

WESTERN CIVILIZATION

ATTARAH F. M. S. 1377

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AND

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ABRAHAM H. MASLOW

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PREFACE

I have tried in this revision to incorporate the main lessons of the last sixteen years. These lessons have been considerable. I consider it a real and extensive revision—even though I had to do only a moderate amount of rewriting—because the main thrust of the book has been modified in important ways which I shall detail below.

When this book appeared in 1954 it was essentially an effort to build upon the classical psychologies available rather than to repudiate them or to establish another rival psychology. It attempted to enlarge our conception of the human personality by reaching into the “higher” levels of human nature. (The title I had first planned to use for the book was *Higher Ceilings for Human Nature*.) If I had had to condense the thesis of this book into a single sentence, I would have said that, in addition to what the psychologies of the time had to say about human nature, man also had a higher nature and that this was instinctoid, i.e., part of his essence. And if I could have had a second sentence, I would have stressed the profoundly holistic nature of human nature in contradiction to the analytic-dissecting-atomistic-Newtonian approach of the behaviorisms and of Freudian psychoanalysis.

Or to say it another way, I certainly accepted and built upon the available *data* of experimental psychology and psychoanalysis. I accepted also the empirical and experimental spirit of the one, and the unmasking and depth-probing of the other, while yet rejecting the *images* of man

which they generated. That is, this book represented a different philosophy of human nature, a new image of man.

However, what I took then to be an argument within the family of psychologists has in my opinion turned out since then to be rather a local manifestation of a new *Zeitgeist*, a new general comprehensive philosophy of life. This new "humanistic" *Weltanschauung* seems to be a new and far more hopeful and encouraging way of conceiving any and every area of human knowledge: e.g., economics, sociology, biology, and every profession: e.g., law, politics, medicine, and all of the social institutions: e.g., the family, education, religion, etc. I have acted upon this personal conviction in revising this book, writing into the psychology presented herein, the belief that it is an aspect of a much broader world view and of a comprehensive life-philosophy, which is already partly worked out, at least to the point of plausibility, and must, therefore, be taken seriously.

I must say a word about the irritating fact that this veritable revolution (a new image of man, of society, of nature, of science, of ultimate values, of philosophy, etc., etc.) is still almost completely overlooked by much of the intellectual community, especially that portion of it that controls the channels of communication to the educated public and to youth. (For this reason I have taken to calling it the Unnoticed Revolution.)

Many members of this community propound an outlook characterized by a profound despair and cynicism which sometimes degenerates into corrosive malice and cruelty. In effect they deny the possibility of improving human nature and society, or of discovering intrinsic human values, or of being life-loving in general.

Doubting the realness of honesty, of kindness, of generosity, of affection, they go beyond a reasonable skepticism or a withholding of judgment into an active hostility when confronted by people whom they sneer at as fools, "Boy Scouts," squares, innocents, do-gooders, or Pollyannas. This active debunking, hating and rending goes beyond contempt; it sometimes looks like an outraged counterattack against what they consider to be an insulting effort to fool them, to take them in, to pull their legs. The psychoanalyst would, I think, see in it a dynamics of rage and revenge for past disappointments and disillusionments.

This subculture of despair, this "more corrosive than thou" attitude, this counter-morality in which predation and hopelessness are real and good will is not, is flatly contradicted by the humanistic psychologies, and by the kind of preliminary data presented in this book and in many of the writings listed in the Bibliography. While it is still necessary to be very cautious about affirming the preconditions for "goodness" in human

nature (see Chapters 7, 9, 11, 16), it is already possible to reject firmly the despairing belief that human nature is ultimately and basically depraved and evil. Such a belief is no longer a matter of taste merely. It can now be maintained only by a determined blindness and ignorance, by a refusal to consider the facts. It must therefore be considered to be a personal projection rather than a reasoned philosophical or scientific position.

The humanistic and holistic conceptions of science presented in the first two chapters and in Appendix B have been powerfully corroborated by many developments of the past decade, but especially by Michael Polanyi's great book *Personal Knowledge* (376). My own book, *The Psychology of Science* (292), carries forward very similar theses. These books are in blunt contradiction to the classical, conventional philosophy of science still too widely prevalent, and they offer a far better substitute for scientific work with persons.

The book is holistic throughout, but a more intensive and perhaps more difficult treatment is contained in Appendix B. Holism is obviously true—after all, the cosmos is one and interrelated; any society is one and interrelated; any person is one and interrelated, etc.—and yet the holistic outlook has a hard time being implemented and being used as it should be, as a way of looking at the world. Recently I have become more and more inclined to think that the atomistic way of thinking is a form of mild psychopathology, or is at least one aspect of the syndrome of cognitive immaturity. The holistic way of thinking and seeing seems to come quite naturally and automatically to healthier, self-actualizing people, and seems to be extraordinarily difficult for less evolved, less mature, less healthy people. To date this is only an impression, of course, and I do not want to push it too hard. Yet I feel justified in presenting it here as a hypothesis to be checked, something which should be relatively easy to do.

The motivation theory presented in Chapters 3 through 7, and to some extent throughout the book, has had an interesting history. First presented in 1942 to a psychoanalytic society, it was an effort to integrate into a single theoretical structure the partial truths I saw in Freud, Adler, Jung, D. M. Levy, Fromm, Horney, and Goldstein. I had learned from my own scattered experiences in therapy that each of these writers was correct at various times and for various persons. My question was essentially the clinical one: which earlier deprivations produce neurosis? Which psychological medicines cure neurosis? Which prophylaxis prevents neurosis? In which order are the psychological medicines demanded? Which are most powerful? Which most basic?

It is fair to say that this theory has been quite successful in a clinical, social and personological way, but not in a laboratory and experimental way. It has fitted very well with the personal experience of most people, and has often given them a structured theory that has helped them to make better sense of their inner lives. It seems for most people to have a direct, personal, subjective plausibility. And yet it still lacks experimental verification and support. I have not yet been able to think of a good way to put it to the test in the laboratory.

Part of the answer to this puzzle came from Douglas McGregor (332), who applied this theory of motivation to the industrial situation. Not only did he find it useful in ordering his data and his observations, but also these data served retroactively as a source of validation and verification for the theory. It is from *this* area, rather than from the laboratory, that empirical support is now coming. (The Bibliography contains a sampling of such reports.)

The lesson I had learned from this and from subsequent validation from other areas of life was this: when we talk about the needs of human beings, we talk about the essence of their lives. How *could* I have thought that this essence could be put to the test in some animal laboratory or some test tube situation? Obviously it needs a life situation of the total human being in his social environment. This is where confirmation or disconfirmation will come from.

Chapter 4 betrays its clinical-therapeutic origins by its stress on neurosis producers rather than on motivations which do not make trouble for the psychotherapist, e.g., inertia and laziness, sensory pleasures, and the need for sensory stimulations and for activity, the sheer zest for life, or the lack of it, the proneness to hope or to hopelessness, the tendency to regress more or less easily under fear, anxiety, scarcity, etc., not to mention the highest human values which are also motivators: beauty, truth, excellence, completion, justice, order, consistency, harmony, etc.

These necessary complements to Chapters 3 and 4 are discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of my *Toward a Psychology of Being* (295), in the chapter on Lower Grumbles, Higher Grumbles and Metagrumbles in my *Eupsychian Management* (291), and in *A Theory of Metamotivation: the Biological Rooting of the Value-Life* (314).

Human life will never be understood unless its highest aspirations are taken into account. Growth, self-actualization, the striving toward health, the quest for identity and autonomy, the yearning for excellence (and other ways of phrasing the striving "upward") must by now be

accepted beyond question as a widespread and perhaps universal human tendency.

And yet there are also other regressive, fearful, self-diminishing tendencies as well, and it is very easy to forget them in our intoxication with "personal growth," especially for inexperienced youngsters. I consider that a necessary prophylactic against such illusions is a thorough knowledge of psychopathology and of depth psychology. We must appreciate that many people choose the worse rather than the better, that growth is often a painful process and may for this reason be shunned, that we are afraid of our own best possibilities in addition to loving them (314) and that we are all of us profoundly ambivalent about truth, beauty, virtue, loving them and fearing them too (295). Freud is still required reading for the humanistic psychologist (his facts, not his metaphysics). I should like also to recommend an extraordinarily sensitive book by Hoggart (196) which will certainly help us to understand compassionately the pull toward the vulgar, the trivial, the cheap and the fake in the less educated people he writes about.

Chapter 4, and Chapter 6 on "The Instinctoid Nature of Basic Needs," constitute for me the foundation of a system of intrinsic human values, human goods that validate themselves, that are intrinsically good and desirable and that need no further justification. This is a hierarchy of values which are to be found in the very essence of human nature itself. These are not only wanted and desired by all human beings, but also needed in the sense that they are necessary to avoid illness and psychopathology. To say the same thing in another vocabulary, these basic needs and the metaneeds (314) are also the intrinsic reinforcers, the unconditioned stimuli which can be used as a basis upon which can be erected all sorts of instrumental learnings and conditionings. That is to say that in order to get these intrinsic goods, animals and men are willing to learn practically anything that will achieve for them these ultimate goods.

I want to be sure to mention here, even though I do not have the space for expanding upon the idea, that it is legitimate and fruitful to regard instinctoid basic needs and the metaneeds as *rights* as well as needs. This follows immediately upon granting that human beings have a right to be human in the same sense that cats have a right to be cats. In order to be fully human, these need and metaneed gratifications are necessary, and may therefore be considered to be natural rights.

The hierarchy of needs and metaneeds has been helpful to me in another way. I find that it serves as a kind of snorgasbord table from which peo-

ple can choose in accordance with their own tastes and appetites. That is to say, that in any judging of the motivations for a person's behavior, the character of the judge also has to be taken into account. He *chooses* the motivations to which he will attribute the behavior, for instance, in accord with his generalized optimism or pessimism. I find the latter choice to be made far more frequently today, so frequently that I find it useful to name the phenomenon "downlevelling of the motivations." Briefly put, this is the tendency to prefer, for explanatory purposes, the lower needs to the middle needs, and the middle needs to the higher. A purely materialistic motivation is preferred to a social or metamotivated one, or to a mixture of all three. It is a kind of paranoid-like suspicion, a form of devaluation of human nature, which I see often but which, to my knowledge, has not been sufficiently described. I think that any complete theory of motivation must include this additional variable.

And of course I am sure that the historian of ideas would find it very easy to find many examples, in different cultures and in different times, of either a general trend to downlevelling or uplevelling of human motivations. At the moment of writing, the trend in our culture is very clearly toward widespread downlevelling. The lower needs are being heavily overused for explanatory purposes and the higher and metaneeds are being badly underused. In my opinion this tendency rests far more on preconception than an empirical fact. I find the higher needs and metaneeds to be far more determinative than my subjects themselves suspect, and certainly far, far more than contemporary intellectuals dare admit. Obviously, this is an empirical and scientific question, and just as obviously it is far too important a matter to be left to cliques and in-groups.

I had added to Chapter 5 on gratification theory a section on the pathology of gratification. Certainly this is something that we were not prepared for fifteen or twenty years ago, that pathological consequences might ensue after having attained what one had been *trying* to attain, and which was supposed to bring happiness. We have learned with Oscar Wilde to beware of what we wish—for the tragedy may come about that our wishes may be granted. This seems to be possible at *any* of the motivational levels, whether the material, or the interpersonal, or the transcendent.

We can learn from this unexpected finding that the gratification of the basic needs does not in itself automatically bring about a system of values in which to believe and to which one may commit himself. Rather, we have learned that one of the possible consequences of basic need

gratifications may be boredom, aimlessness, anomie and the like. Apparently we function best when we are striving for something that we lack, when we wish for something that we do not have, and when we organize our powers in the service of striving toward the gratification of that wish. The state of gratification turns out to be not necessarily a state of guaranteed happiness or contentment. It is a moot state, one that raises problems as well as solving problems.

This discovery implies that for many people the *only* definition of the meaningful life that they can think of is "to be lacking something essential and to be striving for it." But we know that self-actualizing people, even though all their basic needs have already been gratified, find life to be even *more* richly meaningful because they can live, so to speak, in the realm of Being (295). The ordinary, widespread philosophy of a meaningful life is, therefore, a mistaken one, or at least an immature one.

Just as important for me has been the growing realization of what I have been calling Grumble Theory (291). In brief, what I have observed is that need gratifications lead to only temporary happiness which in turn tends to be succeeded by another and (hopefully) higher discontent. It looks as if the human hope for eternal happiness can never be fulfilled. Certainly happiness does come and is obtainable and is real. But it looks as if we must accept its intrinsic transience, especially if we focus on its more intense forms. Peak experiences do not last, and *cannot* last. Intense happiness is episodic, not continuous.

But this amounts to a revision of the theory of happiness that has ruled us for three thousand years and that has determined our concepts of heaven, of the Garden of Eden, of the good life, the good society, the good person. Our love stories have traditionally ended "And they lived happily ever after." And so also have our theories of social improvement and social revolution. So also, for instance, have we been over-sold—and consequently disillusioned—by the very real though limited improvements in our society. We were over-sold on the benefits of labor unionism, of women's suffrage, of the direct election of Senators, of the graded income tax, and of many other improvements that we have built into, e.g., the amendments to the Constitution. Each one of them was supposed to bring a millenium, eternal happiness, the final solution of all problems. The result has tended to be disillusionment after the fact. But disillusionment means that there had been illusions. And this seems to be the clear point to make, that we may reasonably expect improvements

to take place. But we can no longer reasonably expect perfection to come to pass, or permanent happiness to be achieved.

I must call attention also to what has been overlooked almost universally even though now it seems very obvious, namely that the blessings we have already achieved come to be taken for granted, to be forgotten, to drop out of consciousness, and finally, even, not to be valued any more—at least until they are taken away from us (see also 483). For instance, it is characteristic of the American culture as I write this preface in January, 1970, that the undoubted advancements and improvements that have been struggled for and achieved through 150 years are being flicked aside by many thoughtless and shallow people as being all a fake, as being of no value whatsoever, as being unworthy of fighting for or protecting, or valuing, just because the society is not yet perfect.

The present struggle for women's "liberation" will serve as a single example (I could have chosen dozens of others) to illustrate this complex but important point, and to show how many people tend to think in a dichotomous and splitting way rather than in a hierarchical and integrative way. In general it may be said that today, in our culture, the young girl's dream, a dream beyond which she cannot see, is most often of a man who falls in love with her, who gives her a home, and who gives her a baby. In her fantasies she then lives happily ever after. But the fact of the matter is that no matter how much one longs for a home or for a baby, or for a lover, that sooner or later one can become satiated with these blessings, will take them for granted, and will start to feel restless and discontented as if something were lacking, as if something more had to be attained. The frequent mistake then is to turn upon the home and the baby and the husband as something of a fake, or perhaps even a trap or an enslavement, and then to long for the higher needs and higher gratifications in an either/or way, e.g., for professional work, for freedom to travel, for personal autonomy, and the like. The main point of Grumble Theory, and of Hierarchical-Integrative Theory of Needs, is that it is immature and unwise to think of these as mutually exclusive alternatives. It is best to think of the discontented woman as profoundly wishing to hang on to everything that she has and then—like the labor unionists—asking for *more!* That is to say that she generally would like to keep all her blessings and have additional ones as well. But even here it is as if we have not yet learned this eternal lesson, that whatever she yearns for, a career or whatever, when it is achieved the whole process will repeat itself. After the period of happiness, excitement, and fulfill-

ment comes the inevitable taking it all for granted, and becoming restless and discontented again for *More!*

I offer for thought the real possibility that if we become fully aware of these human traits, if we can give up the dream of permanent and uninterrupted happiness, if we can accept the fact that we will be only transiently ecstatic and then inevitably discontented and grumbling for more, that then we may be able to teach the general population what self-actualizing people do automatically, i.e., to be able to count their blessings, to be grateful for them, and to avoid the traps of making either/or choices. It is possible for a woman to have all the specifically female fulfillments (being loved, having the home, having the baby) and *then*, without giving up any of the satisfactions already achieved, go on beyond femaleness to the full humanness that she shares with males. For example, the full development of her intelligence, of any talents that she may have, of her own particular idiosyncratic genius, of her own individual fulfillment.

The main thrust of Chapter 6, "The Instinctoid Nature of Basic Needs," has shifted considerably. The great advances of the last decade or so in the science of genetics has forced us to assign somewhat more determining power to the genes than we did fifteen years ago. Most important of these discoveries for the psychologists has been, I think, the various things that can happen to the X and Y chromosomes: doubling, tripling, loss, etc.

Chapter 9, "Is Destructiveness Instinctoid?," has also been considerably changed by these new discoveries.

Perhaps these developments in genetics may help to make my position more clear and communicable than it apparently has been. Currently, debate on the role of heredity and environment is almost as simplistic as it has been for the last fifty years. It still alternates between a simplistic theory of instincts on the one hand, total instincts of the sorts found in animals, and on the other hand, a complete rejection of the whole instinctual point of view in favor of a total environmentalism. Both positions are easily refuted, and in my opinion are so untenable as to be called stupid. In contrast with these two polarized positions the theory set forth in Chapter 6 and throughout the remainder of the book gives a third position, namely that there are *very weak* instinct-remnants left in the human species, nothing that could be called full instincts in the animal sense. These instinct-remnants and instinctoid tendencies are so weak that culture and learning easily overwhelm them and must

be considered to be far more powerful. In fact, the techniques of psychoanalysis and other uncovering therapies, let alone the "quest for identity," may all be conceived as the very difficult and delicate task of discovering through the overlay of learning, habit, and culture, what our instinct-remnants and instinctoid tendencies, our weakly indicated essential nature may be. In a word, man has a biological essence, but this is very weakly and subtly determined, and needs special hunting techniques to discover it; we must discover, individually and subjectively, our animality, our specieshood.

What this amounts to is the conclusion that human nature is extremely malleable in the sense that it is easy for culture and environment to kill off altogether or to diminish genetic potential, although it cannot create or even increase this potential. So far as society is concerned, this seems to me to be an extremely strong argument in favor of absolute equality of opportunity for every baby born into the world. It is also an especially powerful argument in favor of the good society, since human potentials are so easily lost or destroyed by the bad environment. This is quite apart from the contention already put forward that the sheer fact of membership in the human species constitutes *ipso facto* a right to become fully human, i.e., to actualize all the human potentials possible. *Being* a human being—in the sense of being born to the human species—must be defined also in terms of *becoming* a human being. In this sense a baby is only potentially a human being, and must grow into humanness in the society and the culture, the family.

Ultimately this point of view will force us to take far more seriously than we do the fact of individual differences, as well as species membership. We will have to learn to think of them in this new way as being, 1) very plastic, superficial, easily changed, easily stamped out, but producing thereby all sorts of subtle pathologies. This leads to the delicate task, 2) of trying to uncover the temperament, the constitution, the hidden *bent* of each individual so that he can grow unhampered in his own individual style. This attitude will require far greater attention than has been given by the psychologists to the subtle psychological and physiological costs and sufferings of denying one's true bent, sufferings that are not necessarily conscious or easily seen from the outside. This, in turn, means much more careful attention to the operational meaning of "good growth" at every age level.

Finally, I must point out that we shall have to prepare ourselves in principle for the shaking consequences of giving up the alibi of social injustice. The more we continue to reduce social injustice, the more we shall find this replaced by "biological injustice," by the fact that babies

are born into the world with different genetic potentials. If we get to the point of giving full opportunity to every baby's good potentials, then this means accepting poor potentials as well. Whom shall we blame when a baby is born with a bad heart, or weak kidneys, or with neurological defects? If only nature is there to blame, what will this mean for the self-esteem of the individual "unfairly" treated by nature itself?

In this chapter, and also in other papers, I have introduced the concept of "subjective biology." I have found this to be a very helpful tool in bridging the gap between the subjective and the objective, the phenomenological and the behavioral. I hope this discovery, that one can and must study one's own biology introspectively and subjectively, will be of help to others, especially to biologists.

Chapter 9 on Destructiveness has been extensively reworked. I have subsumed it under the more inclusive category of the psychology of evil, hoping to demonstrate by this careful treatment of one aspect of evil, that the whole problem is empirically and scientifically workable. Bringing it under the jurisdiction of empirical science means for me that we can confidently look forward to steadily increased understanding which always has meant being able to do something about it.

Aggression, we have learned, is both genetically and culturally determined. Also I consider extremely important the distinction between healthy and unhealthy aggression.

Just as aggression cannot be blamed entirely on *either* society or inner human nature, so also is it already clear that evil in general is neither a social product alone or a psychological product alone. This may sound too obvious to be mentioned, but there are today many people who not only believe in these untenable theories but who act upon them as well.

I have introduced in Chapter 10, "The Expressive Component of Behavior," the concept of Apollonian controls, i.e., desirable controls which do not endanger gratification but rather enhance it. I consider this concept to be profoundly important both for pure psychological theory and for applied psychology. It has enabled me to differentiate between (sick) impulsivity and (healthy) spontaneity, a distinction very badly needed today, especially by young people, and by many others who tend to think of *any* controls as necessarily repressive and evil. I hope this insight will be as helpful to others as it has been to me.

I have not taken the time to bring this conceptual tool to bear upon the old problems of freedom, ethics, politics, happiness, and the like, but

I think its relevance and power will be obvious to any serious thinker in these fields. The psychoanalyst will notice that this solution overlaps to some extent with Freud's integration of pleasure principle and reality principle. To think through the similarities and differences will, I think, be a profitable exercise for the theorist of psychodynamics.

In Chapter 11 on self-actualization I have removed one source of confusion by confining the concept very definitely to older people. By the criteria I used, self-actualization does not occur in young people. In our culture at least, youngsters have not yet achieved identity, or autonomy, nor have they had time enough to experience an enduring, loyal, post-romantic love relationship, nor have they generally found their calling, the altar upon which to offer themselves. Nor have they worked out their *own* system of values; nor have they had experience enough (responsibility for others, tragedy, failure, achievement, success) to shed perfectionistic illusions and become realistic; nor have they generally made their peace with death; nor have they learned how to be patient; nor have they learned enough about evil in themselves and others to be compassionate; nor have they had time to become post-ambivalent about parents and elders, power and authority; nor have they generally become knowledgeable and educated enough to open the possibility of becoming wise; nor have they generally acquired enough courage to be unpopular, to be unashamed about being openly virtuous, etc.

In any case, it is better psychological strategy to separate the concept of mature, fully-human, self-actualizing people in whom the human potentialities have been realized and actualized from the concept of health at *any* age level. This translates itself, I have found, into "good-growth-toward-self-actualization," a quite meaningful and researchable concept. I have done enough exploration with college age youngsters to have satisfied myself that it *is* possible to differentiate "healthy" from "unhealthy." It is my impression that healthy young men and women tend to be still growing, likeable, and even lovable, free of malice, secretly kind and altruistic (but very shy about it), privately affectionate of those of their elders who deserve it. Young people are unsure of themselves, not yet formed, uneasy because of their minority position with their peers (their private opinions and tastes are more square, straight, metamotivated, i.e., virtuous, than average). They are secretly uneasy about the cruelty, meanness, and mob spirit so often found in young people, etc.

Of course I do not know that this syndrome inevitably grows into

the self-actualization I have described for older people. Only longitudinal studies can determine this.

I have described my self-actualizing subjects as transcending nationalism. I could have added that they also transcend class and caste. This is true in my experience even though I would expect a priori that affluence and social dignity are apt to make self-actualization more probable.

Another question which I did not anticipate in my first report has been this: Are these people capable of living only with "good" people and in a good world only? My retrospective impression, which of course remains to be checked, is that self-actualizing people are essentially *flexible*, and can adapt themselves realistically to any people, any environment. I think they are ready to handle good people *as* good people, while also being able to handle bad people *as* bad people.

Another addition to the description of self-actualizing people emerged from my study of "grumbles" (291) and the widespread tendency to undervalue one's already achieved need-gratifications, or even to devalue them and throw them away. Self-actualizing persons are relatively exempted from this profound source of human unhappiness. In a word, they are capable of "gratitude." The blessedness of their blessings remains conscious. Miracles remain miracles even though occurring again and again. The awareness of undeserved good luck, of gratuitous grace, guarantees for them that life remains precious and never grows stale.

My study of self-actualizing persons has worked out very well—to my great relief, I must confess. It was, after all, a great gamble, doggedly pursuing an intuitive conviction and, in the process, defying some of the basic canons of scientific method and of philosophical criticism. These were, after all, rules which I myself had believed and accepted, and I was very much aware that I was skating on thin ice. Accordingly, my explorations proceeded against a background of anxiety, conflict, and self-doubt.

Enough verifications and supports have accumulated in the last few decades (see Bibliography) so that this kind of basic alarm is no longer necessary. And yet I am very much aware that these basic methodological and theoretical problems still confront us. The work that *has* been done is a bare beginning. We are now ready for far more objective, consensual and impersonal team methods of selecting self-actualizing (healthy, fully-human, autonomous) individuals for study. Cross-cultural work is clearly indicated. Follow-ups, from the cradle to the grave, will furnish the only truly satisfactory validation, at least in my opinion. Sampling the total population is clearly necessary in addition to selecting, as I did, the