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
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——以转型期中国高等教育制度为研究重点

Power Game on the Institutional Vicissitude

——*Main Studies on Chinese Higher Educational Institution during the Transforming Stage*

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序

制度是人创造的,而人又在制度之中。人通过制度创造了两个生活空间:一是社会(包括经济);二是国家。社会为个体的发展提供了舞台;国家为公共利益提供了保障。社会决定着国家,国家保障着社会,而社会与国家的核心都是共同的,那就是人本身。社会是人与制度的有机统一;国家也同样是人与制度的有机统一。人是最具创造力和发展力的生灵,追求无限与永恒,在与自然的交互作用中,形成了不竭的发展冲动。人的发展,必然带动制度的变迁;制度的变迁,必然为人的发展提供新的可能。人与制度的关系,决定了人在现实生产与生活的任何行为,只要形成一定的集体效应,都可以诱发制度变迁;同样,人的集体意志也完全可以通过国家的公共权力的作用,有意识、有目的地改变制度,通过制度的创新创造个人、社会和国家发展的新空间和新资源。可见,制度变迁是人类生活的常态,犹如自然界的风雨,有时是暴风骤雨式的,有时则是润物无声式的;有时是有意的,有时是无意的;有时是目的性的,有时是工具性的。

既然社会和国家在本质上都是人与制度相统一的产物,所以,它们都同时可以看作是人的聚合或制度的结构。作为人的聚合,社会与国家是人通过一定的制度而形成的有机共同体;作为制度的结构,社会与国家是制度对一定范围内的人群进行有序安排的结果。所以,我们不论是对社会的研究,还是对国家的研究,都离不开制度;同时,对社会制度的研究与对国家制度的研究,是完全可以相互借鉴的研究,具有深刻的互通性。这也就是为什么制度主义诞生以来,在时间上,具有充满活力的延续性和发展性,在空间上,具有强劲的延展性和主导性。新制度主义在当下社会科学研究中的地位 and 影响,足以说明这一点。

人为了生存和发展,创造制度。但人的欲求是十分复杂的,最基本的有三项:保全、发展与秩序。人是从哪项欲求出发创造制度,与人所面临的现实处境密切相关。反过来,任何现存的制度要获得存续,都必须满足一定的需要,具备一定的功用,并且对人的现实存在方式和观念方式产生直接的影响。所以,当我们聚焦制度问题的时候,就会发现,制度处于复杂的时空之中,并受制于不同人的不同动机和欲求,犹如一颗多切面的宝石,五光十色,令人眩目。所以,不论是经济学中的制度主义,还是社会学或政治学中的制度主义,都形成了相当多的流派,以致任何外来者,都无法彻底搞清楚其中的关系。但是,人们依然趋之若鹜。道理很简单:首先制度问题本身就是无法回避的问题,在现实社会,任何问题,触及根本,不是人的问题,就是制度问题;其次,制度主义在假设上比较直接,在对象上比较具体,在方法上比较科学,因而,具有比较强的分析力和阐释力。本论著的激情和风格,生动说明了为什么制度主义会吸引那么多人的原因。

在制度研究中,中国无疑是很好的研究对象。近三十年的变革,中国形成了深刻的制度变迁与发展,并进入了全面的制度创新与制度建设时期。中国过往三十年的改革成功,得益于比较成功和顺利的制度变迁与转型;而中国的未来,又将在很大程度上决定于制度建设的水平和制度健全的程度。改革变革了制度,而制度转型将塑造未来的中国。所以,不论是研究中国的过去,还是把握中国的未来,都必须探求中国制度变迁的逻辑和未来的走向。中国的制度变迁、转型与发展,有中国的特点。首先,中国是一个大国,制度的构成形式、运行方式和功能形态,有其自己的特点;其次,中国是一个社会主义国家,政治、经济与社会的关系有比较独特的历史规定性和政治规定性,因而,任何制度变迁的路径、手段和进程,也有自己的特色。这决定了对中国制度变迁和转型的探究,既要考虑制度本身的逻辑,还需要充分考虑中国的特点与特色。我们固然可以用一般的模式来套中国,但那只有证明和分析现存的理论及模式的意义,不能解释中国问题,因而,也就不能在学术上有新的创造与发现。本书没有落入这个俗套,十分诚恳地回到现实,深究一点,展现一面:这个点就是转型期的中国高等教育,这个面就是中国制度变迁中的权力博弈。

教育是立国之本。高等教育是国家现代化的动力源泉。不论是现代化过程中的人的发展,还是制度创新和科技创新,其智力资源和思想支撑,都来自大学。大学提供价值、设计制度、创新科技,其境界、能力和水平,从大局上影响着一个国家的现代化建设和发展。所以,改革开放后,中国就全面恢复正常的大学体制,并将其迅速运转起来,为现代化建设提供最基本的、也是最关键的人力、智力和创新力的资源。大学的发展,推动了中国现代化发展;同时,现代化的发展,也推动了大学的发展,并对大学建设提出了更高的要求。所以,改革与发展经历了一段时间之后,如何更好地建设和发展中国的大学教育,使中国拥有世界一流大学的问题,就成为现代化发展的战略问题,成为国家进步和崛起的战略问题。

大学的发展,一靠投入;二靠人才;而要使得这两项因素结合之后能够产生最大的发展效益,就需要良好的管理体制。在投入资源相对紧张的情况下,体制和制度建设就显得更为重要,一则可以创造多元的投入渠道;二则可以提高投入的效益。然而,实践中的体制和制度建设,并非易事。这并不是因为没有借鉴的样本,关键在于教育这个产品相当特殊,既要满足个体教育权利和教育消费的需要,也要满足国家建设对教育的要求;而且,教育资源和产品,涉及方方面面的利益,其中的任何变化,都可能触及具体的利益结构,甚至影响全局。所以,本书把中国高等教育制度的变迁和发展,看作是各方面相关主体之间一次又一次,一场又一场权力博弈的结果,参与其中的主体有:中央与地方、政府与高校以及高校内部的校、院、系,行政权力与学术权力、教师与学生等。参与的主体越多,博弈也就越复杂,其结果越难以把握。于是,本书作者动用了数学模型分析,力图把复杂的博弈关系,用清晰的、可测度的数学模型表达出来。方法论的更新,不仅为制度主义研究提供了扎实的基础,而且也为了把握复杂的论题提供了有效的路径。

要进行模型分析,就必须有充分的数据和材料。作者在本书中展现了相当丰富的历史与现实的数据和材料,并对其进行了相当细密的梳理、排列和分析。充足的材料、科学的模型以及细密的分析,虽然给本书带来了一些庞杂感和抽象感,但其整体上所展现出来的

科学气质和严谨态度,还是让人感受到学术的力与美,感受到中国高等教育制度发展的历程与面临问题的复杂性。本书最后得出的基本结论有十条,值得称道的是,这十条结论既不是凑数而成的,也不是来自理性的简单归纳,每一条都有根有据,都能回溯到前面的分析,因而,是在科学的逻辑中形成的。这种结论,不可能是绝对的,但其所做出的判断和所指出的问题,却是不能轻易忽视的。

作为他的导师,我深知这是一本心血之作。作者在其中的付出,超出一般现象。但我认为这种辛劳是值得的,是人生的巨大财富,也是学术实践的巨大财富。学术的路,一定是崎岖的,需要坚韧的毅力和忠诚的心,需要不停攀高的胆量和勇气。我期待着作者新的超越。

林尚立

2007年7月7日于复旦燕园

前言

1978年以来,我国高等教育发生了巨大变化,取得了显著成就,其原因可以从多种角度加以阐释,但我们认为,最根本的原因在于高等教育制度的不断变迁和创新。制度的变迁和创新就是新的更有效的制度替代旧制度的过程,在此过程中,各权力主体之间的权力与职责不断进行重新配置和定位。在转型期的初期阶段,我国高等教育制度变迁的性质属于典型的强制性变迁,这是国家依靠强力自上而下推动的结果,但随着改革的深入以及各权力主体的力量和地位发生变化,制度变迁的方式和性质也日趋复杂,其中,中央政府、地方政府、高校和社会四种力量的对比关系和博弈方式起着决定性作用。本书力图破解转型期我国高等教育制度变迁过程中各权力主体是如何进行权力博弈以及权力博弈的过程和方式是如何影响新的权力均衡和权力关系这一命题的。

我们知道,改革开放以来,我国高等教育制度变迁和创新的最终目标是要理顺五层关系,从而促进高等教育的全面发展。这五层关系是:中央与地方、政府与高校、高校与高校、高校与社会以及高校内部各权力主体之间,其中,理顺中央与地方以及政府与高校这两层关系,既是理顺其他各层关系的核心,也是高等教育体制改革的难点和重点。因此,本书旨在通过研究而着重弄清楚的主要问题是:通过各权力主体之间的反复和多重博弈,在转型期不同阶段,中央和地方以及政府与高校之间的权力关系到底发生了哪些变化和如何变化;这五层关系目前已经发展到了什么程度,其未来发展指向是什么以及还存在哪些尚未解决的问题等。

本书的第一章是绪论,除了论述权力的概念和权力的性质外,提出了本论题将要研究的主要问题,也简要分析了与本论题可能较为

相关的研究现状和研究方法。作为本论题研究的理论基础和分析工具,我们在第二章中,比较详细地论述了制度变迁理论和博弈论的主要观点,特别是诺思和马克思的制度变迁理论要点以及纳什和谢林等学者的博弈论要点,此外,笔者还根据中央与地方的一般关系特征,运用博弈论的主要观点,借助必要的前提假设,设计出了中央与地方利益博弈和权力博弈的模型,并经过数学运算,推导出了这两种博弈模型的最佳均衡解及其他结论。其中的权力博弈最佳均衡解及其他相关结论,被运用于分析转型期我国中央与地方高教权力博弈关系的性质和特征,并首次得出了相应的研究结果。第三章除简要分析中国古代高等教育制度的变迁历程以及各个历史朝代高教管理权限的主要特征外,着重论述了晚清时期、民国时期和新中国前28年的现代高等教育制度特征及其相关管理权限问题,其中还简要讨论了对新中国成立后的高等教育制度变迁历程产生深远影响的“延安模式”和“苏联模式”。第四章对转型期四个阶段影响中国高等教育发展的制度环境(政治制度、经济制度和教育制度等)进行了比较详细的分析。

从第五章到第七章是本论题的研究重点,旨在研究清楚中央与地方以及政府与高校之间的权力关系特征、权力博弈的方式和性质。笔者通过认真研究和分析转型期不同阶段高教领域的大量政策法规和文献,借用自己独创的量化手段,将高教领域七大体制类型中各权力主体的主要权力加以量化,根据量化结果,结合定性和比较研究方法,对各权力主体(中央、地方、政府、高校和社会或个人)的权力场演变特征、权力关系、权力博弈的方式和性质等,进行仔细的研究和分析,得出了一些独特的结论。第八章比较详细地探讨了中国高校内部权力的类型和主要作用方式,在此基础上,比较分析了西方国家高校内部权力博弈的几种典型模式和我国高校内部权力博弈模式,还提出了重构我国高校内部权力博弈模式的几个原则。第九章对本论题的研究结论作一总结。

通过以上研究,笔者主要得出如下十个结论,其中,除第八个结论外,其他九个结论应该是我国高教研究界第一次得出或首次发现的:

第一,到目前为止,我国高等教育体制改革所取得的主要成果之

一是,基本理顺了中央与地方的职权关系以及高校与高校之间的相互关系,而继续理顺政府与高校的职权关系、高校内部各权力主体之间以及高校与社会之间的关系,是下一阶段的改革重点,其中的关键是制度创新。

第二,转型期我国高教体制已从第一阶段的“极端中央集权制”、第二阶段的“中央高度集权制”和第三阶段的“中央适度集权制”,演变到第四阶段的“地方适度分权制”。在这四个阶段中,中央高教权力一直在不断下放之中,地方高教权力在第三阶段前处于不断上升之中,但到第四阶段已略有下降,说明地方政府也在开始下放权力。另外,到第四阶段,地方高教权力值和高校权力值均首次超过了中央权力值,这一发现,可能具有较大意义,因为它标志着我国高等教育体制已开始进入了地方分权的时代,这在中国高教史上是非常罕见的。这一结论也得到权力博弈模型研究结果的进一步证实。

第三,我国政府与高校权力博弈模式的演变历程是,从第一阶段的“政府极端专制型”和第二阶段的“政府较强专制型”,到第三阶段的“政府极强主导型”,再到第四阶段的“政府适度主导型”。虽然在第四阶段中,政府权力已大幅下降,高校权力大幅上升,但是前者的权力值仍然超过后者近一倍,这就是高校在大幅扩大办学自主权之后,仍然感到自主权不足的主要原因。目前,我国政府与高校权力博弈模式正在朝着“高校适度主导型”方向发展。

第四,转型期不同阶段中央与地方高教权力博弈的方式呈现不同的特征,具体是,在第一阶段以隐性权力博弈为主,第二阶段以灰色权力博弈为主,第三阶段以主动型权力博弈为主,而第四阶段则以混合型权力博弈为主,但显性权力博弈在我国高教领域出现的条件尚未成熟。

第五,转型期中央与地方高教权力博弈的性质共有四种,即非规范性、强制性、非均衡性和层次性。在不同阶段,权力博弈性质的侧重点略有不同,具体是,在第一和第二阶段,主要表现为“非规范性”和“强制性”,在第三和第四阶段,则以“非均衡性”和“层次性”为主。

第六,在中央与地方的权力博弈过程中,得到较大实惠者是中央,地方所得利益比较有限。在中央“主动”放权和地方“主动”扩权

的过程中,中央下放掉的权力主要是那些自己用不好或本来就不该用的权力,而改革的主导权以及政策制定的决定权和决策权却始终掌控在中央手中,地方获得的主要权力是资源统筹权和规划权,但在取消毕业生统配政策和实施毕业生自谋职业政策之后,作为最重要的资源——人才资源,已失去了其大部分的统筹和规划意义。其结果是,加剧了各地方之间的不公平竞争,在这一方面,发达地区是最大的赢家,而越是不发达的地区,越得不偿失。不过,发达地区的代价也十分巨大,主要是人才贬值,“大材小用”现象日益普遍。

第七,在政府与高校的权力博弈过程中,主要得惠者是少数中央与地方共建的重点高校,其他高校的境况反而不如从前。

第八,转型期我国高校内部的权力结构极度失衡,政党权力始终大于其他主体的权力,“党管政”现象极为普遍,外行管内行的现象依然常见。此外,行政权力过于强大,学术权力极端弱小,学生权力微不足道,社会权力可有可无,这有违大学的基本精神。理顺高校内部权力关系,应该成为我国下一阶段教育体制改革的重中之重。

第九,在七大类高教体制中,权力下放的力度和幅度相差悬殊,其中,与高校办学自主权关系最为密切的教育教学体制,其权力下放的幅度却最小,这是不正常现象,应该引起有关领导的重视。另外,已经在教育法律、法规中明确规定下放给高校的部分权力,还没有真正得到落实,中央有关部门应该采取坚决的措施,把这些权力落到实处。

第十,根据笔者设计的中央与地方利益博弈和权力博弈模型,通过数学运算,得出的结论是:中央与地方利益博弈的最佳均衡解为 $\{P - Pt + Pt^2L_3, Pt - Pt^2L_3\}$; 中央与地方权力博弈的最佳均衡解为: (1) 对地方分权制国家而言,其最佳权力仰角为 $\alpha = 36.86^\circ$, 此时,双方的权力差和权力损耗值均为 0.2, 中央权力为 0.599 86, 地方权力为 0.800 1, 而中央与地方的最佳权力结构之比为中央:地方 = 0.749 7:1; (2) 对于中央集权制国家而言,其最佳权力仰角为 $\alpha = 53.14^\circ$, 此时,双方的权力差和权力损耗值也均为 0.2, 中央权力为 0.800 1, 地方权力为 0.599 86, 而中央与地方的最佳权力结构之比为中央:地方 = 1.333 8:1。

Preface

Higher education in China has changed dramatically and achieved prominent accomplishments since 1978. We can explain the situation in many ways, though, the most essential reasons rest with the continuously institutional vicissitude and innovation on higher education. Institutional vicissitude and innovation mean the new and more efficient institution substitutes for the past one in which the power and responsibility of several relative power main parts go through re-collocation and re-orientation frequently. During the forefront of the transforming stage, the character of Chinese higher education institutional vicissitude remains with the typical compulsion which is the outcome forced by governments from above to below, but with the reformation development and the changes of potency and status among the power main parts, the ways of institutional vicissitude go through more and more complicated in which the contrastive relations and game ways among such four forces as central governments, local governments, universities and society play a determining role. This dissertation attempts to discuss and explain how the power main parts carry through power game and the processes and ways of power game influence the new power equilibrium and the relationship among the parts during the institutional vicissitude on Chinese higher education.

It is all known that the ultimate goals of institutional vicissitude on higher education in China will try to put in order the five relationships between central governments and local governments, governments and universities, university and university, universities and society, and

among the power main parts within a university , so as to promote overall development of the higher education, the two pairs of relations, i. e. , between central and local governments, and between governments and universities, are the key to put in order other relationships as well as the keystone of higher education system reform. Therefore the dissertation aims to explore the following major issues: after the repeated and excessive games among those power main parts, what and how changes have been got on the power relationships between central and local governments, and between governments and universities; on what stages the above five relationships have currently stepped; what their future goals are and what issues need to be resolved etc.

The first chapter of this dissertation is an introduction which puts forward the major questions it will study and analyzes briefly the research status in quo and research methods related to the thesis in addition to discussions on the concepts and characters of power. As the theoretical basis and analytical instrument of this research, Chapter Two discussed in details several major theories on institution and game, especially the institutional vicissitude theory of Douglass C. North and Karl Marx as well as the game theory of John Nash and Thomas C. Schelling. Furthermore the author designed two models as to benefit game and power game between central and local governments, based on common characteristics of the relations between them, relevant views of game theories and some essential hypothesizes. According to the models and mathematical operation, the author deduced the best equilibrium solutions and other conclusions from these two game models. The best equilibrium solutions and other conclusions of power game model were used to analyze the habitudes and characters of higher educational power game relationship between central and local governments at the transforming stage and elicited several related research results for the first time. Chapter Three emphatically probed into the institutional characters and relative administering popedoms of modern higher education during

the periods of later Qing Dynasty, Min Guo and the former 28 years after the P. R. China was established except for analyzing briefly the vicissitude courses of higher education institution and the main features of higher educational administration popedoms in ancient China, also the author briefly discussed “the Yan-an Pattern” and “the Soviet Union Pattern” which has deeply influenced the institutional vicissitude course of Chinese higher education since 1949. Chapter Four analyzed in great detail the institutional circumstances (such as the political, economical and educational) which influenced the Chinese higher educational development during the four phases of the transforming stage.

The research focus of this thesis unfolded in Chapter Five, Six and Seven, which aimed to make clear the power relation characteristics, power game manners and their habitudes between central and local governments as well as between governments and universities. By reviewing a great lot of literatures on higher educational policies and laws during the four phases of the transforming stage, and employing original quantifying means, the author quantified all power factors of the power main parts of the seven system styles on higher education field. According to the quantifying results and combining the qualitative and comparative methods, the author investigated and analyzed in great details the evolved characters of power field, power relationship as well as the manners and habitudes of power game among such power main parts as central governments, local governments, universities and society, with which we deduced some specific conclusions. Chapter Eight probed into in much detailed manner the power styles and their main roles within the Chinese universities, and comparatively analyzed several typical models of power game between the western and Chinese universities. Furthermore, the author put forward several principia to reconstruct the power game styles within our universities. Chapter Nine summed up some research results from this thesis.

According to the results from the research mentioned above, the

author reached the following ten conclusions, among which there were nine that should be regarded as being deduced or discovered for the first time, except for the No. Eight:

Firstly, up to now one of the main results achieved by the Chinese higher education system reform is that we have mostly made clear the responsibility division and power relationship between central and local governments as well as the interrelation among the universities, while next reform emphasis should be placed on discerning the interrelations between governments and universities, among the power main parts within universities, and between universities and society, in which it is the key for the institutional innovation.

Secondly, the styles of Chinese higher education system during the transforming stage have evolved from “the extremely central unitarianism” in the first phase, “the highly central unitarianism” in the second phase, “the moderately central unitarianism” in the third phase to “the moderately local decentralism” in the fourth phase. The central governments has been decentralizing its higher education power during the four phases, and the local governments have been enlarging their higher education power until the third phase, which, but, has been on decline since the fourth phase. This maybe be attributed to that fact that the local governments begin also to descend its power. Besides, the power value of both local governments and universities has respectively exceeded the one of central governments for the first time, the author believes that this discovery will probably be important because it indicates that Chinese higher education system has come into the new era of decentralism which was very unusual in the history of Chinese higher education. The conclusion was further confirmed by the research results from power game model.

Thirdly, the courses of power game patterns between Chinese governments and universities have evolved from “the extremely governmental despotism” in the first phase, “the more strongly

governmental despotism” in the second phase, “the much strongly governmental dominance” in the third phase till “the moderately governmental dominance” in the fourth phase. Although the governments’ power has dropped greatly and the power of universities has risen largely, the power value of the former almost doubled that of the latter. This is the key reason why the universities still felt scant on their independence after they had greatly enlarged their self-determination right in running the school. At present, the power game pattern between governments and universities is developing toward “the moderate university dominance”.

Fourthly, there were many characteristics presented on the power game manners of higher education between central and local governments in the different phases of transforming stage, i. e. , the concealed power game in the first phase, the gray color power game in the second phase, the initiative power game in the third phase and mixture power game in the fourth phase, respectively, but the conditions for the apparent power game are still premature.

Fifthly, there are four characters embedded in higher educational power game between central and local governments during the transforming stage, i. e. , non-criterion, compulsion, non-equilibrium and arrangement. The emphasis of the power game is different in the various phases, that is, the first and second phases manifesting mainly the non-criterion and compulsion, but the third and fourth phases representing primarily the non-equilibrium and arrangement.

Sixthly, in the process of power game between central and local governments, it is the central governments that has gained greater benefits, while the local governments just got limited boon; and during the course of central and local governments “initiatively” decentralizing and enlarging their powers respectively, the power that central governments decentralized were mainly those it couldn’t executed well or it shouldn’t keep at the beginning, but the driving power of reform and the determining power of policy-making were controlled all the time by

the central governments. The primary power that the local governments got was related to resource planning, but after cancellation of the graduates assignment policy and activation of the policy of graduates looking for jobs by themselves, one of the most important resources, the personnel resource, has mostly lost its meaning for planning, which turned out to be that it pricked up unfair competition among districts, on the one hand, the developed areas were the greater winners while the underdeveloped were not worth the candle, but on the another hand, the developed also paid out great cost, which mainly was personnel depreciation because the phenomena of “one’s business below his capacity” are increasingly at large.

Seventhly, in the process of power game between governments and universities, the main winners were a few of key universities co-constructed by central and local governments, but others were not as good as before instead.

Eighthly, the power structures within Chinese universities were extremely unbalanced as the Party power always outmatched the power of all other power main parts. The phenomenon of “Party supervising administration” was much at large, and the phenomenon of “laypeople supervising experts” was also very common. Except for the Party power, administrative power was excessively strong, learning power was very weak, students’ power was much tiny and social power was unimportant, all of those contravened the basical spirit of universities. To make clear the power relationship within universities should turn into the keystone of Chinese educational system reformation on the next phase.

Ninthly, in the seven kinds of higher educational systems, the strength and range of power-descending were of great disparity. The power of education-teaching system which related the most closely to the independence power of running school was descent in the least, which was very strange and uncommon, and the leaders concerned should pay attention to the phenomenon. Besides, some kinds of powers which the