


*Cultural Studies:
A Reader*

文化研究读本

王建平 / 主编



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CULTURAL STUDIES: A READER

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王建平 主编

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序

《文化研究读本》起始于2008年中国人民大学外国语学院英语语言文学专业研究生课程“跨学科文化研究方法论”。自2010年起,该课成为外国语学院全院各专业研究生方法课。历时八年的补充、修订与完善,目前的《文化研究读本》已经成为一部内容丰富、资料翔实的方法论工具书,注重培养跨学科的分析 and 研究视野,理论与实践并重。本教材共分十三章,精选了二十七篇具有代表性的经典论文或专著中的章节。从内容分类上看,本书由理论与方法、批评与实践两部分组成。第一部分(第一至第六章)从文化与社会、意识形态、政治、历史、文学等关系层面讨论文化研究的基本问题与研究方法;第二部分(第七章至第十三章)着重分析各种文化现象,如大众文化、消费与休闲、媒体与传播、科技、后现代文化等,通过实例分析和个案研究探讨文化研究的应用和经验。

本书的编排在注重把文化研究作为一种总体性方法论的同时,还考虑其历史的延续性,文化研究在不同时期、不同地域所具有的特征。尤其是在文本筛选方面注意以下几个特点。首先,文化研究的跨学科属性十分重要。从文化研究的源头看,无论是伯明翰大学当代文化研究中心早期的代表人物,还是后来在文化研究领域独树一帜并有所建树的学者,都分别来自文学、历史学、哲学、语言学、人类学、社会学等多个学科,各自的研究也专属于不同的领域,但研究的成果和关注的问题却打破了传统学科分类的界限,形成一个多学科的研究领域。这一理论和实践上的特征也在文化研究的发展中延续下来,成为文化研究最具标志性、创新性的方面。其次,从内容上看,文化研究具有无所不包的特点。根据雷蒙·威廉斯的定义,文化应包括全部的人类生活方式(whole way of life),囊括物质、知识与精神所构成的整个人类生活方式。因此,文化研究的关注范围、内容和视野都是前所未有的,不仅包括精英文化、主流文化,还关注边缘文化、非正统、非主流、亚文化,不仅包括正统的文化表述形式,还涉及草根的、大众的、新兴媒体和网络的文化以及商业和消费文化,挖掘这些文化实践自身的特点和价值,建立一个包括所有文化的共同领域。再次,无论其所涉足的领域如何,文化研究的共同点着眼于文化和社会的深层次意义的探究,挖掘其意识形态根源、权力运作机制和潜在的权力话语,这是文化研究最具活力、最富于批判性的话语。最后,文化研究强调理论与实践并重、相互结合。文化研究的实践性是其生命力所在,而文化研究的魅力也恰恰来自于当代社会中大量鲜活的、生动的案例。这些案例构成了文化研究的实践场所和话语空间。

《文化研究读本》的第一部分为理论与方法,包括第一章至第六章,主要有文化研究的定义、起源、主要内容、理论定位、方法论特征、意识形态理论渊源、跨学科属性、文化研究与符号学、意识形态理论、马克思主义理论、文化研究的政治性及全球化问题、后殖民语境下的文化研究等论

题。第一章“文化研究的范式”收录了英国文化研究之父、伯明翰大学文化研究中心的奠基人雷蒙·威廉斯的《文化的定义》和斯图亚特·霍尔的《编码与解码》。第二章“文化与意识形态”选取了马克思的《德意志意识形态》和路易斯·阿尔图塞的《意识形态与意识形态国家机器》、安东尼·葛兰西的《知识分子的形成》。第三章“文化与社会”收录法兰克福学派文化研究代表人物阿尔多诺和霍克海默合著的《文化工业》和皮埃尔·布尔迪厄的《资本的形式》。第四章“符号学与文化研究”收录了瑞士语言学家、符号学家索绪尔的《普通语言学教程》和法国文学理论家、符号学家罗兰·巴特的《当代神话》。第五章“文化研究与政治”选取了爱德华·萨义德的《文化与帝国主义》的前沿部分和康奈尔·韦斯特的《差异的新文化政治》。第六章“文化与全球化”选取约翰·汤姆林森的《全球化与文化》和霍米·巴巴的《文化的定位》。

本书的第二部分包括第七章至第十三章，主要为批评与实践，着重收录文化理论在当代社会文化批评实践中的应用实践和案例分析。第七章“文化研究与文学实践”选取特里·伊格尔顿的《什么是文学？》和《英语的兴起》。第八章“艺术与文化”选取本雅明的《机械复制时代的艺术作品》和詹姆斯·克利福德的《艺术与文化的收藏》。第九章“大众文化”选取了阿尔多诺的《论流行音乐》和劳拉·莫尔维的《视觉快感和电影叙事》。第十章“消费社会”选取让·鲍德里亚的《消费社会》和苏特·哈利的《影像文化：广告与大众文化》。第十一章“种族、族裔、亚文化”收录了维尔纳·索罗斯的《族裔论》和迪克·赫迪格的《亚文化的功能》。第十二章“文化与技术”选取托马斯·科恩的《科学革命的结构》和鲍德里亚的《克隆》。第十三章“视觉与数字文化”收录了盖·德波的《景观社会》和鲍德里亚的《拟像与仿真》。


总之，《文化研究读本》注重文化研究本身的多样化特点，在文本选择上考虑理论、方法、流派、分期等多种因素，以便在有限的时间和篇幅内把文化研究的主要内容及其历史演变以较为清晰的形式呈现出来。

本教材的出版得到中国人民大学“统筹支持一流大学和一流学科建设”项目经费的支持，同时，中国人民大学出版社的编辑对书稿做了认真细致的审校，在此一并致谢。

王建平

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CONTENTS



PART I THEORY AND METHOD

| | | |
|--------------------|--|------------|
| Chapter I | Paradigms for Cultural Studies | 3 |
| | Raymond Williams, Culture..... | 3 |
| | Stuart Hall, Encoding/Decoding | 8 |
| Chapter II | Culture and Ideology | 19 |
| | Karl Marx, The German Ideology | 19 |
| | Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses | 25 |
| | Antonio Gramsci, The Formation of the Intellectuals..... | 35 |
| Chapter III | Culture and Society | 41 |
| | Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception | 41 |
| | Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital | 62 |
| Chapter IV | Semiotics and Cultural Studies | 76 |
| | Ferdinand de Saussure, A Course in General Linguistics..... | 76 |
| | Roland Barthes, Myth Today..... | 90 |
| Chapter V | Cultural Studies and Politics | 122 |
| | Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism | 122 |
| | Cornel West, The New Cultural Politics of Difference | 137 |
| Chapter VI | Culture and Globalization | 149 |
| | John Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture..... | 149 |
| | Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture | 155 |



PART II CRITICISM AND PRACTICE



| | | |
|---------------------|--|------------|
| Chapter VII | Culture Studies and Literary Practice | 175 |
| | Terry Eagleton, What Is Literature? | 175 |
| | Terry Eagleton, The Rise of English | 187 |
| Chapter VIII | Art and Culture | 215 |
| | Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction | 215 |
| | James Clifford, On Collecting Art and Culture | 233 |
| Chapter IX | Popular Culture | 253 |
| | Theodor W. Adorno, On Popular Music | 253 |
| | Laura Mulvey, Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema | 262 |
| Chapter X | Consumer Society | 273 |
| | Jean Baudrillard, Consumer Society | 273 |
| | Sut Jhally, Image Based Culture: Advertising and Popular Culture | 295 |
| Chapter XI | Race, Ethnicity, Subculture | 305 |
| | Werner Sollors, Ethnicity | 305 |
| | Dick Hebdige, The Function of Subculture | 321 |
| Chapter XII | Culture and Technology | 331 |
| | Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions | 331 |
| | Jean Baudrillard, Clone Story | 345 |
| Chapter XIII | Visual and Digital Culture | 351 |
| | Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle | 351 |
| | Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations | 363 |

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PART I
THEORY AND METHOD

PART I

THEORY AND METHOD

Chapter I

Paradigms for Cultural Studies

Culture

Raymond Williams

Culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language. This is so partly because of its intricate historical development, in several European languages, but mainly because it has now come to be used for important concepts in several distinct intellectual disciplines and in several distinct and incompatible systems of thought.

The fw is *cultura*, L, from rw *colere*, L. *Colere* had a range of meanings: inhabit, cultivate, protect, honor with worship. Some of these meanings eventually separated, though still with occasional overlapping, in the derived nouns. Thus 'inhabit' developed through *colonus*, L to *colony*. 'Honor with worship' developed through *cultus*, L to *cult*. *Cultura* took on the main meaning of cultivation or tending, including, as in Cicero, *cultura animi*, though with subsidiary medieval meanings of honor and worship (cf. in English culture as 'worship' in Caxton (1483)). The French forms of *cultura* were *couture*, OF, which has since developed its own specialized meaning, and later *culture*, which by eC15 had passed into English. The primary meaning was then in husbandry, the tending of natural growth.

Culture in all its early uses was a noun of process: the tending of something, basically crops or animals. The subsidiary *coulter* – ploughshare, had travelled by a different linguistic route, from *culter*, L – ploughshare, *culter*, OE, to the variant English spellings *culter*, *colter*, *coulter* and as late as eC17 culture (Webster, *Duchess of Malfi*, III, ii: 'hot burning cultures'). This provided



a further basis for the important next stage of meaning, by metaphor. From eC16 the tending of natural growth was extended to process of human development, and this, alongside the original meaning in husbandry, was the main sense until lC18 and eC19. Thus More: 'to the culture and profit of their minds'; Bacon: 'the culture and manurance of minds' (1605); Hobbes: 'a culture of their minds' (1651); Johnson: 'she neglected the culture of her understanding' (1759). At various points in this development two crucial changes occurred: first, a degree of habituation to the metaphor, which made the sense of human tending direct; second, an extension of particular processes to a general process, which the word could abstractly carry. It is of course from the latter development that the independent noun culture began its complicated modern history, but the process of change is so intricate, and the latencies of meaning are at times so close, that it is not possible to give any definite date. Culture as an independent noun, an abstract process or the product of such a process, is not important before lC18 and is not common before mC19. But the early stages of this development were not sudden. There is an interesting use in Milton, in the second (revised) edition of *The Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth* (1660): 'spread much more Knowledge and Civility, yea, Religion, through all parts of the Land, by communicating the natural heat of Government and Culture more distributively to all extreme parts, which now lie num and neglected'. Here the metaphorical sense ('natural heat') still appears to be present, and *civility* (cf. CIVILIZATION) is still written where in C19 we would normally expect culture. Yet we can also read 'government and culture' in a quite modern sense. Milton, from the tenor of his whole argument, is writing about a general social process, and this is a definite stage of development. In C15 England this general process acquired definite class associations though cultivation and cultivated were more commonly used for this. But there is a letter of 1730 (Bishop of Killala, to Mrs Clayton; cit. Plumb, *England in the Eighteenth Century*) which has this clear sense: 'it has not been customary for persons of either birth or culture to breed up their children to the Church'. Akenside (*Pleasures of Imagination*, 1744) wrote: '... nor purple state nor culture can bestow'. Wordsworth wrote 'where grace of culture hath been utterly unknown' (1805), and Jane Austen (*Emma*, 1816) 'every advantage of discipline and culture'.

It is thus clear that culture was developing in English towards some of its modern senses before the decisive effects of a new social and intellectual movement. But to follow the development through this movement, in lC18 and eC19, we have to look also at developments in other languages and especially in German.

In French, until C18, culture was always accompanied by a grammatical form indicating the matter being cultivated, as in the English usage already noted. Its occasional use as an independent noun dates from mC18, rather later than similar occasional uses in English. The independent noun civilization also emerged in mC18; its relationship to culture has since been very complicated (cf. CIVILIZATION and discussion below). There was at this point an important development in German: the word was borrowed from French, spelled first (lC18) *Cultur* and

from C19 *Kultur*. Its main use was still as a synonym for *civilization*: first in the abstract sense of a general process of becoming 'civilized' or 'cultivated'; second, in the sense which had already been established for *civilization* by the historians of the Enlightenment, in the popular C18 form of the universal histories, as a description of the secular process of human development. There was then a decisive change of use in Herder. In his unfinished *Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind* (1784–91) he wrote of *Cultur*: 'nothing is more indeterminate than this word, and nothing more deceptive than its application to all nations and periods'. He attacked the assumption of the universal histories that 'civilization' or 'culture'—the historical self-development of humanity—was what we would now call a unilinear process, leading to the high and dominant point of C18 European culture. Indeed he attacked what he called European subjugation and domination of the four quarters of the globe, and wrote:

Men of all the quarters of the globe, who have perished over the ages, you have not lived solely to manure the earth with your ashes, so that at the end of time your posterity should be made happy by European culture. The very thought of a superior European culture is a blatant insult to the majesty of Nature.

It is then necessary, he argued, in a decisive innovation, to speak of 'cultures' in the plural: the specific and variable cultures of different nations and periods, but also the specific and variable cultures of social and economic groups within a nation. This sense was widely developed, in the Romantic movement, as an alternative to the orthodox and dominant '*civilization*'. It was first used to emphasize national and traditional cultures, including the new concept of folk-culture (cf. FOLK). It was later used to attack what was seen as the MECHANICAL (q.v.) character of the new civilization then emerging: both for its abstract rationalism and for the 'inhumanity' of current Industrial development. It was used to distinguish between 'human' and 'material' development. Politically, as so often in this period, it veered between radicalism and reaction and very often, in the confusion of major social change, fused elements of both. (It should also be noted, though it adds to the real complication, that the same kind of distinction, especially between 'material' and 'spiritual' development, was made by von Humboldt and others, until as late as 1900, with a reversal of the terms, culture being material and *civilization* spiritual. In general, however, the opposite distinction was dominant.)

On the other hand, from the 1840s in Germany, *Kultur* was being used in very much the sense in which *civilization* had been used in C18 universal histories. The decisive innovation is G. F. Klemm's *Allgemeine Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit*—'General Cultural History of Mankind' (1843–52)—which traced human development from savagery through domestication to freedom. Although the American anthropologist Morgan, tracing comparable stages, used 'Ancient *Society*', with a culmination in *Civilization*, Klemm's sense was sustained, and was directly followed in



English by Tylor in *Primitive Culture* (1870). It is along this line of reference that the dominant sense in modern social sciences has to be traced.

The complexity of the modern development of the word, and of its modern usage, can then be appreciated. We can easily distinguish the sense which depends on a literal continuity of physical process as now in 'sugar-beet culture' or, in the specialized physical application in bacteriology since the 1880s, 'germ culture'. But once we go beyond the physical reference, we have to recognize three broad active categories of usage. The sources of two of these we have already discussed: (i) the independent and abstract noun which describes a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development, from C18; (ii) the independent noun, whether used generally or specifically, which indicates a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period, a group, or humanity in general, from Herder and Klemm. But we have also to recognize (iii) the independent and abstract noun which describes the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity. This seems often now the most widespread use: culture is music, literature, painting and sculpture, theater and film. A Ministry of Culture refers to these specific activities, sometimes with the addition of philosophy, scholarship, history. This use, (iii), is in fact relatively late. It is difficult to date precisely because it is in origin an applied form of sense (i): the idea of a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development was applied and effectively transferred to the works and practices which represent and sustain it. But it also developed from the earlier sense of process; cf. 'progressive culture of fine arts', Millar, *Historical View of the English Government*, IV, 314 (1812). In English (i) and (iii) are still close; at times, for internal reasons, they are indistinguishable as in Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy* (1867); while sense (ii) was decisively introduced into English by Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (1870), following Klemm. The decisive development of sense (iii) in English was in 1C19 and eC20.

Faced by this complex and still active history of the word, it is easy to react by selecting one 'true' or 'proper' or 'scientific' sense and dismissing other senses as loose or confused. There is evidence of this reaction even in the excellent study by Kroeber and Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*, where usage in North American anthropology is in effect taken as a norm. It is clear that, within a discipline, conceptual usage has to be clarified. But in general it is the range and overlap of meanings that is significant. The complex of senses indicates a complex argument about the relations between general human development and a particular way of life, and between both and the works and practices of art and intelligence. It is especially interesting that in archaeology and in cultural anthropology the reference to culture or a culture is primarily to *material* production, while in history and *cultural studies* the reference is primarily to *signifying* or *symbolic* systems. This often confuses but even more often conceals the central question of the relations between 'material' and 'symbolic' production, which in some recent argument—cf. my own *Culture*—have always to be related rather than contrasted. Within this complex argument there are fundamentally opposed as well as effectively overlapping



positions; there are also, understandably, many unresolved questions and confused answers. But these arguments and questions cannot be resolved by reducing the complexity of actual usage. This point is relevant also to uses of forms of the word in languages other than English, where there is considerable variation. The anthropological use is common in the German, Scandinavian and Slavonic language groups, but it is distinctly subordinate to the senses of art and learning, or of a general process of human development, in Italian and French. Between languages as within a language, the range and complexity of sense and reference indicate both difference of intellectual position and some blurring or overlapping. These variations, of whatever kind, necessarily involve alternative views of the activities, relationships and processes which this complex word indicates. The complexity, that is to say, is not finally in the word but in the problems which its variations of use significantly indicate.

It is necessary to look also at some associated and derived words. Cultivation and cultivated went through the same metaphorical extension from a physical to a social or educational sense in C17, and were especially significant words in C18. Coleridge, making a classical eC19 distinction between civilization and culture, wrote (1830): 'the permanent distinction, and occasional contrast, between cultivation and civilization'. The noun in this sense has effectively disappeared but the adjective is still quite common, especially in relation to manners and tastes. The important adjective cultural appears to date from the 1870s; it became common by the 1890s. The word is only available, in its modern sense, when the independent noun, in the artistic and intellectual or anthropological senses, has become familiar. Hostility to the word culture in English appears to date from the controversy around Arnold's views. It gathered force in IC19 and eC20, in association with a comparable hostility to *aesthete* and AESTHETIC (q.v.). Its association with class distinction produced the mime-word *culchab*. There was also an area of hostility associated with anti-German feeling, during and after the 1914-18 War, in relation to propaganda about *Kultur*. The central area of hostility has lasted, and one element of it has been emphasized by the recent American phrase culture-vulture. It is significant that virtually all the hostility (with the sole exception of the temporary anti-German association) has been connected with uses involving claims to superior knowledge (cf. the noun INTELLECTUAL), refinement (*culchab*) and distinctions between 'high' art (culture) and popular art and entertainment. It thus records a real social history and a very difficult and confused phase of social and cultural development. It is interesting that the steadily extending social and anthropological use of culture and cultural and such formations as sub-culture (the culture of a distinguishable smaller group) has, except in certain areas (notably popular entertainment), either bypassed or effectively diminished the hostility and its associated unease and embarrassment. The recent use of culturalism, to indicate a methodological contrast with structuralism in social analysis, retains many of the earlier difficulties, and does not always bypass the hostility.

(From Raymond Williams, *Keywords*)

Encoding/Decoding



Stuart Hall

Traditionally, mass-communications research has conceptualized the process of communication in terms of a circulation circuit or loop. This model has been criticized for its linearity—sender/message/receiver—for its concentration on the level of message exchange and for the absence of a structured conception of the different moments as a complex structure of relations. But it is also possible (and useful) to think of this process in terms of a structure produced and sustained through the articulation of linked but distinctive moments—production, circulation, distribution/consumption, reproduction. This would be to think of the process as a ‘complex structure in dominance’, sustained through the articulation of connected practices, each of which, however, retains its distinctiveness and has its own specific modality, its own forms and conditions of existence. This second approach, homologous to that which forms the skeleton of commodity production offered in Marx’s *Grundrisse* and in *Capital*, has the added advantage of bringing out more sharply how a continuous circuit—production-distribution-production—can be sustained through a ‘passage of forms’. It also highlights the specificity of the forms in which the product of the process ‘appears’ in each moment, and thus what distinguishes discursive ‘production’ from other types of production in our society and in modern media systems.

The ‘object’ of these practices is meanings and messages in the form of sign-vehicles of a specific kind organized, like any form of communication or language, through the operation of codes within the syntagmatic chain of a discourse. The apparatuses, relations and practices of production thus issue, at a certain moment (the moment of ‘production/circulation’) in the form of symbolic vehicles constituted within the rules of ‘language’. It is in this discursive form that the circulation of the ‘product’ takes place. The process thus requires, at the production end, its material instruments—its ‘means’—as well as its own sets of social (production) relations—the organization and combination of practices within media apparatuses. But it is in the *discursive* form that the circulation of the product takes place, as well as its distribution to different audiences. Once accomplished, the discourse must then be translated—transformed, again—into social practices if the circuit is to be both completed and effective. If no ‘meaning’ is taken, there can be no ‘consumption’. If the meaning is not articulated in practice, it has no effect. The value of this approach is that while each of the moments, in articulation, is necessary to the circuit as a whole, no one moment can fully guarantee the next moment with which it is articulated. Since each has its specific modality and conditions of existence, each can constitute its own break or interruption of the ‘passage of forms’ on whose continuity the flow of effective production (that is, ‘reproduction’)

depends.

Thus while in no way wanting to limit research to 'following only those leads which emerge from content analysis' (Halloran, 1973), we must recognize that the discursive form of the message has a privileged position in the communicative exchange (from the viewpoint of circulation), and that the moments of 'encoding' and 'decoding', though only 'relatively autonomous' in relation to the communicative process as a whole, are *determinate* moments. A 'raw' historical event cannot, *in that form*, be transmitted by, say, a television newscast. Events can only be signified within the aural-visual forms of the televisual discourse. In the moment when a historical event passes under the sign of discourse, it is subject to all the complex formal 'rules' by which language signifies. To put it paradoxically, the event must become a 'story' before it can become a *communicative event*. In that moment the formal sub-rules of discourse are 'in dominance', without, of course, subordinating out of existence the historical event so signified, the social relations in which the rules are set to work or the social and political consequences of the event having been signified in this way. The 'message form' is the necessary 'form of appearance' of the event in its passage from source to receiver. Thus the transposition into and out of the 'message form' (or the mode of symbolic exchange) is not a random 'moment', which we can take up or ignore at our convenience. The 'message form' is a determinate moment; though, at another level, it comprises the surface movements of the communications system only and requires, at another stage, to be integrated into the social relations of the communication process as a whole, of which it forms only a part.

From this general perspective, we may crudely characterize the television communicative process as follows. The institutional structures of broadcasting, with their practices and networks of production, their organized relations and technical infrastructures, are required to produce a programme. Using the analogy of *Capital*, this is the 'labour process' in the discursive mode. Production, here, constructs the message. In one sense, then, the circuit begins here. Of course, the production process is not without its 'discursive' aspect: it, too, is framed throughout by meanings and ideas: knowledge-in-use concerning the routines of production, historically defined technical skills, professional ideologies, institutional knowledge, definitions and assumptions, assumptions about the audience and so on frame the constitution of the programme through this production structure. Further, though the production structures of television originate the television discourse, they do not constitute a closed system. They draw topics, treatments, agendas, events, personnel, images of the audience, 'definitions of the situation' from other sources and other discursive formations within the wider socio-cultural and political structure of which they are a differentiated part. Philip Elliott has expressed this point succinctly, within a more traditional framework, in his discussion of the way in which the audience is both the 'source' and the 'receiver' of the television message. Thus—to borrow Marx's terms—circulation and reception are, indeed, 'moments' of the production process in television and are reincorporated, via a num-



ber of skewed and structured 'feedbacks', into the production process itself. The consumption or reception of the television message is thus also itself a 'moment' of the production process in its larger sense, though the latter is 'predominant' because it is the 'point of departure for the realization' of the message. Production and reception of the television message are not, therefore, identical, but they are related: they are differentiated moments within the totality formed by the social relations of the communicative process as a whole.

At a certain point, however, the broadcasting structures must yield encoded messages in the form of a meaningful discourse. The institution-societal relations of production must pass under the discursive rules of language for its product to be 'realized'. This initiates a further differentiated moment, in which the formal rules of discourse and language are in dominance. Before this message can have an 'effect' (however defined), satisfy a 'need' or be put to a 'use', it must first be appropriated as a meaningful discourse and be meaningfully decoded. It is this set of decoded meanings which 'have an effect', influence, entertain, instruct or persuade, with very complex perceptual, cognitive, emotional, ideological or behavioural consequences. In a 'determinate' moment the structure employs a code and yields a 'message': at another determinate moment the 'message', via its decodings, issues into the structure of social practices. We are now fully aware that this re-entry into the practices of audience reception and 'use' cannot be understood in simple behavioural terms. The typical processes identified in positivistic research on isolated elements—effects, uses, 'gratifications'—are themselves framed by structures of understanding, as well as being produced by social and economic relations, which shape their 'realization' at the reception end of the chain and which permit the meanings signified in the discourse to be transposed into practice or consciousness (to acquire social use value or political effectivity).

Clearly, what we have labelled in the diagram 'meaning structures 1' and 'meaning structures 2' may not be the same. They do not constitute an 'immediate identity'. The codes of encoding and decoding may not be perfectly symmetrical. The degrees of symmetry—that is, the degrees of 'understanding' and 'misunderstanding' in the communicative exchange—depend on the degrees of symmetry/asymmetry (relations of equivalence) established between the positions of the 'personifications', encoder-producer and decoder-receiver.

But this in turn depends on the degrees of identity/non-identity between the codes which perfectly or imperfectly transmit, interrupt or systematically distort what has been transmitted. The lack of fit between the codes has a great deal to do with the structural differences of relation and position between broadcasters and audiences, but it also has something to do with the asymmetry between the codes of 'source' and 'receiver' at the moment of transformation into and out of the discursive form. What are called 'distortions' or 'misunderstandings' arise precisely from the *lack of equivalence* between the two sides in the communicative exchange. Once again, this defines the 'relative autonomy', but 'determinateness', of the entry and exit of the message in its discursive moments.