



GRADUATE ENGLISH:
COMMUNICATION SKILLS

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研究生英语： 交流技能教程

◆ 王秋野 主编

浙江大学出版社

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前 言

《研究生英语:交流技能教程》是一本旨在培养和提高学生英语交流(包括口头表达和书面表达)能力的中高级教材。

教材共有十个单元,每单元由三部分(阅读、口语和写作)组成。阅读部分由三篇关于同一主题的文章及相关练习组成。口语部分含两个小节:(1)一般会话功能训练,如赞成与反对、澄清、说服等;(2)围绕单元主题展开的讨论、演讲、辩论、情景表演等。写作部分分三个小节:(1)句型操练;(2)短文英汉互译;(3)应用文写作。

本教材遵循以学习者为本,以培养学生用英语表达思想、交流信息为教学目的的指导思想。教材编排注重新颖性、实用性,以及便于自学等特点。

一、语言输入与输出的有机结合

针对妨碍中国学生表达的最大问题是不知该怎么说、怎么写这一现象,教材提供了充分的语言素材以供学生进行摹仿练习。如,在口语练习之前安排有相关内容的听力训练,针对口语训练向学生提供相关可供参考的语言表达方式;同样,习作练习之前配备了相关语句和范文以供学生摹仿。

二、实用性强

在选择口语功能和应用文类型时,尽可能地考虑了学生使用英语的实际情景和需要,所选口语表达方式和范文,不但利于课堂教学活动的展开,而且也可作为学生日后实际使用的参考。

三、语言新、信息内容新

课文均选自20世纪90年代后期出版的英、美书刊(如 *The Futurist*, *Discover*, *Scientific American*, *Popular Science*, *New Scientists* 等),文章信息新,知识性强,并涉及到当前的热门话题,如生化武器、太空探索、转基因食品、经济全球化等,可极大地激起学生的求知欲。

四、便于自学

为了方便学生自学和自测,每单元的阅读部分提供有大量辅助材料。每单元由三篇围绕同一主题的课文组成,Text A 为主课文,Text B、C 为辅助阅读材料。主课文(Text A)中的大纲词汇和词组使用粗体进行标示。文后分别列有大纲词汇与非大纲词汇,并进行注音;对文中的难句、难点列有详细的解释,并且在书后还附有主课文(Text A)的中译文及各练习答案。此外,每两单元配有一份小测验,以供学生自测学习效果。教材已制成多媒体光盘,包含有美音朗读、练习答案显示等功能。

本教材在浙江大学四校区试用时,受到了师生的广泛好评。

本教材专为硕士研究生、博士研究生教学编写,也适用于英语达到一定水平,希望进一步提高说写能力的学习者。

本教材由浙江大学外国语学院王秋野主编并审订,编写者有:蔡志良、李淑敏、方凡、方小

燕、陈伟英。

美国俄克拉荷马州立大学英语系教授 Glenn Broadhead 博士审校了全书,Becky Goetz 女士参与了文字修订工作,我们在此向他们表示深切的谢意。在本书的编写过程中,张振中教授给予了悉心指导。教材编写得到浙江大学研究生院的大力支持。在教材试用和收集反馈意见的过程中,柴小平、顾晔和马群等老师给予了支持和配合。我们向他们表示诚挚的感谢。

我们还要感谢浙江大学的博士生、硕士生们,感谢他们给予本书的热情关注以及在使用过程中提出的宝贵意见。

本教材选用的英文书刊中的文章或段落,由于种种原因未能与作者或出版商取得联系,在此一并致谢。

教材中疏漏、错误之处,敬请读者不吝指正。

编 者

2001 年 7 月于求是园

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Unit One

Part One Reading

War has always been part of human history. All sorts of weapons, from conventional guns to atomic bombs, to chemical and biological weapons (CBW), are created to kill and maim people. Texts in this unit discuss the issue of weapons. Text A presents an overview of two kinds of unconventional arms: biological and chemical weapons. You'll learn when the advanced weapons were first used and what threat they bring to humankind. Text B argues that weapons should be banned if they cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. Text C discusses the ethical consequences of using non-lethal weapons.

While reading the texts, think about this question: What can we do to prevent the use of weapons that cause massive casualties?

Text A

Unconventional Arms: The Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons

By Richard A. Falkenrath

1. When the wind shifted on the afternoon of April 22, 1915, on fields near Ypres, France, the Imperial German Army ushered in a new age of **warfare**.
2. World War I (1914-1918) had become a **brutal** standoff of opposing infantries fighting from fortified **trenches**. To break the stalemate, the German Supreme Command made a fateful decision to change strategy. At 5 p. m. German combat engineers opened 5730 cylinders of **compressed** chlorine gas. Blown by the wind, this vast yellowish-green cloud wafted across the battlefield toward the unprepared Allied lines.
3. Suddenly **enveloped** and choking from the mysterious gas, French and Belgian troops in the trenches turned and ran for their lives. Unopposed, but wary of the ominous cloud, the German infantry advanced a few hundred meters toward Allied lines and then dug in

for the night.

4. The full price of developments in modern science began coming into view on this day. The science of chemistry had progressed steadily in the late 1800s and early 1900s, but it was on this day, in the blood-soaked fields of France, that newly isolated *chemical agents* (chemicals in a concentrated form) were first used for **destructive** purposes. The chemical weapons used in World War I were the first true weapons of mass destruction. Biological weapons of mass destruction would emerge in the 1930s, followed by nuclear weapons in the 1940s.
5. As chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons proliferated around the world and the technologies behind them advanced, they would together emerge as one of the most serious threats to human existence and international security ever produced by human beings. Scientific progress could bring knowledge and prosperity, but it could also provide new, ever-better tools for killing people or rendering lands **uninhabitable**.
6. During the Cold War, international attention focused primarily on nuclear weapons, which the United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) produced and deployed in numbers sufficient to destroy the world many times over. Chemical and biological weapons (CBW) were regarded as second-tier weapons, in part because military experts assumed that their use would lead quickly to a nuclear exchange. Thus, despite building vast arsenals of chemical and biological weapons, neither weapon type was taken very seriously by the United States or the USSR during the Cold War.
7. Attitudes toward chemical and biological weapons began to change with the passing of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, particularly among U. S. military officials and experts. The Persian Gulf War (1990-1991) was in many respects a wake-up call for the U. S. military, which realized early in the conflict that it was not well prepared to cope with the CBW threat **posed** by Iraq. Many military strategists now regard chemical and biological weapons as one of the **foremost** threats to U. S. national security interests.
8. Some experts have argued that chemical and biological weapons are now more likely to be used than nuclear weapons, whether by an **aggressive** state, such as Iraq, or by a terrorist group, such as the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which attacked the Tokyo, Japan, subway with nerve gas in March 1995. United States security officials and experts are now beginning to focus on the contemporary CBW threat. They are trying to understand how scientific developments are changing this threat and working to better prepare the nation for future CBW incidents.

Chemical and Biological Weapons: An Overview

9. Technologically, chemical and biological weapons are almost entirely different. Chemical weapons are highly **toxic**, manufactured substances that can be disseminated as vapors, **aerosols**, or liquids. Biological weapons, on the other hand, are living, disease-causing microorganisms or *toxins* (deadly chemicals derived from living organisms) which, in their most effective form, are disseminated as aerosols that are inhaled.
10. There are four basic types of chemical warfare agents. Choking agents, such as chlorine and phosgene, attack the victim's lungs through inhalation and produce death or incapacitation by interfering with breathing. Blister agents, such as **mustard** gas and lewisite, destroy human skin and tissue through both inhalation and direct contact with the skin. Blood agents, such as hydrogen cyanide, block the transfer of oxygen through the blood system, and cause injury or death from *anoxia* (a deficiency of oxygen reaching bodily tissues).
11. The most **lethal** chemical warfare agents are nerve agents, such as sarin, tabun, and VX, which produce convulsions and death by blocking an enzyme (acetylcholinesterase) needed to transmit messages in the nervous system. Nerve agents can be lethal in minute amounts: A tiny drop of VX on the skin, for example, can overcome an adult human in a matter of minutes.
12. Chemical weapons require a dissemination system, such as a sprayer or explosive device. Once released against an unprotected population, chemical weapons tend to function quickly and can produce noticeable **symptoms** within an affected group in a matter of seconds or minutes. Most chemical weapons have a **distinctive odor** and can be seen in the atmosphere. Exposure to a chemical warfare agent is not necessarily fatal, since the effects of chemical weapons depend on a wide range of factors, including dose, the length of time a person is exposed, the level of protection a person has, and whether medical treatment is available. The effects of chemical weapons are also highly dependent on terrain and weather.
13. Chemical weapons can be extremely effective against civilians and unprepared military forces, although **literally** tons of agents are needed to create lethal doses in large open areas. Properly prepared military forces, on the other hand, should be able to withstand an enemy's chemical attacks if they possess adequate chemical warfare training and equipment, such as gas masks and protective clothing. Chemical defenses do, however, impose additional physical and logistical demands on military operations.
14. Biological weapons (excluding toxins, which resemble chemical weapons) consist of liv-

ing, **infectious** microorganisms that are disseminated as aerosols through the atmosphere. Inhaled into the lungs, biological agents begin to multiply within the body, causing a disease that can incapacitate or kill the victim. Biological warfare aerosols are generally invisible, odorless, and tasteless. The **onset** of symptoms is usually delayed, often for as much as three to five days, so the victim of biological warfare may not even know that an attack has occurred until the disease has reached an advanced stage.

15. In principle, any disease-causing organism “bacteria, **viruses**, **parasites**, even fungi” can be used as biological warfare agents, but in practice, a handful of well-known agents are believed best suited for biological warfare purposes. Of these, the bacterium that causes anthrax is one of the most worrisome. The anthrax **bacterium** is highly lethal, easily disseminated in the atmosphere, and noncontagious. Military strategists typically dismiss *contagious agents* (those that can be transmitted from an initially infected person to an uninfected one) since they pose the risk of an uncontrollable **epidemic**, which could spread to the attacker’s own population or troops.
16. Because of their ability to multiply within the host, even microscopic doses of biological warfare agents can kill. Kilogram quantities of anthrax bacteria, for example, could kill hundreds of thousands of people if effectively distributed, a **casualty** range comparable to that of a nuclear weapon. However, the effects of a biological weapons attack are highly variable and depend on a range of unpredictable factors. These include the type of agent used and dose received, the **immune** response of the targeted population, the efficiency of the aerosol-producing device, weather, and the timing and quality of medical treatment received by those affected.
17. Traditionally, biological weapons have been regarded as weapons of terror, not instruments for military operations. Apart from the moral stigma attached to the use of biological weapons, their delayed and unpredictable effects make them ill-suited for virtually all tactical military purposes.

International Initiatives to Limit CBW

18. In 1993 the international community signed the landmark Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC went well beyond the 1925 Geneva Protocol by prohibiting the possession and use of all chemical weapons, and by requiring signatory states to destroy all chemical weapons stockpiles. The CWC contains a **comprehensive** system for verifying **compliance** with convention requirements through detailed exchanges of data, regular on-site inspections, and *challenge* (surprise) inspections to investigate irregularities. A new international organization, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), was established in The Hague, Netherlands, to oversee **implementation** of the agreement. After a heated debate in the U. S. Senate, the United States

ratified the CWC in April 1997, allowing the convention to enter into force that same month.

19. Since 1994, negotiations have been underway to add a verification protocol to the 1972 BWC (Biological Weapons Convention). But many experts doubt that these talks will succeed in producing an effective biological weapons verification system, because the nature of such weapons makes them extremely difficult to monitor reliably. In addition, the biotechnology industry is concerned about the risks of industrial espionage perpetrated under the guise of **treaty** verification. Although work continues on the BWC verification protocol, some experts and officials are exploring other options for preventing biological warfare in the future, principally through efforts to further stigmatize biological warfare and to make possession or use of biological weapons a crime under international law.

CBW Risks of the Future

20. Most experts believe that an ever-increasing number of countries and terrorist groups will gain the technical capability to acquire and use chemical and biological weapons. But use of these weapons by hostile states or terrorist groups is not inevitable. Even when locked in bloody conventional wars, nations that have considered using these weapons have generally been deterred by the risk that their opponents would retaliate in kind or **escalate** the conflict elsewhere. Terrorist groups with the technical capacity to acquire and use a chemical or biological weapon have typically lacked an interest in doing so, while groups interested in such weapons have generally lacked the necessary technical skills.
21. **Assessing** future threats, however, involves more than simple extrapolation from past trends. In the case of chemical and biological weapons, it appears that the likelihood of use by both hostile states and terrorist groups is growing, and it is clear that even one such attack against an unprotected population could be devastating.
22. Ironically, some experts believe that the technological superiority of the U. S. armed forces is **heightening** the long-term risks of CBW use by states that wish to challenge the international status quo through aggression. Hostile states that hope to have a fighting chance against a U. S. -led military coalition, such as the one that defeated Iraq in 1991, may search for ways to compensate for the inferiority of their own conventional military forces. An obvious answer, and one of grave concern to U. S. military planners, is that such states might turn to an unconventional arsenal, most importantly chemical and biological weapons.
23. The threat of CBW use by terrorists is of an entirely different character. Terrorists have

almost always chosen to kill fewer people than they are able to kill. The main reason is that traditional terrorist strategies seek to draw international attention to a cause without excessively antagonizing public opinion. For a variety of reasons this traditional model of terrorism appears to be changing in ways that make future acts of CBW terrorism more likely.

24. Some terrorist groups appear to be increasingly interested in causing massive casualties, a phenomenon that may stem from a rise in religiously inspired acts of violence, the emergence of new, more fluid terrorist cells, and the perception that traditional, low-casualty terrorist acts have lost the capacity to focus public attention. To date only the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo has combined the technical capability with the lethal intent required to carry out an act of CBW terrorism. But national security experts are increasingly concerned that more hostile groups will follow Aum's **precedent** and will do so with greater effectiveness than the cult displayed.

The Promise and Peril of Biotechnology

25. As the world struggles to cope with the threats raised by the scientific advances of a century ago, a new revolution in the field of biotechnology may have an even more **profound** impact on the scope and form of future human conflict. Since 1953, when biochemists James Watson and Francis Crick identified the structure of *deoxyribonucleic acid* (DNA, the genetic basis of all living organisms), the scientific understanding of biological and genetic processes has **accelerated** dramatically. This so-called "biotechnology revolution" has spawned new industries focused on manipulating human, animal, plant, and **microbial** genetics to create heretofore unattainable products and services, primarily in the medical area.
26. Some aspects of biotechnology have raised deep ethical questions, but most developments in the field are serving to advance the quality of human life. But like all scientific advances, there is a risk that these new technological capabilities will be used for destructive purposes. In particular, developments in biotechnology are making it possible to design advanced biological warfare agents that could prove even more devastating to **humanity** than their naturally occurring cousins. For example, it might soon be possible for microbiologists to design and produce special pathogens of enhanced lethality, heightened resistance to medical treatment, predictable or controllable effects, or even the ability to infect people selectively, according to specific genetic characteristics.
27. This newly emerging science, if it is ever applied to weapon research, has the potential to revolutionize humankind's ability to destroy life, just as it is currently revolutionizing ways to save and enhance life. This is a scientific revolution every bit as profound as the dawning of the nuclear age, and one which is likely to command at least as much atten-

tion in the first half of the 21st century.

Note: Richard A. Falkenrath is an assistant professor of public policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He is coauthor of *America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack* and author of *Shaping Europe's Military Order: The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty*.

Glossary

Vocabulary required of master and doctoral students

accelerate	/ək'seləreit/	v.	to speed up
aerosol	/'eərəsəl/	n.	a fine mist 烟, 雾; 烟雾剂
aggressive	/ə'gresiv/	adj.	always ready to quarrel or attack
assess	/ə'ses/	v.	to evaluate
bacterium	/bæk'tiəriəm/	n.	very small living things related to plants, some of which cause disease 细菌
brutal	/'bru:təl/	adj.	very cruel or severe
casualty	/'kæʒuəlti/	n.	a person hurt in an accident or killed or wounded in battle 伤亡人员
compliance	/kəm'plaiəns/	n.	obedience to a rule, an agreement, a demand, etc.
comprehensive	/kəmpri'hensiv/	adj.	thorough; broad
compress	/kəm'pres/	v.	to press together; force (a substance) into less space
destructive	/dis'trʌktiv/	adj.	causing destruction
distinctive	/dis'tiŋktiv/	adj.	clearly marking a person or thing as different from others
envelop	/in'veləp/	v.	to wrap up or cover completely
epidemic	/,epi'demik/	n.	a large number of cases of the same infectious disease during a single period of time 流行病, 时疫
escalate	/'eskəleit/	v.	(of war) to make (or become) more serious by stages
foremost	/'fɔ:məust/	adj.	most important; leading
heighten	/'haitən/	v.	to make or become higher or greater
humanity	/hju:'mæniti/	n.	human beings generally
immune	/i'mju:n/	adj.	unable to be harmed because of special qualities in oneself 免疫的
implement	/'impliment/	v.	to carry out or put into practice
infectious	/in'fekʃəs/	adj.	(of a disease) that can be passed from one

			person to another by infection, esp. in the air
inhabit	/in'hæbit/	<i>v.</i>	to live in (a place or area)
initiative	/i'nɪʃiətiv/	<i>n.</i>	the first movement or action which starts something
lethal	/li:θəl/	<i>adj.</i>	deadly; causing death
literally	/li:tərəli/	<i>adv.</i>	in a literal sense; actually
microbe	/maikrəub/	<i>n.</i>	a living thing that is so small that it cannot be seen without a microscope, and that may cause disease; bacterium
mustard	/mʌstəd/	<i>n.</i>	芥子, 芥末
mustard gas		<i>n.</i>	a poisonous gas which burns in the skin 芥子气
odor	/əʊdə/	<i>n.</i>	a smell, esp. an unpleasant one
onset	/ɒnset/	<i>n.</i>	the first attack or beginning (of something bad)
parasite	/pærəsait/	<i>n.</i>	a plant or animal that lives on or in another and gets food from it 寄生虫
peril	/peril/	<i>n.</i>	(great) danger
pose	/pəʊz/	<i>v.</i>	to present; to be the cause of
precedent	/president/	<i>n.</i>	a former action or case that may be used as an example or rule for present or future action
profound	/prə'faund/	<i>adj.</i>	deep; intense
symptom	/simptəm/	<i>n.</i>	an outward or noticeable sign of disease
terrorist	/terərist/	<i>n.</i>	people who use violence or threat to use violence for political gains
toxic	/tɒksik/	<i>adj.</i>	poisonous
treaty	/tri:ti/	<i>n.</i>	an agreement made between countries, esp. after a war, and formally signed by the representatives
trench	/trentʃ/	<i>n.</i>	a deep ditch dug in the ground as a protection for soldiers
uninhabitable	/,ʌnɪn'hæbitəbl/	<i>adj.</i>	unfit to be lived in
virus	/vaɪərəs/	<i>n.</i>	a living thing even smaller than bacteria which causes infectious diseases in the body, in plants, etc. 病毒
warfare	/wɔ:fəə/	<i>n.</i>	military activity against an enemy; war