VOLUME TEN

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LANGUAGE &
LINGUISTICS

SECOND EDITION

语言与语言学百科全书

（第2版）

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
KEITH BROWN

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GUIDE TO USE OF THE ENCYCLOPEDIA

Structure of the Encyclopedia

The material in the Encyclopedia is arranged as a series of articles in alphabetical order. To help you realize the full potential of the material in the Encyclopedia we have provided several features to help you find the topic of your choice: an Alphabetical list of Articles, a Subject Classification, Cross-References and a Subject Index.

1. Alphabetical List of Articles

Your first point of reference will probably be the alphabetical list of articles. It provides a full alphabetical listing of all articles in the order they appear within the work. This list appears at the front of each volume, and will provide you with both the volume number and the page number of the article.

Alternatively, you may choose to browse through the work using the alphabetical order of the articles as your guide. To assist you in identifying your location within the Encyclopedia, a running head line indicates the current article.

You will also find 'dummy entries' for certain languages for which alternative language names exist within the alphabetical list of articles and body text.

For example, if you were attempting to locate material on the *Apalachee* language via the contents list, you would find the following:

Apalachee *See* Muskogean Languages.

The dummy entry directs you to the *Muskogean Languages* article.

If you were trying to locate the material by browsing through the text and you looked up *Apalachee*, you would find the following information provided in the dummy entry:

Apalachee *See:* Muskogean Languages.

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2. Subject Classification

The subject classification is intended for use as a thematic guide to the contents of the Encyclopedia. It is divided by subject areas into 36 sections; most sections are further subdivided where appropriate. The sections and subdivisions appear alphabetically, as do the articles within each section. For quick reference, a list of the section headings and subheadings is provided at the start of the subject classification.

Every article in the encyclopedia is listed under at least one section, and a large number are also listed under one or more additional relevant sections. Biographical entries are an exception to this policy; they are listed only under biographies. Except for a very few cases, repeat entries have been avoided within sections, and a given

article will appear only in the most appropriate subdivisions. Again, biographical entries are the main exception, with many linguists appearing in several subdivisions within biographies.

As explained in the introduction to the Encyclopedia, practical considerations necessitate that, of living linguists, only the older generation receive biographical entries. Those for members of the Encyclopedia's Honorary Editorial Advisory Board and Executive Editorial Board appear separately in Volume 1 and are not listed in the classified list of entries.

3. Cross-References

All of the articles in the Encyclopedia have been extensively cross-referenced. The cross-references, which appear at the end of each article, serve three different functions. For example, at the end of *Norwegian* article, cross-references are used:

1. to indicate if a topic is discussed in greater detail elsewhere

> Norwegian
> *See also:* Aasen, Ivar Andreas (1813–1896); Danish; Inflection and Derivation; Language/Dialect Contact; Language and Dialect: Linguistic Varieties; Morphological Typology; Norway: Language Situation; Norse and Icelandic; Scandinavian Lexicography; Subjects and the Extended Projection Principle; Swedish.

2. to draw the reader's attention to parallel discussions in other articles

> Norwegian
> *See also:* Aasen, Ivar Andreas (1813–1896); Danish; Inflection and Derivation; Language/Dialect Contact; Language and Dialect: Linguistic Varieties; Morphological Typology, Norway: Language Situation; Norse and Icelandic; Scandinavian Lexicography; Subjects and the Extended Projection Principle; Swedish.

3. to indicate material that broadens the discussion

> Norwegian
> *See also:* Aasen, Ivar Andreas (1813 –1896); Danish; Inflection and Derivation; Language/Dialect Contact; Language and Dialect: Linguistic Varieties; Morphological Typology; Norway: Language Situation; Norse and Icelandic; Scandinavian Lexicography; Subjects and the Extended Projection Principle; Swedish.

4. Subject Index

The index provides you with the page number where the material is located, and the index entries differentiate between material that is an entire article, part of an article, or data presented in a figure or table. Detailed notes are provided on the opening page of the index.

Other End Matter

In addition to the articles that form the main body of the Encyclopedia, there are 176 Ethnologue maps; a full list of contributors with contributor names, affiliations, and article titles; a List of Languages, and a Glossary. All of these appear in the last volume of the Encyclopedia.

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF ARTICLES
VOLUME 10

Note: Readers are urged to use the comprehensive name and subject indexes and the Classified List of Entries extensively, since the contents presented here represent only the broad framework of the *Encyclopedia*.

Poutsma, Hendrik (1856–1937)

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Hendrik Poutsma, one of the leading Dutch Anglicists of the early 20th century, was born in Gorredijk, the Netherlands, on December 7, 1856, the son of a headmaster of a municipal primary school. He began his career as a primary school teacher but qualified for a secondary school teaching certificate in English after a stay in England. This marked the beginning of a lifelong career as English master at a number of Dutch secondary schools. Poutsma's education and career mirror those of many early Anglicists in the Netherlands, which knew no tradition of English studies at the university level until 1886, when the first chair of English was established at the University of Groningen.

Poutsma's *magnum opus* is a multivolume, 3200-page grammar of English, published over a period of 22 years, intended for continental, and notably Dutch, students of English: the *Grammar of late modern English*. It offers a highly detailed and systematic description of English grammar. In his preface to the first edition, Poutsma professes to focus on the language of the last 200 years, but in fact he bases his description on a huge corpus of examples, also included in the book, ranging from Chaucer to contemporary newspapers, with 19th-century poets and novelists taking pride of place. Because of its sheer size, the *Grammar* is a reference work rather than a textbook. A more practical enterprise is *Do you speak English?*, which saw six editions between 1893 and 1930, and offers English vocabulary with Dutch translations. It provided some of the material for Ten Bruggencate's authoritative Dutch–English dictionary.

Although Poutsma did not train or teach at university and emphatically based his analysis on specimens of actual written language, his grammar is theoretical and complex. His framework of references shows that he placed his work within the context of theoreticians such as O. Jespersen and H. Sweet. E. Kruisinga, fellow Dutch Anglicist and Poutsma's junior by 19 years, is warmly acknowledged in the preface to part I of the second edition of the *Grammar* (1928). The *Grammar* was criticized for paying little attention to phonetics and word formation, and for overstepping the boundary between synchronic and diachronic syntax, but was nevertheless used at universities in Europe and America. Dutch appreciation for Poutsma's massive contribution to English language studies in 1932 was expressed with a honorary doctorate from the University of Amsterdam.

See also: Jespersen, Otto (1860–1943); Kruisinga, Etsko (1875–1944); Sweet, Henry (1845–1912); English in the Present Day (since ca. 1900).

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Power and Pragmatics

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Introduction

Pragmatics is concerned with meaning in the context of language use. Basically, when we communicate through language we often mean more than we say; there is often a gap between speaker meaning and sentence meaning. For example, why is it that we interpret *Can you pass the salt?* as a request and not simply a question? Why do we tend to interpret *John has three children* as meaning no more than three children? Why, when we say *some of the boys came to the party*, do we know that not all of the boys came to the party? And why do we find that certain utterances are paired, such as greeting/greeting, question/answer, or request/response? Pragmatic theories attempt to explain this knowledge by seeing communication as a process of rational and reasoned interpretation, which draws not only on linguistic structure but also shared and world knowledge, cultural norms, and individual components of specific interactional contexts (see Levinson, 1983, 2000; Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Yule, 1998; Mey, 2001;

Blakemore, 1992). The question we want to consider here is how this view of human communication is related to the operation of power in society.

Pragmatics, Power, and Language

Pragmatics is recognized as a branch of language study and in recent times the operationalization of power within, or through, the use of language in society has become a central concern of discourse analysis, sociolinguistics, and pragmatics. Textbooks are now giving specific emphasis to the area (see Mesthrie et al., 2000) and there are emergent branches of study, such as critical linguistics, critical discourse analysis, or critical sociolinguistics (see Fairclough, 2001; Wodak, 1996; Talbot et al., 2003), where it is the analysis of power within linguistic practices that is the core focus. The term 'critical' links these approaches closely with social theory and their central aim is to demystify the way in which language operates in society. The term 'power' is not always easily defined, however (see Thornborrow, 2001). Power can be ideological, economic, or cultural, for example, and within these confines, power can operate at a range of different levels: the social, individual, military, state-based, legal, and so on. Though all this is true, there is a general understanding that the operation of power is the ability to get an individual to behave or not to behave in a particular manner. Although this process may be realized in different ways and in different social environments, the pragmatic resources utilized may be of the same type. The problem is, of course, that not everyone has the same access to such resources, and, even when they do, not everyone has the same ability to use those resources in the same way. Hence, some individuals or groups may access or use pragmatic resources to maintain a position of power over others (Harris, 1984; Lakoff, 2000; Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998).

Consider, for example, the act of ordering someone to do X. Parents may order a child to be quiet, an army officer may order soldiers to *march*, or a police officer may order a motorist to *stop*. Orders or commands such as *Stop!*, *Be quiet*, or *Quick march*, are imperative forms that function to signal a specific action or, as it is known, a 'speech act' (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969) (*see* Speech Acts). Speech acts frequently have linguistic markers that indicate which act is being performed, such as *I apologize*, or *I order you to X*, but frequently the act is underlying or indirect, as in *(I order you) March!* But equally important in producing speech acts is the recognition that certain conditions hold, such as X has the authority, right, or power to order Y. In the examples

above, this power condition is institutionalized within the system of parental control, within the legal system for traffic law, and within the formal authority of army hierarchy. Thus, although we can all produce orders, we do not all have access to formal roles that ensure the order is carried out. Hence, in contexts such as schools, medical encounters, or certain forms of business organizations, the power to utilize selected pragmatic resources is differentially distributed (Drew and Heritage, 1992; Bourdieu, 1991; Lippi-Green, 1997) (*see* Institutional Talk).

This type of control may be seen in the organization of talk in interaction. Here, there are issues of not only who can say what, but who can speak when and about what topic. Studies of the distribution and organization of taking turns at talk clearly show that in schools it is the teacher who organizes and distributes the turns at talk (Coulthard, 1977). Similarly, in the doctor's surgery, it is the doctor who is in control; it is his job to ask the questions and the patient's job is simply to respond (Wodak, 1996). In these contexts, there is an interactional asymmetry in relation to responsibility for talk organization. Indeed, in the case of either the school or the surgery, for the student or the patient to begin to ask questions or to take the lead in talking would be seen as a challenge to the power and control of the doctor or teacher.

But it need not be a specifically formal situation where such forms of control operate. Studies of gender differences have continually indicated that in mixed-gender interactions, men attempt to dominate the control of turns, access to the floor, and topic content and distribution (Talbot, 1998; Tannen, 1994). As Shaw (2000) has shown, things become even more complicated when gender and formal context are mixed. In a study of what may be termed 'illegal' interruptions in British House of Commons Proceedings, Shaw noted how male MPs made such interruptions more frequently than female MPs. Furthermore, when women MPs did carry out such actions, they were more frequently censured for this by the Speaker of the House.

Instrumental and Influential Power

The pragmatic control of turns or of specific speech actions could be seen as the use of instrumental power. Instrumental power is often formally embedded as a system of control either explicitly formulated as within the law or more subtly ingrained within what Foucault called "regimes of truth" (Foucault, 1980), that is, the control over access to certain forms of knowledge. But there is also what is seen as influential power in the operation of pragmatics,

and here this may be seen in almost all walks of life, although influential power is more often highlighted in the workings of the media, particularly in advertising, and in politics (Talbot *et al.*, 2003; Bell, 1991).

Consider a burger chain advertising statement: *where good people go for good food*. How are we meant to understand this? There is a clever juxtaposition between *good* as a moral/reflective issue and *good* as a comparative adjective of assessment. In the advertising strap line, there is an effort to get us to process the phrase *good people* and *good food* together. But why? According to Grice (Grice, 1975; see also Sperber and Wilson, 1995) what happens is that the juxtaposition of *good people* and *good food* creates an incongruity in terms of the relevance of the claim. It is incongruent, argues Grice, because communication is based an assumption of cooperation, where we try to speak the truth in a clear and concise manner as simply as is necessary to convey a message relevant to the talk. This gives one answer to our question above as to why we assume that John has no more than three children when someone says *John has three children*. If John had more or less than three children, then according to the pragmatic principles espoused by Grice, the speaker would have said so (see Grice, Herbert Paul (1913–1988)).

Grice does not say that his principles are rules that must always be in operation, or which must be obeyed, merely that they provide a heuristics for interpretation. Interestingly, he also suggested that when a speaker says more or less than required, is obscure, or seemingly irrelevant, this may be an indicator that they intend their hearer to look beyond the meanings of the words themselves in order to retrieve the message. In this case, the speaker may be generating a specific kind of inference referred to as a 'conversational implicature' (see Levinson, 1983). For example, if I say *John was in the room* in response to your question *Where have all the apples gone?*, this does not seem to be an answer at all. However, if you assume I am being relevant and saying as much as possible, then you will try to see my response as an answer. Perhaps in this case we both have shared knowledge that John likes to eat apples; if that was the case, you could then infer both that although I do not know who took the apples (if I did I would have said so) I believe/infer that John has taken the apples. The reason I believe this is because, as we jointly know, John really likes his apples, he was in the room, and now the apples are missing. Formally, there would be more to explain here, but the general point is that from a particular utterance we can gain more information

than is readily available from sentence interpretation alone (*see* Implicature).

What then has the process of eating *good food* to do with the moral or other inclinations involved in being *good people*? One answer is that eating food involves choice. We often hear it said after an enjoyable meal at a restaurant that either the food or the restaurant itself, or both, was a *good choice*. Hence, eating out also involves some discernment on behalf of the customers. And those who are *good* at this get *good food*. Hence, in this case, not only can you enjoy the *good food* but you can give yourself a pat on the back as one of the *good people* capable of making a good choice.

> Good people (those who know or care) go for good
>   food to X.

There is also a more general interpretation here, simply that this restaurant is where *good* people go for their food. Since most of us wish to think of ourselves as *good*, then this restaurant is the place to be. Both assumptions would be worked out using a similar approach. In both cases, the message is clear: if you consider yourself *good* in either (or even more) of the interpretations provided, then you should be in restaurant X.

This kind of influential power attempts to control our actions by pushing our choices in a particular direction. Since *good* may be taken in a number of ways, it expands the range of audiences that it might influence. Thus, any ambiguity is utilized for a positive purpose, as is the case with the politician before an election who says *We have no intention and see no reason at this time to raise taxes*. In this case there are two elements worthy of attention. The first is the negation of the term *intention*. If intention means one is going to do X (raise taxes), then this is denied. However, in the second part of the sentence the adverbial *at this time* marks any intention as time- and context-based. Consequently, if at a later time one does raise taxes (after being elected for example), one could not be accused of having previously misled the public.

Such time-controlled modifications are frequent in the political domain. The British Prime Minister stated, in relation to Britain's involvement in the Iraq conflict in 2004, that "At the present time, we believe, we have sufficient troops" (in Iraq). We see the use of the adverbial again, but also in this case the use of an epistemic marker of knowledge, i.e., *believe* as opposed to *know* (see Chafe and Nichols, 1986). *Believe* is weaker than *know* and may be used to 'hedge' any claims. Should future events prove against one's statement, one can always say that is what I believed at the time.

Pragmatics, as may be seen, is central to the operation of power in society. In formalized contexts, it explains acts in terms of their conditions of operation; similarly, it explains in such contexts, and others, who is expected talk when and about what. It also allows us to see how embedded inferential information may be calculated to explain specific messages and similar embedded information may be used to sidetrack us or to protect the speaker. Knowledge of pragmatics is therefore central to understanding power and its role in human communication.

See also: Critical Applied Linguistics; Grice, Herbert Paul (1913–1988); Implicature; Institutional Talk; Maxims and Flouting; Speech Acts; Speech Act Verbs.

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Pragmatic Acts

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A Philosophers' Mistake

An often heard critique of the Searlean approach to speech act theory (and, by implication, also of Austin's and Grice's; see Mey, 2001: 93–94) is that it concentrates on 'speech' to the exclusion of other phenomena (e.g., writing) that also fall into the category of 'language.' As a result of this critique, some linguists have suggested that we replace the term 'speech act' by a more 'general' one, such as 'act of language' (compare also the French distinction between *acte langagier* and *acte de parole*; German has *Sprachhandlung* as opposed to *Sprechakt*; Bühler, 1934) (*see* Speech Acts; Grice, Herbert Paul (1913–1988); Austin, John Langshaw (1911–1960)).

What is at stake here is more than a terminological quibble. Those who want to consider speech as different, less comprehensive than 'language' overlook the fact that all language originates in speech; writing is a later development, arising from the need to preserve the spoken word for later and remote use. However, there is a wider implication, one that is equally often overlooked by linguists and many philosophers alike. As Searle (1969: 16) remarked,

> When I take a noise or a mark on a piece of paper to be an instance of linguistic communication, as a message, one of the things I must assume is that the noise or mark was produced by a being or beings more or less like myself and produced with certain kinds of *intentions*.

In the standard philosophical approach to language, as we encounter it in works by thinkers such as Frege, Russell, Carnap, Reichenbach, Lewis, and a host of other earlier philosophers, the fundamental unit establishing and legitimating our acts of thinking and speaking is the abstract proposition, as it manifests itself in the well-formed linguistic sentence. In this approach, the user of language is conspicuously absent, and consequently so, too, are his or her intentions. For linguists such as Chomsky and his followers, the persistent problem is how to connect a certain representation of the world with a given, well-formed linguistic expression. However, people do not always necessarily think in propositions representing well-formed abstract formulae; nor do they speak in correct sentences, derived according to the rules of an abstract grammar. Regarding people's world representations, the 'intentionality' that Searle points to comprises more than just cognizing: Affect, will, ethical considerations, and so on have to be taken into consideration when we talk about 'mental states.'

Combining these different facets of human mental activity is often thought of as a process of 'addition': To a given propositional content (e.g., 'to shut the door') I can add a volitional component (as in 'I want you to shut the door'), a component of ordering (as in the imperative 'shut the door!'), a component of questioning (as in 'is the door shut?'), and so on. These additional components are then manifested by their appropriate speech acts: wanting, ordering, questioning, etc. It is this kind of thinking that is at the basis of Gazdar's (1979: 4) often quoted formula: 'Pragmatics is meaning without semantics.'

The main difference between speech act theorists such as Searle (one could also mention others, such as Austin, Ryle, and Grice) and linguists such as Chomsky is that the former include the speaker's mental state in their considerations of 'how to do things with words' (Austin, 1962). However, another problem arises here, having to do with the nature of the speech act as primarily defined (in the Searlean approach) in relation to an 'ideal speaker' (the hearer, if present, is similarly idealized). Thus, Searle's approach not only is basically speaker oriented (the hearer being thought of as a speaker who is temporarily 'out of function' – one who is listening to a speaking person in order to become a speaker him- or herself) but also, both speaker and hearer are located in some abstract, idealized universe, devoid of any relation to their actual status as language users. Even where dialogue or conversation is concerned, the question of what the speakers are saying to each other is discussed from a strictly idealized, speaker-oriented viewpoint; thus, questions as well as answers are uttered by dummies figuring as speaker/hearers (e.g., the ubiquitous 'Peter' and 'Mary'). It is in this sense that we must understand Levinson's (1983: 293) often quoted remark that there is no such thing as abstract 'questionhood' or 'answerhood': all questions and their corresponding answers originate in real-world language users. A question is always a concrete somebody's question, and an answer is always given by somebody with real expectations, needs, and obligations.

However, if this is true for questions and answers, then it must hold for other speech acting as well. There are no orders except those given by a superordinate to a subordinate. The speech act of ordering is widely different, for example, in the military than

in the family; although it is true that everywhere certain people give orders while others have to take them, the difference is in the people and their placement in society. Similarly, there are no promises except those given by a concrete 'promiser' to a concrete 'promisee,' as they are characterized by their actual living conditions, especially when it comes to understanding what a promise is about, being able to accept a promise, and so on. Also, regarding ordinary conversation, the accepted ordering sequence of the individual replies *not only represents some external schema* (as used in conversation analysis) but also reflects and reproduces the power structure of our society: *The powerful grab the floor, whereas the weak withdraw under pressure* (*see* Conversation Analysis).

A final aspect (partially adumbrated in the preceding) is essential to our understanding of speech acting. A speech act never comes alone but carries always with it a bevy of other acts on which it essentially depends for its success (*see* Speech Acts and Grammar). Some of these are strictly speech oriented, whereas others are of a more general nature and include, besides speech, those aspects of communication that often are referred to as 'extralinguistic': gestures, intonation, facial mimics, body posture, head movements, laughter, and so on. It is these inclusive acts that I call 'pragmatic acts (*see* Pragmatics: Overview).'

An Illustrative Case: The Irony of Irony

I now illustrate the previous discussion by adducing a classical instance of purported speech acting: the use of irony in speech. Much has been written about irony by linguists, philosophers, sociologists, computer scientists, psychologists, and others. I limit myself here to contrasting two characteristic approaches from different camps: one linguistically and philosophically oriented, and the other more geared toward a computational view (*see* Irony).

Sperber and Wilson, two of the best known authors writing on the subject of irony from a philosophical–linguistic standpoint, have expressed their views on the subject in a number of important contributions. Here is a typical quote:

> "Irony plays on the relationship between speaker's thought and the thought of someone other than the speaker" (Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 243).

According to these authors, the speech act of irony is, in the final instance, expressive of a purely mental process, contrasting two thoughts: the speaker's and someone else's.

In contrast to this mentalistic view of irony, others have taken the stance that irony is first of all a situational phenomenon: "Ironic language presupposes an ironic situation, either in the *hic et nunc* or ... in the human condition at large" (Littman and Mey, 1991: 134). Specifically, a situation is ironic whenever the acting persons' explicit or implicit goals clash with the reality of their acts. For example, consider the firefighter whose smoking in bed causes the fire station to burn down: His implicit goal, to prevent fires, clashes with his explicit acting, causing a fire to break out. This 'clashing' of act and intention is not only typical for irony but also typical for all sorts of humor; cf. especially Freud's definition of humor as "a shock between two heterogeneous or incompatible worlds" (as quoted in Haverkate, 1990: 107; Freud, 1916/1948). Similarly, in Littman and Mey's (1991: 135) terminology, irony is based on a 'twist' that "appears to depend upon some relationship between (1) the actor's goals, (2) the actor's plans, and (3) the actor's state of knowledge about the likelihood of the plan succeeding."

Irony thus presupposes an ironic situation, one in which an actor's plans somehow come to naught through his or her own fault or lack of knowledge, as attested by Robert Burns's "best laid schemes of mice and men" that sooner or later all "gang agley" – most often through the actors' own doings. If we accept this view of irony, then it should be evident that the acting is a central ingredient of any kind of ironic utterance; in fact, ironic utterances are only possible within some kind of action frame, viz., an ironic situation that makes the irony possible. Irony is thus, strictly speaking, not a speech act by its own volition and authority; its quality of 'act' depends on the acting persons and their views and knowledge of the situation in which they act.

It follows that ironic utterances are not, as Sperber and Wilson (1981: 302) maintain, basically to do with speaker attitude but with the world; not principally with speaking but with acting. The distinction between 'using' an utterance and 'mentioning' it (in irony) that these authors advocate (Sperber and Wilson, 1981) thus turns out to be just as vacuous as the time-worn distinction between 'saying' and 'meaning' when applied to irony (cf. Booth, 1974). As to 'mentioning,' this is itself a case of language use and thus not essentially different from other 'use'; as such, it is situation dependent. Speech, by itself, does not act: strictly speaking, there are no speech acts since, ultimately, all speech acting crucially depends on the situation in which the action takes place. Hence, speech acts, in order to be viable, have to be 'situated,' as discussed next.