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# 市场、政府与社会变迁

平塘研究：1911—1993

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博士文丛——市场、政府与社会变迁

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## 内 容 提 要

长期以来,中国如何从小农经济进入现代化的工业体系,一直是国内外学术界争论不休的问题。在这一问题上,施坚雅和黄宗智的影响最大。施坚雅通过对成都平原的案例研究提出,“市集体系”特别是其中的初级市场是中国农村的基本活动单位。黄宗智通过华北和长江中下游地区的案例研究提出,村庄才是中国农村的基本活动单位。本书提供了西南贫困山区的一个县自1911年以来的一个案例研究,指出中国现代社会变迁的理解点,在于地方的政权组织和地区的市场位置。作者把制度经济学理论与社会交换理论结合起来,将文化价值观作为影响经济发展和社会变迁的内生变量,提出经济发展受制于市场位置,社会变迁受制于个人利益与社会利益之间的“第三者获利”。在这一视角下,作者发现中国西南贫困山区的发展状况与平常许多看法相反,要理解中国农村乃至中国社会,必须站在农民的位置上去观察,才能理解他们行为背后的真正原因。

## **Preface**

## **Introduction**

### **Part I : Background ; Government and Market in the Periphery of China within Replica of China Period**

Chapter 1, Market ; Social Structure in the Economic Exchange

Chapter 2, Government ; Administrative Intervient and Local Authorities Structure

### **Part II : Collective Practice ; Rise and Fall of Community System**

Chapter 3, New Order of Rural China ; Socialist Transformation of Agriculture and Commerce

Chapter 4, Peasants Suffering ; Open and Shut of Community System

### **Part III : Differentiation and Integration ; Perfect Describe of Reform Progress**

Chapter 5, Return to Peasant Household ; Institutional Arrange of No—collective

Chapter 6, Commercial owed by owned State ; Market Operate under Differentiation Pressure

Chapter 7, Agricultural Commercialization ; Government and Peasant in the Economic Development

Chapter 8, Society and Organization ; Change Order and Integrated Function

Chapter 9, Public Affairs: Fight Natural Calamities, Birth Control, and Technology Application in the Reform

Chapter 10, Work on No — agriculture: Peasants and Government in the Field of Industrial and Commerce

Chapter 11, Suffering Heavy Pressure: Fiscal Output and Peasants' Live

## **Market, Governments and Social Change:**

### **A Case Study of Southwest China, Pingtang 1911— 1993**

#### **ABSTRACT:**

China have been experiencing phenomenal industrial dynamism after reform. The resulting rapid economic growth has been the focus of much scholarly attention, but corresponding changes in societal structures and cultural complexes have not been explored in great depth. The roles of state policies and market structures in facilitating economic development has been emphasized, but the historical evolution of these political and economic change, and its relationship to underlying social—cultural structures, has not been explored in depth.

In examining debates about the industrialization of parts of the periphery like Pingtang County in the context of the impasse in development theory, I find that neo-classical theory, regulation theory and the theory of the new international division of labor, why all fail to adequately explain the rise of the newly industrializing countries? The methodological approach which reads off in the "local" (the nation—state) solely from events at the "global" level (the world economy) is an important problem. The research I am proposing to carry out is based on the alternative account of two interactions between two level, one is from the "global" to the "local" (state), another is from the "local" (state) to the "community" (in particular rural area), and the as-

sumption that economic institutions reflect, underlying value structures, that prescribe market and non—market exchanges. Identifying and analyzing how these value systems have evolved and are linked to economic development is necessary in order to properly assess how economic development takes place and whether China can maintain its current pace of economic growth.

Community—level (local and area) studies are ideal for assessing the relationship between market forces and cultural values. Market forces is a concept that can be used to refer to those forces for socio—economic change that originate at a societal or global level and provide the signals to which producers must respond. These forces include changes in consumer demand structures, patterns of foreign direct investment, and state economic policies. Culture, on the other hand, is a comparable concept to indicate the historical, geographical and social infrastructure that provide people with the tools for adapting to market force. In fact, one aspect of real development in these countries is the way they manage to alleviate the effects of those tendencies in the global economy, another is the way they create or change the conditions for "favorable" social structure of accumulation at the same time. The research I propose will focus on how the state and communities in China (in particular rural communities) use cultural resource to market force and create economic opportunities for themselves. This study will examine the degree to which socio—economic change in both the "global" and the communities (local and area) is similar and different in these areas, and thus assess the degree to which economic growth in China is following a unique trajectory, as well as what the future may hold



for future economic development in these areas.

### **Theoretical Assumption**

An important part of the contribution made by these "new liberal economists" or "neo—institutionalists" is the rediscovery and study of the importance of the "institution of property rights" for economic development and the expansion of the domain of economic analysis into many non—economic areas, such as in J. M. Buchanan's study of public choice and M. Friedman's study of welfare system. According to neo—institutionalism, the institution of property rights propels economic development by creating a mechanism which makes the interests of the individual tend to coincide with those of the society. Thus, if no transaction cost is involved in establishing the institution, economic growth would be rather easy to attain. Douglass C. North, another representative of neo—institutionalism, takes the view that, speaking from historical experiences, there are two general kinds of factors that generate costs for institutional changes. First, there lacks the means for preventing certain actors from benefiting from the changes without participating in making the changes, or for making these actors share the transaction cost. This is the so—called "free—rider" problem. Secondly, for some organizations or individuals, the cost they have to pay in order to realize the changes may exceed the benefits they could derive from the changes. This is the problem of "established interests".

The theory of ideology was formulated in reaction to the first of these two problems, i. e., the "free—ride" problem. Douglass C. North discovered that besides the designing of such

institutions as patent — right systems, ideology is an important means for overcoming the "free — ride" problem. Thus, he suggests that a theory of ideology is needed for explaining the economic behavior of individuals, because people can give up calculating for personal gains and losses for ideological reasons. Ideology has three characteristics related to this behavioral pattern: 1, ideology is a means for reducing transaction cost; 2, ideology concerns the individual's value orientation; 3, there is an accumulation effect in choosing an ideology.

Douglass C. North has brought out the importance of the theory of ideology, but he is far from having constructed the theory itself. In this aspect, Justin Yifu. Lin who is working in Peking University and worked together with me in Center of State Council Rural Development Researcher between 1988 — 90, has gone one step further than D. North. Lin thinks that ideology is a kind of human capital for the individual. Taking this view, Lin is partly following the theory of human capital of his teacher in Yale University, Theodore Shultz, a Nobel laureate in economics. But this step is very important, because in taking it he has pointed out D. North's mistake — that he has failed to utilize ideology, and utilization is precisely the basis for incorporating ideology into economic analysis. Regrettably, from here, Lin failed to go further and explore the mechanism through which ideology forms. In contrast, he considers the role of ideology to be helping the individual make more judgment. With this conclusion, he has come back to D. North's old path, trying to answer the question: what role does ideology play in institutional changes?

In my opinion, D. North and Lin's failure lies in their taking ideology as an external variable affecting economic development. Their approach turns the study on ideology into a structural functionalist question: with respect to institutional change, a successful ideology is flexible, and a flexible ideology is helpful for institutional changes and with respect to institution implementation, a stable ideology which identifies with the institution can help overcome free-riding and opportunism. But if we just ask why it is so, we would see that this kind of analysis only points out a result. That is to say, the so-called theory of ideology still lacks a logical starting point and an analysis of the generative mechanism.

Just as institutionalist economics takes institution as an internal variable for economic development, my study will treat ideology (culture) as an internal variable for economic development. Further, I consider institution and ideology (culture) as two parallel independent variables, with ideology defined as a set of beliefs about society.

In terms of the objects involved, economic institutions involve economic exchange, which has two characteristics:

- 1, Economic exchange is an exchange of interests, with both sides involved in the exchange being very clear about the goods or service to be exchanged, their respective goals in the exchange, and how much they gain from the exchange. In other words, there is an explicit contract and explicit goods involved.

- 2, In economic exchange, the goods needed could in principle be obtained from any person who possesses such goods. Ideology (culture), on the other hand, involves Social exchange. Unlike

economic exchange, social exchange does not require careful negotiation and meeting, the stipulations of a contract. Social exchange takes place within concrete social relations, and rewards for the actors are obtained from this kind of relations. Therefore, whereas economic exchange leads to the loss and gain in the actors' interests, social exchange leads to changes in the actors' subjective attitudes, such as the sense of responsibility and the sense of trust.

In accordance with these differences, we make two assumptions about the "utility" of ideology.

First, at the individual level, ideology(culture) is a kind of investment for the individual actor, and the investment orientation is to a large extent determined by the social structure and the "rates of fair reward" in social exchange. Such investment is necessary because of the contradiction between the limitation of the individual actor's rationality and the complexity (or unlimitedness) of changes in the external environment.

Secondly, at the collective level, ideology(culture) has an normalizing effect. This is the substitution of norms with values (substitution of the definition of interests and agreed penalty with the sense of responsibility and the sense of trust), in the basis of which both collective consciousness and class consciousness are formed. Ecological identities are thus diffused among various groups and classes as "supplied goods" that serve to reduce transaction costs.

The convergence of the individual's values and the society's values is a sign that ideology(culture) is helping to ensure the stability and development of society. If no transaction cost were

needed for establishing an ideology(culture), then social stability and development would be very easy to achieve. Generally speaking, three factors lead to cost in establishing an ideology (culture);

First, the extent to which elements can be borrowed from the structure of existing culture. If the ideology(culture) to be established contains a large portion that can be found in exiting culture, the cost to be paid would be obviously less.

Secondly, the cost for propagating the ideology(culture). This is the cost for replacing norms with values. It would obviously cost less to get an individual to accept an ideology(culture) which tallies well with his experiences. This implies that the best way to effect changes in ideas is to expand the individual's set of behavioral experiences.

Thirdly, established interests of the existing political structure. This is shown in that the ruling group in a society can "design" the class structure of the society in such a way as to increase the cost for producing "ideological flexibility".

### **Main Points**

With respect to the formation process of an ideology (culture), certain "ideological establishments", such as newspapers, associations, and churches, can also serve to reduce the cost for producing ideological flexibility. Thus, ideology (culture) as a whole appears as "supply" and "demand" for economic actors. That is, it can both be a supply to meet the needs of the established interests of the ruling group and be a supply to meet the needs of the interests of the ruled and the middle class.

Accordingly, ideology (culture) can be divided into four categories: 1, class consciousness to substitute norms with values; 2, individualism in exchange and differentiation; 3, legitimizing values as a means of ruling; and 4, rebel ideals as a means of re-organization.

According to the mechanism of the formation of ideology (culture) as explained above, I venture to suggest a few points about the change of ideas in the process of establishing market economy in China and Pacific Asia.

1. A critique of two theories about the reason for change of ideas (culture):

a) Max Weber's theory that the Protestant ethic led to the institutionalization of property rights. The real reason is that the actors who needed personal property rights propagated the Protestant ethic, because the Protestant ethic appeared as a supply for the new industrial — commercial class and the church as an "ideological establishment" gelled to reduce transaction cost.

b) The theory that East culture (Confucian) impeded the growth of the "sprouts of capitalism". The real reason is that the political structure of China increased the cost for the growth of industrial — commercial culture, and the gentry class played a negative part in this.

2. The present confusion in the economic activity in China is due to the low degree of identification of people's values with the institution of market economy as well as the lack of a clear definition of property rights. A combination of these two factors can produce an avalanche effect, leading to the miscarriage of the institution of market economy in China.

3. The orientation in the change of ideas in the institutionalization of market economy in China and Pacific Asia should include two aspects.

(1): Political structure should be changed so as to increase the set of experience of various interest groups of class in identifying with the institution of market economy.

(2): Much work should be done on probation, including the construction of ideological establishment. Patient and hard on ideological propagation is no less important than institutionalization of market economy itself. This is worth paying much attention. of changes in the external environment, because Identity of institution change and technology change depend on ideology' (culture) normalizing effect (the substitution of norms with values), and on the interaction between institutions and ideology (culture); institutionalization can reduce the cost in propagating an ideology (culture), while an ideology (culture) identified with an institution can reduce free-riding in the operation of the institution.

### **Conclusion:**

In examining debates about rural social structure as Skinner, Philip C. C. Huang and Ramon Myers have studied, I find that all fail to adequately explain the socioeconomic change, the methodological approach which reads off in the "local" society from events at the high commercial and extensive farming areas is a problem, another is the variable selected. My study treats ideology (culture) as an internal variable for economic development, further, I consider institution and ideology (culture) as

two parallel independent variables, and make the assumption that economic institutions reflect, underlying value structures, that prescribe market and non — market exchanges. Identifying and analyzing how these value systems have evolved and are linked to economic development is necessary in order to properly assess how economic development takes place. I especially focus on the ways local cadres used at that time, or how the local administrative officials achieved their goals which had been prescribed by the central government, and want to explain how government could put its policies onto all the local agenda, and how individuals and organizations (governmental and non — governmental organizations) express their needs in the process of social changes.

As a case study, my dissertation has two main resources in material: New Count Histories and government archives and interviews with local people. The former provides much crude information on a wide range of mainly quantitative, contemporary issues, and the latter is a review of and complement to the former.



## 序 言

中国社会学会会长 袁 方  
北京大学社会学博士导师

《市场、政府与社会变迁》一书，是姜汝祥攻读博士的毕业论文。这篇论文不仅在1993年被评为北大优秀论文，而且在1996年国家教委对全国博士论文抽查中，评分列北大第一，在全国也列前几名。这篇论文之所以被评价甚高，主要是它在实践考察上有深度，在理论概括上有创新，对社会学、经济学今后的研究有启发价值。贵州人民出版社将这篇论文作为学术专著出版，我作为作者的博士生导师，感到十分高兴。

中国正在经历着一场深刻的社会变革。这场变革的一个重要的标志，是农村生产关系发生了有利于发展生产力的变化，农民获得了进入现代化序列的机会。中国是传统农业大国，农民占中国人口的大多数，没有农业和农民的现代化，就没有中国的现代化。但是，由于中国历史上若干次的农业进步和商业繁荣并未导致工业化的到来，中国的社会结构是否具有适应工业化的张力？这是国内外学者长期讨论的重大问题。

早在三四十年代，中国的一些社会学家如李景汉、费孝通等，就对中国农村的工业化进程进行过研究，我也对手工业以及城市的手工业者作过调查研究。这些研究，无论是实证考察、理论抽象，还是方法创新，都有着相当的水平 and 高度。至今，像费孝通的《江村