche elaborated these ideas in his book *On the Genealogy of Morality*, in which he also introduced the key concept of resentment as the basis for the slave morality. Nietzsche’s primarily negative assessment of the ethical and moralistic teachings of the world’s monotheistic religions followed from his earlier considerations of the questions of God and morality in the works *The Gay Science* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. These considerations led Nietzsche to the idea of eternal recurrence. Nietzsche primarily meant that, for all practical purposes, his contemporaries lived as if God were dead, though they had not yet recognized it. Nietzsche believed this “death” had already started to undermine the foundations of morality and would lead to moral relativism and moral nihilism. As a response to the dangers of these trends he believed in re-evaluating the foundations of morality to better understand the origins and motives underlying them, so that individuals might decide for themselves whether to regard a moral value as born of an outdated or misguided cultural imposition or as something they wish to hold true.

Social and Political Views

While a political tone may be discerned in Nietzsche’s writings, his work does not in any sense propose or outline a “political project.” The man who stated that “The will to a system is a lack of integrity” was consistent in never devising





or advocating a specific system of governance, enquiry, or ethics—just as, being an advocate of individual struggle and self-realization, he never concerned himself with mass movements or with the organization of groups and political parties—although there are parts of his works where he considers an enigmatic “greater politics”, and others where he thinks the problem of community.

In this sense, some have read Nietzsche as an anti-political thinker. Walter Kaufmann put forward the view that the powerful individualism expressed in his writings would be disastrous if introduced to the public realm of politics. Georges Bataille argued in 1937, in the *Acéphale* review, that Nietzsche’s thoughts were too free to be instrumentalized by any political movement. In “Nietzsche and Fascists,” he argued against such instrumentalization, by the left or the right, declaring that Nietzsche’s aim was to by-pass the short time span of modern politics, and its inherent lies and simplifications, for a greater historical times pan.

Later writers, led by the French intellectual Left, have proposed ways of using Nietzschean theory in what has become known as the “politics of difference”—particularly in formulating theories of political resistance and sexual and moral difference. Owing largely to the writings of Kaufmann and others, the spectre of Nazism has now been almost entirely exorcised from his writings.

Nietzsche and Individualism

Nietzsche often referred to the common people who participated in mass movements and shared a common mass psychology as “the rabble”, or “the herd.” He allegedly valued individualism above all else, although this has been considered by many philosophers to be an oversimplification, as Nietzsche criticized the concept of the subject and of atomism (that

is, the existence of an atomic subject at the foundation of everything, found for example in social contract theories). He considered the individual subject as a complex of instincts and wills-to-power, just as any other organization. Although some have attempted to link his philosophy with Max Stirner's radical individualism, it is first of all unlikely that Nietzsche read *The Ego and Its Own* (1844), and secondly it appears that Nietzsche's ignorance of Stirner led him to incorrectly relate Stirner to Schopenhauer, to whom Nietzsche directly opposed himself. In any case, few philosophers really consider Nietzsche an "individualist" thinker. He is best characterized as a thinker of "hierarchy", although the precise nature of this hierarchy does not cover the current social order (the "establishment") and is related to his thought of the *Will to Power*. Against the strictly "egoist" perspective adopted by Stirner, Nietzsche concerned himself with the "problem of the civilization" and the necessity to give humanity a goal and a direction to its history, making him, in this sense, a very political thinker.

Furthermore, in the context of his criticism of morality and Christianity, expressed, among others works, in *On the Genealogy of Morals* and in *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche often criticized humanitarian feelings, detesting how pity and altruism were ways for the "weak" to take power over the "strong." However, he qualified his critique of Christianity as a "particular case" of his criticisms of free will. Along with the rejection of teleology, this critique of free will is one of the common points he shared with Spinoza, whom he qualified as a "precursor". To the "ethics of compassion" (Mitleid, "shared suffering") exposed by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche opposed an "ethics of friendship" or of "shared joy" (Mitfreude).

While he had a dislike of the state in general, which he called a "cold monster" in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche also



