



SELECTED WORKS
OF
MAO TSE-TUNG

Volume II

统一书号：1017·43

定 价：1.10 元

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Volume II

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS
PEKING 1967

毛泽东选集

第二卷

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外文出版社出版（北京）

一九六五年第一版

一九六七年第二次印刷

编号：（英）1050—386

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一九六七年六月重印

书号 1017·43

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WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

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FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS
PEKING 1967

First Edition 1965
Second Printing 1967

The present volume is an English translation of the second Chinese edition of the second volume of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, published by the People's Publishing House, Peking, in April 1960.

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