

Economic Transition, Benefit Conflicts and Local Protectionism:
A Theoretical Explanation and Empirical Study of the Political Economy

经济转型、利益冲突与 地方保护主义

——基于政治经济学视角的理论解释与实证研究

保建云 徐梅 / 著



经济科学出版社
Economic Science Press

Economic Transition, Benefit Conflicts and Local Protectionism:
A Theoretical Explanation and Empirical Study of the Political Economy

经济转型、利益冲突与 地方保护主义

——基于政治经济学视角的理论解释与实证研究

保建云 徐梅 / 著



经济科学出版社
Economic Science Press

图书在版编目 (CIP) 数据

经济转型、利益冲突与地方保护主义：基于政治经济学视角的理论解释与实证研究 / 保建云，徐梅著. —北京：经济科学出版社，2010. 5

ISBN 978 - 7 - 5058 - 9189 - 0

I. 经… II. ①保…②徐… III. 地区经济 - 经济利益 - 研究 - 中国 IV. F127

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字 (2010) 第 049325 号

责任编辑：周秀霞

责任校对：徐领柱

版式设计：代小卫

技术编辑：邱 天

经济转型、利益冲突与地方保护主义

——基于政治经济学视角的理论解释与实证研究

保建云 徐 梅 著

经济科学出版社出版、发行 新华书店经销

社址：北京市海淀区阜成路甲 28 号 邮编：100142

总编部电话：88191217 发行部电话：88191540

网址：www. esp. com. cn

电子邮件：esp@ esp. com. cn

北京汉德鼎印刷厂印刷

德利装订厂装订

787 × 1092 16 开 15. 75 印张 300000 字

2010 年 5 月第 1 版 2010 年 5 月第 1 次印刷

ISBN 978 - 7 - 5058 - 9189 - 0 定价：31. 00 元

(图书出现印装问题，本社负责调换)

(版权所有 翻印必究)

作者简介

保建云，男，汉族，1970年出生于云南省陆良县。经济学博士（2001）、理论经济学博士后（2003），比利时安特卫普大学经济学系 Erasmus Mundus 访问学者。现为中国人民大学国际关系学院经济学副教授，国际政治系副主任，国际政治经济学研究中心主任，中国国际经济关系学会理事，世界经济专业与国际政治经济学专业硕士导师。2001年毕业于四川大学经济学院政治经济学专业，获经济学博士学位，同年进入南京大学商学院经济学系理论经济学博士后流动站从事研究工作。2003年进入中国人民大学国际关系学院从事国际经济学、西方经济学和国际政治经济学的教学科研工作。2006年10月至2007年1月在比利时安特卫普大学经济学系做“国际经济学与区域经济一体化”项目的访问学者。曾获四川大学优秀博士生宝钢教育奖（1999）、四川大学优秀博士生一等奖（2000）、南京大学优秀博士后奖（2002）、中国人民大学国际关系学院科研成果院长奖（2006~2007学年），被评为中国人民大学先进工作者（2008年度）。承担国家自然科学基金应急项目、国家社科基金青年项目、教育部应急项目、中国人民大学明德青年学者培育计划项目、亚洲基金项目与“985”自由探索项目等多项课题。已出版学术著作6部，公开发表中英文学术论文90余篇。多家学术刊物的匿名审稿人。

徐梅，女，汉族，1970年出生于云南省曲靖市。经济学博士。现为外交学院国际经济学院经济学副教授，综合经济教研室主任，世界经济专业硕士导师。2002年12月毕业于四川大学经济学院政治经济学专业，获经济学博士学位，2000年6月毕业于云南民族大学经济学院国民经济学专业，获经济学硕士学位，1991年6月毕业于中山大学地理系自然地理专业，获理学学士学位。2003年9月进入外交学院国际经济系从事西方经济学、制度经济学、公共投资与会展经济的教学科研工作。曾获云南民族大学硕士研究生挪威国王哈拉尔孔五世奖学金（1999）、四川大学优秀博士生奖（2001），获得“首都教育先锋”称号（2009）、外交学院优秀教学成果奖（2008）。主持国家社会科学基金青年项目“我国新农村建设中的地方公共投资空间布局优化研究”（项目批准号：06CJY025），作为主研人员参与国家级与省部级课题研究多项。已出版学术著作2部。在《中国软科学》、《经济评论》、《社会科学研究》等学术刊物发表学术论文十余篇。

内 容 摘 要

本书以中国社会经济转型为背景，在我国华北、西北、东北、华东、华南、中南、西南地区选择地方利益冲突、地方保护主义与区域市场分割较为突出的若干地区作为样本地区，在利用历史统计资料、通过问卷调查和小型会议访谈方法获得样本地区相关数据、经验、案例的基础上，构建理论分析与计量经济学模型，重点研究中国经济转型期地方利益冲突的内在激励机制与外部约束条件、地方保护主义与区域市场分割导致的市场失灵与经济效益损失、政府统筹区域发展三个方面的问题。本研究的最终目的是研究政府特别是中央政府控制地方利益冲突的制度与机制设计、统筹区域发展战略与政策制定与实施问题，针对中国经济转型特点和发展阶段，提出预防和控制地方利益冲突、统筹区域经济发展的若干对策建议。

第一，本书在对经济转型、地方利益均衡与地方利益冲突、政府统筹区域发展等基本概念进行理论解释的基础上，对相关研究文献进行综述。地方利益是以地方政府官员、地方企业与本地居民为主体形成的共生型集团利益，涉及地区产业发展、区域市场进入与竞争、公共资源与投资分配等多个方面；地方利益冲突与地方保护主义是地方利益主体围绕产业、市场、公共资源与投资利益竞争的结果，政绩显示与政治晋升作为地方政府官员行为的基本目标，受其他地方政府官员行为的影响；中央政府必须承担起协调地方利益冲突与统筹区域发展的职责。中国渐进式经济转型的复杂性与特殊性，使得西方主流经济理论不可能对中国经济转型过程中出现的许多经济现象和经济问题都能够做出科学合理的解释，其解释力受到限制。传统的计划经济理论也不可能解释中国经济转型过程中出现的许多经济现象和问题。中国改革市场目标与非市场目标选择的多样性与动态性、经济制度变迁的特殊性和不确定性、西方主流经济理论的有限性和传统计划理论存在的固有缺陷，使得现有的经济学理论难以对中国改革进程中产生的经济现象、经济问题和经济制度变迁特征进行更科学合理的解释，需要进一步改进和完善。转型经济学研究必须在吸收既有经济学理论研究成果的基础上，突破现有西方主流经济理论和传统计划经济理论的约束，进行创新性扩展和重构。任何简单化、复杂化、神秘化和教条化既有经济理论的观点、态度和方法，都不利于推动转型经济社会的经济学研究。中国改革进程中的经济制度变迁是在政府主导下进行的，其成功的经济发展模式对其他发展中国家与转型国家具有借鉴意义，但失误和存在的问题则需要认真面对。

第二,本书针对转型期中国地方利益分化与地方利益冲突的形成与演变特点,分析地方利益冲突、地方保护主义与政府政策选择问题,探讨转型期中国地区之间社会经济利益分化与地方利益形成的制度背景。改革目标选择与改革权合理化分配目标没有最终实现是导致分配矛盾和利益冲突的根本原因;改革目标选择涉及市场目标与非市场目标的权衡取舍,既是一个自然过程又是一个集体行动和公共选择过程;中国转型期的经济制度变迁具有一般性特点的同时更具有特殊性和中国特色。同时针对中国转型期存在的地方利益分化与地方利益分配矛盾,分析地方利益形成的内在激励机制、地方利益冲突的表现形式及其治理机制构建。经济转型期以资源配置权的调整与重组为主要内容的制度变迁推动着我国地区之间的社会经济利益的分化与调整,可能导致地方保护主义、区域市场分割与垄断,还有可能形成各种地方型社会经济与政治利益集团并受到国际政治经济利益集团的影响。地方政府与中央政府在财政收支与支出方面的变化,反映了中央政府与地方政府之间以财政收支相关领域的资源配置权调整与重组,直接影响到财富在中央政府与地方政府、不同地方政府之间的分配,是地方之间社会经济利益分化的重要制度动因。地方国内生产总值与人均国内生产总值的增长速度与增长幅度差异则是地方之间整体经济利益分化的结果与表现。必须充分发挥现有政治与经济制度的优越性,化解地方社会经济利益分化和地方社会经济利益形成对我国长远发展带来的消极影响,同时发挥其对我国社会主义市场经济体制构建与完善的促进功能。

第三,本书对地方之间的发展竞争、利益冲突的内在激励机制与外部约束条件进行了较为全面而系统的分析。本研究发现,虽然已有文献关注中国经济转型过程中地区之间发展竞争与地方利益冲突的内在机制与外部约束条件,但从理论与实证角度对此进行较为系统分析的研究文献仍然不多。促进本地区特别是本地区的地方政府参与地区之间发展竞争的原因主要涉及五个方面:一是谋求本地区财政收支与财政转移支付的最大化;二是地方政府官员政治晋升竞争需要;三是地方政治家力求获得本地民众的最大化政治支持;四是为本地区企业利益集团谋求最大化的市场份额与利润;五是促进本地区经济增长,为本地区民众创造更多的就业机会并增加本地区民众的社会福利。地区之间的发展竞争是在一定社会经济条件下发生的,受到多种因素的影响和制约,使得地方政府参与的地区之间的发展竞争特别是财税竞争、增长竞争、产业发展竞争、市场进入竞争与优惠政策竞争会被限制在一定的地域空间、一定的经济发展阶段、一定的产业领域与市场范围之内。地方政府介入地区之间的发展竞争的程度和方式,同时受到激励机制与约束条件影响,是二者共同作用的结果。由谋求自身效用最大化的地方政府参与的地区之间的发展竞争,同时受到内部激励机制与外部约束条件的影响,二者对地区发展竞争的影响处于相对稳定时存在着均衡状态。本研究还发现,地方利益冲突是地方之间发展竞争的极端化表现形式,具有特定的内在激励机制,是地方之间发展竞争激励机制受到内部与外

界冲击与特殊调整条件下的产物。地方利益冲突可以转化为推动地区之间分工合作与发展竞争的动力,导致地区之间发展竞争新激励机制的构建与演化,也可能导致新的地方利益冲突的产生,具有跨时期、跨地域空间、跨经济活动领域(跨产业、跨市场)、跨地区、跨国界、跨利益主体传播与扩散的特点。在经济转型过程中出现的地方利益冲突是地方利益分化、地方之间发展竞争激化的产物,在经济转型与发展的某些阶段、某些利益冲突、某些地区之间的矛盾还可能进一步激化,但仍然受到本地区自身的利益诉求、相关地区的利益诉求、中央政府的利益诉求与外国相关利益主体利益诉求的影响与制约,同时还受到地区之间的产业联系与市场联系的影响与制约,使得地方利益冲突不可能在各地区、产业与利益主体之间无限制传递与扩张。地方利益冲突作为地方发展竞争的特殊表现形式,存在内在激励机制与外部约束条件,使得地方利益冲突不可能在我国这样的经济转型国家完全消除,也不可能无限传播与扩张。地方利益冲突发生的地域空间范围、产业与市场领域、时间、程度与规模、介入的利益主体的类型与数量等都由内在激励机制与外部约束条件共同决定。地方利益冲突存在着内在激励机制与外部约束条件,但在不同社会经济条件下可以不同的形式表现出来。

第四,本书还以中国社会经济转型为背景,分析地方政府职能转变、行政权力与地方保护主义演变问题,同时构建委托代理模型分析转型社会中权力寻租与权钱交易问题。地方政府职能转变与地区经济发展模式选择之间存在着密切的互动影响效应,地方政府职能转变是在一定的市场机制下进行的并受到市场化条件约束。地方政府职能转变中的地区社会经济利益导向必然产生多样化的地区经济发展模式,地方政府之间的政绩竞争会导致地区经济发展模式选择中的模仿学习效应与互动竞争效应。权钱交易不仅激励权力出租者的扩权和护权行为,使掌权者围绕公共权力配置与权力租金分配形成官僚同盟与竞争型官僚集团,会导致社会公众的逃避权力控制和反抗权力行为与现象的发生;分权、充分信息与竞争性官僚市场构建是治理权钱交易与官员腐败的关键。免费的权力使用会导致权力扩张和与垄断、权力租金与商业寻租行为产生;权力成本与权力租金变化会导致社会权力结构与资源配置结构的调整;当边际权力租金等于非权力产品边际利润时,权力出租者与寻权者的权钱交易达到均衡;生产技术、权钱交易查处技术进步与商业寻租惩罚制度完善会改变权力出租者与寻权者行为均衡实现的条件。本研究在分析公共权力来源与权力租金形成条件的基础上,构建公共权力分配与权力租金规模理论模型,从理论和实证角度分析政府官员权力租金来源及其控制机制设计问题。转型社会政府官员权力租金来源于权力稀缺性与权力的排他性使用,公共权力的免费使用与高成本运行会导致腐败和非生产性寻利活动(DUP)的产生;政府官员权力租金来源于使用权力的“生产者剩余”,与公共权力使用成本的过快增长紧密相关;提高社会非权力产品生产的平均报酬率、增加替代性官员比例能够弱化政府官员追求权力租金的激

励。地方政府职能转变、地方利益冲突是导致地方保护主义演变的重要因素。

第五,本书以中国经济转型为研究背景,在文献回顾的基础上,以长江三角洲与珠江三角洲之间的市场一体化为例,分析区域间市场一体化发展面临的制约因素与政策选择问题,研究地方利益冲突导致的市场失灵与经济效益损失。现有研究地区专业化的文献更多地关注地区专业化的测算、发展与演变规律,研究区域分工合作与区域一体化文献则更多关注地方保护主义、地区贸易限制对产品与生产要素跨区域流动的影响效应,主要以发达经济体特别是欧盟国家与美国的地区专业化与区域发展问题为研究对象,研究广大发展中国家中的地区专业化、区域分工合作与区域一体化发展问题的文献相对较少。地方利益冲突阻碍产品与生产要素的跨区域流动,不仅限制了跨地区市场交易增长与市场规模的扩大,还增加了地区之间的市场交易成本,甚至破坏地方政府之间、企业之间与民众之间的信任关系,最终影响地区专业化水平的提高。地方利益冲突对区域分工合作的影响效应主要通过参与区域分工合作的微观主体行为方式的改变表现出来。地方利益冲突不仅会损害利益冲突地区的政治家与公务员之间的相互信任关系,还会损害地方企业与民众之间的相互信任关系,损害地方政治家与地方公务员的切身利益,而地方企业利益与地方民众的福利也可能受到损害,从而限制了以地方政府、企业和民众为代表的微观利益主体参与跨地区经济活动的积极性,形成地区之间分工合作的微观反向激励机制,对区域分工合作产生阻碍。地方利益冲突对区域一体化发展的影响,主要反映在对区域一体化的产品市场体系构建与发展、区域一体化的生产要素市场体系构建与发展、区域一体化的产业结构体系形成与发展、企业横向一体化与垂直一体化发展的阻碍方面。地方利益冲突还可能导致阻碍区域一体化发展的地方性社会、政治与经济利益集团的出现。地理区位条件、市场化基础与对外开放程度、人力资源配置与企业家精神培育、经济发展水平、中央政府政策支持和非公有制经济发展为发达区域之间的市场一体化创造了条件;发达地区之间在产业与区域发展模式选择、经济腹地划分等方面存在着矛盾;应创造良好的制度与政策环境,促进发达地区间的分工合作和市场一体化发展。

第六,本研究针对转型期中国地方利益分化与地方利益冲突的形成与演变特点,从微观角度构建地方利益均衡模型,分析中国构建和谐社会中的地方利益均衡与协调问题。作为微观利益主体与利益群体的各种利益在特定时期、特定地区的综合表现的地方利益,其实现需要一定的均衡条件。地区经济发展是地方利益实现的根本途径,地方利益均衡是区域经济协调发展的前提。地方利益均衡涉及两个方面:一是地方内部各微观利益主体的利益均衡;二是地方社会经济发展中的整体利益均衡。地方利益协调也涉及两个方面:一是地方内部不同微观利益主体、地方利益集团之间的协调;二是不同地方之间整体利益的协调。构建有中国特色的地方利益均衡与协调机制是中国构建和谐社会的重要内容。本研究以中国经济转型为研究

背景，以长江三角洲和珠江三角洲为例，分析发达地区之间的发展竞争特点、市场一体化条件与发展模式选择问题，认为发达地区之间的发展竞争在产业竞争力培育、市场进入、生产要素区域聚集与配置、创新能力培育等四个方面表现最为明显；区域发展政策的相互协调配合、产业与产业集群的跨地区分工合作、公共投资跨地区优化配置是推进发达地区市场一体化的关键；市场一体化的最终目的是形成一体化的市场体系、产业体系、对外开放体系和制度安排与政策体系；产业一体化是发达地区间市场一体化的基础，能否消除地方保护与区域市场分割是主要的衡量标准。

第七，本书以中国社会经济转型过程中的区域经济发展和和谐社会构建为背景，对政府统筹区域发展战略与政策进行研究。市场化程度直接影响到政府职能转变的范围、方式与效果；政府职能转变以国有企业改革为突破口、机构改革是关键、以公共政策制定和实施为目标和特色；政府职能转变直接影响到区域发展格局的形成与调整；必须把政府职能转变特别是地方政府职能转变作为推动区域发展的重要环节。政府统筹区域发展政策是实施统筹区域发展战略的各种政策手段的总和，政府统筹区域发展政策目标是实现统筹区域发展战略目标过程中的阶段性、中介性和中间目标。政府统筹区域发展政策的主要目标是实现地区经济可持续发展与地区之间经济发展的相互协调。中央政府统筹发达地区、次发达地区与欠发达地区经济发展的主要目的是控制地区发展差距的不合理扩大，支持欠发达地区的经济发展，为发达地区支持欠发达地区经济发展创造制度条件与激励机制，维持不同发展程度的地区之间的分工合作关系，防止发达地区与欠发达地区之间可能产生的各种利益冲突、地方保护主义、地区市场封锁与垄断。统筹不同发展程度的地区之间的经济发展，关键在于如何协调好东部地区、中部地区、西部地区与东北地区的经济发展与区际利益关系。中央政府统筹发展程度相同地区或者经济区域之间的经济发展，主要是对东部沿海地区、中部内陆地区、西部偏远与民族地区、东北老工业地区内部发展程度相同的省级行政区的经济发展进行统筹安排，促进这些地区经济的一体化发展。对于东部沿海地区而言，中央地方必须协调好珠江三角洲地区、长江三角洲地区、环渤海地区三大经济区域之间的经济发展，同时协调好海峡西岸经济区、海南经济特区、上海浦东新区、天津滨海新区之间的发展关系。对于中部内陆地区而言，必须协调好各个中心城市、核心增长区之间的经济发展关系，特别是武汉及周边经济区、长株潭经济区、郑开洛经济区之间的关系。对于西部地区而言，必须协调好各个次级经济区之间的关系，特别是南贵昆经济区、成渝经济区、北部湾经济区、陇西兰新经济区之间的经济发展关系。对于东北地区而言，主要是统筹好东北三省各个地区之间在东北老工业基地振兴过程中的相互协调与配合。统筹特殊类型区域经济发展与统筹解决典型性区域经济发展问题是各级政府特别是中央政府的重要职责。在中国社会经济转型过程中，少数民族贫困地区与自然灾害地区的

社会经济发展直接影响到整个国家社会经济的长远发展、和谐社会构建与科学发展观的落实,需要各级政府的统筹安排。典型区域经济发展问题的解决涉及各方面、各层次、各环节的利益关系,需要政府从发展环境、政策措施与利益分配等方面进行综合统筹。

总之,本书主要利用实证调查与理论分析相结合的方法,从经济转型期中国地区之间社会经济利益分化和地方利益形成与演化的制度背景、地区之间发展竞争和利益冲突的内在激励机制与外部约束条件、地方利益冲突和地方保护主义及区域市场分割、地方利益冲突对地区专业化和区域分工合作及区域一体化的影响效应、地方利益冲突导致的市场失灵和经济效率损失测算及控制机制设计、政府统筹区域发展战略与政策选择等方面,对中国经济转型期地方利益冲突与政府统筹区域问题进行了较为系统的实证与理论研究。

ABSTRACT

This book, set in the background of social and economic transition of China, covers a sample of several regions that is characteristic of local benefit conflicts, local protectionism and local market segmentation. On the basis of data, experiences and cases from sample regions, this research, having constructed theoretical analysis and econometrical models, mainly focuses on three aspects: inner incentive mechanisms and external constraint conditions of local benefit conflicts, market failure and economic efficiency loss resulted from local protectionism and regional market segmentation as well as government overall coordination of regional development, with the utilization of the historical statistics, questionnaires and mini-conference interview methods. The objective is to study the institution and mechanism design to control local benefit conflicts as well as the strategy, policy-making and implementation of overall coordination of regional development of government, especially central government. Furthermore, it makes several proposals on the prevention and control of local benefit conflicts and overall coordination of regional economic development in the light of the transition characteristics and economy development period of China.

Firstly, this book undertakes literature review on the basis of a theoretical explanation of basic concepts including economic transition, local benefit equilibrium, local benefit conflicts and government overall coordination of regional development. It argues that local benefits, which involves regional industrial development, entry and competition of regional market, public resources, investment allocation and etc., is symbiotic group benefit with a main body of local government officials, local enterprises and local residents, that local benefit conflicts and regional protectionism are the result of competition among local benefit parties in industries, market, public resources and investment benefits, that performance demonstration and political promotion, as the basic goal of local government officials, is influenced by other local government officials' behaviors, that central government have to afford the responsibility of coordinating local benefit conflicts and regional development. This research, at the same time, discovers the complexity and uniqueness of progressive economic transition in China, so that western mainstream economic theories

could not make scientific explanations to various economic phenomena and problems, i. e. , its explanation power is restricted. Traditional plan economic theory could not explain either. The diversity and dynamism of Chinese reform market goals and non-market goals, the uniqueness and uncertainty of economic institution transition, limitedness of western mainstream economic theory and innate defect of traditional plan economic theory, combines to make current economic theory unfit for a more scientific and proper explanation of economic phenomena, economic problems and economic institution transition during reform process in China; thus it has to be upgraded and improved. Transitional Economics research has to innovatively expand and reconstruct on the basis of absorbing current achievements of economic theory and surpassing the constraint of current western mainstream and traditional plan economic theories. Any simplified, complicated, mystified or dogmatic perspectives, attitudes and methods based on the existing economic theories are detrimental to economics research promoting transitional economic society. The economic institution transition during China reform process is lead by the government; China's fruitful economic development pattern has its reference for other developing countries and transition countries, but its defaults and existing problems has to be noted seriously, too.

Secondly, in light of formation and transition characteristics of local benefits differentiation and local benefit conflicts during transition in China, this research analyzes problems of local benefit conflicts, local protectionism and government policy choice, and discusses institutional background of inter-region social and economic benefit differentiation and local benefit formation during transition in China. This study claims that the reform goal choosing plus the failure of proper reform rights allocation are the root causes of distribution discrepancy and benefit conflicts, that reform goal choosing, a natural process as well as a group action and public choice, concerns a trade-off between market and non-market goals, that the economic institution transition during transition in China has something in common with others but meanwhile has its own features and Chinese characteristics. It also analyzes the inner incentive mechanisms of local benefit formation, the manifestation of local benefit conflicts and its governance mechanism construction. The institutional transition in China, mainly involving adjustment of resources allocation rights and restructuring, promotes the polarization and readjustments of inter-regional social and economic benefits, and may result in local protectionism, regional market segmentation and monopoly as well as the formation of different kinds of local social, economic and political benefit groups influenced by international political and economic benefit groups. The change in fiscal revenue and expenditure of local governments and central government reflects the wealth resources allocation rights readjustment and restructuring in fiscal revenue

and expenditure related fields between central government and local governments and among different local governments, which is in fact an important institutional motive of inter-regional social and economic benefit differentiation. The discrepancy in growth rate and magnitude of local GDP and GDP per capita is the result and manifestation of inter-regional overall economic benefit differentiation. It is essential to take full advantage of existing political and economic institution, reduce the negative impact of local social and economic benefit formation and polarization to the country's long-term development, and fully utilize its function to the construction and completion of socialist market economic institution in China.

Thirdly, this book makes a comprehensive and systematic analysis of inner incentive mechanisms and outer constraint conditions of inter-regional development competition and benefit conflicts. It finds that, although preceding works paid attention to inner incentive and outer constraint of inter-regional development competition and benefit conflicts, systematic analysis research from both theoretical and empirical perspectives is still insufficient. Reasons for promoting the participation into the inter-region development competition of local region, especially local government, mainly involve five aspects: (1) to seek maximization of local fiscal revenue and expenditure as well as fiscal transfer payment; (2) the need of local government officials' political promotion; (3) local politicians seeking optimal political support from local population; (4) to seek maximized market share and profits for local enterprise benefit groups; (5) to increase local economic growth, creating more employment opportunities for the public and improving local residents' social welfare. Inter-regional development competition happens under certain social and economic conditions and influenced and restricted by various elements, so that competition participated by local governments, especially fiscally and in growth, industry development, market entry and preferential policy aspects, is limited to certain regional space, certain economic development period, certain industries and markets. The extent and ways of intervention into inter-regional development contest by local governments are influenced by and a combination of incentive mechanisms and constraint conditions. The government seeking optimal utility participates in inter-regional development competition, and meanwhile is influenced by inner incentive mechanisms and outer constraint conditions; the two aspects lead to equilibrium when they are relatively stable. This book also discovers that, local benefit conflict is the extreme manifestation of inter-regional development competition, having particular inner incentive mechanisms, and is the result of inter-regional development competition incentive mechanisms under the impact of inner and outer shocks and special readjustment conditions. Local benefit conflicts can change into motives of en-

couraging inter-regional labor division and cooperation and development competition, leading to the construction and evolution of new incentive mechanisms of inter-regional development competition, but also may result in new local benefit conflicts, possessing the characteristics of dissemination and spreading on the basis of inter-period, inter-regional space, inter-field economic activities (inter-industry and inter-market), inter-district, international, and inter-benefit subjects. The local benefit conflicts during economic transition are the outcome of local benefit differentiation and inter-regional development competition intensification; in some periods of economic transition and development, some benefit conflicts and some inter-regional contradiction can be further fueled, but still influenced and limited by benefit appeal locally, of related areas, central government and foreign relevant benefit subjects, so that it is impossible that local benefit conflicts unrestrictedly disseminate and spread. As a special manifestation of local development competition, local benefit conflict has its own inner incentive mechanisms and outer constraint conditions so that it could not be eliminated completely in such a transitional country as China, neither could it disseminate and spread unlimitedly. Its inner incentive mechanisms and outer constraint conditions determine the regional spatial sphere, industry and market fields, time, extent, scale, type and quantity of intervention benefit subjects and etc. And the incentives and constraints can be expressed differently under various social and economic context.

Fourthly, based on the definition and explanation of related concepts, in the background of social and economic transition in China, this research has constructed agent-client model to analyze power leasing and money-power trading in transitional society. Money-power trading not only encourages lessor to expand and guard power but also prompts those in power to form bureaucrat allies and competitive bureaucrat groups, with a consequence of public evasion and defiance of power control; separation of powers, sufficient information and competitive bureaucrat market construction are core to control money-power trading and government official corruption. Free power use would lead to power expansion and monopoly, power rent as well as commercial leasing behaviors; power cost and rent change would result in readjustment of social power structure and resources allocation structure; when marginal power rent equals non-power products marginal profit, money-power trade between power lessor and people pursuing leasing reaches equilibrium; progress in production technologies and money-power trade investigation and punishment technologies, combined with completion of commercial leasing punishment rules would make changes in the equilibrium conditions. This book, analyzing formation conditions of public rights resources and power rent, constructs theoretical models of public rights allocation

and power rent scale, and further makes a research on government official power leasing resources and its mechanism design, both theoretically and empirically. Government official power rent in transition society is due to power scarcity and exclusive use of power, while free use of public rights and its high cost would result in corruption and directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP); government official power rent is from producer surplus of using power, which is closely related to fast increase of public rights cost; To increase average return rate of social non-power products and to raise substitutive rate of government officials would weaken the incentives of power rent seeking.

Fifthly, this book, set in the background of economic transition of China, with an literature review, taking an example of market integration of Yangzi Delta and Zhujiang Delta, analyzes constraint elements and policy choice during inter-regional market integration as well as market failure and economic efficiency loss as a result of local benefit conflicts. It discovers that, previous research have paid more attention to the measurement and calculation, development and evolution pattern of regional specialization, that literature about regional specialization and cooperation as well as regional integration focuses mainly on local protectionism and influence of regional trade restriction upon inter-regional flow of products and production factors, mostly with an study object of local specialization and regional development issues in developed economies, especially European Union countries and United States. Meanwhile it is much insufficient for research on regional specialization, regional labour division and cooperation and regional integration issues in developing countries.

Local benefit conflicts hamper the inter-regional flow of products and production factors, which confine growth of inter-regional market trade and expansion of market scale, increase inter-regional market transaction cost and even sabotage trust between local governments and among enterprises and the mass, likely exerting an influence on upgrading of regional specialization. The effect on regional labour division and cooperation of local benefit conflicts is mainly expressed by behaviors participating regional labor division and cooperation. Local benefit conflicts are not only harm for trust relationships of politicians and civil servants in related areas as well as that relationship between local enterprises and the mass, but also detrimental to the government officials' vital benefits and welfare of local enterprises and population, which actually restrains enthusiasm of micro-benefit subjects represented by local government, enterprises and the mass participating inter-regional economic activities, fosters micro-counter incentive mechanisms of inter-regional labor division and cooperation and hinders inter-regional labor division and cooperation. On the other hand, its effect upon regional integration is mainly reflected by the establishment

and development of integrated product market system, production factor market system, industry structure system and enterprises' horizontal and vertical expansion. As a consequence of the conflicts, local social, political and economic benefit groups that obstruct regional integration may emerge. Geographic location conditions, marketization base, open-up depth, human resources allocation, enterpriser spirit cultivation, economic development level, central government's policy back-up and non-public sectors of the economy commonly provide conditions for market unification; conflicts exist among developed regions in choice of industry and regional development patterns, economic hinterland division and so on; Proper institution and policy environment should be created to prompt labor division and cooperation as well as market integration among developed regions.

Sixthly, in light of local benefit differentiation and local benefit conflicts formation and evolution characteristics, this book constructs local benefit equilibrium model from micro-view, and also analyzes local benefit equilibrium and coordination issues during establishing harmonious society process in China. Local benefit, as a comprehensive manifestation of all kinds of benefit of micro-subjects and groups in certain periods and areas, needs certain equilibrium conditions for realization. Regional economic development is the fundamental way to realize local benefit; local benefit equilibrium is a pre-condition of regional economic coordinated development. Local benefit equilibrium involves two aspects: one is benefit equilibrium of inner region micro-benefit subjects, and the other is general benefit equilibrium in local social economic development. Likely, local benefit coordination also concerns two aspects: one is coordination of different kinds of micro-subjects and local benefit groups in the region, and the other is general benefit coordination of various areas. The construction of local benefit equilibrium and coordination institution with Chinese characteristics is essential to the building of harmonious society in China. This book, in the context of Chinese economic transition, taking an example of Yangzi Delta and Zhujiang Delta, discusses development competition characteristics in developed regions, conditions for market integration and choice of development patterns. It argues that competition among developed regions lies mostly in cultivation of industry competitiveness, market entry, production factors gathering and allocation and fostering of creativity, four aspects in all; coordination and cooperation of regional development policies, inter-regional labour division and cooperation of industry and its clusters, optimized inter-regional allocation of public investment are key to fostering market integration of developed areas; the ultimate goal of market integration is the formation of integrated market system, industry system, open-up system, institution arrangement and policy system; industry integration is fundamental to market integration of developed areas, and whether local protection and

regional market separation can be eliminated is the main standard.

Seventhly, set in the background of regional economic development and harmonious society construction during social and economic transition in China, this book analyzes strategies and policies by which government coordinates regional development. Marketization depth has a direct influence on the scale, way and effect of government function change; government function transition makes breakthrough in state-owned enterprise reform, and its core lies in institution reform while it features in public policies' making and implementation; government function change directly influences formation and readjustment of regional development layout; it is imperative that government function change, especially locally, be an essential segment to promote regional development. Government policy is the sum of all kinds of strategies and methods to coordinate regional development, and the goal of government coordination policy is the staged, intermediary and intermediate goal in coordination strategy. The main goal of government coordinating regional development policies is to realize the consistency between regional economic sustained development and inter-regional economic development. The main objective of central government's economic development coordination of developed regions, sub-developed regions and under-developed regions is to control the unreasonable expansion of regional development differentiation, to enhance economic development of the underdeveloped, to provide institutional conditions and incentive mechanisms for developed districts supporting the under-developed in economic development, to maintain labour division and cooperation among areas of different development extent, and to prevent all kinds of benefit conflicts, local protectionism, regional market blockade and monopoly between developed and under-developed regions. To coordinate regions of different development extent in economy, the core is how to arrange economic development of eastern area, central area, western area and north-eastern area as well as the inter-regional benefit relationships. Central government's overall coordination of regions, or economic areas, of similar development depth is mainly to arrange economic development of municipalities of similar development extent, in eastern coastal area, central inland area, western remote and ethnic areas and northeastern old industrial base, and to prompt economic integration of these areas. For eastern coastal districts, central government has to coordinate economic development of Zhujiang Delta, Yangzi Delta and Bohai Ocean ring area, and at the same time to arrange development relationships of strait west coast economic zone, Hainan economic zone, Shanghai Pudong new district and Tianjin Binhai new district. While for central inland area, economic development relationships of various cities and core growth districts must be manipulated carefully, especially the relationship of Wuhan and neighbouring economic zones, Chang-