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
第六辑

NO.6

简帛文献与新启示

Excavated Texts and New Inspirations

刘笑敢 主编



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—目录—

纪念唐君毅百年诞辰特稿

- 唐君毅先生铜像揭幕仪式致辞 余英时 1
- One Meaning of Success: A Marriage of Economics and Ethics(成功
的意义:经济与道德的结合) Donald J. Munro(孟旦) 3

专论

- 出土简帛对文献考据方法的启示(之一):反思三种考据方法的推论
前提 刘笑敢 25
- 古今文献与读者之喜新守旧 顾史考(Scott Cook) 45
- 价值与局限:思想史视野下的出土文献研究 曹 峰 69
- 从上海简《诗论》看孔子的“民性”观 李 锐 101
- 战国时期的禅让思潮与“大同”“小康”说——兼论《礼运》的作者与
年代 梁 涛 119
- “生”“胥”“性”之辨与先秦人性论研究之方法论的检讨:以阮元、傅
斯年、徐复观相关论述及郭店竹简为中心(上) 丁四新 147
- 先秦儒家伦理思想的转向:以“忠”观念为中心的思想史考察
白 奚 161
- 战国时代“忠信”概念的发展与王道思想的形成 佐藤将之 181
- 先秦道家的道气论及其发展模式 陈丽桂 201
- 战国词汇发展的时序以及在楚简和其他先秦典籍研究中的应用
陶红印 217
- 无情与猖狂:论《庄子》中“无情”的两种诠释 陈金樑 243
- 庄子论技与道 方万全 259
- 追求伦理的现代性:梁启超的“道德革命”及其追随者(上) 黄进兴 287

新叶林

- Qian Mu's Criticism of Monotheism and Alienation in Modern Life
(钱穆对近现代一神论与异化的批判) Gad C. Isay(伊塞) 303

会议录

探寻中国哲学研究的新方向：“中大哲学系创系六十周年纪念、唐君毅百岁冥寿暨新亚书院六十周年院庆国际学术研讨会”综述

李承贵 327

回音谷

In Defense of Political Philosophy: Responding to Some Recent

Remarks by Professor Donald J. Munro(为政治哲学辩护:回应
孟旦教授)

Thomas A. Metzger(墨子刻) 331

Why New Psychological Findings are Relevant to Ethics: Second

Reply to Professor Thomas Metzger(为何心理学的新发现与道
德息息相关:再复墨子刻教授)

Donald J. Munro(孟旦) 345

Environmental Protection and “Foreknowledge”: Reflections Prompted

by Obama’s Visit to China(环保与“前见”:由奥巴马访华而引
发的反思)

Donald J. Munro(孟旦) 353

编后语

新方向,新在哪里? 刘笑敢

357

友刊目录

Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy

361

《思想史研究》

365

《中国哲学史》

367

稿约

《中国哲学与文化》稿约

369

唐君毅先生铜像揭幕仪式致辞

余英时

编者按:2009年乃纪念唐君毅先生百年诞辰之时。香港中文大学哲学系校友会在新亚书院和中文大学支持下,发起为纪念唐先生募款以铸塑纪念铜像。2009年5月20日铜像正式揭幕。新亚书院第一届校友、新亚书院前院长和香港中文大学前副校长、2006年克鲁格奖(John W. Kluge Prize)获得者余英时先生应邀为铜像撰写铭文(见本刊第五辑),并为揭幕仪式发表录像感言。余先生高度评价唐先生在香港的中国哲学教育事业中的伟大贡献以及推动中国文化在国际社会中传播发展的不懈努力。本刊征得余英时先生首肯,有幸发表录像感言记录稿,以资缅怀唐君毅先生。

我很高兴有机会为唐君毅先生的铜像写了一篇铭文。我觉得,中文大学特别是哲学系能够想到这样一个方案纪念唐先生,这是极为重要也极有意义的。为什么呢?我们可以这样说,在1949年的时候,有许多的高级知识人都到香港来了。这些人都是要对本国的文化以及世界的新文化有一种开放的态度。唐先生在这个时候到了香港,跟钱穆先生,还有其他的先生像张丕介先生一起办这个新亚书院,是一个极重大的文化上的决定。这个文化上的决定后来产生的影响我们今天已经看得清楚了。尤其唐先生在哲学方面,可以说是他打下的天下。唐先生没有到香港以前,据我所知,香港大学并没有教“中国哲学”,任何其他的报纸上也很少谈到“哲学”两个字。所以,香港之有哲学特别是有中国哲学是从唐君毅先生开始的。所以,唐先生在这方面的倡导功能,我们是要永远纪念的。

如果不是唐先生,就不会有后来的香港在许多思想方面的新的发展。我并不是说唐先生个人的学说、个人的哲学理论,我们都应该接受,我的意思是说唐先生倡导中国文化,中国文化的价值,特别是从哲学观点阐明文化的价值对我们的意义,是起了极大的作用的。也可以说,后

来的实践证明唐先生的理想是当年中国所需要的。唐先生很重视道德意识,他认为人的道德意识可以说是文化创造的根源。他个人就是带着道德意识到香港,而他这个道德意识在新亚发生了很大的作用,就种下了根源,然后这个根源就发展出枝枝叶叶,所以,有很大的繁盛。到后来 1958 年唐先生写《中国文化与世界宣言》,他当然不是一个人的意见,可以说代表了一大部分爱护中国文化的人士的智慧,包括老一辈的张君勱先生,也包括牟宗三先生和徐复观先生。这个宣言也是非常有影响的,而这个宣言据我所知道的,基本上是唐先生起草的。我并不是说这个宣言我们都应该接受,每一句话都是真理。但是,至少这个宣言发生了文化的推动的作用,先是保存中国文化,进一步是从保存中间推陈出新,这是唐先生在新亚、在香港发生的一连串的作用,而且这个作用有越来越大的趋势。唐先生 1974 年退休,1978 年逝世,但我们在形式方面还没有给他一个适当的纪念。今天,哲学系的以及新亚的受过唐先生教育的许多同人决定要建立这样一个铜像,我觉得这是一个重大的文化上的发展,也是一个文化上的标志,这说明我们几十年来,1949 年到今天,整整六十年来香港的文化面貌所起的重大的变化,而这个变化里面一个最重要的因素就是唐君毅先生。所以,我很高兴唐先生的铜像能在孔子铜像旁边竖立起来。以孔子之道济世是唐先生一生最大的心愿。谢谢各位。

One Meaning of Success: A Marriage of Economics and Ethics *

(成功的意义:经济与道德的结合)

Donald J. Munro (孟旦)**

Foreword

In part, these pages are for a philosophical audience. But the approach in them is not common in that field's professional publications. For one thing, the paper draws information about current economic policies, and events that followed from them, from newspapers and magazines, speeches and interviews. My first reason for taking this approach is to describe how an awareness of certain positive ethical values is likely to arise when an urgent social problem is present, and that conditions may then be favorable for the promotion and practice of those values. As a concrete example, the paper focuses on the fiscal crisis that emerged in the fall of 2008. My second reason is to point to opportunities thereby open to philosophers for their own uncommon but still professional actions. During such times, philosophers have unique talents for identifying ethical issues embodied in economic and political policies and behaviors, even though for a time most of the principal players may be unaware of those issues. Reading the signals of a crisis and opinions about it in public sources, philosophers can gain a perspective that may differ from that in official pronouncements about the crisis. That perspective in turn may reveal to them a service they can provide to the public (voters, investors, stakeholders). Philosophers can show those citizens how less familiar values at play in the crisis actually have a crucial

* This paper was first presented as a keynote speech at the "New Directions in Chinese Philosophy: International Conference Celebrating the 60th Anniversary of the Department of Philosophy, CUHK, the Centenary of Tang Chun-I and the 60th Anniversary of New Asia College", The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 18-21 May 2009. Special thanks for comments on and suggestions for this paper by Professor William W. Sihler of the Darden Schools of Business at the University of Virginia; T. Douglas Hollowell, Executive Vice-President and General Counsel, TYGRIS Commercial Finance Group, Inc.; Professor Carl Cohen, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, University of Michigan; Edward Sihler; Ann P. Munro; Cathy Bowerman; and Nancy Hollowell.

** Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and Chinese, University of Michigan, U. S. A. (E-mail: dmunro@umich.edu)

role in fostering or damaging values that people already know and cherish, and that they may wish to defend. As someone interested in workable ethics, I think there is a legitimate place for some philosophers publicly to identify and explain the ethical matters raised by such a crisis. I will describe below the other aspect of my approach: drawing information from some of the new sciences.

Introduction

During her campaign for the U. S. presidential nomination, Hillary Clinton said that, “There is a moral imperative to ensure that quality affordable health care is available to all Americans.” President Obama’s economic adviser, Lawrence Summers, also said that such care is “a moral imperative.”^① In the winter of 2008, months into the crisis caused by the burst of the U. S. home ownership bubble and the failure of many financial services companies, the columnist Thomas Friedman wrote,

The Madoff affair [a pyramid fraud of over \$ 50 billion dollars] is the cherry on top of a national breakdown in financial propriety, regulations and common sense. Which is why we don’t just need a financial bailout; we need an ethical bailout. We need to re-establish the core balance between our markets, ethics, and regulations.^②

The previous month, in criticizing the conservative view that private greed has good public consequences, the Nobel-prize economist Paul Krugman had cited Franklin Roosevelt’s second inaugural address, “We have always known that heedless self-interest was bad morals; we know now that it is bad economics.” Krugman continued,

And right now happens to be one of those times when the con-

① Lawrence H. Summers, “The Economic Agenda: Challenges Facing the Next President,” *Harvard Magazine*, September-October 2008, <http://harvardmagazine.com/2008/09/the-economic-agenda.html>

② Thomas Friedman, “The Great Unraveling,” *The New York Times* (hereafter NYT), 17 December 2008, p. 29.

verse is also true, and good morals are good economics. Helping the neediest in a time of crisis, through expanded health and unemployment benefits, is the morally right thing to do; it's also a far more effective form of economic stimulus than cutting the capital gains tax.^③

All of these are powerful words, but none of those who now advocate this marriage of economics and ethics have given us much help in knowing what is the content of the moral imperatives that should be bound up with economics. To correct this deficiency and provide some of the content for what is desirable and necessary in ethics, to combine with economics, is the point of this talk. Unavoidably, and with apologies to a philosophical audience, I must spend some time on the core features of the financial crisis.

But then I will turn to what philosophers East and West can contribute to its correction. In so doing, I will use an approach that also constitutes one new direction in philosophy. Thus Chinese philosophy may consider as one of the new global directions, the healthy movement that draws information from evolutionary psychology and those cognitive neurosciences that are relevant to ethics. Beside my own work, some other scholars associated with this movement as it applies to Chinese philosophy are David Wong of Duke University, Edward Slingerland of the University of British Columbia, and Hagop Sarkissian of the City University of New York. I do not mean to imply that an approach must be "new" to have great significance. Philosophy is not like a commercial product such as soap that must be new and improved in order to have an audience. There is much wisdom also in earlier directions in philosophy.

The Economic Model

The popular operational economic principles found in the United States at the time of the collapse of 2008 included these items. First, short-term material profit was the operational standard of success for most corporations and many other organizations, when the executives did their periodic P and

^③ Paul Krugman, "The Obama Agenda," *NYT*, 7 October 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/opinion/07iht-edkrugman.1.17624497.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=%20The%20Obama%20Agenda%22&st=cse

L (profit and loss) examinations. I emphasize “short-term.” When I was here at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 2006 as a Tang Junyi Visiting Professor, I criticized this practice, saying, “While deserving of attention, this standard [the popular economic standard of success] alone ignores whether a policy, idea, or product is beneficial or not to the public, particularly taking a long-term perspective.” The corporate ritual of a quarterly performance review of everyone from managers to CEOs also reinforces the short-term view. Those employees with below average earning results for the company in the quarter under review may be fired. There are also short-term attempts to cause a rise in a stock’s prices.

Another factor promoting short-term interest at the popular level was the retail distribution and ownership of equities among ordinary Americans, culturally manifest in the growth in the 1990s of “24 Hour Financial News” in outlets such as CNBC and Bloomberg. As a historical matter, from 1860 to 1930, the state laws that authorized people to conduct business as a “corporation” actually prohibited such businesses from considering matters other than the legality and profitability of their corporation. Then corporations were small and had few shareholders. Such a position was not appropriate for the evolving large multi-state or multi-national conglomerates with thousands of shareholders that we know today. Gradually, after the U. S. depression and World War II, the doctrine softened. The watershed 1953 case was *A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. vs. Barlow*. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a gift by the company to Princeton University, arguing that shareholders would benefit because it would bring goodwill to the company. By the beginning of the 21st century, the profit maximization norm had been relaxed, and, as some changes in corporate governance took place, the serious discussion of long-term social benefits began to occur. ④

④ Donald J. Munro, *Ethics in Action* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2008), p. 4. I am grateful to Professor William W. Sihler of The Darden School [of Business], The University of Virginia, for information about the quarterly performance review. Sihler also discusses the origin of asset-backed securities, later called derivatives, in Richard D. Crawford and William W. Sihler, *The Troubled Money Business: The Death of an Old Order and the Rise of a New Order* (New York: HarperBusiness, 1992), p. 167. I am especially grateful to Douglas Hollowell for explaining to me the evolution of and eventual softening of the early state focus on profitability. On the more recent relaxation of the norm of profit maximization and opening of a place for social benefits, due to changes in corporate governance, see Kent Greenfield, “Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool,” 8 July 2001, Boston College Law School Research Paper No. 2001-06, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=276168>. Long before (转下页)

Today, many believe that social goals enhance profitability in the long run. Those in charge of marketing and branding believe so. The short-term perspective plays into our human weakness of will or motivational preference for short-term benefits that may end up being harmful, rather than long-term results that are more difficult to calculate.

To the degree that a corporation is isolated from the community containing its offices or factories, it may get away with ignoring the long-term outlook. That outlook usually includes impact on a community or community social benefit. In the summer of 2002, the board of the Hershey Trust that had a controlling interest in Hershey Foods acted on a decision about which the community in Pennsylvania, where Hershey Foods is based, was not consulted. The board had decided to sell the entire company to Wrigley. This was contrary to the founding wishes of Milton S. Hershey, for his wealth to be used "for a purpose of enduring good." Among other things besides jobs, the community depended on the company for funding a school for the disadvantaged, and for the maintenance of the spa, hotel and gardens that brought many tourists to the town. The reaction of the community was so negative and widely publicized, that the board repudiated its own plan. In the end, for many who follow news about the corporate world, the case revealed how cooperation between community and company, including a concern with long-term social benefits, can create a win-win situation for all. Indeed, this happened. An evolutionary psychologist who had studied chimpanzee behavior could have predicted this outcome for cooperation among human mammals, having learned how it works for chimps.

Second, in private institutions or in government agencies, it was not one of the priority responsibilities for the leaders to provide accessible factual knowledge to stakeholders (shareholders, employees, local community citizens) about the financial instruments in which they or the company invests. Nor did many large institutional investors, such as pension funds, demand that factual information, as their fiduciary duties would have suggested. They had far more ability to be informed than did individual investors. Many ordinary people invest through a mutual fund and rely on the judgment of fund managers, whose interests may be different from their own. The phrase "factual knowledge" concerns magnitude of risk of the invest-

(接上页) this, about half of 82 large corporations studied treated social responsibility as one of their goals. See Y. K. Shelly, "A New Look at Corporate Goals," *California Management Review* 16. 2 (1979): 71-79.

ment paper sold by a company. Simply put, if the company was insuring an activity or enterprise with risks that were known in some degree, it did not clarify whether or not it had the money to sustain the value it assigned to the risk, in bad times or good. "Risk" refers to the future value of the paper being sold or insured and to the future well-being of the individuals who buy it. In the long run, it also refers to the well-being of society and the environment. Instead, if there were default positions, they were either toleration of ignorance or policies of secrecy.

One institutional reason for public ignorance of risk was caused in 2004 by the federal agency in charge of regulating bank risk, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It permitted large investment banks to raise by a huge amount the ratio of their debt to their equity (up to at least 30 to 1). The SEC did not publicize the enhanced risk to ordinary investors.

But there were several other reasons for the toleration of ignorance. One was the generally obsessive love affair with debt that has characterized American society over the past quarter century, which meant it was socially acceptable to accumulate and then disregard debt. One causal factor was the decline in the American industrial and manufacturing sectors beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in a lower GDP. During the 1980s, the Reagan administration sought to make up the lost GDP by increasing consumer spending on goods and services through easily accessible consumer credit. The contrast between the negligible savings of individual American families and East Asian families is striking. No wonder that in going into debt, the U. S. government borrows primarily from Asians and the Middle East, rather than from its own citizens. And the Bush administration's own disinterest toward debt was known around the world. Another cause of the American toleration of ignorance was the complexity of the investment instruments involved in the debt. In many cases, these were packages of mortgages or of slices of mortgages ("tranches") having varying degrees of risk and bearing varying interests, which neither regulators nor rating agencies understood. Yet another reason for tolerating ignorance was the desire of professional financial people and regulators not to rock the boat of Wall Street, thereby endangering their own career possibilities. In the future, they might want to work there.

A third economic principle operative before the collapse concerns assumptions about human nature and human psychology. Executives claimed to know (or assumed that they knew) all that was necessary about human nature and society, and in consequence supposed that there was no need for

them to look for new facts or challenge their own assumptions. A principal assumption was that private self-interest will automatically benefit society as a whole. ⑤ Adam Smith's idea of an invisible hand that keeps a balance between self-interest and public good, is one source of this archaic idea. Many high officials, including the former Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan, were influenced by the Ayn Rand position on the pervasive legitimacy of self-interest. The other main assumption was that there are mathematical rules that can always predict future human choices. "Always" means that the mathematicians or physicists (called "quants") did not believe they needed to change their formulae to account for new information on risks and liquidity. In particular, heads of financial institutions assumed that most buyers would continue to choose to pay top price for houses, the expansion of the housing market would endure indefinitely, and that large scale defaults were therefore not to be feared. But assumptions such as these were not well warranted, not sound, and not universally applicable. One core problem was that, as a statistical matter, mortgages usually have a 3% default rate. The quants assumed that if a bank bought enough of even "non-investment grade" bonds to have the statistically relevant size (say, 25,000-30,000 individual mortgages), then that bunch of bonds could have a triple A rating. In the end, the former Goldman Sachs quant and current Columbia University professor Emanuel Derman, summed it up this way: "Recent events have invalidated all of the models we had." ⑥

Foreknowledge

By examining information gleaned from the new sciences, I will identify an ethical value, "foreknowledge" (*qianjian* 前见). This is a knowledge of risks and advantages that facilitates any good choices by individuals and groups. It is knowledge based on factual information about the consequences of choices (risks and benefits) for our core values. Among these

⑤ Peter Steinfels, "Economics: The Invisible Hand of the Market," *NYT*, 25 November 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/25/us/25beliefs.html?scp=1&sq=%22Economics%20The%20Invisible%20Hand%20of%20the%20Market%22&st=cse>

⑥ Steve Lohr, "Modeling Risk, Financial Engineers Didn't Account for Human Factor," *NYT*, 5 November 2008, pp. 1, 5. Emanuel Derman is quoted in the very informative article by Dennis Overbye, entitled, "They Tried to Outsmart Wall Street," in *NYT*, "Science Times," 10 March 2009, pp. D1, D4.

core values are health and psychological well-being. It is *not* prognostication or fortune telling based on the finding of *signs* for fortune telling or reading the future.

Foreknowledge is not as common to most people as the values they learn early on in families, churches, or schools: the equal worth of all human lives (“all men are created equal”), fairness, trust, care of kin, and respect. But it is essential to realizing most of them. This is especially true of an individual or group’s health and psychological well-being, on which their lives depend. It is a requirement for truly wise choices about our bodies and resources, and those of our families and communities. This role of foreknowledge is the justification for governments’ duty to provide muscle through laws to ensure that people have access to such factual information in many aspects of their lives. The laws should be backed up by criminal or civil sanctions. In the financial world, the laws may be embodied in regulations about degree of permissible risk that institutions may undertake for items they insure or sell, and requirements for that information to be transparent.

Humans are universally capable of foreknowledge. When sought, it is a value with evolutionary advantages for humans in a wide range of life circumstances. To call it an ethical value flags the fact that there is an imperative on all parties to act and honor it. In the end, the cooperative behavior on which society’s health depends is grounded upon foreknowledge because only with such knowledge may a person exercise that foresight about which choices lead to life benefits and which lead to dangers.

I am a non-traditional utilitarian. I judge choices and acts by their consequences, namely joy and suffering. These are the ways in which the body manifests health and well-being. Unlike traditionalists, I do not advocate quantitative calculation of joy and suffering; I am content with the informal and probabilistic, educated choices available when information is accessible. To treat health and well-being as part of an ultimate standard for evaluations has a distant cousin in the reference by some Confucians, including Tang Junyi, to treat honoring the production and reproduction of life (*sheng sheng buyi* 生生不已) as a Heavenly goal.

Foreknowledge comes about through the neural networks involved in learning. At the cellular level, learning involves strengthening synapses. Genes design the neurons, and each one has about 70 synapses connecting it to other neurons. The brain causes dopamine neurons or cells to react to bad predictions of the future with surprise and to flag positive outcomes. Learn-

ing occurs here and is part of the process of making and revising choices. Making choices is something our brains have evolved to do over a long course of time. We can change beliefs and make new choices as a result of what we learn, including information in our culture or social environment that affects our foreknowledge. In a summary example of what is involved, two evolutionary biologists say that learning influences evolution and evolution influences learning. For instance, "...individuals that learn to predict during life also improve their food-finding ability during life." ^⑦

One of the basic human desires rooted in biology is foresight about the consequences of our acts. This is combined with a desire for some control over our resulting choices. The source is the biological instinct to avoid injury and achieve a positive result, achieved by being alert to good and bad choices, such as which path in the forest leads to water and which leads to predators. It also involves the ability to devise creative responses to danger. All of these illuminate the fact that foreknowledge plays a role in human self-preservation, a very great evolutionary advantage. In the words of the brain scientist Antonio Damasio,

Eventually, in a fruitful combination with past memories, imagination, and reasoning, feelings led to the emergence of foresight and possibility of creating novel, non-stereotypical responses. ^⑧

Foresight about other people's intentions involves mirror neurons. Mirror neurons are subsets of neurons in the brains of humans and monkeys that react when an individual does something, or when she looks at another individual doing something. We see someone yawn, and we yawn. They facilitate imitation. Mirror neurons give the observer an immediate internal comprehension of the other individual's inner experience, including intention and emotion. The Italian neuroscientists who first discovered the brain's mirror neurons have discussed their probable role in our ability to foresee the intentions of other people. By grasping the emotional content in their choices, we can often predict their choices. Herein lies an evolution-

^⑦ Stefano Nolfi and Jeffrey L. Elman, "Learning and Evolution in Neural Networks," *Adaptive Behavior* 3. 1 (1994): 5-28.

^⑧ Antonio Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain* (New York: Harcourt, 2003), p. 80.

ary advantage. As Giacomo Rizzolatti says,

Indeed, emotion is often a key contextual element that signals the intent of an action. That is why we and other research groups have also been exploring whether the mirror system allows us to understand what others feel in addition to what they do. ^⑨

Or, as the biologist Marc Hauser puts it,

And in humans, at least, these social relations often depend upon the development of a rich sense of self, empathic concern for others, and the ability to generate predictions about others' states of mind without any direct experience of their behavior. ^⑩

The ability and desire for foresight ultimately has come to be, as an evolutionary outcome, part of our nature, hard wired in our brains, as revealed in Steven Pinker's words,

The faculties underlying empathy, foresight, and self-respect are information-processing systems that accept input and commandeer other parts of the brain and body. ^⑪

With the addition of what we learn from our environments, from culture, and from other information sources, foresight can move from being only a gut instinct to being an informed insight. Sometimes our foresight is mistaken. But with information and experience, it can have a rich cognitive content, or true beliefs, about what conditions are most likely to lead to risk reduced, positive choices. For example, in the buying of financial derivatives (see below), our gut instinct is to rely on and accept the evaluations of public authority figures, as a short cut to personal investigations. An example would be relying on the credit rating of a derivative by a company

^⑨ Giacomo Rizzolatti, Leonardo Fogassi, and Vittorio Gallese, "Mirrors in the Mind," *Scientific American* 295.5 (Nov. 2006): 59-60.

^⑩ Marc Hauser, *Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong* (New York: Ecco, 2006), pp. 214, 313.

^⑪ Steven Pinker, *The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature* (New York: Viking, 2002), p. 166.