


全球化进程中文化问题探究


杨生平 叶险明◎主编

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序 言

当代哲学人文社会科学学术研究有三个关键词或主题词，即：全球化、文化和发展。但细微观之，这三个主题词的核心又是“全球化”。当代“文化”和“发展”问题归根结底都缘于全球化，都是由全球化及其发展所使然。全球化使当代哲学人文社会科学学术研究的内容、方法和范式发生了极为深刻变化，并必将对哲学人文社会科学在未来的发展产生深远的影响。本书编者并不奢望全面概括这种变化和影响，而仅想通过对近年来国内外学术界一些有代表性的相关成果的整理和归类来窥视其中的一二^①。

“全球化历史化”与“历史学全球化”是当代历史学界越来越来凸显的两种相互联系的趋向。如果说前者体现了人们对理解世界历史由分散到整合的过程及其规律的渴望的话，那么后者则体现了人们认识和把握世界历史由分散到整合的过程及其规律的方法，即所谓“全球史观”。历史学家在依据“全球史观”来重新认识和解释世界史过程中试图构建“全球普适性的历史话语系统”，从而实现“历史学本身的全球化”。本书所编辑的论文，如《异质性，系统性，联系性：关于全球过去概念的争论》（Heterogeneity, Systems, Connections: Debating Conceptions of the Global Past）、《16 世纪的全球化与十字军意识形态在美洲的接受》（Sixteenth-century Globalization and the Adoption of Crusade Ideology in Mesoamerica）、《全球史观与近代早期世界史编纂》、《全球史中的“早期近代”概念》等，就是从一个侧面体现了这

^① 本书所收录的论文大部分选自国内外学者向由首都师范大学全球化与文化研究中心于 2007 年主办的“全球化与知识的挑战”国际学术研讨会递交的论文，还有一部分是全球化与文化研究中心在不同时间里开展国际或同内交流的成果。

方面的研究成果。“全球史观”力图打破“西方中心论”的束缚和以国别史拼凑世界史的框架，全面探讨世界史不同时期的整体特征、发展主流和总体趋势以及不同文明互动关系的特点，把整体观念贯穿于世界史研究的始终。当然，“全球史观”目前仍存在着许多问题值得进一步深入探讨，如全球史的内在动力问题、“全球史观”的可操纵性问题等，但这并不妨碍“全球化历史化”与“历史学全球化”越来越成为历史学界两种并存互动的趋向。

在当今时代，发生深刻变化的当然不仅仅是历史学，整个人文社会科学都深深地打上了全球化的“印记”。全球化究竟会对人文社会科学的发展产生何种影响？未来的人文社会科学的价值何以体现？全球化时代各种文明和文化间互动的特点及其规律是怎样的？全球化会使人类的认知结构和对知识的认识方式发生什么样的变化？国内外学术界在上个世纪的80、90年代就将这些问题涵盖“全球化与人文社会科学”、“全球化与人文社会科学的未来发展”等专题的研究中了。在今天，上个世纪末的这些专题研究又通过新的学术范式和方法在不断地深化着。本书所编辑的论文，如《新游戏，新规则：社会科学的危机时期：多极文化世界的跨文化战略或欧洲、亚洲、非洲三边的互动认识》（New Games, New Rules: Crisis Time in Social Sciences: Transcultural Strategies for a Multipolar Cultural World or Europe/Asia/Africa, a Reciprocal Knowledge Triangle）、《全球化与科学知识的表征：研究与教学—经验及技术中的历史知识的全球化》（Globalization and the Presentation of Scientific Knowledge: Globalizing Historical Knowledge in Research and Teaching-experiences and Observations）、《全球知识的问题化与新百科全书计划》、《后革命时期的革命书写》、《文学性的叙事与通俗化的经典》、《学术术语的全球化旅行》等，就从一个层面上反映着当今国内外学者从不同视角对上述问题的探讨。

要全面、深入地把握全球化对历史学乃至整个人文社会科学的发展所产生的影响，就不可避免地要回到对“全球化”及其与文化间的关系进行哲学历史观思考的层面。对“全球化”及其与文化间的关系进行哲学历史观层面的思考也可称之为对“全球化”及其与文化间关系的“元思考”。这种思考的具体内容包括：作为现实和发展趋势的全球化与作为认识结构和价值观念的全球化间的关系，西方文化与全球化间的关系，文化全球化的

逻辑，文化全球化与普世价值的关系，等等。应该看到，近些年来，学界在总体上对这些方面问题的研究进展比较迟缓，其主要原因在于：随着当代全球化的发展，基于不同的全球化主体的认识结构和价值判断，学术研究中呈现出越来越多的“全球化”（包括“文化全球化”、“政治全球化”等），甚至出现了形形色色的“全球化迷雾”，这就使得人们对全球化的认识在方法论上“不知所云”了。我们认为，现在该是把“全球化”作为主体性全球化来系统研究的时候了。进而言之，只有把“全球化”作为一种主体性的对象来批判（这种全球化也可称之为“主体性的全球化”），而不是仅仅地把它作为一种既定的客体或者“事实”来描述，才有可能达到对现实的“全球化”的科学认识。目前国内外的一些学者试图在对这方面问题研究上有所突破。本书所编辑的论文，如《“全球化”批判——对“全球化”的一种主体性思考》、《全球化进程及其发展走向——一种意识形态的考量》、《对“文化全球化”及其意义的一种历史观阐释》、《普世价值的证明——多元文化观点下的普世价值观念》、《文化全球化的双重逻辑与当代中国文化建设》、《詹姆逊文化全球化理论评析》等，就从一个侧面体现着这方面的成果。

“问题是时代的格言，是表现时代自己内心状态的最实际的呼声。”“一个时代的迫切问题，有着和任何在内容上有根据的因而也是合理的问题共同的命运：主要的困难不是答案，而是问题。”^① 本书所编辑的论文并不是要为全球化时代当代哲学人文社会科学学术研究的内容、方法和范式所发生深刻变化这一问题提供什么标准答案，而是要正确地在思维中再现这一问题。当然，在思维中正确地再现这一问题的本身也是对这一问题探讨的重要环节，甚至是最重要的环节。只要这一问题在思维中得到正确的再现，那么寻找到这一问题的答案就是顺理成章的事情了。这是我们编辑本书的主旨。

① 《马克思恩格斯全集》第1卷，人民出版社1956年版，第203页。

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第一篇 全球化与全球史

Heterogeneity, Systems, Connections: Debating Conceptions of the Global Past

Jerry H. Bentley
University of Hawaii

Heterogeneity: distinctive communities and their claims for historians = attention

Problems of historical representation come in several forms. One has to do with representation proper the depiction, description, and characterization of individuals and groups. The publication of Edward W. Said's *Orientalism* prompted a round of scholarly self-reflection that has led gradually to the elimination of the most egregious characterizations of foreign peoples.^① Contests over these kinds of representation are not by any means completely over. Debates about so-called political correctness in the 1990s represented, in part, a rear-guard response to scholarly efforts in search of more appropriate and precise representations. And it is still possible to encounter remarkably crude orientalist formulations, such as the recent assertion of a prominent historian that the Chinese lacked range, focus, and above all, curiosity.^② For the most part, however, overtly stereotypical, essentialist, and otherwise offensive characterizations are already making their exit from historical scholarship, and it seems safe to predict that this pattern will

① Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1978) .

② David S. Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor* (New York, 1998), p. 96.

continue for the foreseeable future, even if the process takes a generation or more to work itself out.

Yet there remain more subtle dimensions of the larger representation issue, much trickier to deal with. The main question here is: whose realities does historical scholarship normalize? If American history were to focus principally on the experiences of the male Euro-American population, or if world history were to treat the world primarily as a stage for the dramas of European expansion, penetration, and domination, then they would efface the historical realities of many populations, rendering them peoples without history, while also verging back toward the discredited Eurocentric metanarratives discussed earlier. While affronting the ignored groups, these approaches would also lead to distorted and grossly oversimplified understandings of historical development. Thus, calls for historians to pay serious attention to distinctive communities are more than responses to the needs of identity politics.^① If one of the purposes of historical analysis is to understand as best as we can how the world has developed through time, it is imperative to consider the dynamics of all peoples, not just a privileged few, engaged in negotiation and interaction with one another.

This does not mean that all world historians must discuss the experiences of all identifiable peoples and communities. Even if it was possible to do so, this approach would turn world history into ethnic-historical entitlements programs that would sacrifice coherent meaning on the altar of uncritical inclusion. But in any case, it would be impossible to devote equal attention to the experiences of all peoples, even on a per capita basis. In most cases, subalterns of individual societies and the global order as well have not left extensive records of their experiences and perspectives that lend themselves to historical analysis. Scholars have managed to bring oral and written sources into productive dialogue in a few historical contexts, but in most cases, historical accounts based on oral sources reflect interests and deal with issues quite different

^① Some commentators have recognized this point even as they have criticized approaches that make history the handmaiden of identity politics. See for example Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society*, rev. ed. (New York, 1998); and David A. Hollinger, *Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism* (New York, 1995).

from those treated in contemporary historical writing.^① Nor is it entirely clear which parties, if any, possess the moral right to speak for subalterns.

So in the interests of recognizing the roles of various historical actors and seeking deeper understanding of historical development, how might it be possible for world historians to move beyond the norms of dominant or hegemonic groups? How might it be possible to organize historical knowledge that integrates the experiences of women, workers, minorities, migrants, subalterns, and other previously ignored peoples as well as the men, the elites, the majorities, the powerful, or otherwise dominant groups whose experiences have mostly served as proxies for their whole societies? How might it be possible to reach an enriched understanding of the world and its historical development through a broadening of the historical franchise that recognizes history as a property pertaining to all peoples and groups? Postmodern and postcolonial scholarship offers limited positive guidance on these questions except insofar as it makes persuasive cases for the significance of individual distinctive communities. Although they have made little effort to place local experiences in larger contexts, postmodern and postcolonial treatments nevertheless suggest fresh ways of thinking about individual communities that have strong potential to enrich world history.

The critiques of Eurocentric metanarrative and historical representation come together powerfully in a book by Dipesh Chakrabarty, whose work illustrates both the value and the limitations of postmodern and postcolonial scholarship. Chakrabarty argues that the problems of historical scholarship go deeper than many critics have assumed, that they arise from power relations that sustain academic historical scholarship and inevitably distort its products. In *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Chakrabarty offers a distinctly pessimistic view of academic history and its potential to deal responsibly with the larger world. He holds that professional historians cannot avoid dealing with Europe, which in his view has become the reference point of professional historical scholar-

① For a sophisticated analysis drawing on written and oral sources, see Karen Ordahl Kupperman, *Indians and English: Facing Off in Early America* (Ithaca, 2000). For the case of some histories based on indigenous Australian oral sources, see Mudrooroo, *Us Mob: History, Culture, Struggle* (Sydney, 1995), pp. 175–92, especially pp. 188–92, where Mudrooroo cites the work of the indigenous historian Tom Bennell.

ship. There is a peculiar way, Chakrabarty says, in which all . . . other histories tend to become variations on a master narrative that could be called the history of Europe. Further, As long as one operates within the discourse of history produced at the institutional site of the university, it is not possible simply to walk out of the deep collusion between history and the modernizing narrative (s) of citizenship, bourgeois public and private, and the nation state. So history as an intellectual project falls inevitably and completely within the orbit of European modernity.

Systems: bringing the larger world into focus

As I can see, there are at the moment two principal alternatives to these varieties of European exceptionalism. One springs from a sophisticated effort to reconsider modern economic development and industrialization in comparative and global context. As represented in the works of R. Bin Wong, Andre Gunder Frank, and Kenneth Pomeranz, this body of scholarship holds that European peoples enjoyed little if any significant political, military, economic, social, technological, or cultural advantage over, Indian, Ottoman, or many other societies until the nineteenth century, when industrialization vastly increased European power. So how is it possible to account for industrialization itself? R. Bin Wong considers it the outcome of an unpredictable burst of technological innovation, while Andre Gunder Frank explains it as a result of efforts to supplement scarce labor with mechanical devices, and Kenneth Pomeranz emphasizes windfall gains from overseas colonies and the fortuitous presence of coal resources at sites that could readily develop into manufacturing centers. On all these analyses industrialization and European world dominance were not natural or inevitable outgrowths of long-term conditions so much as unpredictable and perhaps even accidental results of chance circumstances. ^①Some

① R. Bin Wong, *China Transformed: Reprint Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience* (Ithaca, 1997); Andre Gunder Frank, *ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley, 1998); Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton, 2000). See also Jack Goldstone, *The Problem of the Early Modern World*, *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 41 (1998): 249—84; and *The Rise of the West Or Not? A Revision to Socio-economic History, Sociological Theory*, forthcoming.

of these explanations may well be more persuasive than others, but they all have some value for suggesting alternatives to the inherited, teleological, basically Eurocentric understandings of modern economic development and industrialization.

The second alternative to European exceptionalism draws inspiration from geographical, ecological, and environmental analysis rather than political economy in seeking to account for the larger course of world history. Alfred W. Crosby argues that European plants, animals, diseases, and human populations mutually reinforced one another as they ventured into the larger world and created a neo-Europes in several of the world's temperate zones. Jared Diamond looks to the deep past in explaining the development of powerful, complex societies in Eurasia as the result of global biological endowments as of 10, 000 years ago. Most of the world's domesticable plant and animal species were natives to southwest Asia, and they traveled readily across much of the Eurasian landmass. By contrast, sub-Saharan Africa, the Americas, and Oceania harbored many fewer species susceptible to domestication. Thus Eurasian lands were unusually hospitable environments for the emergence of agriculture, densely populated societies, writing, technology, and powerful social organization.^① While they do not necessarily contradict the other schools of thought, and indeed complement them in some ways, these geographically, ecologically, and environmentally grounded theories make different assumptions about the dynamics driving historical development. They insist particularly on the need to take the natural world seriously and understand historical development in light of human relationships with the natural world.

Modern history will inevitably loom large in any conspectus of world history, as it does in the various theoretical approaches mentioned above, but world history must also deal with the global past from ancient to contemporary times. What about premodern times? Even if a tidy, coherent narrative is out of the question, is it possible to conceive at least a sensible framework for all of world history? This chal-

^① Alfred W. Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900* (Cambridge, 1986); Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (New York, 1997). For a sketch of an even larger project that places human history in the context of universal history since the big bang, see David Christian, "The Case for Big History", *Journal of World History* 2 (1991): 223–38.

lenge has emboldened macrotheorists from Marx and Weber, to Spengler and Toynbee, to Michael Mann and Jared Diamond to seek the key to world history. While conceding that the theorists have articulated some useful insights, historians and other scholars alike have mostly judged their efforts unsuccessful, at least insofar as they claim to explain all of world history. All of the macrotheories collapse on empirical grounds: in oversimplifying the world's diversity, they grotesquely distort the experiences of many peoples. Moreover, most of them also depend heavily on some strain of exceptionalist thought or discredited metanarrative.

Is it possible to articulate credible alternatives to the rejected metanarratives and macrotheories that do not founder on the diversity of the world's peoples and their historical experiences? It is clear that no single narrative or metanarrative or macrotheory will accommodate all the multiplicity and variety of world history, which calls with particular insistence for a vision of the past that recognizes both heterogeneity and systems, a vision that can account for both integration and fragmentation on several different levelsocial, regional, national, continental, hemispheric, oceanic, global, and perhaps others as well. Responding to this need, world historians like William H. McNeill, Philip D. Curtin, and Alfred W. Crosby have focused their analyses on interactions and exchanges between peoples and societies in premodern as well as modern times. At the same time, however, they have portrayed messy worlds and resisted temptations to reduce the diversity of historical experience to overly simple principles.^①

My own view is that there are some larger human stories or at least contexts that can serve as useful frameworks for analysis of the global past. More specifically, the global stories of rising human population, expanding technological capacity, and increasing interaction between peoples of different societies have profoundly shaped the experiences of almost all human societies, and further more have worked collectively like a triple helix to reinforce one another with powerful effects through-

① See for example William H. McNeill, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community* (Chicago, 1963); Philip D. Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History* (Cambridge, 1984); and Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism*.

out history. ^① This approach, which I call a Historical Globalization, does not authorize rigid theoretical positions or teleological narratives, but rather emphasizes shifting patterns of cross-cultural connections, relationships, networks, interactions, and exchanges. Perhaps the principal question here is whether it will be possible to pull coherent large-scale and global stories from the many, various, complicated local histories of rising population, expanding technological capacity, and increasing cross-cultural interaction?

Like the scholarship of heterogeneity that calls for attention to distinctive communities, works making the case for historical study of large-scale systems, structures, and processes generate problems of analysis and interpretation. It is tempting, as some critics have noted, for historians contemplating large-scale issues to overlook or ignore significant differences both within and between societies, to flatten and homogenize peoples, societies, and historical experiences. While this problem could lead to un-nuanced results, it also is readily fixable through historicization. Instead of regarding imperialism and colonialism as a monolithic project, for example, it would be possible to follow Nicholas Thomas and recognize various cultures of colonialism that help to explain the different experiences of colonizers and colonized in different lands. Similarly, instead of assuming a permanent, static, essentialized African diaspora, it would be possible to follow Paul Gilroy and consider the diaspora community a changing same Bone that like all human communities is subject to development under fluctuating historical circumstances, but that is nevertheless a distinctive group that maintains some greater or lesser degree of coherence through traditions, rituals, and communications. ^②

A related problem has to do with historical agency. As they have posited large-scale structures like climate regimes, biological zones, sea and ocean basins, world systems, and the like, world historians, global macrotheorists, and other analysts

① Bentley, *A World History and Grand Narrative*. See also Andrew Sherratt, "A Reviving the Grand Narrative: Archaeology and Long-Term Change", *Journal of European Archaeology* 3 (1995): 1-32; and Johan Goudsblom, E. L. Jones, and Stephen Mennell, *Human History and Social Process* (Exeter, 1989).

② Nicholas Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel, and Government* (Princeton, 1994); Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993).