



SELECTED WORKS  
OF  
MAO TSE-TUNG

Volume I

SELECTED WORKS  
OF  
MAO TSE-TUNG

Volume I

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS  
PEKING 1967

毛泽东选集

第一卷

\*

外文出版社出版（北京）

一九六五年八月第一版

编号：（英）1050—289

\*

一九六七年三月重印

书号 1017·42

定价 0.90 元



毛泽东



SELECTED WORKS  
OF  
MAO TSE-TUNG

Volume I

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS  
PEKING 1967

First Edition 1965

Second Printing 1967

The present volume is an English translation of the second Chinese edition of the first volume of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, published by the People's Publishing House, Peking, in April 1960.

## PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* includes important articles he wrote in the different periods of the Chinese revolution. A number of Chinese editions of his works have appeared in various places, but none of them had been gone over by the author; their arrangement was haphazard, there were errors in the text, and certain important writings were omitted. The contents of the present edition are arranged in chronological order and according to the main periods in the history of the Communist Party of China since its foundation in 1921. The present edition includes a number of important writings not included in the earlier editions. The author has read all the articles, made certain verbal changes and, in isolated cases, revised the text.

The following points need to be made clear in connection with the publication:

1. The present selection remains incomplete. As revolutionary records were destroyed by the Kuomintang reactionaries or dispersed and lost over the long years of war, we cannot collect all the writings of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, and particularly his numerous letters and telegrams which form a considerable part of his writings.

2. Some articles which have been widely circulated (*e.g.*, *Rural Surveys*) were omitted in compliance with the author's wishes, and for the same reason only Chapter 1 of *Economic and Financial Problems* ("A Basic Summing-Up of Our Past Work") was included.

3. Explanatory notes are added to this selection. Some explaining the titles are placed at the bottom of the first page of each article, while the rest, political or otherwise, come at the end of each article.

4. The present Chinese edition is available in a single volume or in a set of four volumes. The first volume of the set covers the periods of the First Revolutionary Civil War (1924-27) and of the



Second Revolutionary Civil War (1927-37); the second and third volumes cover the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45); and the fourth volume covers that of the Third Revolutionary Civil War (1945-49).

Committee for the Publication of the  
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,  
Central Committee of the Communist  
Party of China

August 25, 1951

## CONTENTS

### THE FIRST REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR PERIOD

ANALYSIS OF THE CLASSES IN CHINESE SOCIETY	13
REPORT ON AN INVESTIGATION OF THE PEASANT MOVEMENT IN HUNAN	23
The Importance of the Peasant Problem	23
Get Organized!	24
Down with the Local Tyrants and Evil Gentry! All Power to the Peasant Associations!	25
"It's Terrible!" or "It's Fine!"	26
The Question of "Going Too Far"	27
The "Movement of the Riffraff"	29
Vanguards of the Revolution	30
Fourteen Great Achievements	34
1. Organizing the Peasants into Peasant Associations	34
2. Hitting the Landlords Politically	35
3. Hitting the Landlords Economically	39
4. Overthrowing the Feudal Rule of the Local Tyrants and Evil Gentry — Smashing the <i>Tu</i> and <i>Tuan</i>	40
5. Overthrowing the Armed Forces of the Landlords and Establishing Those of the Peasants	41
6. Overthrowing the Political Power of the County Magistrate and His Bailiffs	42
7. Overthrowing the Clan Authority of the Ancestral Temples and Clan Elders, the Religious Authority of Town and Village Gods, and the Masculine Authority of Husbands	44
8. Spreading Political Propaganda	47
9. Peasant Bans and Prohibitions	49
10. Eliminating Banditry	52
11. Abolishing Exorbitant Levies	53
12. The Movement for Education	53
13. The Co-operative Movement	54
14. Building Roads and Repairing Embankments	55

*THE SECOND REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR PERIOD*

WHY IS IT THAT RED POLITICAL POWER CAN EXIST IN CHINA?	63
I. The Internal Political Situation	63
II. Reasons for the Emergence and Survival of Red Political Power in China	64
III. The Independent Regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area and the August Defeat	67
IV. The Role of the Independent Regime of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi	68
V. Economic Problems	69
VI. The Problem of Military Bases	70
THE STRUGGLE IN THE CHINGKANG MOUNTAINS	73
The Independent Regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area and the August Defeat	73
The Current Situation in the Area Under the Independent Regime	79
Military Questions	80
Land Questions	87
Questions of Political Power	90
Questions of Party Organization	92
The Question of the Character of the Revolution	97
The Question of the Location of Our Independent Regime	99
ON CORRECTING MISTAKEN IDEAS IN THE PARTY	105
On the Purely Military Viewpoint	105
On Ultra-Democracy	108
On the Disregard of Organizational Discipline	109
On Absolute Equalitarianism	110
On Subjectivism	111
On Individualism	112
On the Ideology of Roving Rebel Bands	114
On the Remnants of Putschism	114
A SINGLE SPARK CAN START A PRAIRIE FIRE	117
PAY ATTENTION TO ECONOMIC WORK	129
HOW TO DIFFERENTIATE THE CLASSES IN THE RURAL AREAS	137

OUR ECONOMIC POLICY	141
BE CONCERNED WITH THE WELL-BEING OF THE MASSES, PAY ATTENTION TO METHODS OF WORK	147
ON TACTICS AGAINST JAPANESE IMPERIALISM	153
The Characteristics of the Present Political Situation	153
The National United Front	162
The People's Republic	165
International Support	170
PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR	179
<i>Chapter I</i>	
How to Study War	179
1. The Laws of War Are Developmental	179
2. The Aim of War Is to Eliminate War	182
3. Strategy Is the Study of the Laws of a War Situation as a Whole	183
4. The Important Thing Is to Be Good at Learning	186
<i>Chapter II</i>	
The Chinese Communist Party and China's Revolutionary War	191
<i>Chapter III</i>	
Characteristics of China's Revolutionary War	194
1. The Importance of the Subject	194
2. What Are the Characteristics of China's Revolutionary War?	196
3. Our Strategy and Tactics Ensuing from These Characteristics	199
<i>Chapter IV</i>	
"Encirclement and Suppression" and Counter-Campaigns Against It—the Main Pattern of China's Civil War	200
<i>Chapter V</i>	
The Strategic Defensive	205
1. Active and Passive Defence	205
2. Preparations for Combating "Encirclement and Suppression" Campaigns	208
3. Strategic Retreat	211
4. Strategic Counter-Offensive	223
5. Starting the Counter-Offensive	225
6. Concentration of Troops	233
7. Mobile Warfare	239
8. War of Quick Decision	244
9. War of Annihilation	248
A STATEMENT ON CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S STATEMENT	255

THE TASKS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE PERIOD OF RESISTANCE TO JAPAN	263
The Present Stage of Development of China's External and Internal Contradictions	263
The Struggle for Democracy and Freedom	267
Our Responsibility to Lead	273
WIN THE MASSES IN THEIR MILLIONS FOR THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT	285
The Question of Peace	285
The Question of Democracy	288
The Question of the Future of the Revolution	290
The Question of Cadres	291
The Question of Democracy Within the Party	292
Unity in the Conference and in the Whole Party	292
Win the Masses in Their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front	292
ON PRACTICE	295
ON CONTRADICTION	311
I. The Two World Outlooks	311
II. The Universality of Contradiction	315
III. The Particularity of Contradiction	319
IV. The Principal Contradiction and the Principal Aspect of a Contradiction	331
V. The Identity and Struggle of the Aspects of a Contradiction	337
VI. The Place of Antagonism in Contradiction	343
VII. Conclusion	345

**THE FIRST  
REVOLUTIONARY CIVIL WAR  
PERIOD**



## ANALYSIS OF THE CLASSES IN CHINESE SOCIETY

March 1926

Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution. The basic reason why all previous revolutionary struggles in China achieved so little was their failure to unite with real friends in order to attack real enemies. A revolutionary party is the guide of the masses, and no revolution ever succeeds when the revolutionary party leads them astray. To ensure that we will definitely achieve success in our revolution and will not lead the masses astray, we must pay attention to uniting with our real friends in order to attack our real enemies. To distinguish real friends from real enemies, we must make a general analysis of the economic status of the various classes in Chinese society and of their respective attitudes towards the revolution.

What is the condition of each of the classes in Chinese society?

*The landlord class and the comprador class.*<sup>1</sup> In economically backward and semi-colonial China the landlord class and the comprador class are wholly appendages of the international bourgeoisie, depending upon imperialism for their survival and growth. These classes represent the most backward and most reactionary relations of production in China and hinder the development of her productive forces. Their existence is utterly incompatible with the aims of the Chinese revolution. The big landlord and big comprador classes in particular always side with imperialism and constitute an extreme counter-

---

This article was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to combat two deviations then to be found in the Party. The exponents of the first deviation, represented by Chen Tu-hsiu, were concerned only with co-operation with the Kuomintang and forgot about the peasants; this was Right opportunism. The exponents of the second deviation, represented by Chang Kuo-tao, were concerned only with the labour movement, and likewise forgot about the peasants; this was "Left" opportunism. Both were aware that their own strength was inadequate, but



revolutionary group. Their political representatives are the *Étatisistes*<sup>2</sup> and the right-wing of the Kuomintang.

*The middle bourgeoisie.* This class represents the capitalist relations of production in China in town and country. The middle bourgeoisie, by which is meant chiefly the national bourgeoisie,<sup>3</sup> is inconsistent in its attitude towards the Chinese revolution: they feel the need for revolution and favour the revolutionary movement against imperialism and the warlords when they are smarting under the blows of foreign capital and the oppression of the warlords, but they become suspicious of the revolution when they sense that, with the militant participation of the proletariat at home and the active support of the international proletariat abroad, the revolution is threatening the hope of their class to attain the status of a big bourgeoisie. Politically, they stand for the establishment of a state under the rule of a single class, the national bourgeoisie. A self-styled true disciple of Tai Chi-tao<sup>4</sup> wrote in the *Chen Pao*,<sup>5</sup> Peking, "Raise your left fist to knock down the imperialists and your right to knock down the Communists." These words depict the dilemma and anxiety of this class. It is against interpreting the Kuomintang's Principle of the People's Livelihood according to the theory of class struggle, and it opposes the Kuomintang's alliance with Russia and the admission of Communists<sup>6</sup> and left-wingers. But its attempt to establish a state under the rule of the national bourgeoisie is quite impracticable, because the present world situation is such that the two major forces, revolution and counter-revolution, are locked in final struggle. Each has hoisted a huge banner: one is the red banner of revolution held aloft by the Third International as the rallying point for all the oppressed classes of the world, the other is the white banner of counter-revolution held aloft by the League of Nations as the rallying point for all the counter-revolutionaries of the world. The intermediate classes are bound to disintegrate quickly, some sections turning left to join the revolution, others turning right to join the counter-revolution; there is no room for them to remain "independent". Therefore

---

neither of them knew where to seek reinforcements or where to obtain allies on a mass scale. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the peasantry was the staunchest and numerically the largest ally of the Chinese proletariat, and thus solved the problem of who was the chief ally in the Chinese revolution. Moreover, he saw that the national bourgeoisie was a vacillating class and predicted that it would disintegrate during the upsurge of the revolution, with its right-wing going over to the side of imperialism. This was borne out by the events of 1927.