



博士文库

创新力与控制力统一论丛

转型期国企保险式 授权经营研究

兼论创新力与控制力的统一

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总 序

近年来，中南财经政法大学企业管理博士点对企业创新力与控制力统一的问题，做了大量的研究工作，先后在国内重要的学术刊物上发表了一系列论文来分析阐述这一问题。这从一定程度上反映了经济学界、企业管理学界对企业创新力与控制力统一问题的重视。由于两力统一问题是企业管理中一个重大的新思路，贯彻“两力统一”是一个系统工程，因此我想简要谈谈我们是怎样发现和提出这一问题的；国外在这方面有些什么研究成果；我们的研究与国外研究的相同点和差异点；如何进一步深化研究等等。

创新力与控制力统一的思想是我们通过对国内外一些企业从“明星”到“流星”的蜕变过程的考察、跟踪，深入研究后提出来的。本着不唯上，不唯书，只唯实的思路，对我国不少企业运行中出现的下列一些问题引起了我们的深思：为什么会出现“不搞技改等死，搞了技改找死”？为什么有的国有企业，内部人控制严重，出现了“庙穷方丈富”的现象？为什么有的在国外投资的国有企业，“个人富了，国家亏了”，有的甚至携款潜逃？为什么一批企业，很快从明星转入流星？如太阳神、秦池、飞龙、亚细亚等。

上述现象的出现，说明从国有企业到非国有企业，从国内企

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业到国外企业都存在一个企业创新力与控制力如何统一的问题。

目前企业界、企业管理学界大多强调企业管理中创新的重要，这是很必要的，今后还要不断宣传企业创新的重要。但是应当指出，人们在强调创新力的同时，往往很少注意甚至忽视了企业的控制力。如果只是强调创新力而忽视控制力，就可能对企业的发展，特别是对大中企业的持续发展带来危害，这是我们提出创新力与控制力统一的初衷和出发点。

我们这一思路的公开表述是我在总结海尔大成功的十条经验中出现的，指出海尔的大成功，归根结底是海尔的创新力与控制力的统一。由于这是一个重大的企业管理思路，虽然提出来了，但是为什么国内同声少觅处。带着这个问题我们通过多次报告会的形式，去征询企业家的看法，可以说他们都众口一词地认为“企业创新力与控制力的统一”是大中企业能否持续发展的一个关键问题。之后，新华社记者吴晓波先生的《大败局》一书2001年问世。读后，很受启发。吴晓波指出缺乏创新会导致企业长期失血，缺乏控制会导致企业猝死。从而使我们更加坚定了提出这一企业管理新思路的信心。

同在20世纪90年代，国外学者对企业管理的研究，也提出了与我们相似的观点。伊查克·爱迪思博士在35个国家400多个组织中担任管理咨询顾问，在他的《企业生命周期》和《把握变革》两本著作中提出“企业成长与老化同生物体一样，主要都是通过灵活性与可控性这两大因素之间的关系来表现的”，“灵活性和控制性是E（创新精神）和CAPI（A指职权，P指权力，I指影响，C指前三者的结合）的函数”。这就是说企业的灵活性与创新性在很大程度上是相重合的，只有不断创新企业才能灵活，而只有保持可控性和灵活性的企业才能得以长久存在。这里实质上反映了创新力与控制力的统一。罗伯特·西蒙斯教授和哈

佛大学商业行政管理学院查尔斯·M·威廉教授，在他们的著作《控制的树干：管理者如何利用创造性控制系统来驾驭策略更新》中指出：“20世纪90年代企业经理们面对的一个主要问题是：如何在一个要求灵活性和创新性的企业施加足够的控制”。这与我们的观点是相当一致的。

我们的研究与国外学者的研究的共同点是：从企业营运的实际出发得出了大中企业的持续发展都必须重视“创新力与控制力的统一”的结论。上述三位学者的三本著作问世，使我们的研究从“国内同声少觅处”，进入到“喜逢海外有知音”。不同点是，无论是伊查克·爱迪思教授，还是罗伯特·西蒙斯教授，他们提出的创新力与控制力统一的观点，是从发达的市场经济和现代企业制度比较健全的企业实际出发，因此，他们大多是偏重从文化的角度而较少地从制度的角度来提出问题和解决问题。如伊查克·爱迪思提出的“健康的管理= $f(\text{PAEI}), (\text{CAPI})$ ”。罗伯特·西蒙斯提出的缓解创造性和控制性矛盾的四大系统：诊断系统、信仰系统、禁区系统和交叉控制系统。而我国企业现实处境是市场经济和现代企业制度正在建立过程中。企业制度不健全，是创新力与控制力的统一难以实现的关键。因此，中国企业如何做到创新力与控制力的统一，除了要重视企业文化的建设，当务之急是建立健全现代企业制度。因此，从本土实际出发，我们的研究大多是从制度安排上考虑的多一些。当然企业的改革，改到深处，就是企业文化问题，而且企业文化建设与企业制度建设是相辅相成的，任何好的制度安排都需要优秀的企业文化作支撑，这是企业界和企业管理学界的共识。

本论丛的五本专著系在博士论文基础上修改而成的，围绕“企业创新力与控制力统一”这一问题，分别从不同的角度进行了探索。

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周晖博士的《企业生命模型研究》，在企业创新力与控制力统一的理论基础上，提出了企业生命模型，以揭示影响企业成长各因素及其相互耦合的作用机理。作者在模型中构建了企业成长“基因”的“DNA 双螺旋结构”——财务资本链与人力资本链。连接双链的四要素是企业家、公司治理、技术与文化。作者从理论与实践的角度进一步阐明企业生命模型中的四因素自身演化以及对企业成长演化的作用机理。并在此基础上初步建立了创新力与控制力统一综合性的企业评价体系和企业的三级预警系统，并以中国的 1000 多家上市公司进行了实证分析。

曾令逸博士的《转型期国企保险式授权经营研究——兼论创新力与控制力的统一》，剖析了我国国有企业为什么难以走出“收”与“放”的困境，为什么有的国有企业改革总是虎头蛇尾等问题，指出建国以来至今的国企改革方案，改革开放前和改革开放初期，国企的主要矛盾是控制力过强，统得过死，企业缺乏足够的活力和自主权，企业创新力几乎被扼杀。而改革开放后至今，国企的主要矛盾是企业有了一定活力甚至创新力，但企业短期行为严重，控制力逐渐削弱，有的乃至丧失。只有真正的公司才具有自我调节的功能，才能实现创新力和控制力的统一。作者在文中提出了国有资本通过引入体制外资本保险式授权经营，重构公司治理结构，以形成新的生命体的国有企业改革思路。

叶生洪博士的《企业结构·能力·绩效——微观 SCP 框架研究》，在既有的企业管理理论的基础上，创造性地提出了微观的结构·能力·绩效（SCP）研究框架。作者较系统地研究了我国企业的结构、能力、绩效问题，并深入探讨了三者的相互关系。作者从企业创新力与控制力统一的管理思想来考察企业的结构、能力和绩效问题，认为企业的结构安排从静态来讲体现的是控制，从动态来讲结构的变迁便是创新，企业的结构优化必须注意

创新力与控制力相统一；创新力与控制力本身就是两种重要的企业能力，企业能力包括核心能力得到提升和转化为现实的竞争优势的必要条件就是坚持创新力与控制力的统一；从三要素的互动来看，在互动过程中充分贯彻创新力与控制力的统一的企业才能实现可持续发展，反之则很难得到有效发展。作者根据研究结论提出了中国企业的现实对策性思考。

肖海林博士的《企业可持续发展——理论基础、生成机制与管理框架》，是国内首部系统分析新经济条件下企业可持续发展生成机制的著作。作者针对新经济对企业成长机制的深刻影响，提出了企业可持续发展的理论基础，揭示了可持续竞争优势四面体协同成长——创新力与控制力动态效率统一——学习能力演进的企业可持续发展时空网状生成机制，并在此基础上提出了以企业可持续发展为目标的 LCT 管理框架。作者发现，企业可持续发展的直接支撑——可持续竞争优势表现为以市场权力、产业平台、制度平台和核心能力为核心慢变量的四面体形结构关系，竞争优势得以持续的机制是四要素的协同作用与缺位支撑；企业可持续发展要通过四面体成长管理来实现，而四面体成长靠创新力与控制力协同驱动，是两力动态效率统一的表现；学习型组织则是实现创新力与控制力动态效率统一的载体和机制，从而是企业可持续发展的原动力。作者比较成功地建立了创新力与控制力统一论的概念体系和逻辑体系，尤其是对海尔集团持续发展的实证性分析，突破了国内外对海尔的分析框架，颇具创新性。

王成慧博士的《市场营销理论的演进逻辑与创新研究》，从市场营销的角度分析了创新力与控制力统一问题。作者从理论上科学地阐释了市场营销的逻辑起源，从营销哲学和总体理论框架、顾客理论与竞争理论三大方面系统阐述了营销理论的发展过程，总结了营销理论中 Ps 学说，并将其与最新发展起来的关系营

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销 4Rs 理论进行了有效地整合，构建了当今营销学两大理论流派的融合模型。作者将以资源基础理论和企业能力理论为主的“竞争优势内生论”的思想观点引入了营销理论的分析范畴，并将企业顾客价值创造能力体系作为营销理论分析的一个重要组成部分。特别是在营销理论创新框架中，作者运用创新力与控制力动态统一的思想，构建了一个“蝶形”营销理论创新框架。将企业营销活动分为顾客价值搜寻、顾客价值创造和顾客价值传递三个过程，并形成企业价值创造的内部四大能力体系和外部两大合作网络的运行平台。

上述五本著作可以说是我们前期对“创新力与控制力统一”这一问题研究的一个小结。我们虽然在 20 世纪 90 年代，提出了“企业创新力与控制力的统一”问题，近年来围绕这一问题相继发表了一批论文，但我们的研究毕竟是初步的。从理论上讲为什么要坚持创新力与控制力的统一？什么是创新力与控制力的统一？如何建立考核创新力与控制力统一的指标体系？等等，都需要作进一步深入研究。我们前此的作为，只能是一种引玉之砖，为了及早使我们的大中型企业进入国际强手之林，我们切盼广大企业界和企业管理学界的关注和帮助。

彭星闾

2003 年 9 月

Study on Secure Authorized Management of State – owned Enterprises in Transition Period

—Also on the integration of
creativity and control power
(Abstract)

After careful and prudent review of economic development in western countries, Mr Douglass C. North, a renowned American expert on economic history, had reached a remarkable conclusion: industrial revolution and technical advancement, which are more often than not viewed as the motivating factors for economic growth, are indeed the growth itself; it is economic institution, that is the system of property rights, that constitutes the real impetus of economic growth.

I. History Review: a baffling circle for state – owned enterprises

The first reform on state – owned enterprises began as early as 1957. The reform mainly focused on the delegation of management power of enterprises previously belonging to the ministries of the central government to local governments. However, the reform inevitably fell into the baffling circle of "devitalization under the centralized management, disorder while delegating the management authority, re-taking the power when the enterprise in disorder", which is in essence

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a circle of delegating and retaking of administrative power.

It is not until 1991 were we are clearly aware that the deficient vitality of state - owned enterprises was not attributed to the problem of inappropriate profit distribution between the state and enterprises, but to their improper management mechanism. The solution is to transform the management mechanism, and to establish market - oriented modern corporate system with clearly established ownership, well defined power and responsibility, separation of enterprise from administration and scientific management. However, in the enforcement of share holding system, many problems with unique Chinese characteristics cropped up, e. g. loss of state - owned assets, black box administration, false financial report of listed companies, fraud and collusion, immoderate money collection from stock issuance, connected transaction, and embezzlement of corporate assets by big shareholders, etc. These problems discourage some people who firstly advocated the reform.

II. Logic Analysis: integration of creativity and control power

Reform of many Chinese enterprises is basically following such a logic sequence: enriching vitality - making profit (external) - transforming mechanism (internal) - institutional innovation. And in respect of the specific theory and measures of reform, the corresponding process adopted is: expanding power - separation of power - " four - self mechanism " (responsible for their own management decisions, profits and losses, independent development, self regulating - corpo-

rate property rights).

In this sense, the thinking of reform is not set beforehand, but accumulated in the steady process of exploring the new fields and solving the new problems appeared. The internal logic of reform just impels and directs the progress of reform. In the constant process of discovering and solving problems, we are getting nearer to conflicts of deeper level and the crux of the problems.

Nevertheless, the reforms measures are usually not base on integral and systematic consideration, and thus most of the measures are stop – gap and piecemeal ones, lacking integration of creativity and control power.

Creativity is the source and foundation for the survival and development of enterprises. Enterprise, in English, contains the meaning of adventure and innovation. And control power is the guarantee for steady growth of an enterprise. Karl Marx once pointed out that a significant cause would never be attained in any places if without regulation. Creativity and control power are of equal important to an enterprise, both of which are indispensable. They are the unity of opposites. They are opposite. The strengthening of control power will to some extent weaken the creativity of an enterprise; and the encouragement of creativity will cripple the control power. But the two are also unified. In an enterprise with sound mechanism, complete system and scientific management, the appropriate strengthening of control power will ensure the orientation, effectiveness, sustainability of creativity; and the creativity being brought into full play will help adjust the control power of the enterprise and adapt it to the changing situation. In this respect, many transient enterprises serve as negative examples

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such as Giant, Sanzhu, and Idall. Their failures proved that an enterprise, if without creativity, or without corresponding control power for its creativity, would inevitably go to its doom.

When surveying the reform project for state – owned enterprises ever since 1949, we will find that, before and at the beginning of the reform and opening up policy, the principal contradiction of state – owned enterprise lied in excessive control power and centralized management. The enterprises at that time were lacking of vitality and own decision – making power, and the creativity was stifled. The enterprise is, in essence, a factory. Since 1950s, the crux of the matter, that is, to increase the vitality of enterprises, had been noticed at the very beginning when the delegation measures were carried out. The enterprise became more active. During those years, the delegation measures were rather drastic. But the delegation was only limited to the power transferring from the central government to local governments, which was fundamentally the measures adopted under the planned economy. Since these measures didn't go as far as to touch about the independent decision – making power of enterprise and the reform was not deepened as far as to reform the mechanism, the problem of excessive control power and deficient creativity of enterprises basically remained unsolved. And whenever there was disorder, the power was retaken in a hasty manner to maintain social and political stability. The newly gained strength of enterprises died away.

After the carrying out the reform and opening up policy, the principal contradiction of state – owned enterprise has been shifted to the problem that the control power of enterprise gradually becomes weakened, or even lost and the short – term actions prevail, though they

have regain certain vitality and creativity. As a result, the problem of considerable losses of state – owned assets became fierce. In the middle of 1980s, the successful reform in countryside provided priceless experience for corporate reform. It was obvious that the vitality was derived from impetus, and impetus was closely associated with people and interest. Ever since then, all reform measures, including benefit – to – tax shift, economic responsibility system, linking income to performance, and contracting system, are all centered on interest – shaping of enterprises. Once the enterprise has its own interest, it will be highly motivated, and accordingly it will acquire vitality. The internal logic of reform is clear. Under the guidance of the theory of separation of ownership and management rights, state – owned enterprises have experienced unprecedented growth and the vitality and creativity of enterprises have been greatly enhanced. However, an external interest – shaping, the lack of property right as the base for the interest of management personnel, generated a number of new abnormal phenomena, and the short – term actions and diminishing of control power are just the cases in point. People became more and more aware that the internal interest mechanism, as well as the external interest – shaping, is essential. Based on this concept, considerable efforts have been made such as the transformation of operational mechanism, advancing of "four – self mechanism", and the trial and popularization of share holding system in an aim to resume the role of "company" of state – owned enterprises through establishing clearly defined ownership. It is generally accepted that only company possesses the self – regulating functions and achieves the integration of creativity and control power.

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It is a breathtaking leap to shift from state - owned enterprises to "corporate system with Chinese characteristics". In order to achieve this goal, we, first of all, have to clarify certain misleading concept and theories.

III. Root Analysis: fossilized concept and misleading theory

As the mainstay theory at home and abroad suggests, the reform strategy of China is a kind of gradually reforming strategy, different from the "shock therapy" and "big bang" adopted in East Europe. From the author's point of view, it is a vivid description to sum up the merits of the reform strategy as "gradual in speed", but this summary can be misleading in theory in the future for it doesn't go to the essence of the matter. As a matter of fact, "gradual in speed" is only the form of reform, not the essence. The reform in East Europe and the former Soviet Union before 1989 under the socialist system was also "gradual in speed", and the same went to the reform in former Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland in its initial stage. Though the reform had been carried out in those countries for over ten or even twenty years, the basic frame of old system had never been touched. Consequently, those states met economic crisis in 1980s and ended in economic and political collapse. In view of this, economists such as Kornai advocated "shock therapy". From the point of view of logic, it is absurd and illogical to attribute the failure of reform in East Europe to "gradual in speed" and contribute the success in China to "gradual in speed".

Since state – owned economic factor occupies a dominant position in key industries and infrastructure, the slow – moving state – owned economy reform and the stagnant state departments reform will lead to the coexistence of dual systems and result in the state with many conflicts and flaws, or even trigger a series of economic, social and political problems. It is a waste of opportunity to carry out the reform in a gradual step for a long time. It is high time that we took strong and earnest measures to reform the state – owned enterprise. The goal of reform is clear: to resume the role of "corporation" of state – owned enterprises and to rebuild the corporate system. And the essential points here are the breakthrough in concept and the selection of a practical and rational road. According to the author, the "internal force" is not sufficient enough to push forward the "reform of mechanism" for there can hardly be any breakthrough if without external force.

Theoretical circle has made considerable effort to explore the solution to the state – enterprises reform, the big headache, and many schools of different theories have been come into being, such as the theory on narrowing the distribution of state – owned assets, market theory, property right theory, government theory, and manager theory, etc.

Advocate for theory on narrowing the distribution of state – owned assets holds that we shall narrow the distribution scope of state – owned assets and focus on the management of key sections of state – owned assets with best entrepreneurs and financial strength. The best efficiency will only come from narrowing the scope.

However, the matter is not as simple as merely "selling", espe-

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cially when the capital factor is taken into account.

Advocate for market theory holds that market competition will affect the principal – agent relation and will positively affect the efficacy of enterprises. However, market force is far from enough, and even market itself is in the way of constant rectification and improvement.

Property right determinist holds that the problem of efficiency in the principal – agent relation mainly lies in property right system and the state – owned enterprise will resume its vitality once the property right is clearly established. Some even believe that the problem will definitely be solved as soon as the shareholding system is implemented.

The author agrees that the modern shareholding system based on clearly established property rights is the ideal solution and goal to the reform of state – owned enterprises. The problem is how to establish the property rights clearly. The existing shareholding system has been proved a failure in the stock exchange market. Though the shareholding system has been implemented in the state – owned enterprises and the shares have been listed in form, its nature has not changed since it still remains to be the only controlling shareholder, and the holders of state – owned shares are still not the personified people. What's the worse, grave loss of state – owned assets and "insider control" prevail for the diminishing of control power. And this is what we shall avoid. The reform of option, yearly – salary system, shareholding by employees, corporate governance will be fruitless until the above – mentioned fundamental problem has been solved for they are only superficial. And this well accounts for the overrun of problems of existing shareholding systems.