

The International Political Economy of
Trade Protectionism :Theoretical
Framework, Empirical Study and Policy Choice

贸易保护主义的 国际政治经济学分析

——理论模型、实证检验及政策选择

保建云 著

2



经济科学出版社
Economic Science Press

F741.2

B269

**The International Political Economy of
Trade Protectionism :Theoretical
Framework, Empirical Study and Policy Choice**

贸易保护主义的 国际政治经济学分析

——理论模型、实证检验及政策选择

保建云 著



经济科学出版社
Economic Science Press

责任编辑：周秀霞

责任校对：杨晓莹

版式设计：代小卫

技术编辑：邱 天

图书在版编目 (CIP) 数据

贸易保护主义的国际政治经济学分析：理论模型、实证检验及政策选择/保建云著. —北京：经济科学出版社，2010.5

ISBN 978 - 7 - 5058 - 9196 - 8

I. ①贸… II. ①保… III. ①保护贸易 - 政治经济学 - 研究 IV. ①F741.2

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字 (2010) 第 050862 号

贸易保护主义的国际政治经济学分析

——理论模型、实证检验及政策选择

保建云 著

经济科学出版社出版、发行 新华书店经销

社址：北京市海淀区阜成路甲 28 号 邮编：100142

总编部电话：88191217 发行部电话：88191540

网址：www. esp. com. cn

电子邮件：esp@ esp. com. cn

北京欣舒印务有限公司印刷

德利装订厂装订

787 × 1092 16 开 19 印张 380000 字

2010 年 5 月第 1 版 2010 年 5 月第 1 次印刷

ISBN 978 - 7 - 5058 - 9196 - 8 定价：36.00 元

(图书出现印装问题，本社负责调换)

(版权所有 翻印必究)

内 容 摘 要

本书以全球化条件下国际社会各国之间的利益冲突、贸易摩擦与贸易冲突大量出现为背景,以中国、欧盟、美国、日本等世界主要贸易大国和经济体之间、中国与其他发展中国家之间的贸易发展与贸易摩擦为实证依据,在吸收现代政治学与经济学理论研究成果的基础上,构建理论模型,从国际政治经济学角度对贸易保护主义的产生、发展、演变与影响效应进行内生解释,从理论与经验实证相结合角度构建贸易保护主义国际政治经济学分析的理论框架,并以全球公共治理和世界经济和谐发展为目标提出相关论点和公共政策建议。本书共分九章。

第一,本书在对贸易保护主义与国际政治经济学相关概念界定与解释的基础上,阐述贸易保护主义国际政治经济学产生的理论与现实背景、文献基础、研究框架与主要研究内容。贸易保护主义国际政治经济学就是从政治与经济相互影响的角度,对国际社会中的贸易保护主义思想、政策、现象进行系统的理论解释与实证分析的学科体系,既是国际政治经济学理论在贸易保护主义研究领域的具体应用,又是国际政治经济学理论的重要理论分支。作为现代国际政治经济学理论体系基础的相互依赖理论、霸权稳定论、国家主义理论、依附论与世界体系理论,拓展与丰富了传统国际关系理论与政治经济学理论的研究视野与内容,但仍然存在多方面的不足,需要进一步的丰富与完善。导致贸易保护主义在全球范围内的扩展与传播的一个重要原因是针对贸易保护主义的全球治理机制的缺失。贸易保护主义与现代国际政治经济学理论研究视野中的行为主体理性假设,是建立在作为国际行为主体的个人、家庭、企业、政府、国际组织具有可认识、可评价与可选择的行动集合的基础上的。

第二,本书从国际利益冲突、政治商业周期跨国传递与国际治理机制构建角度构建理论模型,分析贸易保护主义产生的微观机制、宏观背景、国际国内政治动因与环境。国际经济利益冲突可以通过微观机制从一国国内外溢到其他国家,也可以从其他国家向一国国内渗透,形成国际经济利益格局调整的微观动力,导致国际贸易与开放国家经济增长的不稳定性与风险;贸易政策的制定必须充分考虑本国消费者和厂商利益,而不仅仅考虑宏观目标,必须防止国际经济利益冲突在微观领域对我国国际贸易与经济增长产生消极影响。经济增长速度与经济规模、产业与经济结构、经济活动地理区位与资源禀赋、经济制度和历史文化背景及社会意识形态是影

响国际经济利益格局调整的主要宏观变量；国家之间在经济发展目标、宏观经济政策、国际贸易政策、国际经济制度及规则领域的利益冲突表现最为明显；国际经济利益在宏观层面的冲突必然会影响我国的国际贸易与投资活动，不利于国际经济关系的民主化与公平合理的国际经济新秩序的构建，应根据国际经济利益冲突的宏观影响因素及表现，适时调整我国的经济政策。贸易保护主义政策的出台过程本身就是一个利益集团的动态博弈过程，显示出一定的政治商业周期特征。一个开放经济国家的时间贴现系数越高则由贸易保护主义导致的政治商业周期越可能发生。贸易保护主义的国际治理机制要具有可行性、可实施性和不可替代性，必须满足参与性约束、激励兼容约束与帕累托改进条件。为了防止贸易保护主义及政治商业周期的全球恶性传播，需要以现有国际贸易机制与区域性贸易安排为基础，构建与完善相应的国际治理机制。

第三，本书构建大国动态贸易模型，以中国、欧盟、东盟三个大规模开放经济体之间的贸易数据为实证依据，分析大规模开放经济体系中的贸易保护主义问题。在开放经济大国间的贸易发展过程中，进出口贸易额占国民生产总值的比重变化率与国内生产总值之间存在着正相关变化关系。大规模开放经济体系之间出口贸易与进口贸易的不平衡性，既是大规模开放经济体在经济增长与发展过程中外部不平衡的重要表现，又是世界经济运行过程各经济体经济增长与发展不平衡的表现，具有周期性和动态性，进出口贸易动态不平衡与经济增长动态不平衡之间存在着密切的互动影响效应；开放经济大国之间贸易发展不仅影响到本国经济增长，还对地区与世界经济增长产生影响，大国间贸易增长在促进本国、本地区与世界经济增长的同时，也可能导致贸易摩擦、大国垄断与跨国垄断利益集团的出现，损害中小国家与广大发展中国家的利益。

第四，本书以全球存货和国际贸易依存度变化为背景，分析新贸易保护主义及其新发展问题。是否值得与能否对弱势产业进行贸易保护，在大国与小国的答案并不完全相同，可以利用大国规模经济效应提升弱势产业的比较竞争优势。对优势产业与“夕阳产业”同时进行保护、贸易保护的意识形态工具创新是新贸易保护主义新发展的主要特点；为了应对新贸易保护主义新发展对中国进出口贸易的冲击，必须制定有中国社会主义市场经济特色的战略性贸易政策。可以把自由产品以外的经济产品区分为国家自用产品、跨国公共产品与跨国俱乐部产品三种类型，国家自用产品主要由本国生产和提供，跨国公共产品则需要由世界各国联合提供，跨国俱乐部产品则需要由多国联合提供。国家经济规模大小直接影响到该国参与跨国区域经济合作的方式和政策，大国之间的相关关系直接影响到跨国区域经济合作的模式与绩效；跨国公共产品与跨国俱乐部产品总量在国际经济体系中的重要性和比例会不断提高。如何克服面临的各种制约因素，充分发挥有利条件，建立互惠互利的跨国区域经济合作，防止新贸易保护主义对国际贸易与世界经济发展带来的消极影

响,是中国与其他国家共同面临的任务。

第五,本书分析了霸权国家、世界经济稳定性与贸易保护主义问题。据提供的国际公共产品类型不同,可以把霸权国家区分为全球型霸权国家与俱乐部型霸权国家。在国际社会中,无论是全球型霸权国家还是俱乐部型霸权国家及其国家集团,在向国际社会提供产品以谋求霸权利益时,会进行经济行为与政治活动的成本与收益计算。霸权与国际社会秩序稳定之间存在着联系,但不存在着直接因果必然关系,霸权并不会必然导致稳定,也不会必然导致非稳定,霸权是中性的。霸权国家并不是贸易自由主义或者贸易保护主义的必然推行者,其会根据霸权利益计算进行选择与调整。以美国为代表的霸权国家或者霸权国家集团的产生作为国际社会历史演进过程中的一种社会现象,是多种因素共同作用的结果,是微观层次的国家、国际组织、企业、家庭(个人)等社会组织共同作用的结果,也是国际社会宏观制度安排演进的结果,与国际社会秩序的稳定与否则存在着密切的联系,但二者之间不存在必然的因果关系或者充分——必要条件关系。

第六,本书以相关研究文献和实证数据为基础,分析地理区位与贸易保护主义之间的相关性问题。新亚欧大陆桥和中哈石油管道的开通及中哈之间签署的一系列双边和多边协定,为跨国区域经济合作创造了良好的跨国公共产品与跨国俱乐部产品供求基础;地理区位优势 and 跨国产品有效供给是国际贸易和跨国区域经济合作比较优势充分发挥的重要条件和基本前提;双边贸易和跨区域合作中既有比较优势,又面临风险。中国已逐渐成为周边国家的重要的贸易伙伴,周边国家经济发展对中国市场的依赖程度有不同程度的提高。如何消除双边经贸关系中的不平衡性和不稳定性,是深化中国与周边国家双边与多边跨国区域经济合作面临的问题。可以在中国—东盟自由贸易区建设框架下推动双边区域经济合作,使之成为中国—东盟国家区域经济合作的纽带和桥梁。防止地理区位因素导致的贸易保护主义的发生。

第七,本书以经济转型阶段的中国、越南和朝鲜的经济转型及国际贸易发展数据为实证依据,研究制度变迁与贸易保护主义问题。欧美国家的经济制度不可能作为任何经济转型国家的唯一目标选择与参考标准,转型国家之间的相互模仿学习对经济转型具有积极效应,经济转型与制度变迁为转型国家之间的贸易发展创造了条件,但也面临贸易保护主义问题。随着中国与越南双边贸易的发展,两国之间的相互依赖程度逐渐提高,中国与越南双边贸易中的波动性和不平衡性特征仍然较为明显,面临一系列矛盾和问题。在中国—东盟自由贸易区的框架下加强两国之间的跨国区域合作,才可能妥善解决双边贸易矛盾和摩擦;应尽快推动两国之间的昆明—老街—河内—海防和南宁—凭祥—河内—海防两条跨国经济走廊和环北部湾经济圈的构建。后转型国家能够从先转型国家学习到丰富经济转型知识,中国的经济转型经验对其他国家的经济转型产生了模仿学习效应。应把中国与其他转型国家的双边贸易关系纳入区域经济合作的框架下统筹考虑。必须不断扩大中国与其他转型国家

之间双边经贸交流与合作,防止制度变迁导致的贸易保护主义发生。

第八,本书在相关研究文献基础上,以相关国家的产业发展与贸易数据为依据,构建理论模型分析产业内国际贸易垄断发展与贸易保护主义问题。针对产品生产经营国际化进程中面临的产业内国际垄断限制,从规模报酬递增角度分析产品跨国生产经营网络扩展与产业内国际贸易垄断的新发展问题。基于报酬递增的产品跨国生产经营网络扩展的主要目的在于获得比较优势,降低产品生产经营的平均成本和边际成本。产业内国际贸易垄断是跨国企业或者跨国企业集团对某一产业内的商品进出口活动的排他性和独占性控制,在技术密集型制成品、关键性原材料、以石油为典型代表的能源产品和服务产品国际贸易领域表现更为明显;必须制定适应中国经济快速发展特点的大国战略性国际贸易政策。如何充分发挥中国与其他国家在双边与多边贸易中的比较优势,克服双边与多边进出口贸易中的问题和矛盾,防止贸易保护主义的发生是各国共同面临的任务。

第九,本书分析了金融危机与贸易保护主义问题。随着经济全球化和世界经济金融化程度的不断提高,各种类型的金融危机不断涌现,金融是信用扩张与金融监管之间的矛盾、实体经济与虚拟经济之间的矛盾发展到一定阶段的强制性缓解。国际金融危机背景下的贸易保护主义表现出多样性特点。如果不考虑国际货币体系中的储备货币供给的寡头垄断结构、美国实体经济中的产业垄断特别是军工产业的寡头垄断结构及其对美国普通制造业竞争力的影响效应,则难以从更深的层次对2008年金融危机进行内生化解释。贸易保护主义在金融危机期间表现更为明显,一些新的贸易保护主义观点和措施会不断产生。传统贸易保护主义抬头的同时出现了新贸易保护主义的新形式,出现了专门针对“中国产品”、“中国人”的“中国条款”式歧视性贸易保护主义。我国必须从战略高度把握国际经济格局调整与演变的长远趋势,充分利用此次国际金融危机提供的历史机遇,推动国际政治格局的调整与演变,维护我国的国际政治与战略安全利益,制定“有理、有利、有节”的应对策略。

总之,本书在借鉴已有研究成果的基础上,以中国与其他国家的贸易数据和案例为实证依据,构建静态和动态分析理论模型,从国际政治经济学角度对贸易保护主义的产生、发展、演变与影响效应进行理论解释,构建贸易保护主义国际政治经济学的基本理论分析框架,提出防止贸易保护主义消极影响的论点与公共政策建议。

ABSTRACT

This book, set in the background of extensive emergence of benefit conflicts, trade friction and collision among countries in international community under the condition of globalization, taking empirical evidence from trade development and friction among China, European Union, United States, Japan and other major world trade economies as well as between China and other developing countries, on the basis of achievements of modern political economy and economic theories, carries out theoretical analysis and model explanation, from the perspective of international political economy, makes an endogenous explanation of the emergence, development, evolution and influence of trade protectionism, theoretically and empirically constructs theoretical explanation framework, an international political economy analysis of trade protectionism, and furthermore proposes several arguments and public policy suggestions aiming at global public governance and harmonious development of world economy. There are nine chapters in this book.

Firstly, this book, based on the definition and explanation of related concepts in trade protectionism and international political economy, presents theoretical and practical background, literature foundation, framework and main content of the formation of trade protectionism international political economy. International political economy of trade protectionism, is a system of comprehensive theoretical elaboration and empirical analysis of trade protectionism ideas, policies and phenomena in the world, from the view of interactive impacts between politics and economy. It is an actual example of international political economy theories applying in trade protectionism, and also an important branch of international political economic theories. Inter-dependence theory, hegemony stability theory, nationalism theory, dependency theory and world system theory, as the basis of modern international political economy theory system, have expanded and enriched traditional international relations and political economy theories, while there are still shortcomings so that further improvement and completion is needed. An indispensable reason for global dissemination of trade protectionism is its global governance mechanism defect. The rationality hypothesis of behavior subjects in trade protectionism and modern international political economy, is based on the premise that individuals, households, enterprises, govern-

ments and international organizations, as international behavior subjects, have evaluable and optional behavior collection.

Secondly, this book constructs theoretical models from the point of view of mechanism establishment of international benefit conflicts, international political business cycle transmission and international governance, conducts an analysis of micro-mechanisms, macro-context, and political incentives and environments both home and abroad. International economic benefit conflicts can spill over to other countries through micro-mechanisms, and can also infiltrate into one country from outside; the micro-motives to readjust international economic benefit pattern result in instability and risk of the international trade and open countries' economic growth. Trade policy-making has to take into consideration of interest of native consumers and enterprises, in steady of confining in the macro-targets, and it is essential to prevent the negative impact of international economic benefit conflicts upon trade and economic growth in this country through micro-channels. Economic growth rate, economic scale, industry and economy structure, geographic location and resources endowment of economic activities, economic institution, historical and cultural background and social ideology, are the main macro-variables that influence the readjustment of international economic benefit structure; benefit conflicts are most fierce in international economic development goals, macro-economic policies, international trade policies and economic institution and rules; Macro-conflicts of international economic benefit certainly influences Chinese trade and investment activities, which is detrimental to democracy of international economic relationships and construction of renewed international economic order that is fair and reasonable, and so native economic policies should be adjusted timely according to macro-elements and manifestation of international economic interest conflicts. The introduction of trade protectionism policy is itself a dynamic game of benefit groups, which exhibits certain political business cycle characteristics. More often would a political business cycle resulted from trade protectionism happen when there is a higher time discount factor. The international governance of trade protectionism has to be feasible, practical and irreplaceable and has to be under participative constraint, incentive and compatible constraint as well as Pareto improvement conditions. In order to avoid global vicious dissemination of trade protectionism and political business cycle, it is essential to establish and improve related international governance mechanism, on the basis of existing world trade mechanism and regional trade arrangement.

Next, this research, constructs dynamic trade model of large country, drawing empirical evidence from trade data of China, EU and ASEAN (Association of South East

Asian Nations), three open economies, analyzes trade protectionism in large-open-economy. During trade development of large open countries, import and export proportion in GNP relates positively with GDP. The imbalance of import and export trade among large-open-economy countries, is an important manifestation of, for one hand, external imbalance during economic growth and development, and, for the other, inner imbalance of the economies; the trade imbalance turns out to be cyclical and dynamic, and has a close interactive effect on dynamic imbalance of economic growth. Trade growth of large open economies exerts an influence on native, regional and international economic growth, with effects of both economic spur and trade friction, large-country-monopoly and multinational monopoly benefit groups, and thus causes damage to medium and small countries and developing economies.

Fourthly, set in the background of change in global inventory and international trade dependence, this book explores neo-trade protectionism and its development issues. The answer is not the same as to whether it is worthwhile and possible for trade protection for large and small economies. It is feasible to upgrade relative competitive advantages of weak industries utilizing scale economic effect of large countries. The main characteristics of recent development of neo-protectionism in trade are, for one thing, protection of both advantageous industries and sunset industries, and, for the other, innovation in ideological tools in trade protectionism. In order to respond to strike of neo-protectionism in trade to Chinese import and export trade, it is imperative to make strategic trade policies with Chinese socialist market economy features. Economic goods, apart from free goods for native use, international public goods can be divided into three categories, i. e. , and international club goods. The first category is mainly produced and supplied by home country, the second category is provided by world union, and the club ones are offered by multinational union. The economy scale of a country directly influences ways and policies of its participation in international economic cooperation, while relationships of large countries directly impact on modes and performances of international regional economic cooperation. The significance and proportion of international public goods and club goods in international economy would consistently increase. It is common tasks for China and other countries to overcome various constraints, to fully utilize advantages, to construct international regional economic cooperation to both benefits and interests, and to prevent negative impact of neo-trade protectionism upon world trade and economic development.

Fifthly, this book explores the issues on the hegemony countries, world economy and trade protectionism. Based on the related literature of international political economy (IPE), this book analyses the hegemony and stability of the world economy with dynamic

theoretical models. Although the hegemony countries are active players in the development of the world economy, but there is not direct positive or negative relations between the hegemony countries and the stability and the world economy. Any hegemony country, which is global hegemony or club hegemony, can calculate the income coming from hegemony and the provision of the public goods, but the calculation methods and income content change always because of changing of the income content and resources allocation. Must to satisfy with some certain conditions, the behaviors of the hegemony countries can lead to the ability or un-ability of the world economy, and the hegemony countries are neutral. In the world, however, global hegemony countries, club hegemony countries and their respective groups, would conduct cost and return calculation of economic and political activities when providing goods to seek hegemony profits.

Sixthly, this book, based on related research and empirical data, discusses correlations between geographic location and trade protectionism. The new Europe-Asia continental bridge, Sino-Kazakhstan oil pipeline and a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements, commonly provide satisfied supply and demand base for international public goods and club goods of international regional economic cooperation. Geographic location advantages and effective supply of international products are important conditions and fundamental premises of full elaboration of relative advantages of world trade and international regional economic cooperation. There are both relative advantages and risk in bilateral trade and inter-regional cooperation. China has become an important trade partner of its neighbouring countries, whose dependence on China market has deepened but varied in depth. It is an important issue to eliminate imbalance and instability in bilateral economic and trade relations in order to strengthen bilateral and multi-lateral regional cooperation. It is practical to promote bilateral regional economic cooperation under the framework of China-ASEAN free trade zone, so that it can be a link or bridge in cooperation between China and ASEAN countries in economy. And it is imperative to prevent trade protectionism resulted from geographical location elements.

Seventhly, this book makes an research on institutional transition and trade protectionism, taking empirical support from transition and international trade development data of China, Vietnam and the DPRK in transition. Economic institution of western market economies is not the only choice and reference standard for any economic transition country while positive effects exist in interactive imitation and learning in transitional countries. The later transition countries could learn a lot from the former ones while still face trade protectionism. As bilateral trade between China and Vietnam progresses, the two countries' inter-dependence increases, while the instability and imbalance of the bilateral

trade is still obvious with the existence of contradictions and problems. Under the framework of Sino-ASEAN free trade zone, it is feasible to solve the bilateral conflicts and friction by strengthening international regional cooperation. It is essential to fasten the construction of Beibu-bay economic circle and two international economic corridors. China's experience in economic transition has imitation and learning effect to other countries. It has to consider bilateral trade between China and other transitional economies under the framework of regional economic cooperation. It has to expand bilateral exchange and cooperation in economy and trade between China and other transitional countries and to avoid trade protectionism resulted from institutional change.

Eighthly, having a review of related literature, based on the evidence from data of industry development and trade in relevant countries, this book conducts an analysis of inner industrial trade monopoly development and protectionism by constructing theoretical models. In light of international monopoly restriction in the industry during internationalization of production and operation, from the view of increasing returns to scale, it analyzes new issues of international expansion of production and operation networks as well as inner-industrial trade monopoly. The main objective of international expansion of production and operation networks on the basis of increasing returns to scale is to obtain relative advantages and to reduce average cost and marginal cost in production and operation. Inner industrial trade monopoly is exclusive and monopolized control of import and export activities by international enterprises and their groups; it is much more obvious in word trade fields, mainly including technology-intensive manufactures, core raw materials, energy products with a typical example of oil and service products. It is imperative to make strategic trade policies of large country that is fit for fast economic growth in China. How to make full use of relative advantages of multi-lateral and bilateral trade, to overcome its problems and contradictions and to prevent trade protectionism is common problems for all countries.

Lastly, this book analyses the relations between the financial crises and trade protectionism. Some new form financial crises teem with the development of economic globalization and financial sector in the world, and financial crises are the results of contradictions among credit expansion, financial administration, economic entity and financial sector. We can't find the real main reasons causing financial crisis in USA since 2008 if we ignore the oligopoly structures of international reserve money and American industry development. The new trade protectionism policies and behaviors show in the period of international crisis while the traditional trade protectionism policies always stop international trade. China is one of the largest counties facing all sorts of traditional and new trade pro-

tectionism in international financial crisis since 2008, and there are coming forth some special trade protectionism behaviors for China's good exports in developed countries, especially in the USA and the EU, while some other new trade protectionism policies for China show in developing countries such as India, Mexico and so on. China should take some useful countermeasures to deal with trade protectionism in the period of international financial crisis.

In summary, this book, based on the achievements of previous research and empirical evidence from trade data and cases, constructs static and dynamic theoretical models, analyzes the formation, development, evolution and influence effects of trade protectionism from the perspective of international political economy, establishes basic theoretical analysis framework of international political economy of trade protectionism, makes arguments to prevent the negative impact of protectionism and policy choice.

目 录

第 1 章 贸易保护主义国际政治经济学：文献、逻辑起点与微观机制	1
1.1 贸易保护主义与国际政治经济学	1
1.2 文献述评：一个批评性的回顾	4
1.3 贸易保护主义国际政治经济学研究的逻辑起点：国际行为主体 理性假设	13
1.4 贸易保护主义的国际政治经济学分析：相互依赖的微观机制	16
1.5 本章小结	19
第 2 章 贸易保护主义产生的政治动因：利益冲突与政治商业周期	21
2.1 贸易保护主义产生的微观动因：国际微观利益冲突	21
2.2 贸易保护主义的宏观动因与表现：国际宏观利益冲突	27
2.3 利益集团博弈与政治商业周期跨国传播	37
2.4 本章小结	47
第 3 章 开放经济大国的贸易保护主义：大国贸易模型	49
3.1 大国贸易与经济增长：开放经济大国模型	49
3.2 全球经济增长与进出口贸易增长相关性分析	54
3.3 欧洲同中国的国内生产总值与贸易增长关系比较分析	57
3.4 来自中国 与 欧盟 9 国的经验证据	63
3.5 大规模开放经济体间贸易不平衡对世界经济增长的影响	67
3.6 中国与东盟间的进出口贸易	72
3.7 本章小结	80
附表	82
第 4 章 新贸易保护主义及其发展：全球存货变化与贸易依存度	95
4.1 贸易保护主义与新贸易保护主义的新发展	95
4.2 世界经济一体化中的全球存货变化分析	104

4.3	贸易依存度与贸易发展：中国与蒙古国	115
4.4	增长、人口与贸易发展：中国与外高加索三国	124
4.5	本章小结	131
第5章	霸权国家、世界经济与贸易保护主义	132
5.1	霸权国家与世界经济稳定性	132
5.2	霸权国家与世界经济稳定与非稳定条件	133
5.3	霸权中性与世界经济：理论解释	135
5.4	霸权利益计算与贸易保护主义	137
5.5	美国维护还是破坏了世界经济的稳定：实证分析	141
5.6	本章小结	149
第6章	地理区位、贸易发展与贸易约束	150
6.1	地理区位毗邻与贸易发展：中国与哈萨克斯坦	150
6.2	地理区位毗邻与国际贸易约束：中国与老挝	161
6.3	地理区位毗邻、直接投资与贸易：中国与蒙古国	169
6.4	地理区位与贸易约束：中国与外高加索三国	179
6.5	本章小结	191
第7章	经济转型、制度变迁与贸易发展	193
7.1	经济转型、国际贸易与贸易保护主义：中国与越南	193
7.2	经济转型、比较优势与贸易发展：中国与朝鲜	198
7.3	本章小结	206
第8章	产业内贸易垄断与贸易保护主义	208
8.1	产业内国际贸易垄断的新发展	208
8.2	商品结构与贸易发展：中国与中亚五国	218
8.3	产业结构差异与贸易发展：中国与俄罗斯	227
8.4	本章小结	239
第9章	金融危机与贸易保护主义	240
9.1	国际金融危机背景下的贸易保护主义	240
9.2	国际金融危机特点、影响与趋势：以2008~2010年国际 金融危机为例	253
9.3	传统贸易保护主义与新贸易保护主义	258

9.4 “中国条款”式歧视性贸易保护主义的出现及其影响	260
9.5 政策选择	262
9.6 本章小结	265
参考文献.....	266
后记.....	281

CONTENTS

Chapter 1 The International Political Economy of Trade Protectionism: Literature, Study Logic and Microeconomic Mechanism	1
1.1 Trade Protectionism and International Political Economy	1
1.2 The Related Literature: A Critical Review	4
1.3 The Study Logic of International Political Economy of Trade Protectionism: Rationality Hypothesis of International Behavior Agents	13
1.4 Analysis of International Political Economy of Trade Protectionism: Inter-dependence Micro-mechanisms	16
1.5 Brief Sumarry	19
Chapter 2 Political Motives of Trade Protectionism: Interest Conflicts and Political Business Cycles	21
2.1 Micro-motives of Trade Protectionism: International Micro-benefit Conflicts	21
2.2 Macro-motives of Trade Protectionism: International Macro-benefit Conflicts	27
2.3 Benefit Group Games and International Spread of Political Business Cycle	37
2.4 Brief Sumarry	47
Chapter 3 Protectionism in Large Open Economies!	49
3.1 Trade and Economic Growth in Large Countries: A Model	49
3.2 Analysis of Correlation between Global Economic Growth and International Trade	54
3.3 Comparative Analysis on the Relations between GDP and Trade of China and the Europe	57
3.4 Evidence from China and Nine Countries of the EU	63