

Attitude
Organization
and Change

Carl Hovland

新闻学与传播学经典丛书·英文原版系列

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态度的形成和改变

Carl Hovland 等著
[美]卡尔·霍夫兰

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“新闻学与传播学经典丛书·英文原版系列”，选取了在新闻学与传播学历史上具有里程碑意义的大师经典名作，如传播学“四大奠基人”哈罗德·拉斯韦尔、保罗·拉扎斯菲尔德等，及加布里埃尔·塔尔德、罗伯特·帕克、哈罗德·伊尼斯、马歇尔·麦克卢汉、库尔特·卢因、卡尔·霍夫兰等这些学界耳熟能详的名家佳作。这些是传播学与新闻学的奠基之作，也是现代新闻学与传播学发展的基础。许多名作都多次再版，影响深远，历久不衰，成为新闻学与传播学的经典。此套丛书采用英文原版出版，希望读者能读到原汁原味的著作。

随着中国高等教育的教学改革，广大师生已不满足于仅仅阅读国外图书的翻译版，他们迫切希望能读到原版图书，希望能采用国外英文原版图书进行教学，从而保证所讲授的知识体系的完整性、系统性、科学性和文字描绘的准确性。此套丛书的出版便是满足了这种需求，同时可使学生在专业技术方面尽快掌握本学科相应的外语词汇，并了解先进国家的学术发展方向。

本系列在引进英文原版图书的同时，将目录译为中文，作为对原版的一种导读，供读者阅读时参考。

从事经典著作的出版，需要出版人付出不懈的努力，我们自知本套丛书也许会有很多缺陷，虚心接受读者提出的批评和建议。

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CHAPTER I

Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Components of Attitudes

MILTON J. ROSENBERG AND CARL I. HOVLAND

ATTITUDES ARE TYPICALLY DEFINED as "predispositions to respond in a particular way toward a specified class of objects." Being predispositions they are not directly observable or measurable. Instead they are inferred from the way we react to particular stimuli. Saying that a man has an unfavorable attitude toward foreigners leads us to expect that he will perceive their actions with distrust, will have strong negative feelings toward them, and will tend to avoid them socially. Thus when attitudes are studied what are observed are the evoking stimuli on the one hand and the various types of response on the other. The types of response that are commonly used as "indices" of attitudes fall in three major categories: cognitive, affective, and behavioral.

For certain types of research it may be sufficient to use a single response as the "index" of an individual's attitude. Thus if we can keep other factors constant and merely introduce some external stimulus, say a communication, we can see how the individual's way of perceiving an issue is changed. For example, if one wants to determine whether presenting a particular point of view in first position, as compared to

second position (after the opposing point of view has been presented), produces greater change in attitude, one can administer a scale of verbal statements about the issue before and after the two orders of presentation and compare their impact.


Experiments involving this procedure were described in the first volume of this series (Hovland et al., 1957). These studies yielded results concerning the differences between pro-con and con-pro sequences in modifying *beliefs* about attitude objects. But even in such a situation it is possible that subjects who were similar in their tested beliefs on a particular issue were not similar in how they felt about the issue emotionally or in the actions they would take concerning it.

In nonexperimental situations, uncontrolled variability in the factors that influence attitudinal responses makes for still greater uncertainty. Thus, despite the fact that two persons respond in the same way on one specific index of attitude (say, how they vote on a school bond proposal) they may hold very different beliefs, expectations, feelings, and action orientations toward the matter at issue. Indeed if attitude is defined as the *set* of "predispositions to respond in a particular way toward some particular class of stimuli," they may hold quite different *attitudes*. On the other hand, it is quite conceivable that for a given person, or group of persons, or for a given issue, the various types of indices by which "attitudes" are estimated may be highly and predictably related to one another. This is assumed when, frequently, we infer one type of response from another.

These considerations reflect a major problem in attitude measurement and theory: the relationship between the three major components of attitude and the factors which increase or decrease their correlation. It is to this problem that the present volume is addressed.

In the accompanying diagram our formulation is presented in simple schematic form. We here indicate that attitudes are predispositions to respond to some class of stimuli with certain classes of responses and designate the three major types of response as cognitive, affective, and behavioral. Attention to these different aspects of attitude goes back at least to McDougall (1908) and persists in current work (cf. the interesting discussion by Katz and Stotland, 1959). To a

Figure 1. Schematic Conception of Attitudes



large extent these response classes are themselves abstractions or constructs and are typically inferred from the specific types of measurable response indicated at the extreme right. Thus an individual's affective response toward another individual may be inferred from measures of such physiological variables as blood pressure or galvanic response (cf. Lawson and Stagner, 1957), but is more typically inferred from verbal statements of how much he likes or dislikes him. Similarly

how an individual will *act* toward a given situation may be evaluated by how he does respond when directly confronted with the situation but may also be inferred from what he says he will do in the given situation. *Cognitions* include perceptions, concepts, and beliefs about the attitude object and these are usually elicited by verbal questions in printed or oral form.

The basic question in studies of attitude dynamics is how, or under what conditions, responses in any or all of these three classes undergo relatively persisting alteration. This question can be pursued in various ways. The first volume in the present series, *The Order of Presentation in Persuasion*, was mainly concerned with the patterning of communications intended to alter attitudes. The second volume, *Personality and Persuasibility*, investigated certain personality characteristics that seem to foster general receptivity to such communications. The present volume, by focusing on factors influencing the correlation between different types of response components, represents a third approach; one in which attitude change is related to the internal *organization* of attitudes.

Considerable research and theorizing have been directed toward the analysis of each of the three attitude components of interest to us—cognitive, affective, and behavioral. The cognitive component has received considerable emphasis during the last two decades. The study by Katz and Braly (1933) was an early attempt to investigate the cognitive content of attitudes. A well-known finding from this study was that prejudiced respondents were markedly similar in the “traits” they attributed to members of disliked ethnic groups. Harding et al. (1954) have reviewed a number of studies in which the procedures developed by Katz and Braly were used to study cognitive stereotypes associated with prejudices.

Another cognitive aspect of attitude was investigated by

Hartley (1946) and Kramer (1949). In both these studies it was shown that groups perceived with varying degrees of clarity may elicit equally hostile attitudes.

In another group of studies some dimensions upon which the cognitive components of attitudes are likely to vary have been investigated. Thus Axelrod (1959), Carlson (1956), Nowlis (1960), Peak (1959), Rosenberg (1956), Smith (1949), and Woodruff (1942) have reported studies in which beliefs about relations between attitude objects and goal states have been singled out for special attention. These and other dimensions of beliefs about attitude objects have been discussed in theoretical articles by a number of writers, among whom are Abelson and Rosenberg (1958), Cartwright and Harary (1956), Heider (1946), Katz and Stotland (1959), Peak (1958), and Tolman (1951). Similarly the studies by Osgood and his associates (1958), employing the "semantic differential" technique, may be interpreted as illuminating some of the major cognitive dimensions of attitudes.

For the majority of researchers, however, evaluation of the affective component has been central. The attitude scales developed by Thurstone (1929) were primarily intended as evaluations of the respondent's feeling about the object or issue of concern. Krech and Crutchfield (1948) have stressed the importance of feelings of being "for or against" something and having "positive or negative affect" in distinguishing attitudes from opinions. Consistent with this emphasis, the bulk of attitude research, whether undertaken by "pollsters" or by experimenters, has involved some index of "affect" (or "evaluative response") as the prime measure of attitude. Extensive documentation of this point is available in the reviews by Green (1954), Harding et al. (1954), and Hovland (1954).

A few experimental studies have been reported in which classical conditioning procedures have been employed to

generate attitudelike emotional responses toward previously neutral stimuli. Thus Lazarus and McLeary (1951) have shown that subjects respond emotionally (i.e. "autonomically") to subthreshold presentations of nonsense syllables that have been paired with electric shock. The experiments by Statts and Statts (1958, 1959) are probably more pertinent to the study of attitudes. A typical finding in these studies is that stimulus words that have been paired with emotionally toned words tend to shift in their locations on the evaluative dimension isolated by Osgood's semantic differential technique.

Of the three major types of attitudinal response delineated in our diagrammatic scheme, "overt behavior" has perhaps received the least amount of systematic study and has been least often used as the main index of attitude. But a few studies, among which are those of Cartwright (1949), Katz and Kahn (1952), La Pierre (1934), and Schanck (1932), have been reported in which attitudes are characterized through some index of overt behavior. In these studies, however, the data force the conclusion that overt action toward an object reflects not only the attitude elicited by that object but also the influence of other variables.

While all of the research studies described above stress a particular response component of attitude, some of them, particularly those concerned with the cognitive aspect, also deal with the problem of the *interrelation* of the various classes of attitudinal response. It is the purpose of the present volume to pursue this problem further. Thus each of the present studies is directly oriented toward some major aspect of the interrelation and interaction between the classes of response associated with attitude.

Before turning to the present group of studies, however, it will be useful to ask what kinds of studies have been undertaken, and what kinds of conclusions reached, in earlier work along similar lines.

Perhaps the most common approach in previous research has been that involving correlational study of the separate response components of attitudes. Thus, to cite two examples: Stouffer (1931) has investigated the relationship between behavior and attitude scales; and Lund (1925) has dealt with the correlation between beliefs and desires. A systematic review of many of the early studies of this type will be found in the pre-war survey by Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb (1937).

The phenomena of attitude change have also been investigated by means of correlational procedures. Some outstanding examples are the study by Newcomb (1943) on changes in attitude during college years and the studies by Lazarsfeld and his colleagues (1944) on voting behavior. In such studies the separate response components of attitude are investigated not only for their relationships to one another but also for the influence of background variables upon those relationships.

Studies of this type have yielded many valuable findings; but at the same time the nature of the correlational method sets limits upon the theoretical significance of the data. Thus without control over the general setting in which the data are collected the influence of other variables upon the obtained findings is not easily assessed. Nor is it always possible to draw conclusions about the causal relationships represented in such data.

A second method has been one utilizing "case histories" to investigate the correlation between attitude components and to study the relationships between attitude and aspects of personal history or personality. Illustrations of this approach are the early study by Murray and Morgan (1945) and more recently studies by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, and colleagues (1950) and by Smith, Bruner, and White (1956). In general such studies have suggested some ways in which the person's social attitudes (and the interrelation between their

components) may be influenced and shaped by his major emotional needs, conflicts, and defense mechanisms. Taken together such studies yield broad and dramatic "clinical" findings in which social attitudes are pulled out of the limbo to which social psychologists too often relegate them and are incorporated into the general pattern of integrated psychological processes that are summarized in the term "personality."

But to the extent that one aspires toward reductionist analysis and toward precise delineation of the variables influencing the relations between attitude responses such findings cannot be fully satisfying. The problem must be pursued through procedures that enable close control over interacting, independent variables and close measurement of dependent variables. Experimental methods are required for this purpose and this is the principal methodology employed in the present studies.

Experimentation typically involves controlled manipulation of some variable and estimation of related change in some other variable. Thus most experimental work bearing on the interrelation of attitude components has comprised attempts to produce "attitude change." Attitude change experiments have dealt with a wide range of variables and hypotheses, but until fairly recent times these have been mainly concerned with the impact of the change-inducing communication or with aspects of the situation in which the communication has been received. More recently a number of experiments have been reported in which attention is focused on the production of inconsistency between response components and its consequences with regard to the ultimate reorganization of the attitudes to which these components refer.

A general and frequently replicated finding obtained in some of these studies is the simple one that persons are more

satisfied by "consistent" arrangements of related responses than by "inconsistent" arrangements. Among the large number of studies demonstrating this cardinal fact are those by Burdick and Burns (1958), Esch (in Heider, 1958), Horowitz, Lyons, and Perlmutter (1951), Jordan (1953), and Kogan and Taguirri (1958). Some, but not all, of these studies seem, however, to be restricted to mere demonstration. By arousing quite intense and extreme discrepancies between responses referring to the same object they usually succeed in eliciting attempts to reduce inconsistency; however, the extents, limits, and complexities of the general phenomenon are not illuminated.

In addition to those studies mainly concerned with demonstrating the preference for consistency there are a number that are oriented toward the exposition and development of the detailed propositions of various theories concerned with response consistency. These include studies based on Festinger's "dissonance theory" (1957), Heider's theory of "interpersonal perception" (1946, 1958), Newcomb's theory of "communicative acts" (1953, 1959), and Osgood and Tannenbaum's "congruity" approach (1955). Neither the concepts and hypotheses which make up these separate theories, nor the experiments intended to test them, will be reviewed here; where pertinent they will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

The studies in the present volume seek to clarify and extend some of the issues raised in earlier investigations; particularly they seek to examine these issues in ways that contribute to our general understanding of the processes involved in attitude change. Two types of general questions are posed which seem to combine a number of important theoretical issues. The first is an examination of the common hypothesis that affective and behavioral changes will result from exposure to verbal stimuli which change one's concep-

tion and perception of the object of the communication. Since attitudes also have both affective and behavioral components this hypothesis amounts to an assumption that affect and behavior components are modified as a result of changes in the cognitive components. Indeed there is some research by Carlson (1956), Peak (1959), Woodruff and DiVesta (1948), and others indicating that this process occurs. What then is the nature of the other linkages between the components? Are cognitions changed when the affect toward the attitude object is modified? Is affect modified when behavior change is induced? What is the influence of "contextual" or "structural" factors? These are some of the questions to which the present volume is addressed.

Closely related is another assumption made in persuasive communication, namely that when the communicator is able to present evidence indicating the need to change one of one's premises, there will be a corresponding change in the conclusion that will be drawn. Thus if the recipient believes a civic improvement is undesirable because it will be too costly, the communicator often takes as his task the demonstration that the improvement will not be too costly and assumes that the recipient will then modify his opinion of the desirability of the proposed construction as a result. Does this in fact happen and if so how is the process mediated? This is a second type of question whose answer is sought in the present studies.

All the studies reported make use of the same sort of research strategy. Typically the relationships between a number of attitude components are measured in a complex setting before any communication or other manipulation is presented. Then one group is systematically exposed to devices designed to change one of the attitude components while a second similar group either is kept as a control or exposed to some other manipulation. Then the changes in

each group are compared. This permits an analysis of the complex patterns of changes among the various components as a result of modification of the single component which is being influenced by the communication or other agency of change.

Each of the studies reported seeks to test and extend a particular theoretical orientation concerned with response consistency and attitude dynamics. But no common theoretical position is involved. While the theoretical constructions advanced in two of these chapters (the one by Rosenberg and the one by Rosenberg and Abelson) have much in common, their theoretical positions differ considerably from those by McGuire and by Brehm. Similarly the latter two chapters differ considerably from each other.

It should be clear when these chapters have been read that the differences are not necessarily disagreements. Indeed it seems to us more accurate to view the differences (or better, the contrasts) between the contributions as due to the fact that each is an attempt to test and develop a particular model. Believing that the current state of attitude theory permits no one available model to be judged clearly preferable to all others, the authors have not attempted to employ a completely uniform vocabulary or uniform set of concepts. Each chapter pursues a particular and special way of formally casting up some of the general issues that have been raised in this introduction. A brief preview of the approaches and issues dealt with in each chapter may be helpful.

Rosenberg attempts to elaborate a theoretical scheme of attitude change that is related to his earlier work on attitude structure (1953, 1956). In this earlier work, some portions of which he reviews, it was demonstrated that the affective and cognitive components of attitudes are ordinarily organized in congruence with one another. His present contribution is based on the postulate that the disruption of