

# 文化研究选读

*Cultural Studies:  
A Selected Reader*

王逢振 王晓路 张中载 编

外语教学与研究出版社

FOREIGN LANGUAGE TEACHING AND RESEARCH PRESS

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## 前言

《文化研究选读》是外研社出版的西方文论研究生教学用书的第3部，“西方文论系列”中的第5部。该系列中的《西方古典文论选读》和《二十世纪西方文论选读》问世后不久，就相继于2002、2003年被教育部遴选为全国“研究生教学用书”，进入许多大学的课堂。

在《二十世纪西方文论选读》的最后一章（第十三章）“文化研究”中，我们只选用了雷蒙·威廉斯（Raymond Williams）的“马克思主义文化理论中的基础与上层建筑”（Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory）和狄克·赫布迪（Dick Hebdige）的“从文化到霸权”（From Culture to Hegemony）两篇。这与文化研究的重要性及其涉及面之广相比很不相称。但作为全书中的一章，总不能厚此薄彼，更何况全书已长达700多页，不宜再增加篇幅了。

显然，文化研究需要一部专题教学用书。在大学读人文社会学科的学生，尤其是文学的学生，不能不学文化研究。当然不是说，文化研究可以取代文学研究或美学研究。学文学的人还是要从读文学文本入手。其实，西方的文化研究原本就是从文学研究发展而来，继而为文学研究提供了新的视角和更广阔的视域。从本书的目录可以看出，文化研究的对象真可谓包罗万象。其视野早已突破了传统意义上的知识产品和知识活动，把触角延伸至种族、民族性、身份政治学、性别政治、文化政策和机构、经济学、管理学、传媒、权力与意识形态等，具有明显的跨学科倾向。

文学是一个民族或国家的文化的集中表现。如果说“文化是一个民族的身份证”，那么，文学就是一种文化的身份证。文学研究离不开文化研究。以《红楼梦》为例，它既是文学作品，也是文化产品；既是文学研究的对象，也是文化研究的对象。书中或人或神或仙，或论天说地，或谈情说爱，或饮酒赋诗，或品茶看戏，或器玩或颐养，三教九流，民俗风尚，无不饱含文化意蕴，尽在文化研究的视域之中。

再举商业一例。

我国文人历来鄙视商人和商业，错误地视商人为没有文化之人，视商业为没有文化之行业。殊不知我国商人早已致力于文化资源的开发，把文化纳入财富增长和商业竞争

中。同仁堂这家名扬海内外的老字号中药店，其昌盛和威信，靠的就是属于文化范畴的伦理。同仁堂打出“同修仁德，济世养生”这个丝毫没有功利主义味道、却充溢着人文主义精神的招牌招徕顾客，正是利用了文化中的伦理作为生财、兴隆的后盾。可见，文化资源同物质资源一样，也是资本充分利用的对象。今天的资本正以更快的速度，更高效的手段进入文化生产的空间。经济与文化之间，你中有我，我中有你，相互消融，相互利用，难分彼此。两者合则双赢，分则双输。

当前，在文化研究中日益引起有识之士关注的是，随着西方资本、技术、商品、意识形态、文化产品的大量进入，我国的传统文化和本土文化正面临巨大的冲击。仅以中外文化贸易额为例，据2005年第16期《领导决策信息》报道，这几年，文艺演出的引进和派出、出版物和版权的引进和输出，其比例几乎都是10比1，有10倍之差。至于音像制品和影片的进出口，悬殊就更大了。在走向全球化的当今世界，要排斥外国文化产品的进入是不可能的。唯一的办法是弘扬我国的优秀传统与文化，优化我国的文化工作和文化产品，加大我国文化产品的输出，促使进出口文化产品得以相对平衡地双向交流。

可喜的是，2005年7月中旬，国务院新闻办公室与新闻出版总署联合发布了《“中国图书对外推广计划”实施办法》的通知，启动了我国文化输出的大战略。政府将出资翻译我国的优秀图书，帮助它们走向世界。而另一则鼓舞人心的消息是，世界最大的出版机构培生出版集团下属的企鹅出版集团已经买断了原创性很高的我国文学作品《狼图腾》在全球发行的英文版权，首开我国文化产品大规模进入英文主流市场的先河。

一个国家的综合国力是硬国力和软国力的整合，而软国力说到底是个文化问题。可见文化研究之重要。

我们希望使用这本书的青年学生能在了解西方文化研究理论的同时，致力于建构具有中国特色的文化研究理论，并用自己本土的理论来研究中国和外国种种文化现象和活动，而不是尾随西学之后。《狼图腾》之所以如此风光地走向世界，正是因为它是很有原创性和民族性的文化产品。

张中载

2005年10月

北京外国语大学

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# 第一章

## 文化的概念

自人类产生以来,文化就一直伴随着人类自身。它将人类整个生活方式、范围,物质条件的改善和精神生活的追求全部纳入自身的轨迹之中。正如人类生活的复杂性和多面性一样,文化一词似乎无所不包,因而也成为人类从思想上进行整体观照难以脱离的命题。而随着人类认知能力的提高和观察角度的改变,文化的内涵和外延也不断发生着迁移。在当下全球化和新的社会历史的语境下,人们面对了社会转型、新的文化区域关系以及与之相关的文化政治问题。因此,原有的界定往往不足以解释这些新的文化现象,而社会文化和思想文化自身的变化又构成了人们观察的社会事实。知识界以自身的关注出场,他们所追问的是,这些事实是在何种社会条件下产生的、这些事实间的相关性是什么、它如何改变着人们的观念形态以及新的观念形态何以进入社会并导致新的事实发生。显然,文化理论的兴起与当代社会的转型以及相关知识生产紧密地联系在一起。当新的生产方式构成了新的社会关系,其中又产生出了新的文化问题之时,人们不得不重新审视既有的文化含义以及其对社会事实进行解释的合法性和有效性,对什么是文化以及如何对文化进行解释进行新的思考。可以说,一个领域的界说和相关范畴的界定史构成了该领域的发生和发展史,文化研究亦不例外。

本章选取了三篇有关文化理论界定的文章。第一篇选自英国著名学者特里·伊格尔顿(Terry Eagleton)的新著《文化的观念》(*The Idea of Culture*, 2000)中有关文化定义的一章。第二篇选自齐格蒙特·鲍曼(Zygmunt Bauman)的名著《作为实践的文化》(*Culture as Praxis*, 1999)中的一节;第三篇为英国文化研究的先驱人物雷蒙·威廉斯的著名文章“文化分析”。三篇文章各自独立,又互为系统,既具有某种相关性,又从不同的角度深入地讨论了文化概念本身所涉及到的问题。

伊格尔顿首先从词源学角度讨论“文化”是派生于自然的概念。由于自然世界同时与非自然世界联系在一起,文化总是包含着事物的两面,如制造与被制造、合理与自发性之间的张力,而“文化唯物论”则类似于同义反复,即是一种从物质到精神层面的过程。这一词汇的内涵经历历史变迁的同时涉及到了诸多问题,如哲学命题以及被规范物与未被规范物之间的相互作用。因此,文化的观念意味着对有机决定论和精神自主性的双重拒绝;文化既是描述性的也是评价性的,既指已经展现的生活层面也指应当展现的层面。文化是一个既自我克服又自我认识的问题。文化既意味着自我区分,又意味着—

种自我治疗。在此基础上,伊氏进而考察了“文明”的界说。他认为,正是由于“文明”难以孤立地作为行为,才使文化从个人意义转向了社会意义,而文明的掠夺和低劣的本质又使文化的概念在内涵中被迫采取了一种批判的态度。因此文化术语出现的原因之一也正是文明作为一个价值术语而越来越不可信的事实。但文化要保持其有效的批评,就必须保持其社会性。他指出,文化一词第一个重要的派生意义是反资本主义的,第二是对整体生活方式复数化的反映,第三是逐步专门化。对此,他同意阿多诺(Theodor W. Adorno)有关文化既是抽象完美的一种理想,同时又是力求达到这一目的的不完美的历史进程的观点。在这一层意义上,文化本身也成了它所主张加以治疗的那种病症。应当说,伊格尔顿的考察有自己独特的思考,其论点也是有力的。

鲍曼的文章援引了大量人类学家和社会学家的论著,从另一角度梳理了文化的概念。他的考察追溯到古希腊人对差异的关注。他认为,随着现代社会结构历史性地瓦解了个人及其社区的整体性,文化标准的相对性得到了理解和认同,而文化不同的概念犹如其他所有概念一样,是记录人类经验积累上的知性结构,因而成为社会实践的不同层面。社会文化形式也同时与非社会(如自然环境)条件紧密联系在一起,因而文化是人类应对自然的不懈努力。在人类不同的文化圈中,文化犹如语言一样,是一个集合名词,由众多的名词所构成,但每一文化又并非是孤立的、独立的实体,其中一种文化是一种精神的共同体,但同时分享其中的共同意义。然而,对文化普遍化的做法是应当有所警惕的。在历史进程中,文化实际上一直是一个自我容纳特征的系统(self-contained system of traits)。在当今全球化的时代,文化的不同概念是世界图景中绝对必需的要素。鲍曼的文章以人类学和社会学奠定的知识结构为基础讨论文化的界定,对于人文知识生产的机制考察无疑是大有裨益的。

威廉斯的文章首先讨论了文化的三种定义。第一是“理想的”,即文化是人类完善的一种状态或过程。第二是“文献式”的定义,即文化是知性和想象作品的整体,这些作品以不同的方式详尽记录了人类的思想和经验。第三是文化的“社会”定义,即文化是对一种生活方式的描述,它不仅包含前两种定义的内容,而且表现制度和日常行为中的意义和价值。每一种定义都拥有相应的分析方式。其必然的逻辑为,第一种定义的分析必然是对那种永恒秩序或与普遍的人类状况有关联的价值的发现和描述。第二种则是涉及范围极广的批评活动,将作品的分析与传统和社会加以结合。第三种必须对那种特殊的生活方式加以阐述,分析其中的意义和价值。他特别指出,三种定义都有其重要的指涉,其中的联系是值得注意的,因为文化作为一个术语在使用中必须注意其意义和指涉的变化及其复杂性。“理想”的文化定义试图将人的理想发展视为与其物质需要相脱离甚至对立的;而“文献式”定义只是从书写的记载中看到价值,将其与人的其他社会生活截然分开。“社会”定义将一般过程或艺术、学术总体当成纯粹的副产品,是一种消极反映,因此,在威廉斯看来,均不可取。但每一定义也有其合理之处,同时也是相互关联的,所以必须将这个过程视为一个整体,其中选择有着重要的作用,因为文化传统不仅

是每一代所作出的一种选择，而且也是对传统的一种阐释。文化是多层次的，每一因素也都将体现出一些真实的关系。在描述这些关系的过程中，真正的文化过程将显现出来。<sup>①</sup>

学术界面对新的历史语境，在审视原有界说中考察文化问题性的实质，是应对经济逻辑在社会蔓延中对文化的重新定位，也是知识界历史性的出场。

## 特里·伊格尔顿：文化的解说

### Versions of Culture

*Terry Eagleton*

‘Culture’ is said to be one of the two or three most complex words in the English language, and the term which is sometimes considered to be its opposite—nature—is commonly awarded the accolade of being the most complex of all. Yet though it is fashionable these days to see nature as a derivative of culture, culture, etymologically speaking, is a concept derived from nature. One of its original meanings is ‘husbandry’, or the tending of natural growth. The same is true of our words for law and justice, as well as of terms like ‘capital’, ‘stock’, ‘pecuniary’ and ‘sterling’. The word ‘coulter’, which is a cognate of ‘culture’, means the blade of a ploughshare. We derive our word for the finest of human activities from labour and agriculture, crops and cultivation. Francis Bacon writes of ‘the culture and manurance of minds’, in a suggestive hesitancy between dung and mental distinction. ‘Culture’ here means an activity, and it was a long time before the word came to denote an entity. Even then, it was probably not until Matthew Arnold that the word dropped such adjectives as ‘moral’ and ‘intellectual’ and came to be just ‘culture’, an abstraction in itself.

Etymologically speaking, then, the now-popular phrase ‘cultural materialism’ is something of a tautology. ‘Culture’ at first denoted a thoroughly material process, which was then metaphorically transposed to affairs of the spirit. The word thus charts within its semantic unfolding humanity’s own historic shift from rural to urban existence,

<sup>①</sup> 这三篇文章中，读者可参见第一和第三篇文章的中译本：伊格尔顿：“各种意义的文化”，载《文化的观念》（第一章），方杰译，南京：南京大学出版社，2003年。威廉斯：“文化分析”，赵国新译，载《文化研究读本》，罗钢、刘象愚主编，北京：中国社会科学出版社，2000年。

pig-farming to Picasso, tilling the soil to splitting the atom. In Marxist parlance, it brings together both base and superstructure in a single notion. Perhaps behind the pleasure we are supposed to take in 'cultivated' people lurks a race-memory of drought and famine. But the semantic shift is also paradoxical; it is the urban dwellers who are 'cultivated', and those who actually live by tilling the soil who are not. Those who cultivate the land are less able to cultivate themselves. Agriculture leaves no leisure for culture.

The Latin root of the word 'culture' is *colere*, which can mean anything from cultivating and inhabiting to worshipping and protecting. Its meaning as 'inhabit' has evolved from the Latin *colonus* to the contemporary 'colonialism', so that titles like *Culture and Colonialism* are, once again, mildly tautological. But *colere* also ends up via the Latin *cultus* as the religious term 'cult', just as the idea of culture itself in the modern age comes to substitute itself for a fading sense of divinity, and transcendence. Culture truths—whether high art or the traditions of a people—are sometimes sacred ones, to be protected and revered. Culture, then, inherits the imposing mantle of religious authority, but also has uneasy affinities with occupation and invasion; and it is between these two poles, positive and negative, that the concept is currently pitched. It is one of those rare ideas which have been as integral to the political left as they are vital to the political right, and its social history is thus exceptionally tangled and ambivalent.

If the word 'culture' traces a momentous historical transition, it also encodes a number of key philosophical issues. Within this single term, questions of freedom and determinism, agency and endurance, change and identity, the given and the created, come dimly into focus. If culture means the active tending of natural growth, then it suggests a dialectic between the artificial and the natural, what we do to the world and what the world does to us. It is an epistemologically 'realist' notion, since it implies that there is a nature or raw material beyond ourselves; but it also has a 'constructivist' dimension, since this raw material must be worked up into humanly significant shape. So it is less a matter of deconstructing the opposition between culture and nature than of recognizing that the term 'culture' is already such a deconstruction.

In a further dialectical turn, the cultural means we use to transform nature are themselves derived from it. The point is made rather more poetically by Polixenes in Shakespeare's *The Winter's Tale*:

Yet nature is made better by no mean  
But nature makes that mean; so over that art,  
Which you say adds to nature, is an art

That nature makes ... This is an art  
Which does mend nature—change it rather, but  
The art itself is nature.

(Act IV, sc. iv)

Nature produces culture which changes nature; it is a familiar motif of the so-called Last Comedies, which see culture as the medium of nature's constant self-refashioning. If Ariel in *The Tempest* is all airy agency and Caliban all earthy inertia, a more dialectical interplay of culture and nature can be found in Gonzalo's description of Ferdinand swimming from the wrecked ship:

Sir, he may live;  
I saw him beat the surges under him,  
And ride upon their backs; he trod the water,  
Whose enmity he flung aside, and breasted  
The surge most swoln that met him; his bold head  
'Bove the contentious waves he kept, and oared  
Himself with his good arms in lusty stroke  
To th' shore ...

(Act II, sc. i)

Swimming is an apt image of the interplay in question, since the swimmer actively creates the current which sustains him, plying the waves so they may return to buoy him up. Thus Ferdinand 'beats the surges' only to 'ride upon their backs', treads, flings, breasts and oars an ocean which is by no means just pliable material but 'contentious', antagonistic, recalcitrant to human shaping. But it is just this resistance which allows him to act upon it. Nature itself produces the means of its own transcendence, rather as the Derridean 'supplement' is already contained by whatever it amplifies. As we shall see later, there is something oddly necessary about the gratuitous superabundance we call culture. If nature is always in some sense cultural, then cultures are built out of that ceaseless traffic with nature which we call labour. Cities are raised out of sand, wood, iron, stone, water and the like, and are thus quite as natural as rural idylls are cultural. The geographer David Harvey argues that there is nothing 'unnatural' about New York city, and doubts that tribal peoples can be said to be 'closer to nature' than the West.<sup>1</sup> The word 'manufacture' originally means handicraft, and is thus 'organic', but comes

over time to denote mechanical mass production, and so picks up a pejorative overtone of artifice, as in 'manufacturing divisions where none exist'.

If culture originally means husbandry, it suggests both regulation and spontaneous growth. The cultural is what we can change, but the stuff to be altered has its own autonomous existence, which then lends it something of the recalcitrance of nature. But culture is also a matter of following rules, and this too involves an interplay of the regulated and unregulated. To follow a rule is not like obeying a physical law, since it involves a creative application of the rule in question. 2—4—6—8—10—30 may well represent a rule-bound sequence, just not the rule one most expects. And there can be no rules for applying rules, under pain of infinite regress. Without such open-endedness, rules would not be rules, rather as words would not be words; but this does not mean that any move whatsoever can count as following a rule. Rule-following is a matter neither of anarchy nor autocracy. Rules, like cultures, are neither sheerly random nor rigidly determined—which is to say that both involve the idea of freedom. Someone who was entirely absolved from cultural conventions would be no more free than someone who was their slave.

The idea of culture, then, signifies a double refusal: of organic determinism on the one hand, and of the autonomy of spirit on the other. It is a rebuff to both naturalism and idealism, insisting against the former that there is that within nature which exceeds and undoes it, and against idealism that even the most high-minded human agency has its humble roots in our biology and natural environment. The fact that culture (like nature in this respect) can be both a descriptive and evaluative term, meaning what has actually evolved as well as what ought to, is relevant to this refusal of both naturalism and idealism. If the concept sets its face against determinism, it is equally wary of voluntarism. Human beings are not mere products of their environs, but neither are those environs sheer clay for their arbitrary self-fashioning. If culture transfigures nature, it is a project to which nature sets rigorous limits. The very word 'culture' contains a tension between making and being made, rationality and spontaneity, which upbraids the disembodied intellect of the Enlightenment as much as it defies the cultural reductionism of so much contemporary thought. It even hints towards the political contrast between evolution and revolution—the former 'organic' and 'spontaneous', the latter artificial and *voulu*—and suggests how one might move beyond this stale antithesis too. The word oddly commingles growth and calculation, freedom and necessity, the idea of a conscious project but also of an unplannable surplus. And if this is true of the word, so is it of some

of the activities it denotes. When Friedrich Nietzsche looked for a practice which might dismantle the opposition between freedom and determinism, it was to the experience of making art that he turned, which for the artist feels not only free *and* necessary, creative *and* constrained; but each of these in terms of the other, and so appears to press these rather tattered old polarities to the point of undecidability.

There is another sense in which culture as a word faces both ways. For it can also suggest a division within ourselves, between that part of us which cultivates and refines, and whatever within us constitutes the raw material for such refinement. Once culture is grasped as *self*-culture, it posits a duality between higher and lower faculties, will and desire, reason and passion, which it then instantly offers to overcome. Nature now is not just the stuff of the world, but the dangerously appetitive stuff of the self. Like culture, the word means both what is around us and inside us, and the disruptive drives within can easily be equated with anarchic forces without. Culture is thus a matter of self-overcoming as much as self-realization. If it celebrates the self, it also disciplines it, aesthetic and ascetic together. Human nature is not quite the same as a field of beetroot, but like a field it needs to be cultivated—so that as the word ‘culture’ shifts us from the natural to the spiritual, it also intimates an affinity between them. If we are cultural beings, we are also part of the nature on which we go to work. Indeed it is part of the point of the word ‘nature’ to remind us of the continuum between ourselves and our surroundings, just as the word ‘culture’ serves to highlight the difference.

In this process of self-shaping, action and passivity, the strenuously willed and the sheerly given, unite once more, this time in the same individuals. We resemble nature in that we, like it, are to be cuffed into shape, but we differ from it in that we can do this to ourselves, thus introducing into the world a degree of self-reflexivity to which the rest of nature cannot aspire. As self-cultivators, we are clay in our own hands, at once redeemer and unregenerate, priest and sinner in the same body. Left to its own devices, our reprobate nature will not spontaneously rise to the grace of culture; but neither can such grace be rudely forced upon it. It must rather cooperate with the innate tendencies of nature itself, in order to induce it to transcend itself. Like grace, culture must already represent a potential within human nature, if it is to stick. But the very need for culture suggests that there is something lacking in nature—that our capacity to rise to heights beyond those of our fellow natural creatures is necessary because our natural condition is also a good deal more ‘unnatural’ than that of our fellows. If there is a history and a politics concealed in the word ‘culture’, there is also a theology.

Cultivation, however, may not only be something we do to ourselves. It may also be something done to us, not least by the political state. For the state to flourish, it must inculcate in its citizens the proper sorts of spiritual disposition; and it is this which the idea of culture or *Bildung* signifies in a venerable tradition from Schiller to Matthew Arnold.<sup>2</sup> In civil society, individuals live in a state of chronic antagonism, driven by opposing interests; but the state is that transcendent realm in which these divisions can be harmoniously reconciled. For this to happen, however, the state must already have been at work in civil society, soothing its rancour and refining its sensibilities; and this process is what we know as culture. Culture is a kind of ethical pedagogy which will fit us for political citizenship by liberating the ideal or collective self buried within each of us, a self which finds supreme representation in the universal realm of the state. Coleridge writes accordingly of the need to ground civilization in cultivation, ‘in the harmonious development of those qualities and faculties that characterise our *humanity*. We must be men in order to be citizens’.<sup>3</sup> The state incarnates culture, which in turn embodies our common humanity.

To elevate culture over politics—to be men first and citizens later—means that politics must move within a deeper ethical dimension, drawing on the resources of *Bildung* and forming individuals into suitably well-tempered, responsible citizens. This is the rhetoric of the civics class, if a little more highly pitched. But since ‘humanity’ here means a community free of conflict, what is at stake is not just the priority of culture over politics, but over a particular kind of politics. Culture, or the state, are a sort of premature utopia, abolishing struggle at an imaginary level so that they need not resolve it at a political one. Nothing could be less politically innocent than a denigration of politics in the name of the human. Those who proclaim the need for a period of ethical incubation to prepare men and women for political citizenship include those who deny colonial peoples the right to self-government until they are ‘civilized’ enough to exercise it responsibly. They overlook the fact that by far the best preparation of political independence is political independence. Ironically, then, a case which moves from humanity to culture to politics betrays by its own political bias the fact that the real movement is the other way—that it is political interests which usually govern cultural ones, and in doing so define a particular version of humanity.

What culture does, then, is distil our common humanity from our sectarian political selves, redeeming the spirit from the senses, wresting the changeless from the temporal, and plucking unity from diversity. It signifies a kind of self-division as well as a self-

healing, by which our fractious, sublunary selves are not abolished, but refined from within by a more ideal sort of humanity. The rift between state and civil society—between how the bourgeois citizen would like to represent himself and how he actually is—is preserved but also eroded. Culture is a form of universal subjectivity at work within each of us, just as the state is the presence of the universal within the particularist realm of civil society. As Friedrich Schiller puts it in his *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1795):

Every individual human being, one may say, carries within him, potentially and prescriptively, an ideal man, the archetype of a human being, and it is his life's task to be, through all his changing manifestations, in harmony with the unchanging unity of this ideal. This archetype, which is to be discerned more or less clearly in every individual, is represented by the State, the objective and, as it were, canonical form in which all the diversity of individual subjects strives to unite.<sup>4</sup>

In this tradition of thought, then, culture is neither dissociated from society nor wholly at one with it. If it is a critique of social life at one level, it is complicit with it at another. It has not yet set its face entirely against the actual, as it will as the English 'Culture and Society' lineage gradually unfurls. Indeed culture for Schiller is the very mechanism of what will later be called 'hegemony', moulding human subjects to the needs of a new kind of polity, remodelling them from the ground up into the docile, moderate, high-minded, peace-loving, uncontentious, disinterested agents of that political order. But to do this, culture must also act as a kind of immanent critique or deconstruction, occupying an unregenerate society from within to break down its resistance to the motions of the spirit. Later in the modern age, culture will become either Olympian wisdom or ideological weapon, a secluded form of social critique or a process locked all too deeply into the status quo. Here, at an earlier, more buoyant moment of that history, it is still possible to see culture as at once an ideal criticism and a real social force.

Raymond Williams has traced something of the complex history of the word 'culture', distinguishing three major modern senses of the word.<sup>5</sup> From its etymological roots in rural labour, the word comes first to mean something like 'civility', and then in the eighteenth century becomes more or less synonymous with 'civilization', in the sense of a general process of intellectual, spiritual and material progress. As an idea, civilization significantly equates manners and morals: to be civilized includes not spitting on the carpet